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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis examines the potential impacts of the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) between the EU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It 
provides a quantitative assessment of the prospective implications for welfare, output 
and trade structures, resource allocation, prices and fiscal revenue. 
The thesis undertakes country- and sector-specific analyses using the multi-region, 
multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) GLOBE model. The model is 
calibrated to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Database- version 7 for 2004.  
Different scenarios are implemented in order to simulate the alternative EU-SADC 
EPA scenarios in addition to their WTO-compatible alternatives. 
The thesis aims to contribute novel insights to the ongoing debate on the EU-SADC 
EPAs. It provides detailed country- and sector-specific impact projections within an 
internally consistent modelling framework. Furthermore, it contemplates the other 
WTO-compatible arrangements for SADC-EU trade in the case of not signing final 
EPAs. 
The simulation results inform answers for several research questions, as follows. Who 
gains and who loses from the EU-SADC EPAs? Do the agreements help SADC to 
effectively integrate into the world economy? What type of structural change might 
SADC experience under the EU-SADC EPA scenarios? How significant are potential 
adjustment costs for the SADC members likely to be? Are the WTO-compatible 
alternatives preferable for SADC members compared to the EU-SADC EPAs scenario? 
iv 
 
 
 
The simulation results suggest that a comprehensive EPA scenario is welfare-
improving for many SADC members. The agreements, however, do not serve as a 
stumbling block towards more integration for SADC members into the world markets. 
Overall, SADC production structures become more concentrated in export-oriented 
sectors. These structural changes are accompanied by a high degree of adjustment in 
factor markets and substantial fiscal losses. A comprehensive EPA scenario is the best 
option vis-à-vis the WTO-compatible alternatives for SADC non-LDCs, whereas the 
results for SADC LDCs are mixed. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research Background 
In June 2000, representatives of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and 
the European Union (EU) met in the economic capital of Benin (Cotonou). The two 
negotiating sides agreed on the most comprehensive partnership agreement between 
the EU and developing countries – the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA).1 In 
2003, the Cotonou Agreement effectively replaced the Lomé Convention that has 
governed EU-ACP trade since 1977.2  
The Cotonou Agreement was implemented through a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) waiver. According to this waiver, the EU was allowed to provide non-
reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP states until December 2007. The pre-2008 
Cotonou trade preferences are not WTO-compatible for two reasons. Firstly, the EU 
does not provide equivalent preferences to all non-ACP countries at the same level of 
development. This violates the WTO-principle under the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
clause.3 Secondly, these non-reciprocal preferences are not granted to all developing 
countries and, hence, cannot be covered by the ‘Enabling Clause’.4 Therefore, the 
Cotonou Agreement (Article 37.1) has to declare that the non-reciprocal preferences 
will be replaced by reciprocal trade commitments in compliance with Article XXIV of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).5 
                                                          
1 For the full documentation of the Cotonou Agreement, see European Commission (2000). 
2 Lomé is the capital of Togo. Four Lomé Conventions were signed by the EU and the ACP states: Lomé I 
was signed in 1975 and came into force in 1976, Lomé II was signed in 1979 and covered the period 
(1981-1985), Lomé III was signed in 1985 and Lomé IV was signed in December 1989 and covered a 
ten-year period (1990-2000).   
3 According to the MFN principle, WTO members cannot discriminate between their trading partners. 
That is to say, countries that are accorded MFN treatment should not be treated less advantageously 
than other WTO members.    
4 The ‘Enabling Clause’, which was announced in 1979, allows for providing non-reciprocal preferences 
to products originated in developing countries, albeit without discriminating between groups of 
developing countries. 
5 The GATT 1994 is legally distinct from the GATT 1947. According to Annex 1A of the GATT 1994, the 
original agreement dealing with trade in goods (i.e. the GATT 1947) is incorporated into the GATT 
1994. See World Trade Organization (1994, p. 23). 
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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of the oldest regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) in Africa. The SADC region is a mixture of diverse economies 
encompassing fifteen members. The Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) was originally launched in 1980 by nine countries: Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. In the 1990s, the membership of SADC increased to fourteen members: 
Namibia (1990), South Africa (1994), Mauritius (1995), Congo, D.R. and Seychelles 
(1997). The Seychelles ceased its membership in 2004 and then was readmitted in 
2008. Madagascar was granted full membership in 2005, but its membership is 
currently suspended from all community institutions and organs until the country 
returns to constitutional order.6 
According to the constitutional framework described above, the SADC trade relations 
with the EU have been based on the non-reciprocal Cotonou preferences. Alongside 
the Cotonou Agreement, the EU launched its negotiations on Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with SADC in 2002. The EU-SADC EPAs vision goes beyond 
securing reciprocal market access and aims at establishing inclusive frameworks with 
a wide set of trade and development components.  
At the end of 2007, when the WTO waiver for the Cotonou preferences expired, the EU 
has initialled region-to-region interim EPAs (hereinafter referred to as IEPAs) with 
eleven out of the fifteen SADC members. Both signatory sides agreed on resuming 
negotiations over final EPAs. Nevertheless, the evolution of the negotiation process 
casts a cloud over the possibility of concluding final EPAs between the EU and SADC.  
                                                          
6 In 2009, Madagascar experienced political instability when the former mayor Andry Rajoelina led a 
coup d’état and seized power with backing by the army. This has been met by strong international 
condemnation. The African Union (AU) suspended Madagascar's membership. At its Extraordinary 
Summit in March 2009, the SADC Heads of State and Government decided not to recognize Mr. 
Rajoelina declaring that “… his appointment did not only violate the Constitution of Madagascar and 
democratic principles, but also violated the core principles and values of the SADC Treaty, the African 
Union Constitutive Act and the United Nations Charter” (Southern African Development Community 
2010a). The EU has considered suspending Madagascar access to the EU markets granted under the 
Cotonou Agreement. In May 2010, the EU council decided to apply ‘appropriate’ measures for a year 
while resuming the negotiations with Madagascar (Council of the European Union 2010). The United 
States cuts off non-humanitarian aid and suspended Madagascar’s membership from the African 
Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) in December 2009.   
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In the case of not reaching final EPAs with the EU, SADC-EU trade has to be organized 
by WTO-compatible alternative frameworks. The SADC least developed countries 
(LDCs) could maintain their duty-free, quota-free access to the EU markets under the 
‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative. The SADC non-LDCs will switch to the EU-
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). South Africa has already a FTA with the EU 
called Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA). 
 
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions  
Given this background, the thesis aims to provide an in-depth quantitative assessment 
of the prospective implications of the EU-SADC EPAs for welfare, trade and structural 
change. Furthermore, the thesis examines the possible ways for different SADC 
members to liberalize their trade with the EU in the case of not agreeing on final EPAs. 
It evaluates the EU-SADC EPAs by means of a comparison with the relevant WTO-
compatible alternative options. The thesis undertakes detailed country- and sector-
specific impact projections for individual SADC members. 
The study aims at tackling an interrelated set of research questions. Who gains and 
who loses from the EU-SADC EPAs? What are the determinants for the potential 
outcomes of the EU-SADC EPAs? Will liberalizing intra-SADC trade affect the potential 
impacts and, if so, in what direction? Do the EU-SADC EPAs help SADC to effectively 
integrate into the world economy? Do the EU-SADC EPAs offer export opportunities 
for SADC products in the EU markets? How do the EU-SADC EPAs affect SADC trade 
with third parties and with other SADC partners? What type of structural change 
might SADC experience under the EU-SADC EPA scenarios? How significant are 
potential adjustment costs for the SADC members likely to be? Do the EU-SADC EPAs 
help SADC members to diversify their export structures? Furthermore, as different 
SADC members face different alternative options to a completion of the EU-SADC 
EPAs, the thesis addresses the important question whether, for any of the SADC 
members, a complete breakdown of the EPA negotiations is actually a preferable 
option. 
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1.3 Methodological Approach and Simulation Design   
Evidently, answering these research questions requires contemplating individual 
SADC members, the EU, as well as SADC’s main non-EU trade partners within an 
internally consistent modelling framework. Therefore, the thesis uses a comparative 
static multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The 
model captures not only first order effects but also feedback effects generated by the 
simulated trade shocks. The model is calibrated to the most recent version of the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database; i.e. GTAP version 7, which is 
referenced to 2004.7  
The core quantitative assessment is conducted in two simulation phases. The first 
simulation phase quantifies the potential impacts of the envisaged EPA liberalization 
scenarios in comparison to the 2004 benchmark equilibrium. This phase addresses 
the interesting question how the EPAs compare to the status quo ante prior to the 
expiry of the WTO waiver for the Cotonou preferences. This is more than a purely 
academic question, given that some critics of the EU EPA process have, indeed, 
proposed that the EU should have applied for an extension for the WTO waiver.8 The 
second simulation phase, in turn, takes into account that a return to the status quo 
ante is actually not a politically feasible fall-back option at this stage and compares the 
EU-SADC EPAs with the WTO-compatible alternative options that reflect other 
possible ways for individual SADC members to liberalize their trade with the EU in the 
case of not reaching agreement on final EU-SADC EPAs. 
 
 
                                                          
7 The GTAP8 database, which is referenced to both 2004 and 2007, has been recently released in March 
2012. GTAP is coordinated by the Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of Agricultural 
Economics at Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA. See the Center for Global Trade Analysis, 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/. 
8 Indeed, the Ministerial Monitoring Committee (MMC) for West Africa’s EPA negotiations has 
requested the European Commission (EC) to extend the WTO waiver “in order to pursue the 
negotiations in a non-pressured atmosphere and to achieve a mutually advantageous agreement”, 
(Olympio, Sacko and Fifatin 2008, p. 12). 
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1.4 Examined Impacts and Targeted Variables 
The thesis examines the implications of the EU-SADC EPAs for welfare, output and 
trade structures, resource allocation, prices and fiscal revenue.  
Within the general equilibrium framework of this study, the overall economy-wide 
and sectoral impacts are examined. The generated results are examined at both 
aggregate and sectoral levels for individual SADC members. Welfare impacts are 
examined at the aggregate levels and, thereby, winners and losers are identified. 
Terms of trade impacts are analyzed in order to gain better understanding of the 
likely welfare impacts. 
Interpreting the changes in bilateral trade balances, captured by the model, requires 
more detailed analyses of the underlying changes in price as well as industrial and 
trade structures at the sectoral level. The study, consequently, undertakes a close 
investigation of trade impacts on SADC members, covering total trade, trade with the 
EU, intra-SADC trade and trade with third parties. 
The analysis proceeds by measuring fiscal losses SADC members will have to endure 
by liberalizing trade with the EU. Furthermore, the study provides indications of the 
potential costs each economy would have to bear during its adjustment process to a 
policy shock.  
Rigorous diagnostic analyses are undertaken for the experienced trade effects in 
order to quantify trade diversion and trade creation effects. Obviously, this requires 
more detailed sectoral analyses of price and structural change in the industrial and 
trade structures in each SADC economy. In addition, hypothetical scenarios are 
implemented in order to trace the potential changes in trade prices and levels if all 
SADC trade partners were treated equally.     
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CGE models are often described as ‘black boxes’ referring to the complex transmission 
channels through which the model findings are delivered. The simultaneous 
interdependence among the endogenous variables makes it difficult, sometimes even 
for the modellers themselves, to diagnose the causality links and to identify the main 
determinants of the model findings. Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001, p. 40) argue 
that 
“Unearthing the features of CGE models that drive …. [the gains from 
preferential liberalization] is often a time-consuming exercise. This is 
because their sheer size, facilitated by recent advances in computer 
technology, makes it difficult to pinpoint the precise source of a particular 
result. They often remain a black box. Indeed, frequently, authors are 
themselves unable to explain their results intuitively and, when pressed, 
resort to uninformative answers such as “trade creation dominates trade 
diversion” or vice versa”. 
By acknowledging this difficulty, the thesis aims to contribute better understanding of 
the generated results from multi-region, multi-sector CGE models. The main 
simulation scenarios are decomposed into two components according to the source of 
the simulated tariff cuts; the SADC and the European side. This helps to gain clear 
insights of the results and their determinants. The generated welfare impacts are 
decomposed according to the component of the simulated trade shock that derives the 
impact. Furthermore, detailed country- and sector-specific analyses are used to open 
up these boxes in such a way that allows for tracing the transmission channel of the 
impacts. The simulation results are interpreted on the basis of previously 
implemented descriptive analyses of SADC production structures and trade 
relationships at the baseline equilibrium. Accordingly, rigorous insights on the causes 
of the simulation results are provided.  
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1.5 Research Relevance, Importance and Contributions 
The thesis aims to contribute novel insights to the ongoing debate on the EU-SADC 
EPAs. The impact of the EPAs on SADC members has been the subject of contentious 
debate in the relevant literature as well as at the negotiating table. This stems from, at 
least, three grounds: theoretical debate, complexities in the regional architecture of 
SADC as well as rigidities and distortions embodied in SADC production and trade 
structures.    
The envisaged EU-SADC EPAs adopt a set of various objectives. The salient ones are 
promoting development, reinforcing regional integration and helping SADC members 
to effectively integrate into the world economy. The relevant theoretical framework 
shows long debate of whether regional integration is a pro-development strategy. 
Furthermore, no clear-cut linkage from preferential liberalization and multilateral 
liberalization is provided.    
The debate becomes more complicated as regards SADC integration with the EU. The 
SADC region is a classic example for a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of overlapping trade 
arrangements in which trade is eligible for ‘crisscrossing’ trade preferences. 
Therefore, two questions need to be addressed. Firstly, to what extent does SADC 
efficiently utilize these preferential arrangements? Secondly, is the underlying 
approach of the envisaged EPAs effective in helping SADC to rationalize this 
multiplicity and eventually integrate into the world economy? 
SADC production structures are, to a great extent, homogenous. This is reflected in 
their undiversified exports and, consequent, weak trade complementarity within the 
region. In addition, SADC trade balances are skewed towards the EU. These structural 
features make the task of reciprocal trade liberalization with the EU particularly 
challenging for individual SADC members.  
This ongoing debate emphasizes the importance of this study. The thesis findings 
serve to illustrate the prospective impacts in individual SADC member states. They 
thus enable SADC members to identify the scenarios that maximize gains from the 
EPAs. Besides, the thesis provides a comparative analytical framework for the 
situation under different WTO-compatible alternatives to the EPAs. From SADC’s 
perspective, the research provides cost-benefit analysis of alternative EPA scenarios. 
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Given the premised goal to promote development in SADC members, the results are 
also useful for the EU in conducting an impact assessment of the envisaged EPAs. 
This study provides novel, detailed country- and sector-specific analyses of the 
prospective effects of the EU-SADC EPAs on individual SADC members. Furthermore, 
it contemplates other alternatives to the EU-SADC EPAs as well as the major likely 
changes in the relevant multilateral trade agreement. To the best of my knowledge, 
there is no work yet that examines the effects of the EU-SADC EPAs on the individual 
SADC countries at this level of sectoral detail using the most recent version of the 
GTAP database. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
In addition to this introductory chapter, the thesis is organized into six core chapters 
followed by a concluding chapter.  
Chapter 2 aims at contextualizing the EU-SADC EPAs. It describes the institutional 
background of the envisaged agreements and portrays the alternative frameworks for 
liberalizing SADC-EU trade. It presents the EPAs objectives, negotiation configurations 
and evolutions; and provides detailed analyses of the agreed liberalization 
programmes between the EU and all SADC members. Furthermore, it reviews the 
WTO-compatible alternative frameworks for SADC trade with the EU (the EU-GSP, the 
EU-EBA and the EU-South Africa TDCA) and describes more broadly the EU sugar 
trade liberalization and reforms. 
Regional integration is a central aspect of both international trade theory and applied 
trade policy analysis. The impacts of discriminatory trade liberalization depend 
mainly on the pre-liberalization economic features and trade relationships among 
member countries as well as their trade linkages with the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, the institutional features of the regional group itself are main 
determinants for the integration outcomes.  
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Chapter 3 places the thesis in its appropriate position within the relevant literature. It 
provides a critical review for both theoretical and empirical studies. It discusses the 
theoretical foundations and the analytical issues that surround the exercise of 
analysing the impacts of RTAs. Furthermore, it reviews a list of selected studies that 
examine the impacts of the EU-SADC EPAs. The studies included in the review are 
chosen to represent different methodological frameworks: partial equilibrium 
analysis, general equilibrium analysis and complementary approaches. The review 
thus serves to shed light on various perspectives and differentiated conclusions for 
the thesis research topic. 
For a given economy, the structural features, trade relationships as well as the initial 
protection conditions are among major determinants of its response to the changes in 
trade policy. Therefore, a close inspection of these features for the economies under 
consideration provides preliminary suggestions on the potential welfare and trade 
effects of the simulated changes in trade policy. Furthermore, they are essential in 
identifying the main transmission channels and, thus, in understanding the dominant 
causal mechanisms that drive the results of the quantitative simulation analysis.  
Chapter 4 examines the main features of the SADC economies. After introducing the 
GTAP database, it analyzes the structural characteristics and initial conditions for 
SADC economies as captured by the baseline equilibrium, which serves as the starting 
point for the simulation analysis in subsequent chapters. The chapter provides 
detailed examinations for the nature of SADC trade and protection profiles at three 
levels: within the region, with the EU and with other major trade partners. These 
analyses give preliminary initial indications of potential impacts induced by the 
envisaged EPAs with the EU. 
Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the employed CGE model. It describes the 
behavioural specification for the different agents in the model and presents the 
different closure rules that are adopted under the simulation scenarios provided in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Furthermore, macroeconomic indicators employed by the study in 
order to measure welfare, terms of trade as well as the adjustment degree in factor 
markets are explained. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the rationale 
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behind choosing this model as an analytical framework for the study and the 
limitations of the analysis.  
Chapter 6 quantifies the potential effects of the alternative EU-SADC EPA scenarios on 
individual SADC members. It assesses the implications for welfare, output and trade 
structures, resource allocation, prices and fiscal revenue. The chapter carries out a 
series of three simulation sets; each set consists of two liberalization scenarios. The 
first scenario simulates the case in which the EPA negotiations are confined to the 
SADC-EPA group only whereas the second main simulation scenario considers all 
SADC members in a comprehensive EPA scenario. The second simulation set 
represents the case in which SADC liberalizes its trade with the EU according to the 
previous two scenarios and simultaneously completes its intra-regional trade 
liberalization. The last simulation set assumes that tariff revenue losses generated by 
each of the two main scenarios are offset through a rise in domestic sales tax rates. In 
addition, the chapter runs a series of sensitivity analyses in order to test the 
robustness of the model results with respect to variations in the model settings and 
the liberalization degree and coverage. 
While the preceding chapter examines the impacts of alternative EU-SADC EPA 
scenarios, Chapter 7 deals with the alternative scenarios to the EU-SADC EPAs. It aims 
to examine the possible ways for different SADC members to liberalize their trade 
with the EU in the case of not agreeing on final EPAs. It employs three alternative 
simulation scenarios. The first one simulates the EU-EBA (for SADC LDCs), the EU-GSP 
(for SADC non-LDCs) and the EU-South Africa TDCA (for South Africa). In addition to 
these alternative trade arrangements, the EU sugar reforms and the Doha Round are 
simulated to examine their implications for the assessment of the EU-SADC EPAs.   
Finally, Chapter 8 revisits the research questions posed above and provides answers. 
It compiles the generated simulation results under different scenarios and gives 
inferences that serve to answer the underlying research questions. Furthermore, it 
reflects on some policy implications and acknowledges the limitations of the analyses. 
Based on these reflections, the chapter concludes with suggestions for areas for future 
research. 
11 
 
 
 
The quantitative results generated by the thesis are presented in a consistent 
framework that facilitates comparison between the simulated scenarios and the 
baseline scenario on one hand and comparison across scenarios on the other. To 
facilitate the exposition, results at the aggregate level are included in the main text 
while further disaggregated results are relegated to separate appendices to Chapters 
4, 6 and 7 at the end of the thesis. Tables provided in the appendices are tagged by the 
letter ‘A’.  
 
  
2 The EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
EU-SADC trade has been governed by the Cotonou Agreement. The Cotonou 
Agreement was implemented through a WTO waiver that allowed the EU to provide 
non-reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP states until December 2007. Alongside 
the Cotonou Agreement, the EU launched negotiations with SADC on EPAs in 2002. 
These envisaged EPAs are not the only WTO-compatible framework. If final EPAs with 
the EU are not concluded, the SADC LDCs could maintain their duty-free, quota-free 
access to the EU markets under the EBA initiative. The SADC non-LDCs would face the 
EU-GSP tariffs which entail a reduction in their preferential access to the EU markets 
granted under the Cotonou Agreement. South Africa already has a FTA with the EU, i.e. 
the EU-South Africa TDCA.  
This chapter aims at contextualizing the EU-SADC EPAs. It describes the institutional 
background to the envisaged EPAs and outlines the alternative frameworks for 
liberalizing SADC-EU trade.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the EPAs objectives, 
negotiation configurations and evolution over time. It also presents the nature and 
extent of the overlap between SADC and other regional groupings and examines the 
implication of SADC multiple memberships for intra-SADC integration and for the EU-
SADC EPAs. Section 2.3 provides detailed analyses of the agreed liberalization 
programmes between the EU and all SADC members. It also summarizes the 
development components of the agreements as well as the challenges surrounding the 
negotiation process for the EPAs. Section 2.4 reviews the WTO-compatible alternative 
frameworks for SADC trade with the EU. It starts with the preferential trade 
arrangements available for SADC members: the EU-GSP, the EU-EBA and the EU-South 
Africa TDCA. Then, it describes more broadly the EU sugar trade liberalization and 
reforms. Finally, Section 2.5 provides some policy implications.     
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2.2 The EU-SADC EPAs 
The EU has been granting non-reciprocal preferences to the ACP states under the 
Cotonou Agreement since 2000. According to the WTO Cotonou waiver, the EU was 
allowed to provide non-reciprocal preferences until December 2007, and thereafter 
non-reciprocal preferences should be replaced by reciprocal trade commitments in 
compliance with Article XXIV of the GATT. The Cotonou non-reciprocal preferences 
are not directed to all developing countries and they therefore cannot be covered by 
the ‘Enabling Clause’ and have to be operated under the WTO waiver.           
Consequently, the EU launched negotiations with the ACP states in 2002 on EPAs that 
were supposed to be completed by the end of 2007. The negotiations are organized 
into two phases. The first phase operates at an all-ACP level whereas the second 
phase, which started in 2004, targets different regional groups. The Cotonou 
Agreement (Article 37.5) states that the EPA negotiations should be undertaken with 
the ACP countries “… at the level they consider appropriate and in accordance with 
the procedures agreed by the ACP Group, taking into account regional integration 
process within the ACP”, (European Commission 2000). Accordingly, geographic 
configurations were originally identified to organize seventy seven ACP states into six 
negotiating groups: West Africa-EPA, Central Africa-EPA, Eastern and Southern Africa 
(ESA)-EPA, SADC-EPA, Caribbean-EPA, and Pacific-EPA groups. In September 2007, 
the East African Community (EAC)-EPA was formed as an additional negotiating 
group. Table 2-1 lists the member countries for each of these groups.  
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Table 2-1: ACP-EPA Negotiating Groups 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
EPA Group Member States Regional Group 
West Africa-
EPA Group 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
UEMOA & 
ECOWAS 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone  
WAMZ & ECOWAS 
Cape Verde ECOWAS 
Mauritania  
Central Africa-
EPA Group 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
São Tomé and Principe 
CEMAC & ECCAS 
Congo, D.R. (2005) 
CEMAC, ECCAS & 
SADC 
ESA-EPA 
Group 
Congo, D.R. (2004) 
CEMAC, SADC & 
COMESA 
Kenya (2004), Uganda (2004) 
IGAD, EAC & 
COMESA 
Djibouti, Ethiopia,  Eritrea, Sudan  IGAD & COMESA 
Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
SADC & COMESA 
Burundi (2004), Rwanda (2004) ECCAS & COMESA 
Comoros COMESA  
SADC-EPA 
Group 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South 
Africa  
SACU & SADC 
Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania (2004) SADC 
EAC-EPA 
Group (2007) 
Tanzania (2007) EAC & SADC 
Burundi (2007), Kenya (2007), Rwanda (2007), 
Uganda (2007) 
EAC 
Caribbean-
EPA Group 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and  
the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
CARICOM 
Pacific-EPA 
Group 
Cook Islands, The Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
Pacific Island 
Forum 
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2.2.1 Objectives and Instruments   
The Cotonou Agreement (Article 1) states that “The partnership shall be centred on 
the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the 
objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP 
countries into the world economy”, (European Commission 2000). Therefore, the 
vision for the envisaged EU-ACP EPAs goes beyond securing reciprocal market access 
and aims at establishing inclusive frameworks with a wide set of trade and 
development components. The EU-SADC EPAs are supposed to help SADC members to 
reduce poverty, maintain sustainable development and to effectively integrate into the 
world economy. Based on this vision, provisions for trade in goods and services, 
competition and investment policies, and other pro-development measures are 
planned to be included in the full EU-ACP EPAs, (European Commission 2007a).  
Despite these declared objectives, there is no clear consensus about the appropriate 
instruments that should be implemented by the EU-SADC EPAs in order to accomplish 
these objectives. In practice, the EPA negotiations reveal a great deal of dispute among 
the SADC representatives, on one hand, and between them and their European 
counterparts on the other. These disputes stem, inter alia, from different perspectives 
regarding the agreements’ objectives, provisions and the embodied development 
components. Indeed, “… different readings of the ‘development component’ of EPAs 
are symptomatic of an increasing division between the EU and the ACP as a result of 
the EPA negotiating process”, (Meyn 2008, p. 516).  
A clear-cut example is how the objective of ‘integration into the world economy’ and 
the role of regional integration are perceived within the EU-SADC EPAs context. As 
aforementioned, enabling SADC countries to effectively integrate into the world 
economy is a main objective of the EU-EPAs. Furthermore, the Cotonou Agreement 
(Article 35.2) recognizes enhancing regional integration as “… a key instrument for 
the integration of ACP countries into the world economy”, (European Commission 
2000). Nevertheless, the two negotiating parties adopt different approaches in 
achieving this goal. 
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Based on its own integration experience, the EU presumes that SADC countries will be 
able to integrate effectively into the world economy by opening up their markets with 
the EU. This liberalization policy per se is expected to lead to more diversified 
production structures, create a reliable economic climate and attract foreign 
investment, with these changes eventually enabling SADC to integrate into the world 
economy. On the other side of the negotiating table, SADC negotiators have different 
views of effective integration into the world economy. SADC members aim to attract 
foreign investment and resources required for enhancing their integration into the 
world economy. Their perspective is that foreign investment should directly target 
manufacturing activities, particularly export-oriented manufacturing. In a study that 
examines the role of FTAs in stimulating foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
promoting integration into the world economy, Robles Jr (2008, p. 188) argues that 
the EU-SADC and Mercosur EPAs “… will not necessarily encourage EU FDI into these 
two regions and might not even increase the resources available to members of these 
two organisations for supporting local firms”.1 
 
2.2.2 Negotiation Configurations 
According to the EPA negotiation configurations, SADC members were originally 
allocated into two negotiating groups (i.e. SADC-EPA and ESA-EPA). D.R. Congo joined 
the Central Africa-EPA group in 2005 and, then, the EAC-EPA group was formed in 
September 2007. The point to highlight here is that these geographical configurations 
cut across different regional trade groups in the SADC region. Figure 2-1 depicts the 
overlapping RTAs for SADC members as of 2004.  
Overlapping membership for SADC members has important implications for the 
progress of SADC negotiation with the EU and for the SADC regional integration 
process. Furthermore, the EU-ACP EPAs aim at enhancing existing regional 
integration. The integration approach of the EU-SADC EPAs provides opportunities 
and incentives for SADC members to resolve this overlapping complexity. It is, thus, 
                                                          
1 There is a voluminous strand of literature that examines whether enhancing regional integration 
eventually enables country members to effectively integrate into the world economy. This literature is 
presented in detail in Chapter 3. 
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pertinent to examine the interaction between SADC multiple memberships and the 
EU-SADC EPAs.  
This sub-section starts by describing the different regional groups with which SADC 
overlaps (Sub-section 2.2.2.1) before moving to analyzing the implications for SADC 
integration (Sub-section 2.2.2.2). Sub-section 2.2.2.3 examines how this overlapping 
membership affects the EPA negotiations. It aims at answering the question how 
different SADC-EPA configurations can be reconciled in a way that does not violate 
various regional commitments and facilitates the progress of the negotiations. The 
analysis is confined to the most important three regional organizations with which 
SADC overlaps: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU-CU), EAC-CU and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA-CU).  
   
Figure 2-1: Overlapping Membership in Africa, 2004 
    
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007), p. 99. 
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2.2.2.1 Overlapping Trade Agreements 
All SADC members, except Mozambique, participate in more than one regional 
integration grouping and are engaged in a number of other bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. Five SADC members form the SACU-CU, Tanzania is a member of the EAC-
CU and eight SADC states are members of the COMESA-CU. D.R. Congo is a member of 
the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).2 
Furthermore, SADC members are involved in several regional initiatives, which do not 
officially form regional organizations, and other bilateral trade agreements. Nine 
members (i.e. Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are involved in the Cross Border Initiative (CBI) 
that aims at promoting trade and investment. Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles 
are involved in the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).3 D.R. Congo is a member of the 
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC). In addition, SACU 
members have a FTA with Malawi and three of them (Botswana, Namibia and South 
Africa) have a FTA with Zimbabwe.  
 
2.2.2.1.1 SADC-FTA 
The SADC Protocol on Trade was established in 2000 when the majority of SADC 
members approved the free trade accord.4 In March 2004, SADC announced an 
ambitious integration plan that includes establishing SADC-CU by 2010,5 launching a 
common market by 2012 and, eventually, establishing a central bank and issuing 
                                                          
2 CEMAC, which is an abbreviation of its French name Communauté Économique et Monétaire de 
l'Afrique Centrale, was established in 1994 and entered into force in 1999. CEMAC members along with 
Angola are also members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which is 
known in French as Communauté Économique des États d'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC). ECCAS has 
broader objectives that include peace promotion and political cooperation. In 2007, Rwanda 
terminated its membership of ECCAS and withdrew its application to join SADC in order to join EAC. 
3 IOC is known in French by the Commission de l'Océan Indien. It is an inter-governmental organization 
that encompasses Comoros beside France as a representative for Réunion Islands. ECGLC is known in 
French as Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (CEPGL). 
4 For the full documentation of the SADC Protocol on Trade, see Southern African Development 
Community (2010b). 
5 Arndt et al. (2007) examine different modalities for the planned SADC-CU. The study finds that intra-
SADC trade liberalization has potential gains for SADC economies, among which is improving their 
international competitiveness. The study, however, highlights the importance of complementary 
policies that improve infrastructure and rationalize transaction costs within the region. It concludes 
that creating a SADC-CU will significantly enhance trade facilitation in the region. 
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SADC common currency by 2016.6 Twelve members established the SADC-FTA in 
August 2008. Angola and D.R. Congo expressed their intention to join in the near 
future. Seychelles, which rejoined the community later in 2008, is considering the 
FTA-formalities.  
According to the SADC Protocol on Trade, tariffs on 85 percent of intra-SADC trade 
lines were to be phased out beginning in 2001 and entirely removed by the end of 
2007. Asymmetric liberalization schedules were implemented by SADC members, and 
members were classified ad hoc according to levels of development into three groups. 
The ‘Front Loading Group’ includes SACU members, i.e. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
South Africa and Swaziland. This group immediately applied trade liberalization, 
beginning in 2001. The ‘Mid Loading Group’ that comprises the two developing non-
SACU SADC members (i.e. Mauritius and Zimbabwe) started removing tariffs in 2004. 
Finally, the ‘Back Loading Group’ includes SADC LDCs (i.e. Angola, D.R. Congo, Malawi, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) and this group did not begin 
liberalizing intra-SADC trade until 2006. 
The remaining tariff lines, which include textiles, clothing and motor vehicles, are 
planned to be phased out by 2012. As a special non-reciprocal arrangement, non-
SACU SADC sugar exports are granted duty-free access to the SACU markets, with full 
reciprocal liberalization planned for 2012, taking into consideration the status of the 
world sugar markets.7 Furthermore, all members are supposed to entirely eliminate 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and not to impose any new ones, with the exception of 
NTBs for health and safety purposes.  
As noted above, the tariff elimination provisions have been implemented under a 
gradual annual schedule since 2001. Nevertheless, many empirical studies (e.g. 
Niekerk and Moreira 2002) argue that intra-SADC trade liberalization process fell 
behind its planned schedule. Indeed, a Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of the 
SADC Protocol on Trade shows that Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Tanzania 
                                                          
6 According to the African Economic Outlook (OECD et al. 2011, p. 58), SADC-CU is expected to take 
place in 2011. 
7 This arrangement is governed by the SADC Sugar Cooperation Agreement launched under the Annex 
VII of the SADC Protocol on Trade. For further information, see Southern African Development 
Community (2010b).   
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are behind their planned liberalization schedules.8 Back-loading of liberalization 
arrangements entails that these members will have to liberalize more than half of 
their tariff lines in only one year, the procedure that will yield sharp fiscal losses. 
Moreover, the removal of NTBs has proved to be challenging for SADC, the region that 
contains many landlocked countries whose trade has to cross several borders. Using 
gravity model estimations, Behar, Manners and Nelson (2009) find a positive 
significant impact of improving neighbours’ logistics (e.g. efficiency of the clearance 
process, shipment facilities and transport and information technology infrastructure) 
on exports. This finding is particularly relevant for the landlocked SADC states. 
Simplifying and harmonizing trade regulations among SADC members would enhance 
the efficiency of the clearance and shipment process for trade that crosses several 
borders and would, thereby, stimulate SADC trade. Interestingly, Behar and Edwards 
(2011) suggest that NTBs, when controlled to income levels and geography, are not 
particularly restrictive to intra-SADC trade in comparison to countries at similar 
development stage. The study presents variations in the extent and type of NTBs 
among SADC members. NTBs are relatively low in Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique and Tanzania. However, complicated logistics (for Angola, Botswana, 
Namibia, Mauritius and Zambia) and the required time and cost of trade (for SACU, 
Angola, Zambia and Malawi) prove to be major trade impediments. The weak 
performance of the intra-SADC integration process is also attributed, inter alia, to 
fragmented markets, lack of institutional capacity and conflicting political interests.9  
An important analytical question in the EU-SADC EPAs context is, thus, to what extent, 
and in what direction, will the envisaged EPAs affect the intra-SADC integration 
process. In other words, will the EU-SADC EPAs facilitate SADC regional integration or 
will they impose further challenges to the already slack regional group? 
 
                                                          
8 The Review is undertaken in 2004 by the USAID funded Southern Africa Global Competitiveness Hub 
(SA Trade Hub), see The USAID – The Services Group (2007). 
9 There is large body of literature on the political economy of regional integration in the region. As a 
recent example, Hansohm and Adongo (2008) examine the political dynamics behind the actual 
implementation of regional integration in eastern and southern Africa. The study provides useful 
insights on the political, economic and social governance for different regional groups, among which 
are SADC and COMESA. 
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2.2.2.1.2 SADC Inclusion of SACU-CU 
SACU-CU comprises five of the SADC members, i.e. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and South Africa.10 SACU internal trade is fully liberalized and it employs a 
common external tariffs (CET) on its external trade. In addition, SACU pursues a 
revenue-sharing formula to collect and distribute the region tariff revenues.  
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland expressed concerns about a diminishing revenue 
pool as a result of launching the TDCA-FTA between South Africa and the EU; this 
agreement will be dealt with in detail in Sub-section 2.4.1.3. Consequently, a new 
formula was launched in 2002 aiming to compensate the less developed and fragile 
SACU economies.11 
The revised formula contains three components. First, customs revenues are 
distributed according to the members’ shares in intra-SACU imports. This entails 
compensating those members who depend more on imports from within the region. 
Nevertheless, Edwards and Lawrence (2008) argue that this criterion causes 
contentions, since member countries tend to overestimate their intra-SACU trade, as 
well as instability in customs revenues for BLNS countries. Second, revenues from 
excise duties are distributed according to the economy size after allocating a fixed 
portion to the development component. The latter is evenly distributed across 
members. As such, the members that provide larger contributions benefit the least 
from the development fund and vice versa. Indeed, South Africa provides the bulk of 
the development component and acquires only a quintile of it.12 
 
                                                          
10 SACU is the oldest CU in the world, dating back to 1910. SACU Agreement was approved in 1969. In 
November 1994, negotiations were launched to amend the Agreement. Eight years later, the new SACU 
Agreement was concluded in 2002.    
In 2005, SACU signed a FTA with the USA called Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation 
Agreement (TIDCA). The agreement entered into force in 2008. SACU-Mercosur Preferential Trade 
Agreement was signed in 2004 and it is expected to enter into force in 2010. 
11 For more details, see Alden and Soko (2005, pp. 371- 373). 
12 For an assessment of the SACU-new Agreement, sharing formula and, more broadly, the included 
compensation instruments, see Kirk and Stern (2005, pp. 169-190). 
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2.2.2.1.3 SADC Intersection with EAC-CU 
Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya announced the EAC-CU on 1st January 2005. Burundi and 
Rwanda joined in 2007. On 20th November 2009, the five member states signed a 
common market protocol for goods, labour and capital that came into force in July 
2010. The East African Monetary Union (EAMU) is planned to be established by 2012 
that is envisaged as a step towards a political federation of the East African States at a 
later stage of the EAC integration process.  
The immediate provisions of the EAC-CU protocol are full liberalization of total 
imports by Kenya as well as the majority of imports by Uganda and Tanzania. Gradual 
tariff elimination is to be applied to sensitive imports for the two countries until full 
liberalization that was supposed to take place in 2010. 
Since 2005, Tanzania has had to follow a CET with its EAC partners. The EAC-CET 
contains three tariff bands: 0 percent, 10 percent and a maximum rate of 25 percent, 
while the latter will be revised after 5 years and likely reduced to 20 percent. Tariff 
rates higher than the maximum CET rate are applied to imports of sensitive goods into 
the EAC region. 
According to the SADC-FTA, Tanzania is expected to provide free access for imports 
originated in the SADC states. This poses a contradiction with its EAC arrangements. 
As a compromise to this conflict, the EAC partners agreed to temporarily exempt the 
tariff preferences that have been granted to third countries prior to announcing the 
EAC-CU protocol from their CET.13 However, by the time the SADC-CU enters into 
force, Tanzania would have to consider terminating one of its two CU memberships. 
 
                                                          
13 This exemption was valid also for the tariff preferences granted for Kenya’s and Uganda’s previously 
COMESA-FTA partners. 
23 
 
 
 
2.2.2.1.4 SADC Overlaps with COMESA-CU 
Eight SADC states (D.R. Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe) are concurrently members of COMESA.14 Five of the eight 
COMESA/SADC members were part of the COMESA-FTA that was launched in 2000. 
D.R. Congo and Seychelles were eligible only for limited duty-free access to the other 
COMESA members. Swaziland, which is a member of the SACU-CU, was exempted 
from opening its markets to the other COMESA members. 
At the 13th Summit of the COMESA Heads of State and Government in June 2009, the 
COMESA-CU was launched between 19 members. The member states were granted 
three years to adapt their tariffs in accordance with the COMESA-CET that is 
scheduled for 2012. The full removal of barriers to the movement of goods, services, 
capital and people is supposed to take place in 2025.  
The COMESA-CET contains four tariff bands: zero-rate for raw materials and for 
capital goods, 10 percent for intermediate goods and 25 percent for finished goods. 
Members identify sensitive products on which different rates than the CET rates are 
applied. Khandelwal (2005) assesses the impact of applying the COMESA-CET on 
member states. The study shows that the CET will generate high adjustment costs for 
Angola, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe in addition to sizable 
revenue losses for Madagascar, Mauritius and Zimbabwe.       
The launch of the COMESA-CU has important implications for SADC/COMESA 
members. Taking into consideration that the potential for the harmonization of the 
SADC-CU and the COMESA-CU is limited, the launch of the COMESA-CU implies that 
SADC/COMESA members will need to make serious decisions about their membership 
in the planned SADC-CU. In accordance with these decisions, COMESA and SADC 
members will need to adapt their EPA liberalization programmes. 
 
                                                          
14 Beside the eight the SADC states, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda are also members of COMESA. Another four SADC states terminated their 
COMESA membership (i.e. Lesotho and Mozambique (1997), Tanzania (1999), Namibia (2004)) and, in 
2007, Angola suspended its membership.    
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2.2.2.2 Implications for Intra-SADC Integration  
Notionally, overlapping membership for members of CUs is unsustainable. In the 
SADC context, three CUs (i.e. SACU, EAC and COMESA) are already operating. SADC 
overlaps with the COMESA-CU and the EAC-CU is a challenge since their integration 
agendas are dynamic and compete with the SADC agenda.  
USAID - the Services Group (2007, pp. 8-17) shows that intra-SADC trade outside the 
SACU region is organized by either COMESA or various bilateral preferences. 
Afesorgbor and Bergeijk (2011) employ a modified version of the gravity model to 
quantify the impact of overlapping membership on intra-regional trade for SADC and 
COMESA during the period 1995-2006. Interestingly, the study demonstrates that 
being a member of another regional group augments intra-COMESA bilateral trade by 
0.83 percent. Conversely, overlapping membership does not stimulate bilateral trade 
among SADC members. It might also hinder the process of implementing SADC trade 
regulations. The study explains this by inconsistent trade regulations and conflicting 
RoOs between SADC, on one side, and the regional groups with which SADC overlaps 
(i.e. COMESA, ECCAS and EAC) on the other. 
Harmonizing the tariff schedules and ensuring coherence in the regional agendas of 
COMESA and SADC are particularly crucial for the eight SADC/COMESA members. If 
SADC-CU is proceeding as planned, its provisions (e.g. CET and RoOs) need to be 
reconciled with those of COMESA-CU. A failure to fulfil such reconciliation would 
mean that SADC/COMESA members will have to terminate one of their memberships 
by the time SADC-CU is launched. For that reason, Jakobeit et al. (2005) suggest 
merging SADC and COMESA in one FTA.15   
Indeed, the idea of merging SADC, COMESA and EAC into a joint FTA was proposed at 
the first COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit in 2008. A Draft Tripartite FTA 
Agreement was revised in 2010 and the member states agreed on the principles of the 
                                                          
15 In a study on different pathways for the EAC members, Stahl (2005) argues that the differences 
between the EAC and the COMESA configurations, in terms of CETs and RoOs, are less pronounced 
compared to those between EAC and SADC. 
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negotiations and laid out a roadmap for provisions and action plans at the second 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit in 2011.16   
 
2.2.2.3 Implications for the EPA Negotiations 
Overlapping membership for SADC countries continues to impose challenges to their 
negotiation progress. As of 2004, both SADC and COMESA were intending to establish 
CUs; this imposed fundamental conflict for the countries intertwined in both regional 
communities. As a compromise to resolve their conflicting interests, two EPA 
configurations were established: the SADC-EPA and the ESA-EPA groups.  
These configurations merged the only two operating CUs, at the time, into broader 
regional groups: SACU into the SADC-EPA group and EAC into the ESA-EPA group.17 
Participating in the SADC-EPA group is exclusive for SADC members whereas the ESA-
EPA group is an amalgamation of several regional groups. As seen in Table 2-1, the 
ESA-EPA includes members of COMESA, SADC, EAC, CEMAC and the Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).18 
The SADC-EPA group originally included Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
(the so-called BLNS sub-group); and Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania (the so-called 
MAT sub-group). In addition, South Africa, who initially participated as an observer, 
became a full member of the negotiations in February 2007.  
Some complications within the SADC-EPA group stream from the TDCA-FTA between 
South Africa and the EU. BLNS members de facto have reciprocal access to the EU 
markets through their SACU-CU with South Africa. According to the Cotonou 
principles, no ACP country should be worse off as a result of concluding an EPA with 
the EU. This, thus, imposes challenges to their negotiation process.  
In addition, MAT members had an option to negotiate separately with the EU. Since 
their bargaining position versus the EU is extremely weak, they considered joining 
                                                          
16 For more details, see COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit (2008) and COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite Summit (2011), respectively. 
17 Two CUs (i.e. the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) that is known in French as 
Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA) and the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ)) are merged into the West Africa-EPA group. The West-Africa-EPA group, thus, includes all 
members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) along with Mauritania. 
18 IGAD is known in French as Autorité Intergouvernementale pour le Développement. 
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either SACU or the ESA-EPA negotiating group. Furthermore, Tanzania and Angola 
had options to negotiate as members of the EAC and COMESA, respectively. This 
would imply that Mozambique, which has an option to sustain its non-reciprocal trade 
relations under the EBA, would have had to negotiate with the EU independently.  
In light of these complications, the SADC-EPA group has been shrinking over the 
course of the negotiations, and is now centred on SACU members and Mozambique 
only.19 Tanzania left the SADC-EPA group and has opted to negotiate, and to provide a 
common offer, with its trade partners in the EAC-EPA group. Angola has chosen to 
continue benefiting from duty-free market access to the EU market through the EBA 
initiative.  
The rest of SADC members (i.e. D.R. Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe) initially participated in the negotiations as part of the ESA-
EPA group. In 2005, D.R. Congo left the ESA-EPA group and joined the Central Africa-
EPA group. The ESA-EPA group eventually came to be confined primarily to LDCs 
when the other EAC members deserted the group in 2007.  
Throughout the negotiation process, SADC members have aligned themselves with 
four different configurations. As seen in Table 2-2, these configurations are the SADC-
EPA, the EAC-EPA, the ESA-EPA and the Central Africa-EPA groups. The SADC 
members that are negotiating outside the SADC-EPA group are mainly LDCs. These 
two factors together profoundly undermine the bargaining power for SADC and raise 
concerns about the importance of the community’s common interests within the 
different agendas for the negotiating groups. Meyn (2004) finds that the limited 
institutional capacity for SADC members to negotiate collectively with the EU does not 
allow them to seize the implicit opportunities provided by the EPAs process. 
Arguably, the EU-EPA approach in enhancing regional integration is to put pressure 
on the negotiating parties to choose one regional scheme. Hansohm, Adongo and 
                                                          
19 Mozambique expressed its interests in joining SACU. Mushiri (2006, pp. 59-70) suggests that, if this 
was the case, Angola and Tanzania would have found it useful to join SACU as well. The USAID - the 
Services Group (2004) provides detailed analyses of the impacts on Mozambique in the case of joining 
SACU. For a recent doctoral dissertation on the effects of the SADC-FTA on Mozambique, see Delpiazzo 
(2009/2010). Interestingly, the study contrasts the results generated under three different theoretical 
CGE frameworks and demonstrates the significance of the chosen closure rule in determining the 
models’ outcomes. 
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Tutalife (2005) argue that this approach was effective in rationalizing multiple 
memberships for some countries in the region. The example taken by the study is 
Namibia’s decision to terminate its COMESA membership in 2004. Nevertheless, 
SADC’s negotiation experience demonstrates that the EPA configurations, which cut 
across regional groups, can also produce further complications alongside the existing 
overlapping memberships. Serious concerns are voiced by the SADC negotiators about 
establishing cross-cutting EU-SADC EPAs, given their potentially adverse implications 
for completing the envisaged SADC-CU. In light of these complexities, and the 
observed sluggish progress of the negotiation process, further problems at the 
implementation stage are expected. 
 
Table 2-2: SADC Overlapping Membership 
SADC 
Members 
SACU-
CU 
EAC-
CU 
COMESA-
CU 
EPA 
Group 
Region 
Classification 
The EU-
Preferential 
Regime 
Angola    SADC-EPA LDC EBA 
Botswana X   SADC-EPA Non-LDC  GSP 
Congo, D.R.   X 
Central 
Africa-EPA 
LDC EBA 
Lesotho X   SADC-EPA LDC EBA 
Madagascar   X ESA-EPA LDC EBA 
Malawi   X ESA-EPA LDC EBA 
Mauritius    X ESA-EPA Non-LDC GSP 
Mozambique     SADC-EPA LDC EBA 
Namibia X   SADC-EPA Non-LDC GSP 
Seychelles   X ESA-EPA Non-LDC GSP 
South Africa X   SADC-EPA Non-LDC TDCA 
Swaziland X  X SADC-EPA Non-LDC GSP 
Tanzania  X  EAC-EPA LDC EBA 
Zambia   X ESA-EPA LDC EBA 
Zimbabwe   X ESA-EPA Non-LDC GSP 
Note: Here and hereafter, shading indicates SADC non-LDCs and vice versa.  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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2.3 Negotiation Outcomes and Contentions 
2.3.1 Trade Liberalization Programmes 
Towards the expiry date of the WTO waiver for the Cotonou preferences (November 
2007), none of the negotiating groups was able to conclude a comprehensive EPA. The 
only exception is the Caribbean-EPA Group.20 In response to the complexities 
surrounding the negotiation process, the EC pushed to launch IEPAs at the region-to-
region level.21 
The EU initialled IEPAs with countries from the SADC-EPA, EAC-EPA and ESA-EPA 
groups.22 Eleven out of the eighteen African countries that have agreed on region-to-
region IEPAs with the EU are SADC members. As seen in Table 2-3, among the 
signatory SADC members, five are from the SADC-EPA group, another five participate 
as part of the ESA-EPA group, while Tanzania participates as a member of the EAC-
EPA group.  
The non-signatory SADC members, excluding South Africa, are all LDCs who have 
preferential access to the EU under the EBA initiative and, arguably, do not face urgent 
pressure to conclude agreements. A study on lessons from the EU-ACP EPA 
negotiations criticizes the EC’s approach in negotiating with both LDCs and non-LDCs 
who are involved in different regional groups with different and, arguably, conflicting 
interests. Makhan (2009, pp. 6-7) argues that “[d]iverging interests were furthermore 
emphasised by competing incentives created by EU trade policies for developing 
countries” and consequently “… there was little incentive for LDCs – i.e. most 
countries on the African continent – to fully engage in the EPA negotiations”. 
Nevertheless, five LDCs (i.e. Madagascar, Mozambique, Lesotho, Tanzania and Zambia) 
had voluntarily initialled IEPAs. Lui and Bilal (2009) argue that, overall, the signatory 
ACP members are those who would have lost their preferential access to the EU 
markets if they had not agreed on IEPAs. 
                                                          
20 At the most recent, only the CARIFORUM countries (except Haiti) have reached a comprehensive EPA 
covering trade in goods and services, investment as well as other trade-related areas (European 
Commission 2009).    
21 For a detailed description of the negotiation dynamics and political tensions, see Lorenz (2011). 
Based on an interview in 2008, Lorenz (2011, p. 132) quotes the ACP Secretary General Sir John 
Kaputin in his description of this negotiation phase as “fraught with panic, confusion and 
disagreement”.   
22 Further IEPAs have been initialled with key trade partners in the Pacific.    
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The IEPAs provide largely WTO-compatible market access for trade by both parties, 
though many trade related issues are still under consideration. The participating 
SADC members are granted duty-free, quota-free access to the EU markets. Exports by 
the signatory SADC countries have been eligible for duty-free, quota-free access to the 
EU markets as of 1st January 2008, with transition periods for rice and sugar. While 
the transition period for rice is quite short, it lasts until 2015 for sugar.  
From their part, the IEPAs signatories are supposed to gradually open their markets 
to EU exports. According to Article XXIV of the GATT, WTO members can provide 
preferential market access in the form of a CU or a FTA conditioned that “… the duties 
and other restrictive regulations of commerce … are eliminated on substantially all 
the trade” and provided that the formation of this CU or FTA is concluded “… within a 
reasonable length of time”, (World Trade Organization 1986, pp. 41-44). The precise 
interpretations of ‘substantially all the trade’ and of ‘a reasonable length of time’ have 
been subject to contentious debate at the negotiating table. Precedent suggests that 90 
percent of trade is considered ‘substantially all trade’. Yet, this share of trade is 
measured between each pair of partners and, as a result, the actual liberalized trade 
depends on bilateral trade balances. Therefore, the degree of liberalization differs 
across the negotiating groups and across the members within a group as well. For 
example, in the cases of Mauritius and Seychelles, economies which are better off 
compared to the other SADC members, liberalization coverage is more than 90 
percent of their imports from the EU. Table 2-3 presents the liberalization schedules, 
timeframes and other features of the IEPAs for different SADC states. 
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2.3.1.1 The SADC-EPA Group 
Within the SADC-EPA group, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique initialled 
the IEPA on 23rd November 2007 in Brussels. Namibia initialled the IEPA later, on 11th 
December 2007, stating that  
“Republic of Namibia has initialled the Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreement on the understanding that concerns which Namibia had 
identified throughout the negotiations of the Interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement would be addressed through the negotiations 
towards a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement”, (Republic of 
Namibia - Ministry of Trade and Industry 2007, p. 1).  
The IEPA was signed by all participants but Namibia in June 2009. Both the IEPA 
signatory sides agreed on resuming negotiations over an inclusive EPA formula that 
accommodates all SADC members. 
As shown in Table 2-3, the IEPA includes liberalizing 86 percent of imports from the 
EU by Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland by 2015 at the latest. This 
liberalization arrangement is in line with the EU-South Africa TDCA that calls for 
liberalizing 86 percent of South African imports from the EU over twelve years; this 
agreement is described later in detail. Mozambique is only required to liberalize 80.5 
percent within 16 years, while sensitive imports include agricultural products and 
textiles, (European Commission 2007b). 
The IEPA provides potential opportunities for the SADC-EPA group. Examples include 
removing the remaining special duty (8 percent) on Botswana beef exports to the EU 
and waiving the quota restrictions on Swaziland sugar exports in October 2009. The 
envisaged improvements in RoO for textile exports have special importance for 
Botswana and Swaziland. Mozambique has already been granted duty-free, quota-free 
access to the EU markets under the EBA initiative. However, attracting multinational 
enterprises to invest in sugar and bananas exporting sectors could be potential 
opportunities for the country, (Agritrade 2010b). 
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As of 2009, it seemed implausible to conclude an EPA as planned. Concerns that the 
EU-SADC EPAs, if they were to adopt the IEPA outlines, would have adversely affected 
the SADC industrialization strategy and regional integration process remain relevant. 
Furthermore, the potential adjustment costs are relatively high for many SADC 
economies.23 
Angola, Namibia and South Africa have voiced concerns over key provisions of the 
IEPA text “… that profoundly impede prospects for deepening the processes of 
sustainable integration and development within and between the countries of 
Southern Africa” (Governments of Angola, Namibia and South Africa 2009, p. 1). The 
three countries have jointly called for a more comprehensive EPA that encompasses 
all SADC members, with emphasis on inclusion of South Africa, in one common 
arrangement to access the EU markets. 
Consequently, Namibia decided not to sign the initialized IEPA. Being eligible for the 
EBA initiative, Angola did not have incentives to initialize the IEPA. It rather expressed 
its intention to join a full EPA after finalising its tariff offer and reaching a compromise 
regarding the previous concerns. South Africa also has not signed the IEPA and has 
not shown full commitments regarding trade in services. During their negotiation 
round in November 2008, South Africa and the EC agreed to provide a modified 
market access offer by December 2008, (European Commission 2009).  
In order to keep South Africa at the negotiating table, the EU granted it more advanced 
market access provisions, especially for agricultural products, compared to its current 
market access under the TDCA-FTA. Nevertheless, this would not be expanded to full 
duty-free, quota-free treatment, since South Africa is a major and competitive 
exporting partner for the EU, particularly in agricultural markets. In its turn, South 
Africa is negotiating some tariff reductions with the EU.  
 
                                                          
23 For more information on the most recent developments in the negotiation outcomes, see the most 
up-to-date versions of the African Economic Outlook by OECD, African Development Bank (AFDB) and 
United Nations-Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) (2010, pp. 50-53) and OECD et al. (2011, pp. 
55-57). 
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2.3.1.2 The EAC-EPA Group 
Tanzania, along with its EAC partners, signed an IEPA in 2007. The agreement called 
for gradual liberalization of 82 percent of imports from the EU over 25 years. This 
liberalization is scheduled as: 64 percent in 2010, 16 percent in 2023 and 2 percent in 
2033. The remaining 18 percent of imports from the EU covers sensitive products for 
EAC including coffee, tea and spices, fish, meat, dairy products, certain vegetables and 
oils, (European Commission 2007b). 
      
2.3.1.3 The ESA-EPA Group 
Within the ESA-EPA group, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, along 
with Comoros, agreed on an IEPA at the end of 2007. The Zambian tariff schedule was 
not initialled until September 2008 and, as a result, its exports to the EU were treated 
according to the EBA provisions until December 2008. In August 2009, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe signed the IEPA whereas Zambia was still 
indecisive.   
The degree of liberalization that was agreed varies among the participants: 98 percent 
(Seychelles), 96 percent (Mauritius), 81 percent (Madagascar) and 80 percent 
(Zambia and Zimbabwe), (European Commission 2007b). 
In October 2009, exports by the members of the ESA-EPA group started benefiting 
duty-free, quota-free access to the EU markets either under the IEPAs or the EBA 
initiative. Removing barriers to sugar exports is expected to boost sugar production 
and exports for Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania. For the non-LDC members, Agritrade 
(2010c, p. 7) finds that  
“… the granting of duty-free, quota-free treatment under the IEPAs 
comparable to that extended under the EBA appears to have removed the 
disadvantage that non-LDCs have faced in terms of their attractiveness to 
external investment since the announcement of the EBA initiative in 2001, 
previously, the EBA initiative led to extensive investment flows into LDCs, 
notably in the sugar sector, and left non-LDCs at a disadvantage for 
attracting such investment”.   
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Pulling together the strands of the liberalization programmes for different SADC 
members, some points are revealed. Different tariff schedules are in use and, most 
importantly, some countries are gradually eliminating tariff barriers for their EU trade 
while neighbouring countries maintain those barriers. The excluded products are 
heterogeneous across members. This situation will continue to pose a serious 
challenge to the integration process in the region. Braude (2008) demonstrates that 
these differentiated liberalization schedules impose new barriers to intra-SADC 
integration rather than enhancing it. 
 
2.3.2 The Development Dimensions  
As aforementioned, the EPAs are not meant to be merely conventional trade 
agreements. The agreements are supposed to deal with supply-side constraints, 
enhance production capacities, stimulate competitiveness and ensure sustainable 
development. These broad objectives require comprehensive agendas that cover trade 
in goods and services, the ‘Singapore issues’ (i.e. trade facilitation, trade and 
investment, competition policy and transparency in government procurements) and 
other components (e.g. export taxes, MFN clause, RoO and movements of people).24  
Indeed, utilizing the EPAs as an instrument for development is crucial for SADC 
members to exploit the opportunities provided by the EPAs. The envisaged EPAs will 
provide free access for SADC products into the EU markets. The actual gains in market 
share depend, inter alia, on SADC production capacity and competitiveness. Therefore, 
if market access gains are to be seized by SADC members, issues like supply-side 
constraints, enhancing competitiveness and building regional production and trade 
capacities have to be dealt with up-front. Persson (2008) examines the potential 
impacts of the trade facilitation provisions on the ACP-negotiating groups. The study 
finds that trade transaction costs are influential for the SADC-EPA and ESA-EPA 
groups. Curran, Nilsson and Brew (2008, pp. 542-546) review the non-trade 
components of the EPAs and discuss potential impacts on ACP states. 
                                                          
24 The ‘Singapore issues’ were firstly discussed at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 in Singapore. 
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Furthermore, the proliferation of multilateral liberalization entails diminishing the 
potential preference margins for SADC members in the EU markets. As such, the 
longer the EU-SADC EPA negotiations continue, the less likely it is for SADC members 
to realize significant benefits related to preferential trade access and, hence, the more 
important are the development components of the EPAs.  
The IEPAs include provisions on the MFN clause, infant industry protection and 
safeguards, NTBs, export subsidies and taxes. The IEPA signatory parties agreed to 
resume negotiations over the remaining issues, (European Commission 2009). As can 
be seen in Table 2-3, these provisions are not transmitted into precise action plans. 
Moreover, most of these provisions are subject to long debate, as described in the 
following sub-section. 
 
2.3.3 Challenges and Contentious Issues 
Serious concerns about the potential adverse impacts of the EPAs on SADC members, 
as well as various contentious issues, have been raised in the course of the negotiation 
process. This study does not aim to provide an exhaustive list of the contentious 
issues, but rather illustrative discussion of the relevant arguments.25 
One of the main concerns raised by the SADC negotiators is the consequences of 
exposing domestic industries to intensified competition from European substitutes. A 
WTO-compatible trade liberalization scenario that covers ‘substantially all trade’ 
would cause unbalanced competition for SADC products. This concern has a special 
importance for agricultural producers who, on one hand, export to the EU markets 
and, on the other hand, will face competition from subsidized European farmers.  
Among the important contentious issues are the IEPAs provisions on infant industry 
protection and safeguards. In the EU-SADC IEPA text, the infant industry provisions 
are available only for twelve years (or fifteen years in the case of LDCs). This means 
that these provisions are designed as limited safeguards against potential surges in 
imports during the liberalization phase rather than being flexible measures to protect 
                                                          
25 Some areas of disagreement are already discussed throughout the previous discussion of the 
negotiation objectives, evolution and outcomes. For a detailed discussion of the contentious issues, see 
Lui and Bilal (2009). 
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an infant industry until accomplishing a certain degree of competitiveness. The eight-
year time restriction implies that the infant-industry measure will be ineffective 
starting 2016. This has profound implications for the SADC LDCs. Such provisions 
have the potential to prevent the emergence of new industries and to impede the 
progress of already undiversified production structures. Indeed, negotiators have 
raised demands for amending the SADC-IEPAs infant industry provisions in such a 
way that serves the purposes of protecting infant industries in the region.26  
The potential revenue losses for SADC economies, and the appropriate compensation 
measures, continue to pose challenges on the EPA negotiations. The IEPAs imply 
asymmetrical liberalization that allows SADC members to maintain protection for 
some sensitive sectors. However, the criteria for determining sensitive products and 
the associated transition periods are unclear and vary across countries. In addition, 
the aid-for-trade component is one of the most debated issues in the EPA negotiations. 
SADC negotiators are pushing for more effective financial compensation for the 
potential tariff revenue losses. On the other side of the negotiating table, the EC insists 
on keeping the aid-for-trade component outside of the formal EPAs, as voluntary 
packages. 
Other debatable issues include trade in services and investment. With respect to trade 
in services, the SADC-EPA negotiating parties agreed on several steps in order to 
implement the IEPA provisions. These include liberalizing one services sector for all 
members in the SADC-EPA group, except Namibia and South Africa, and aiming to 
progressively liberalize the substantial services trade within three years following the 
full EPA. Focusing on the ESA-EPA group, a study by the South Centre (2007, p. 5) 
argues that “It is difficult to see how a reciprocal Agreement on trade in services with 
the EU (a fully integrated regional block); can work to the benefit of ESA ….”.  
Regarding investment, it was agreed to negotiate investment provisions between the 
SADC-EPA group and the EU before 2009, taking into consideration the SADC 
Investment Protocol, (European Commission 2009). Foreign investment is viewed as 
                                                          
26 For more on the implications of the IEPAs infant industry provisions along with other contentious 
issues for SADC, see Agritrade (2008). For a recent review of the WTO/GATT safeguards provisions, see 
Finger (2010, pp. 289–318).  
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one of the opportunities available for SADC members from launching the EPAs with 
the EU. As aforementioned, the EC argues that the policy reforms associated with the 
EPAs will stimulate FDI and create the required resources to fund investment. 
Among other important issues under negotiations are the IEPA provisions on 
reducing subsidies on agricultural production and exports, the MFN clause, 
intellectual property rights and RoO. The EC has tended to postpone these issues to 
the comprehensive EPA phase, whilst some SADC negotiators insist on tackling them 
up-front and have called for modifying the existing IEPAs. The point to notice here is 
the evident pertinence of these contentious IEPA issues to the Doha Round agenda. 
This distinct linkage highlights the importance of examining how concluding the Doha 
Round would affect the EU-SADC EPAs outcome and which of the two arrangements 
should come first. Hinkle and Schiff (2004) argue that concluding the Doha Round in 
advance of signing final EPAs is beneficial for sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
 
2.4 Alternative Trade Arrangements to the EU-SADC EPAs 
SADC trade is eligible for different preferential schemes, and the importance and value 
of trade preferences vary significantly across countries and sectors. Overall, the EU is 
main provider of trade preferences for SADC members.27 The EU-GSP to all developing 
countries was first implemented in 1971.28 In February 2001, the special scheme of 
the EU-GSP, i.e. the EBA initiative, was launched to target LDCs.29 Two non-reciprocal 
regimes are, thus, available for SADC members: the EU-GSP (for SADC non-LDCs) and 
the EBA (for SADC-LDCs). South Africa is a special case since it already has a 
reciprocal trade arrangement with the EU through its TDCA-FTA.  
                                                          
27 The second important preferences provider for SADC is the USA who grants African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) to Sub-Saharan African countries. Thirty-eight African countries are eligible 
for AGOA preferences, among which are thirteen SADC members. Zimbabwe is exempted from this 
arrangement and Madagascar’s membership was suspended in 2009, as aforementioned. For more 
information on membership and eligibility, see African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (2000).  
28 The GSP could also refer to the whole system of preferences provided by the Quadrilateral group 
(known as the Quad countries: the EU, USA, Japan and Canada) that was first formed during the 7th G7 
summit in July 1981. 
29 Another sub-regime of the EU-GSP is called the EU-GSP+. The EU-GSP+ provides additional tariff 
reductions to the most vulnerable developing countries. None of SADC members is eligible for the EU-
GSP+. For more details, see CARIS (2010, pp. 39-42). 
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Improving market access for SADC sugar exporters is one of the most contentious 
issues in the EPA negotiations. The EU domestic sugar sector has been protected 
through the policies pursued by the Common Organization of the Markets in Sugar 
(Com Sugar).  Recently, internal and external motivations have led the EU to launch 
several reform policies for sugar production and trade. It is, thus, interesting to 
examine the EU sugar trade and reforms and their implications for the EU-SADC EPAs.   
It is against this background that this section presents the alternative trade 
arrangements for SADC-EU trade in the case of not agreeing on final EPAs.  It deals 
first with the alternative preferential trade agreements provided by the EU to SADC 
members (i.e. GSP, EBA and TDCA) and, then, it considers more broadly the EU sugar 
trade liberalization and reforms. 
 
2.4.1. The EU-SADC Preferential Agreements 
2.4.1.1 The EU-GSP for SADC non-LDCs 
In terms of trade coverage, the EU-GSP is the most important preferential trade 
scheme for SADC members. Despite its importance, the GSP program has a limited 
product coverage and validation period. The GSP covers 7200 products. It provides 
duty-free access to all non-sensitive products, which are mainly manufactured 
products. Agricultural products and some labour-intensive manufacturing are not 
eligible for duty-free market access. Sensitive products are eligible for a tariff 
reduction of 3.5 percentage points of the ad valorem MFN tariff rate or a 30 percent 
tariff reduction of the specific MFN tariff rate. The tariff reduction in the case of 
textiles and clothing is 20 percent of the ad valorem MFN tariff rate. 
The GSP is subject to periodic revisions and can be unilaterally terminated. The most 
recent substantial changes took place in 2006.30  
 
                                                          
30 For a comprehensive assessment of the GSP using complementarity methodologies, see CARIS 
(2010). 
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2.4.1.2 The EU-EBA Initiative for SADC LDCs 
The EBA initiative grants duty-free, quota-free access to exports, except arms and 
munitions, by LDCs to the EU markets.31 The EBA proposal includes 919 tariff lines 
that are mainly agricultural products, e.g. vegetables, fruits, food and meat products. 
However, limited transition periods were applied to three sensitive products: bananas 
(2006) rice and sugar (2009).  
The remaining duties on bananas were reduced by 20 percent per annum beginning in 
January 2002 and were fully eliminated in January 2006. Duties on rice were reduced 
by 20 percent in September 2006, by 50 percent in September 2007, by 80 percent in 
September 2008 and fully eliminated in September 2009. In addition, rice exports 
were granted immediate duty-free access within quota limits. The quota quantity was 
initially determined by previous export levels to the EU and was then phased out by 
15 percent each year until all tariffs and quotas were fully removed in 2008/09. 
Duties on sugar were supposed to be reduced by 20 percent in July 2006, by 50 
percent in July 2007, by 80 percent in July 2008 and fully eliminated in July 2009.  
The EBA is a non-reciprocal trade agreement in the sense that the beneficiary 
countries export duty-free, quota-free without obligation to open their markets to 
European exports in return. Although it is regulated by the GSP scheme, the EBA 
initiative departs from these general rules regarding its coverage, duration and 
limitation. The EBA is more comprehensive and provides greater certainty for the 
beneficiary exporters; it is not subject to any changes and none of the EBA’s parties 
can unilaterally terminate it.32    
In terms of statutory tariff rates, the EBA is the best arrangement available for LDCs 
exports to the EU. Unlike the EU-GSP, the EBA preferences are granted for an 
indefinite time period and are not subject to revision. Nevertheless, the EBA 
utilization rate is low.33 Some authors (e.g. Candau and Jean 2009) attribute this 
underutilization for the EBA preferences to the availability of more favourable 
                                                          
31 Some non-LDCs (e.g. Bosnia, Herzegovina and Moldova) benefit from similar preferential treatment 
to the EBA’s through bilateral agreements with the EU. 
32 For a detailed description of the EBA initiative, see Bjørnskov and Krivonos (2001).  
33 Candau and Jean (2009, pp. 75-79) estimate the actual utilization rates for the EBA preferences by all 
Sub-Saharan African LDCs to be 2.8 percent in 2002.        
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preferential arrangements granted to LDCs under the Cotonou regime. Others (e.g. 
Brenton 2003) argue that the EBA’s tight RoOs and complicated administrative 
constraints impede its utilization. 
 
2.4.1.3 The EU-South Africa TDCA  
The EU and South Africa began negotiations on a bilateral trade arrangement in 1995 
and eventually agreed on their TDCA-FTA in 1999, which came into operation in 
2004.34 The agreement provisions are applicable for ‘substantially all trade’ between 
the EU and South Africa. The interpretation of ‘substantially all trade’ in the context of 
the TDCA-FTA implies asymmetric liberalization of trade between South Africa and 
the EU. It is agreed that 95 percent of South African exports will enter EU markets 
duty-free after ten years and 86 percent of EU exports to South Africa will be 
liberalized after a transition period of twelve years. Accordingly, the full FTA should 
be in force in 2012. 
Some sensitive products are excluded from the immediate liberalization schedule 
while others are partially liberalized. For South Africa, sensitive sectors include some 
textiles and clothing products and motor vehicles. Liberalizing motor vehicles trade 
did not start until 2006. With respect to the EU, sensitive sectors are mainly 
agricultural products.35  
The EU-South Africa TDCA raises concerns that regional exports to the South African 
markets will face unbalanced competition from subsidized EU agricultural products. 
Using a partial equilibrium model, Thurlow and Holden (2002) find that the EU-South 
Africa TDCA’s impact on South Africa imports from COMESA is limited. Mauritius 
exports to South Africa are the most affected; particularly textiles, clothing, footwear 
and leather products. 
 
                                                          
34 Some of the agreement provisions were operating since January 2000, but were not ratified by the 
South Africa’s SACU trade partners until 2002. One reason of this late implementation is the concerns 
raised by BLNS countries regarding the impact of TDCA on their economies.  
35 For a full list of the products that are not included in the liberalization schedule and those to be 
reviewed after a certain length of time, see European Commission (1999). For a list of hypothetically 
excluding sectors and mapping them to the GTAP sectors, see McDonald and Walmsley (2008).  
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2.4.1.4 The EU Preference Utilization Rates 
The question to be raised here is to what extent are the EU preferential arrangements 
actually effective in improving market access. Indeed, the actual significance of the EU 
preferential trade arrangements is an empirical exercise. This sub-section gives some 
empirical evidence on SADC utilization rates for the EU preferential trade regimes. 
Data on EU imports from SADC members according to the different import regimes is 
derived from the Eurostat database for 2004 and 2008. According to the database, 
imports are classified into four import regimes: ‘MFN Zero’, ‘MFN Non Zero’, ‘Any 
Preference Zero’ and ‘Any Preference Non Zero’. Imports under the first two regimes 
are then distinguished according to imports eligible for ‘Only MFN’ and imports 
eligible for ‘GSP and/or Preferences’. The import regime is ‘Unknown’ for some import 
flows. 
Based on these data, EU duty-free imports as ratios to total imports by country are 
calculated, Table 2-4. These duty-free import ratios are calculated for the two duty-
free import regimes: ‘MFN Zero’ and ‘Any Preference Zero’. It is worth noting here that 
the former includes imports eligible for ‘Only MFN’ and imports eligible for ‘GSP 
and/or Preferences’. Furthermore, preference utilization rates are measured as the 
ratios of imports under any preference regime; whether zero or non-zero rates, to 
total imports eligible for the preference regimes. These calculations are undertaken 
for the three dutiable trade regimes: ‘Normal’, ‘Outward Processing’ and ‘Economic 
Processing Arrangements for Textile’. 
The bulk of EU imports from SADC in 2004 enter duty-free. Mozambique is the only 
exception, as duty-free trade constitutes only 35 percent of its total exports to the EU. 
In 2008, more than three-quarters of exports to the EU were duty-free. Preference 
utilization rates differ in 2008 compared to 2004 for many of the cases. The most 
striking case is Angola, where the utilization rate increases from merely 10 percent in 
2004 to 63 percent in 2008. 
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Table 2-4: The EU Duty-free Imports and Preference Utilization Rates 
 
2004, percent  2008, percent 
Duty-free Imports as 
Ratio to Total Imports 
by Import Regime 
Preference 
Utilization 
Rate 
Duty-free Imports as 
Ratio to Total Imports 
by Import Regime 
Preference 
Utilization 
Rate MFN 
Zero 
Any 
Preference 
Zero 
Total 
MFN 
Zero 
Any 
Preference 
Zero 
Total 
Angola 98.4 0.1 98.5 9.7 98.5 0.8 99.3 62.5 
Botswana 97.1 0.8 97.9 90.5 90.5 9.0 99.4 95.8 
Congo, D.R. 94.6 1.1 95.7 73.0 92.3 1.8 94.0 80.1 
Lesotho 93.9 2.6 96.5 45.0 98.4 1.2 99.6 87.4 
Madagascar 25.9 66.1 92.0 95.9 24.5 72.7 97.2 96.8 
Malawi 20.6 66.0 86.9 93.9 28.4 57.5 93.9 83.4 
Mauritius 13.4 73.5 86.6 91.3 8.9 85.0 85.9 94.9 
Mozambique 2.5 32.4 34.8 99.0 7.5 89.0 96.5 99.6 
Namibia 63.7 25.5 89.1 97.7 22.9 72.9 95.8 95.8 
Seychelles 12.6 73.4 86.0 96.0 3.3 95.5 98.8 99.4 
Swaziland 5.8 82.9 88.7 98.2 3.2 79.6 82.7 83.5 
Tanzania 69.0 24.0 92.9 93.4 40.3 56.9 97.3 98.1 
South Africa 57.3 18.6 75.9 80.4 59.8 26.3 86.1 87.7 
Zambia 29.6 29.1 58.7 100.0 59.6 15.6 75.2 87.7 
Zimbabwe 30.1 54.4 84.5 94.8 33.2 62.1 95.3 94.5 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the Eurostat Database (2010).    
 
2.4.2. The EU Sugar Trade and Reforms 
Interestingly, the EU is both a major sugar importer and a major sugar exporter. This 
is attributed to intertwining schemes of preferential arrangements. The EU sugar 
trade has been organized by two preferential arrangements: the EU Sugar Protocol 
(SP) for a group of ACP countries and the EBA initiative for LDCs. These arrangements 
involve protective policies in favour of the EU sugar producers. This creates a 
dilemma to EU sugar trade liberalization within the EU-EPA context. If all ACP sugar 
exporters were to be equally treated as ACP-SP or LDC-EBA beneficiaries, the EU 
sugar sector would experience sudden volatilities. Arguably, these changes would 
have occurred at the expense of the SP beneficiaries. The argument is that the EU 
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cannot guarantee the intervention price for ACP-SP exporters without stabilizing 
sugar price in its domestic markets.  
Therefore, sugar liberalization within the EPA framework has to be undertaken 
gradually and a transition period during which market reforms are underway is 
needed. The European Commission (2005a, p. 8) states that the  
“The Sugar Protocol should be integrated into EPAs in such a way that does 
not prejudice the EU’s commitment to LDCs for full market access for sugar 
from 2009 and that ensures full compatibility with WTO rules. This will be 
covered by the review of the Sugar Protocol, to be negotiated jointly with 
the ACP in the framework of EPA negotiations”.  
This commitment to liberalization of trade in sugar puts pressure on the EU to reform 
its domestic sugar sector. Other motivations for reform arise from the required 
elimination of export subsidies either as an element of the Doha liberalization agenda 
or in response to the WTO decision regarding the dispute raised by Australia, Brazil 
and Thailand against the EU protective policies.   
The following two sub-sections deal with the EU sugar trade arrangements and its 
unilateral sugar reforms.   
 
2.4.2.1 Preferential Sugar Trade Arrangements 
The SP is a bilateral, non-reciprocal preferential agreement granted to a group of 19 
ACP countries. It was established in 1975 and then renewed in 2000 under the 
Cotonou Agreement.36 The SP signatory countries are granted duty-free access to 
European markets for their sugar (cane, raw and white) exports within quota limits. 
These export flows receive a price higher than the price in the world market.37 This 
differential pricing scheme yields substantial income transfers for the SP exporters.  
                                                          
36 The previous Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was transmitted to the EU by the UK accession to the 
community in 1973 and two years later during the first Lomé Convention it is shaped into the SP. Eight 
SADC members (Congo DR, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe) with other eleven ACP countries (Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, 
Kenya, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda) benefit from the SP. In 2005 
onwards, the EC included Mozambique in the list of the ACP-SP beneficiaries. See European 
Commission (2005a) and European Union (2006). The same preferential treatment was simultaneously 
granted to India and ever since the Sugar Protocol is called the ACP/India Sugar Protocol. 
37 Sugar price is determined each year in a way that reflects sugar price in the European markets.  
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In 1986, the EC introduced the concept of Maximum Supply Need (MSN) that sets a 
ceiling for raw sugar imports that are allowed to enter the European markets under 
preferential arrangements. This import ceiling is meant to control sugar imports by 
EU members that have sugar refining industries, i.e. Finland, France, Portugal and the 
UK. The MSN for sugar is primarily met from ACP/India SP beneficiaries, overseas 
countries and territories (OCTs)38 and MFN exporters.39 Any additional imports of 
raw sugar for processing above the MSN limits are imported under the Special 
Preferential Sugar (SPS) arrangements. The SPS is a less favourable preferential 
arrangements compared to the SP. EU Sugar imports under the SPS are granted 
preferential market access at a reduced or zero tariff rate and are sold at a lower price 
compared to the SP imports.  
As reported in Table 2-5, sugar import quotas allocated to SADC members sum up to 
691 thousand tonnes in 2003/04. The bulk of the SADC sugar quota (70 percent) is 
assigned to Mauritius. A quota of around 200,000 tonnes is opened annually for the 
ACP/India SP beneficiaries. 
According to the EBA initiative, sugar imports from LDCs within the quota limits enter 
the European market duty-free during a transition period (2001-2006) and these 
quotas are subject to a 15 percent annual increase. After this transition period, tariffs 
on sugar imports from LDCs are to be gradually reduced without quantity limits. 
These tariff cuts are scheduled to start in July 2006 by rates of 20, 50 and 80 percent 
until reaching duty-free, quota-free access by July 2009.  
Two points are worth highlighting here. First, these increases in sugar quotas do not 
entail increases in total EU sugar imports. Similar reductions are scheduled for the 
SPS quotas.40 As shown in Table 2-5, the SADC quota allocation is roughly the same 
under both regimes. In this context, Gibb (2006) examines the welfare impacts of the 
EBA sugar arrangements. The study demonstrates that the initiative will not affect EU 
                                                          
38 Some EU members have trade links with these OCTs (e.g. the French overseas terrorises of Reunion). 
Sugar imports from these OCTs enter the European markets duty-free.     
39 The Finland preferential agreement of sugar imports from Cuba and Brazil was transmitted to the EU 
in 1995 by the Finland’s accession to the EU. These imports are granted reduced tariff and sold at the 
EU intervention price. 
40 The European Commission (2001, L 60/44) states that “Imports of sugar under the ACP-EC Sugar 
Protocol should be excluded from the above calculations so as to uphold the viability of this protocol”. 
Chaplin and Matthews (2005, p. 5) argue that these reductions might be valid until closer to 2009.  
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sugar producers and any increase in LDC market share will be at the expense of other 
developing countries. Secondly, the EBA does not guarantee a minimum price for 
these import flows. However, sugar imports under this transition system of tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs) are sold at the same price provided for sugar imports under the SPS, 
(Chaplin and Matthews 2005, p. 5). This might make it profitable for some LDCs who 
are net importers of sugar to export sugar in order to benefit from the higher 
intervention price in European markets, while meeting their domestic needs by 
importing from other partners.  
 
Table 2-5: The EU Sugar Import Quotas  
(2003/04, tonnes, white sugar equivalent) 
Country 
Sugar Protocol Sugar 
Allocations 
Special Preferential Sugar 
Allocations with EBA 
Quota 
Allocation 
% of 
SADC 
Quota 
% of 
Total 
Quota 
Quota 
Allocation*** 
% of SADC 
Quota 
% of Total 
Quota 
Congo, D.R. 10,186 1.5 0.8    
Madagascar 10,760 1.6 0.8 2,055 1.9 1.0 
Malawi 20,824 3.0 1.6 10,000 9.3 5.0 
Mauritius 491,031 71.1 37.6 26,551.8 24.6 13.3 
Mozambique*        
Swaziland 117,845 17.1 9.0 30,000 27.8 15.0 
Tanzania 10,186 1.5 0.8 2,014.6 1.9 1.0 
Zambia 0 0.0 0.0 12,238.3 11.3 6.1 
Zimbabwe 30,225 4.4 2.3 25,000 23.2 12.5 
Total SADC 
Quotas 
691,057 100.0 53.0 107,860 100.0 53.9 
Total 
Beneficiaries 
Quotas** 
1,304,700  200,000  
* Mozambique was not an EU-SP beneficiary until 2005. ** Including India that is allocated 
10,000 tonnes.  
Source: European Commission (2004) *** Gibb (2006, p. 12). 
 
Only SADC LDCs that initialized the EBA Sugar Framework Agreement with the EU are 
eligible for these planned increases in sugar quotas. Seven out of the eight SADC/EBA 
members (i.e. Angola, D.R. Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
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Zambia) are included in the LDC Sugar Supplying States.41 Apart from Angola, these 
members are also SP beneficiaries. This means that their sugar export quotas are not 
effectively affected by phasing out sugar quotas during the transition period. 
However, all EBA/SADC members benefit from the post-2006 full liberalization 
arrangements. 
Sugar import quotas assigned to the SADC EBA beneficiaries were enlarged from 
36,557 tonnes (of white-sugar equivalent) in 2001/02 to 43,768 tonnes in 2005/06. 
Three SADC members (i.e. Mauritius, Swaziland, Zimbabwe) are SP beneficiaries but 
not eligible for the EBA provisions. Their sugar exports, as well as exports by the other 
SP non-LDC signatories, were equivalently deducted during the transition period in 
order to allow for phasing out the LDCs sugar quotas. 
In addition to these restrictions, the European Council imposes safeguard provisions 
on LDC sugar exports to the EU. According to these provisions, any preferences that 
have been granted can be suspended if sugar imports significantly disrupt EU sugar 
markets.  
  
2.4.2.2 The EU Unilateral Sugar Reforms 
The EU has controlled sugar production through a system of shared quotas among its 
members. Three types of quotas were assigned to each EU member: ‘A’ quotas were 
determined according to domestic consumption, ‘B’ quotas were set for potential 
export supply and ‘C’ quotas are for out-of-quota sugar that could be either exported 
or shifted to the next marketing year. Minimum prices were set for sugar of type ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ whereas the price of ‘C’ quota sugar was negotiated between growers and 
manufactures. Export subsidies were provided to compensate producers for the gap 
between domestic and world prices.       
In 2005, the EC launched initiatives for sugar reform that deal with interventions in 
domestic markets as well as preferential trade arrangements.42 A fixed cut of 36 
                                                          
41 Lesotho only does not sign the agreement. For more information, see Agritrade (2011). 
42 Initial reform proposal (European Commission 2004) and a subsequent modified version (European 
Commission 2005b) were issued before reaching a final agreement on reform policies in November 
2005. For a more detailed description of sugar reforms and their scope and measures, see European 
Commission (2006a). 
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percent in the EU intervention sugar price was planned spanning four years beginning 
in 2006/07. The annual price cuts were scheduled to be 20 percent in 2006/07, 27.5 
percent in 2007/08, 35 percent in 2008/09 and 36 percent in 2009/10. These price 
cuts were to be reflected in reduced export subsidies, as a result of a reduced price 
wedge between world and domestic prices.43 Compensation funds amounting to 60 
percent of the estimated revenue losses due to these price cuts were planned to be 
provided to producers. In order to facilitate reductions in domestic subsidies, a plan 
was put in place to merge type ‘A’ and ‘B’ production quotas. Quota ‘C’ producers were 
allowed to purchase an additional 1 million tonne quota, and quotas were reduced by 
a buy-out scheme. In addition, improved market access for preferential sugar trade 
was to be achieved by reducing tariffs and phasing out TRQs. During this transition 
period (i.e. 2006-2009), ACP- and India-SP beneficiaries were granted free access to 
75 percent of their previously assigned quotas.  
Restructuring the EU sugar sector has major implications for ACP sugar producers and 
traders. A recent report by Agritrade (2010a) provides an example in the expansion of 
Associated British Foods (ABF). In 2006, ABF purchased 51 percent of the issued 
share capital of one of the major sugar companies in Southern Africa called Illovo, 
which operates in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zambia. According to the report, the cooperation with ABF has led to a substantial 
expansion in sugar production in Southern Africa.  
 
 
2.5 Policy Implications: What are the Main Negotiating Issues to be Examined? 
This detailed description of the context for the EU-SADC EPAs highlights several 
important issues relevant to analyzing the impact of the envisaged agreements. These 
issues can be summarized in three main categories. First, impact analyses of the EU-
SADC EPAs should be undertaken in a way that assesses how far the underlying 
objective of helping SADC members to effectively integrate into the world economy is 
achieved. Second, given that enhancing existing regional integration is one of the 
                                                          
43 The potential impact of the EU sugar reforms on the sugar world markets has been extensively 
addressed in the literature. See, for example, Elobeid and Beghin (2006).  
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announced objectives of the EU-ACP EPAs, examining how SADC regional integration 
will be affected by different EPA scenarios is crucial. These two aspects jointly 
highlight the significance of employing general equilibrium analysis that encompasses 
different SADC members, the EU and other main trade partners within an internally 
consistent modelling framework. Eventually, a third important issue for any critical 
evaluation of the impact of the EU-SADC EPAs lies in identifying appropriate 
counterfactual scenarios to the agreements. Bearing in mind that the status quo prior 
to the agreements is unsustainable, the consequences of the EPAs should be 
contrasted with available WTO-compatible alternatives to the EU-SADC EPAs. 
  
  
3 Regional Integration Agreements: Theoretical Foundations 
and Analytical Approaches 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The static theory on preferential trade liberalization does not provide a clear-cut 
proof of the sign of the potential welfare impact on the participant countries and their 
trade partners, let alone the magnitude of the impact. The impacts of discriminatory 
trade liberalization depend mainly on the pre-liberalization economic features and 
trade relationships among member countries. Furthermore, the institutional features 
of the regional group itself and its trade linkages with the rest of the world are main 
determinants for integration outcomes. A large strand of literature examines the 
different types of RTAs and how their institutional features influence potential 
outcomes. 
This chapter provides a systematic discussion of the theoretical foundations and 
analytical issues that surround the analysis of impacts of RTAs. Section 3.2 reviews 
the theoretical literature on RTAs, starting with identifying potential trade and 
welfare effects in member countries, non-member countries and the world at large. 
Subsequently, attention turns to the associated changes in the economic structure, 
leading to a discussion of potential adjustment costs. Section 3.3 presents the various 
analytical approaches adopted in the relevant literature for assessing RTAs, and 
provides thoughts on how this diversity in approaches leads to complexity in 
interpreting findings taken from different studies. Section 3.4 provides a critical 
review of selected studies that examine the impacts of the EU-SADC EPAs. Finally, 
Section 3.5 concludes with a summary of syntheses of the literature. 
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3.2 Regional Trade Agreements in Theory  
Welfare implications of preferential trade liberalization have been widely discussed in 
the theoretical literature. This section outlines the main themes of the literature on 
the impacts of preferential trade liberalization and the underlying transmission 
channels that bring forth these effects. 
 
3.2.1. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects 
The theoretical debate on welfare implications of trade liberalization stems from the 
pioneering work of Viner (1950), Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) on the theory of 
customs unions. Regional integration implies trade liberalization among member 
countries and trade protection vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The generated welfare 
effects within this model of ‘second best’ are ambiguous. Trade liberalization entails 
trade expansion, which is not necessarily welfare-improving. Whether or not trade 
expansion is welfare-improving depends on the source of the increments in trade. 
Viner (1950) demonstrates that forming a CU is welfare-improving in sectors that 
experience trade creation whereas it causes welfare-decreasing trade diversion in 
other sectors. Trade creation enhances welfare since it implies replacing high-cost 
domestic production with imports from a partner country. Trade diversion, on the 
other hand, occurs when imports are diverted from a non-member country to less 
efficient products in a member country and, thereby, reduces welfare. If member and 
non-member countries were treated equally, the non-member country would be the 
lower-cost import source. The relative magnitude of these two effects determines the 
net welfare effect of forming a CU. Viner’s partial equilibrium analysis does not 
provide such economy-wide net welfare implications. 
The fundamental departure of Meade’s model from Viner’s work is that it goes beyond 
the assumption of ‘small country’ in examining the welfare effects for the world as a 
whole within a general equilibrium framework. Meade (1955) points out that the 
relative magnitudes of trade creation and trade diversion are not sufficient to 
determine the economy-wide net welfare effects. He demonstrates that net-welfare 
effects depend on the relative changes in cost per unit for created and diverted trade. 
Pre-liberalization tariff levels and the degree of cross-product complementarity are, 
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inter alia, the main determinants of welfare outcomes. He also argues that with 
continuing tariff cuts, world welfare gains from trade creation shrink with higher 
probability of trade diversion.1 
Lipsey criticizes Viner’s work, arguing that trade-diverting CUs can be welfare-
improving. Based on the assumption of substitution in consumption, Lipsey (1957, p. 
43) demonstrates that “… [A] country … might gain by entering a customs union 
whose sole production effect was to divert her import trade from lower- to higher-
cost sources of supply”. The author (Lipsey 1957, p. 43) explains that   
“The possibility stems from the fact that whenever imports are subject to a 
tariff, the position of equilibrium must be one where an indifference curve 
cuts (not is tangent to) the international price line. From this it follows 
that there will exist an area where indifference curves higher than the one 
achieved at equilibrium lie below the international price line”. 
By diverting imports to a member country, consumer prices drop by the tariff rate on 
pre-CU imports from a non-member country. This might offset price differences 
between member and non-member countries. Lipsey (1957, pp. 41-44) graphically 
shows a trade diversion case where the generated consumer surplus offsets the 
generated terms of trade loss and, therefore, the net welfare impact is positive. 
Bhagwati (1971) seconds Lipsey’s argument for the possibility that a trade-diverting 
CU generates welfare gains. However, Bhagwati criticizes Lipsey’s analysis as 
insufficient to validate the argument. Instead, he introduces variability in production 
as a source of the gains derived from trade diversion. Bhagwati (1971, p. 585) 
explains that  
“The trade diversion, in the sense of a shift of imports to a higher-cost 
source of supply, implies a terms of trade loss. On the other hand, the 
price-ratio facing domestic consumers and producers moves closer to the 
“true” (least-cost) international price-ratio so that there is a consumption 
gain and a production gain respectively. In so far as the aggregate of these 
                                                          
1 Influenced by Meade’s work on the effects of RTAs on third parties and world welfare, Lipsey and 
Lancaster (1956–1957) develop the theory of second-best. Panagariya (1996b) provides an extensive 
discussion of Meade’s work on regional integration. 
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gains outweighs the terms of trade loss, a trade-diverting customs union 
will show welfare-improvement”. 
The basic foundations of welfare analysis of CUs were not concluded until Mundell’s 
contribution on the terms of trade effects. As such, the main components of welfare 
impacts (i.e. production, consumption and terms of trade changes) are elaborately 
explained in the literature. The next sub-section presents the terms of trade effects in 
detail. 
Potential welfare effects of the EU-SADC EPAs on SADC members seem ambiguous. 
Providing preferential access to EU products in SADC markets entails discriminatory 
liberalization for imports from the EU at the expense of non-EU exporters, including 
other SADC partners. In light of pre-EPAs SADC trade and protection structures, 
launching an FTA with the EU might generate welfare gains for SADC members that 
impose high tariff protection on imports from the EU. This preferential trade 
liberalization might, however, imply fewer imports from other SADC partners; South 
Africa in particular. Potential export expansions and market share gains depend, inter 
alia, on comparative advantage and competition in the EU markets. The net welfare 
impacts are expected to vary across SADC countries and, for that reason, a 
comprehensive country- and sector-specific analysis that accounts for intra-SADC 
trade and tariff structures is required. 
 
3.2.2. Terms of Trade Effects 
Discriminatory tariff reductions by a member country generate changes in its terms of 
trade vis-à-vis both other members in the regional group and trade partners outside 
the region. Mundell (1964) examines the terms of trade effects driven by 
discriminatory tariff reductions. Presuming substitutability in the domestic market, he 
proves that terms of trade for the partner country improves vis-à-vis both the tariff-
reducing country and the rest of the world. In other words, discriminatory tariff 
reductions by a member country generates terms of trade gains for its regional trade 
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partner. The higher the pre-liberalization tariffs, the greater are the accrued terms of 
trade gains by the partner country.2 
It is ambiguous, though, whether terms of trade for the tariff-reducing country 
improves or deteriorates with respect to the rest of the world. Mundell (1964, p. 7) 
argues that “… the terms of trade for the rest of the world worsens with respect to at 
least one and perhaps both of the member countries”. He highlights the importance of 
the elasticity of substitution for member countries between imports from inside and 
from outside the region in determining the associated terms of trade effects. For a 
member country, the less the elasticity of substitution between imports originated 
inside the region and their substitutes from outside the region, the higher is the 
probability of deteriorating its terms of trade with respect to the rest of the world.3 
Such term of trade changes entail changes in welfare. Favourable changes in terms of 
trade mean that each export unit is being sold in the world market for more import 
units and vice versa. Accordingly, changes in terms of trade lead to income 
redistribution among member countries; some members gain while others lose.4 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999, pp. 38-56) demonstrate that whether a member 
country gains or not depends on the degree of preferential access it gives to its trade 
partner in the region vis-à-vis the preferential access it receives from them. 
Drawing on this theoretical review, discriminatory trade liberalization generates 
terms of trade and, hence, welfare impacts not only in member countries but also in 
the rest of the world. Impacts on third parties are driven through several channels 
including trade diversion, terms of trade and rules of origin (RoOs); the latter will be 
dealt with in the next sub-section. The magnitude of the terms of trade effects is 
                                                          
2 Nevertheless, if exports by the partner country and exports by the non-member country are 
complementary for domestic consumers, the terms of trade for both member countries might 
deteriorate with respect to the rest of the world. This influential article was republished in 1999, see 
Mundell (1999, pp. 145-156). 
3 The author provides some specific types of tariff reductions that lead to improvements in the terms of 
trade for both member countries with respect to the rest of the world.  
4 Despite the high importance of terms of trade effects in trade theory, less attention has been given to 
measuring the impact of forming a RTA on export prices for non-member countries. Chang and Winters 
(2002, pp. 889-904) econometrically examine the impact of forming the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) on the prices of imports from outside the region. They demonstrate a substantial decline 
in the prices of imports from non-members and conclude that “… the price effects of integration can be 
quantitatively significant for nonmember exporters supplying an integrating market …”. 
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determined, inter alia, by the pre-liberalization trade patterns and protection 
structures not only among member countries but for third parties as well. 
Furthermore, the degree of substitutability between imports from member countries 
and imports from non-member countries affects the direction of potential changes in 
terms of trade with respect to the rest of the world. Therefore, welfare impacts for 
regional integration can only be properly grasped within a general equilibrium 
framework that encompasses all members in the regional group, as well as their trade 
partners in the rest of the world. 
Reciprocal trade liberalization in the context of the EU-SADC EPAs yields terms of 
trade changes in opposite directions. For SADC members, reducing tariffs on imports 
from the EU entails terms of trade deterioration, whereas the EU tariff removal 
improves terms of trade. The net terms of trade effect is determined, inter alia, by 
SADC pre-liberalization trade relationships and protection and the degree and pattern 
of tariff cuts. 
Some concerns on deterioration in SADC terms of trade vis-à-vis both the EU and third 
parties are legitimate here. As we will see in Chapter 4, the EU is the main source of 
SADC imports in many sectors where high tariff protections are imposed. On the 
export side, the EU is the primary exporting market for many SADC products. 
Nevertheless, pre-liberalization EU tariffs on SADC exports are relatively low. Overall, 
SADC markets are more protected than EU markets. Reciprocal trade liberalization, 
therefore, means that SADC gives a greater preference margin to EU products (vis-à-
vis SADC imports from other partners) than the preference margin SADC exports are 
granted in the EU markets (vis-à-vis EU imports from other partners). In addition, the 
envisaged EU-EPAs with other ACP states and completing the Doha Round of 
multilateral liberalization mean yet lesser preference margins are likely to be given to 
SADC products in the EU markets. It is thus unlikely for the EU SADC EPAs to generate 
sensible terms of trade gains for SADC members. 
The effects on SADC terms of trade with respect to third parties are ambiguous too. 
Launching a FTA between the EU and SADC entails discriminatory liberalization for 
EU-SADC trade while keeping tariffs on SADC imports from other partners. SADC tariff 
removal might entail terms of trade deteriorations with respect to non-EU partners. 
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This proposition is based on an inference of low elasticity of substitution in SADC 
markets between EU products and their equivalents from outside the EU, as suggested 
later in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the SADC-EPA group does not cover all SADC 
members. It is therefore possible for some SADC members to experience terms of 
trade losses, if the EU discriminatorily removes tariffs on imports from their SADC 
partners. 
 
3.2.3. Trade Deflection Effects 
The trade effects of different types of preferential trade arrangements have long been 
examined using the traditional CU framework, with little distinction made between 
CUs and FTAs. The analytical framework for trade effects should, however, account for 
the different theoretical elements of each type of integration scheme. At the region’s 
border, FTAs are more discriminatory against third parties exports than CUs and, as 
such, different trade distorting effects are FTAs-specific.5 
In the absence of CET, indirect trade flows from non-member countries can enter the 
region through the member with the lowest tariffs, and are then transhipped to other 
members, i.e. trade deflection.6 Arguably, this trade deflection effect is welfare-
improving for both member and non-member countries. It induces positive 
consumption effects for member countries and alleviates the negative effects of 
discriminatory trade liberalization for excluded countries. Nevertheless, it yields 
distribution effects within the regional group. Tariff revenues are transferred from 
members with higher tariffs to members with lower tariffs. 
In order to prevent trade flows from accessing the region indirectly through its lower 
tariff border, RoOs need to be established.7 It is worth mentioning that RoOs are 
distorting trade measures, per se. They prohibit trade flows that are potentially 
sourced from more efficient producers. Krueger (1993, pp. 8-9) argues that “… ROOs 
                                                          
5 Many studies examine trade effects driven by FTAs, albeit a few studies contrast them with those of 
CUs, e.g. Krueger (1995). 
6 Recent empirical studies examine trade deflection effects. For example, Bown and Crowley (2007) 
find substantial trade deflection flows of Japanese exports away from the US market, in which they face 
antidumping and safeguard tariffs, to third countries. 
7 In addition to preventing trade deflection, RoOs give incentives to producers to use inputs that are 
originated within the region rather than imported inputs from third countries. 
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can constitute a source of bias toward economic inefficiency in FTAs in a way they 
cannot do with customs unions”. She demonstrates that imposing RoOs, in the context 
of FTAs, effectively broadens trade barriers from the most protective member to the 
least protective member in the region. Krueger (1993,  p. 2) points out that “… not 
only must a country’s trade barriers be low, but so also must its partner’s, to insure 
that these costs are avoided”. Presuming that the effective rate of protection does not 
rise after launching a CU, Krueger (1995, p. 15 and p. 4) demonstrates that “… an FTA 
cannot lead to any more trade creation than can a customs union and, when ROOs 
export any protection, an FTA leads to more trade diversion than does a customs 
union” and “[t]herefore, all else equal, customs union arrangements are strictly Pareto 
superior to free trade agreements”. 
Trade deflection effects are particularly relevant in the EU-SADC EPAs context. As we 
will see in Chapter 4, trade patterns and tariff structures are heterogeneous among 
SADC members, and for SADC, on one side, and the EU on the other. Overall, SADC 
members impose higher tariff restrictions against exports from third parties than the 
EU does. Third party products can potentially be re-exported through EU borders into 
SADC markets. This effect entails consumer welfare gains and tariff losses for SADC 
members. Trade deflection effects in the opposite direction are also valid for the 
highly protected sector in the EU market. Third country exports can enter EU markets 
through SADC borders and thereby tariff revenue will be transferred from the EU to 
SADC importers. Furthermore, the EU EPAs that exclude South Africa inevitably result 
in deflecting EU products to BLNS and re-exporting them to South Africa. South Africa 
can also deflect the exports that face high tariffs barriers in the EU to its BLNS 
partners. In the case of signing EPAs with the SADC-EPA group only, the EU products 
can be deflected away from non-participant SADC members to low tariff borders in 
the SADC-EPA group. Likewise, non-participant SADC exports will have access to EU 
markets through their SADC partners. Therefore, RoOs in the context of the EU-SADC 
EPAs, as well as intra-SACU trade, can play an important role in keeping the potential 
trade deflection effects at low levels.8 
                                                          
8 Despite this importance, very few empirical studies on the impact of the EPA RoOs on SADC trade are 
conducted. Section 3.4 reviews one of these studies. 
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3.2.4. Changes in Production Structure and Efficiency 
The World Bank (2000, pp. 29-62) interestingly classifies the impacts of regional 
integration into trade and location effects versus competition and scale effects. The 
former refers to associated changes in the pattern of trade and location of production 
that eventually generate changes in real incomes for consumers, producers and 
government; whereas the latter deals with trade policy effects under new trade 
theory. This sub-section elaborates on how regional integration influences production 
and resource allocation decisions under both perfectly and imperfectly competitive 
market structures. 
Regional integration and the associated changes in trade provide impulses to the 
production system in member countries and the rest of the world. Ricardian and 
Heckscher-Ohlin theories propose that resources are reallocated across activities 
according to comparative advantage for member countries relative to each other, on 
the one hand, and relative to non-member countries on the other. Under the 
assumption of inter-sectoral factor mobility, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
demonstrates that increases in relative prices of goods intensive in a factor induce 
income distribution effect in favour of this factor. That is to say, trade liberalization 
benefits the owners of the relatively abundant factor and harms those who hold the 
scarce factors. 
“Traditional theory based on the perfect competition paradigm had very 
little good to say about any measures to interfere with free trade. A tariff 
could benefit one country that was large enough to improve its terms of 
trade, even if this resulted in a net economic loss to the world as a whole”, 
(Dixit 1993, p. 180).  
In their survey of trade-focused CGE models, Robinson and Thierfelder (2002, p. 596) 
emphasize that “[a]nalysis with neoclassical models seems to get the sign right, but 
the magnitude wrong …”. This is because models based on the conventional trade 
theory are inadequate for explaining an important phenomenon in international 
economy - intra-industry trade. 
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New trade theory goes beyond neoclassical market structure and contemplates 
features such as imperfect competition, economies of scale and trade externalities.9 
Krugman (1979 and 1980) demonstrates that trade occurs even without the 
traditional comparative advantage impulses. Combining markets into a regional entity 
enables individual members to pursue gains from economies of scale in a setting with 
intra-industry differentiation and monopolistic competition. Dixit and Norman (1980, 
pp. 265-294) provide models in the same class that show that increased competition 
fosters efficiency gains among firms in different member states. This, however, might 
adversely affect welfare since firms specialize in a narrow product variety. Under the 
assumption of product differentiation and monopolistic competition, they 
demonstrate that the more homogenous the economic structures for member 
countries, the more pronounced is their intra-industry trade. These contributions 
provide an elegant account of the determinants of trade under economies of scale and 
imperfect competition.10 
To summarize, the theoretical literature on trade liberalization highlights the 
importance of associated changes in the production and trade mixes. The relevant 
question is whether these changes are desirable from a development economics 
perspective. The next sub-section addresses this question. 
 
                                                          
9 Willenbockel (1994, pp. 63-106) provides step-by-step explanations for partial and general 
equilibrium models with new trade theory features. The study analyzes the determinants of the effects 
for the UK of EC integration under economies of scale and imperfect competition. 
10 The introduction of imperfect competition to trade theory and applied trade policy analysis has 
triggered a voluminous body of literature exploring trade liberalization under alternative market 
structures. A review of this literature is beyond the scope of the present study. Willenbockel (2004) 
studies the robustness of results from trade liberalization scenarios to alternative market structure 
assumptions in a CGE context. The study concludes that “For a given demand nesting structure, the 
simulated responses to a trade policy shock are far more sensitive to the direct or indirect selection of 
demand substitution elasticity figures and benchmark mark-ups at the calibration stage than to the 
choice of firm conduct specification at the theoretical model design stage”, (Willenbockel 2004, pp. 
1092-1093). 
61 
 
 
 
3.2.5. Efficient Re-allocation or De-industrialization? 
There is controversy in the literature around the impact of trade liberalization on 
development. One school of thought argues that trade liberalization produces more 
diversified output and export structures and lifts the economy to the industrialisation 
phase of the development ladder. For example, Krueger (1998, pp. 1515-1516) points 
out that  
“… a liberalised trade regime permits low-cost producers to expand their 
output well beyond that demanded in the domestic market. Whereas 
industrialisation based on protection of domestic industries thus results in 
ever-higher capital intensity of production … the open trade regime 
permits enjoyment of constant returns to scale over a much wider range”.  
Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1998) also advocate the long term structural effects 
of liberalization policy.11  
In contrast, proponents of protectionism argue that short-term protection enables 
new industries to exploit economies of scale and, thereby, enhances production 
efficiency. Moreover, some scholars have doubts about trade liberalization impacts on 
industrialization and growth. Rodrik (1988) analytically criticizes various arguments 
that link trade liberalization with productivity and growth. The study interestingly 
concludes with the disclaimer: “Warning! Trade liberalization cannot be shown to 
enhance technical efficiency; nor has it been empirically demonstrated to do so”. 
More importantly, some empirical studies provide evidence of de-industrialization 
effects in developing countries that pursue trade liberalization policies. Wangwe 
(1995) points out that competitive pressure is not sufficient to diversify export base 
and direct it towards manufacturing sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa. He also highlights 
the importance of applying a ‘managed’ liberalization strategy that offers chances for 
firms to cope with a more competitive environment and provides incentives to build 
up their production capabilities. In contrast, Lewis (2001) demonstrates that trade 
liberalization and the associated structural change in South Africa during the nineties 
                                                          
11 The authors highlight the importance of distinguishing between trade liberalization and openness in 
assessing these changes in the export and production structures. They conclude that “… it is vital not to 
equate liberalisation with openness and equally vital to remember that openness is a function of many 
factors not just liberalisation”. Trade liberalization measurements have been extensively discussed in 
the literature. See, for example, Iapadre (2004). 
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do not entail de-industrialization. Moreover, Edwards and Lawrence (2006) 
demonstrate that trade liberalization during the nineties stimulates and diversifies 
South African exports. Based on the estimated long term export function, the study 
identifies two channels through which liberalization promotes export capabilities: 
reducing inputs costs and enhancing profitability of exporting relative to domestic 
sales. Retrospectively, tariff protection during the Apartheid period negatively affects 
exports of non-commodity manufactured goods. The study, accordingly, attributes the 
acquired comparative advantage in capital-intensive primary and manufactured 
commodities to both natural resource endowments and the protection pattern.  
Inferences on de-industrialization effects in developing countries should be treated 
with caution, though. It is important to distinguish between de-industrialization and 
efficient reallocation of resources. Trade liberalization might cause contraction in 
some manufacturing sectors that had previously expanded under protective policy 
without justification on the grounds of dynamic comparative advantage. This type of 
de-industrialization might seem reasonable if it is transitory and efficiency-
enhancing.12   
Such changes in output and trade structures are particularly important in the context 
of the EU-SADC EPAs. The agreements endeavour to help SADC to maintain 
sustainable development and to integrate into the world economy. Some studies 
argue that opening SADC markets and exposing domestic production to high 
competition from EU products enhance supply capacity and production efficiency and, 
eventually, help to diversify industry and export structures. On the other hand, some 
scholars express concerns about potential de-industrialization effects in SADC 
economies. Relative to the EU, SADC countries have comparative advantage in 
agricultural and agro-processing activities. Accordingly, reciprocal liberalization with 
the EU is likely to reallocate resources away from manufacturing activities towards 
the sectors with comparative advantage. Indeed, a study by the United Nations-
Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) (2005) suggests contractions in heavy 
                                                          
12 For a more detailed discussion, see Shafaeddin (2005). 
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industries, low- and medium- technologies, textiles and clothing in Sub-Saharan Africa 
under a full reciprocity scenario with the EU.13   
Even for the studies that advocate favourable structural effects of the EU-SADC EPAs, 
clear acknowledgments on the associated adjustment costs are provided. But, what is 
the nature of these adjustment costs and how are they dealt with in the literature? 
 
3.2.6. Structural Change: At What Adjustment Costs? 
Trade liberalization generates structural change, for both the output and trade mix, 
which is likely to be associated with high adjustment costs. After liberalizing trade, 
production factors move across sectors, mainly towards export-oriented sectors. The 
displaced factors and the economy as a whole incur adjustment costs. Examples of 
factor-displacement costs are expenses associated with searching for job 
opportunities, and costs incurred acquiring new skills. Furthermore, in the case of 
market imperfections, e.g. price rigidity and factor immobility, the economy as a 
whole incurs net welfare costs of adjustment associated with income losses and 
underemployment.14  
Literature on adjustment costs suffers from ill-defined concepts, lack of required data 
and complexities in the provided measures. Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson (1980, pp. 
406-413) provide an eloquent discussion of potential adjustment costs as a result of 
multilateral trade liberalization. Empirical studies on developing countries in general, 
and SADC countries in particular, are few. Milner and Wright (1998) examine labour 
market adjustment to trade liberalization policies implemented during the 1980s in 
Mauritius. 
Adjustment costs could be particularly influential for SADC economies should they 
undertake reciprocal liberalization with the EU. In these economies, unskilled labour-
intensive sectors are predominant with salient features of factor market rigidity. 
Indeed, Davidson and Matusz (2000) demonstrate that, under factor rigidity 
assumptions, adjustment costs might outweigh generated gains. In spite of this 
                                                          
13 Results provided by this study are presented later in detail in Section 3.4. 
14 In this context, Mussa (1974) specifies the determinants of factor income responses to changes in 
commodity prices in both the short and long terms. He highlights the importance of factor specificity, 
substitutability and intensity. 
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important impact, empirical studies on welfare effects of trade liberalization tend to 
neglect, or at least underestimate the associated adjustment costs. This is attributed, 
inter alia, to lack of required data at a sufficiently disaggregated level, avoiding any 
additional complexity to welfare analysis or adopting assumptions about market 
perfections and fully adaptable factors/activities. 
Indeed, concerns on adjustment costs associated with the EU-SADC EPAs are 
discussed in the relevant literature. Some studies attempt to estimate the potential 
adjustment costs, e.g. Milner (2006), and others assess complementary measurements 
to compensate these estimated costs, e.g. Silva and Grynberg (2006) and Braun-
Munzinger (2009). 
     
 
3.3 Regional Trade Agreements: Different Analytical Perspectives 
At this stage of developing the analytical framework and before turning to the 
empirical work on the EU-SADC EPAs, it is worth distinguishing between different 
approaches to dealing with the impacts of RTAs. In this literature, one could identify 
different analytical approaches. The first one examines the impacts of RTAs and 
addresses the question whether the RTA is welfare-improving for the RTA partners or 
not. This type of analysis is already discussed in Section 3.2.  
Another strand of studies considers more comprehensive impacts on the global 
liberalization process. Studies in this category are concerned with the questions 
whether RTAs bring the global economy closer to the ideal of globally unrestricted 
trade or RTAs impose additional distortions on the global trade system, and to what 
extent a RTA is compatible with the WTO objectives. This analytical approach of 
viewing regionalism is dealt with in Sub-sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. The last group of 
studies considers the distribution of gains and losses between member countries and 
how the institutional features of an RTA could affect its outcomes and their 
distribution. Clearly, this task is not straightforward in light of the observed 
overlapping trade arrangements and criss-cross trade preferences. Sub-sections 3.3.3 
and 3.3.4 provide a review of these analytical issues.  
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3.3.1. Building or Stumbling Blocks? 
FTAs are preferential arrangements that liberalize trade among member countries 
but, in effect, impose trade protection against non-member countries. From this 
perspective, a large number of studies examine whether the proliferation of RTAs will 
eventually lead to non-discriminatory trade liberalization or whether it adds further 
distortions to the world trading system. Many scholars argue against preferential, 
both bilateral and regional, trade liberalization since it undermines the multilateral 
trade liberalization process. Panagariya (1996a, p. 485) finds that “… discriminatory 
liberalisation under FTAs may increase rather than decrease protection and may, 
indeed, make the countries undertaken the liberalisation as well as the world as a 
whole worse off”. Along this line, Crawford and Fiorentino (2005, p. 16) point out that 
“… RTAs may pose a threat to a balanced development of world trade through 
increased trade and investment division …”. 
In his seminal paper, Bhagwati (1991) introduces the concept of a ‘building block’ 
describing a PTA that contributes to global free trade in contrast to a ‘stumbling block’ 
that fragments world trade. Lawrence (1991) specifies some criteria for a PTA to 
serve as a ‘building block’, among which are expanding its membership and urging 
multilateral trade liberalization. DeRosa (1998) asserts that reducing trade barriers 
with non-member countries would generate more welfare gains and support 
multilateral trade liberalization.  
Baldwin (2006) introduces a novel political economy mechanism, termed the 
‘spaghetti bowls as building blocs’ mechanism, of the proliferation of RTAs. Employing 
the ‘domino theory’ of regionalism, the study explains that after an immediate impact 
that deepens integration within a new preferential trading area, non-members tend to 
join the regional group.15 This entails more discriminatory trade liberalization against 
other non-members and, thereby, stronger political incentive to integrate. This 
iteration eventually leads to the ‘multi-lateralization of regionalism’.  
                                                          
15 The ‘domino theory’ of regionalism was first introduced by Baldwin (1993). For applications of the 
‘domino theory’ to US-Mexico integration and the EU, see Baldwin (1997).  
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Interestingly, Richard Blackhurst, in the context of commenting on Bhagwati (1993, 
pp. 56-57), concludes that  
“… the fundamental issue in this area is not regionalism versus 
multilateralism, but rather interventionism versus liberalism. In other 
words, the fact that regional economic integration can be either 
supportive of or antagonistic toward the multilateral trading system, 
depending on the details, suggests that regional economic integration per 
se is not the basic issue”. 
 
3.3.2. The Natural Trading Bloc Argument  
Another school of thought argues that although discriminatory tariff reductions are 
not the optimal solution, regional integration can be desirable under the observed 
distortions in the world trade system. In this vein, Krugman (1991) and Summers 
(1991) note that countries in the same geographical region form a ‘natural trading 
bloc’ which is more likely to create, rather than divert, trade and even in the case of 
trade diversion, more influential welfare gains stem, inter alia, from realizing 
economies of scale. Krugman (1999) supports the ‘natural trading bloc’ argument and 
demonstrates that the greater the number of trading blocs and the less their sizes, the 
greater are the induced welfare gains for the world as a whole. The crux of the 
argument is that the higher the trade share with the potential partner in a RTA, the 
greater is the probability that the agreement is welfare-enhancing.   
Nonetheless, a great debate surrounds the argument of ‘natural trading bloc’. In their 
critical work, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999, p. 46) argue that  
“… the larger the initial quantity of imports from a trading partner, the 
greater (not smaller) the loss to the country liberalizing preferentially, 
ceteris paribus. That is to say, the more natural the trading partner 
according to Summers’ definition, the larger the loss from a discriminatory 
trade liberalization with it!”  
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Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests low trade shares between neighbour 
countries in many cases. Bhagwati (1999) demonstrates that substitution elasticities, 
not only trade shares, between domestic goods and imports sourced in member and 
non-member countries are a crucial determinant of the potential welfare effects 
induced by any regional arrangement. Schiff (1996 and 1999) challenges both 
arguments by considering the revenue loss in the welfare analysis. Using a partial 
equilibrium framework, the author finds that the higher import shares from a trading 
partner, the more likely it is for the tariff losses to outweigh the gains in consumer 
surplus.  
An important issue that is intensively discussed in the EU-SADC EPAs literature is the 
effectiveness of the EPAs in integrating SADC into the world market. That is to 
question the extent to which the EU-SADC EPAs are ‘building blocks’. Although the EU 
is not geographically a ‘natural trading bloc’ for SADC, the EU is a primary exporting 
market for many SADC countries. The theoretical literature does not provide a clear-
cut answer on whether this pattern of integration entails potential gains for SADC or 
predominant losses. This issue, indeed, merits a thorough empirical, rather than 
analytical, examination.  
In this context, Hinkle and Schiff (2004) argue that the EU-EPA provides an 
opportunity for Sub-Saharan African countries to effectively integrate into the global 
market. The pressure on Sub-Saharan African countries to liberalize trade with the EU 
accelerates their own regional integration and reform policies. Besides, liberalizing 
trade in services and the associated regulatory reforms generate strong second-round 
effects for other sectors and attract foreign investment. The study emphasizes that the 
EU-EPA’s potential as a pro-development device for Sub-Saharan Africa lies in its non-
trade components. These include liberalizing RoOs, relaxing labour movement 
regulations as well as providing adequate technical and financial support. 
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3.3.3. Spaghetti Bowl of Trade Agreements and Trade Preferences 
Empirical evidence shows that countries tend to participate in RTAs to avoid 
exclusion. This general tendency towards regionalism generates a ‘domino effect’ of 
proliferating RTAs, which eventually forms a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of overlapping 
agreements with a ‘crisscrossing’ of trade preferences.16  
This ad hoc proliferation of RTAs makes the task of examining the effects of RTAs 
particularly complicated. In order to properly assess a RTA, the preferential access 
granted to its members should be evaluated and contrasted to alternative preferential 
arrangements to which members are eligible. The potential benefits of preferential 
liberalization arrangements depend, inter alia, on the size of preference margins. 
Preference margins should be large enough to serve as economic incentives for the 
recipient country to invest in export-oriented sectors. Arguably, the WTO logic is that 
the current wave of globally lowering trade restrictions makes market access less 
important.  
“These MFN tariff reductions have diminished considerably the incentive 
to obtain preferential market access in developed country markets. 
Margins of preference – the gap between the MFN tariff rate and duty-free 
treatment – have declined, and indeed been eliminated over a large range 
of products”, (World Trade Organization 1995, p. 56).  
Product coverage also matters in assessing preferential liberalization arrangements. 
The higher the product shares in total exports for the recipient country, the greater 
are the potential export expansions and revenue gains. Other factors are either related 
to the program design, e.g. the criterion of country eligibility and other regulatory 
rules; or attributed to production and export capacities for the preference recipients. 
                                                          
16 The terms ‘spaghetti bowl’ of RTAs and ‘crisscrossing’ of trade preferences were first used by 
Bhagwati (1995) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996, pp. 1-78). 
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3.3.4. North -South versus South -South Agreements  
An important group of studies concerns how the institutional features of a RTA could 
affect its outcomes and the distribution of gains and losses among member countries. 
There is no clear-cut evidence on this issue. Some studies argue that RTAs between 
developing countries may emphasise trade diversion over trade creation. Summers 
(1991, p. 297) states that “Agreements within groups of small, highly distorted, and 
protectionist countries that diminish momentum for greater overall liberality are 
clear candidates for welfare worsening regional agreements”.  
The literature offers a variety of justifications that advocate North-South regional 
integration. Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (2003) argue that developing countries 
have greater opportunities to gain from increased competition and economies of scale 
compared to the developed members in the regional group.17 Other scholars, e.g. 
Venables (1999), note that divergence of member countries’ incomes occurs in the 
case of integration between developing countries and that convergence to high 
income levels does not occur unless the integration scheme contains at least one 
developed country.18 Vamvakidis (1998) argues that being with open and developed 
countries in the same region fosters growth rate in the home country. Schiff and Wang 
(2010) provide evidence of strong productivity gains experienced by developing 
countries in North-South RTAs.    
There is a long-standing debate in the literature around the issue of overlapping 
membership for SADC members. The majority of empirical studies attribute observed 
low intra-SADC trade to SADC multiple memberships. This issue has important 
implications for the EU-SADC EPAs as well. As we saw in Chapter 2, the EU-EPAs 
configuration assigns SADC members into different negotiating groups. The focal 
point is, therefore, to what extent the current configuration facilitates the integration 
efforts within the SADC region, on the one hand, and with the EU on the other. This 
configuration, prima facia, entails fragmenting intra-SADC regional integration.  
                                                          
17 Hinojosa-Ojeda, Robinson and Lewis (1995) reveal larger dynamic impacts of NAFTA on Mexico 
compared with the US. 
18 In a study on regional integration in Europe, Ben-David (1993) shows a strong negative relationship 
between trade liberalization and the degree of income disparity across countries. 
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In this context, some scholars argue that intra-SADC regional integration is a 
prerequisite for SADC members to benefit from the EU-EPAs. Meyn (2004) raises 
concerns about welfare losses induced by the North-South arrangement that is 
embodied in the EU-SADC EPAs. The study finds that opening markets to EU imports 
generates trade diversion and de-industrialization effects for Botswana, Mauritius and 
Mozambique. Therefore, it concludes that strengthening the South-South integration 
up-front is essential for the EU-EPAs to benefit SADC. The study, however, follows an 
analytical, rather than empirical, framework. It does not provide evidence to support 
that SADC benefits from the EU-EPAs if intra-SADC integration was completed first, let 
alone empirical findings on the optimal level of SADC integration that maximizes its 
gains from the EPAs. 
 
 
3.4 The EU-SADC EPAs in the Literature 
The EU-ACP EPAs have been empirically examined in the literature mostly at a 
regional level according to the negotiating regional groups. Examples are Keck and 
Piermartini (2008) for SADC-EPA; Milner, Morrissey and McKay (2005) for ESA-EPA; 
Ngeleza and Muhammad (2009) for Central Africa-EPA; Busse, Borrmann and 
Grossmann (2004) for West Africa-EPA; Gasiorek and Winters (2004) and Stevens, 
Kennan and Meyn (2009) for the Caribbean-EPA and Pacific-EPA groups. More 
comprehensive studies consider the ACP negotiating regions altogether, e.g. Fontagné, 
Laborde and Mitaritonna (2010).  
The literature on the EU-SADC EPAs shows a wide spread variations in terms of 
regional and sectoral coverage, adopted methodology and analytical approach. Most of 
the empirical studies conduct analyses at a regional level, covering the two 
negotiating regions in which SADC members are assigned: the SADC-EPA and ESA-
EPA groups. Yet, several SADC members are dealt with either as an individual 
negotiator (i.e. South Africa) or as part of another negotiating group. Examples for the 
latter are Ngeleza and Muhammad (2009), which considers D.R. Congo as a member of 
CEMAC, and Milner, Morrissey and McKay (2005) that deals with Tanzania as a 
member of EAC. Few studies conduct country-specific analyses, either for each SADC 
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member (e.g. Tekere and Ndlela 2003) or for a specific member (e.g. Milner, Morrissey 
and Zgovu 2007).  
Empirical examinations for the effects of the EU-SADC EPAs are generally undertaken 
within a partial equilibrium framework, fewer studies employ general equilibrium 
analyses and very few complement both methodologies. Most of analyses consider 
liberalizing trade in goods without giving adequate attention to trade in services, let 
alone to non-trade aspects of the EPAs. As an exception, Jansen (2007) assesses the 
potential benefits and losses for the Eastern and Southern African countries from 
liberalizing services trade with the EU in the EPAs context. 
Studies tend to conduct comparative analyses of the effects driven by variant EPA 
scenarios. They often do not consider the legal situation, i.e. that the status quo for 
SADC-EU trade is no longer sustainable. From this perspective, Hinkle and Schiff 
(2004) presume that the EU-EPAs are the only available scenario for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and, thereby, explore the required conditions under which Sub-Saharan African 
countries benefit the most from the EU-EPAs. It is, however, an analytical rather than 
an empirical study. Few empirical studies contrast the effects of the EU-SADC EPAs 
with the effects of alternative trade arrangements in the case of not signing final EPAs 
with the EU, e.g. Fontagné, Laborde and Mitaritonna (2010).   
In light of these variations, reviewing the conclusions abstracted from the literature is 
not a straightforward task. The impacts of different studies vary in magnitude and, 
more importantly, contradict in content. This is attributed, inter alia, to employing 
different methodologies with variation in assumptions. This section therefore seeks to 
elucidate the main trends in the ongoing debate in the literature, and the striking 
inconsistencies, without attempting to conduct comparison between specific 
outcomes. The review is based on selected ex-ante empirical studies that examine the 
EU-EPAs effect on SADC members, whether within the EU-SADC EPA configuration or 
in a different EU-ACP EPA group.    
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3.4.1. Partial Equilibrium Analysis  
Milner, Morrissey and McKay (2005) follow partial equilibrium analysis to evaluate 
the trade and welfare effects of the EU-EAC EPAs, including Tanzania.19 The study 
introduces a novel method for decomposing the induced welfare impacts into three 
components: consumption effects, trade creation and trade diversion effects. The 
study identifies three types of sector-specific effects. For those sectors where the EU is 
the main supplier, consumption effects are estimated. Secondly, for sectors where 
imports are mainly originated in third parties (i.e. non-EU and non-EAC members) 
potential trade diversion and consumption effects are quantified. Finally, trade 
creation and the associated consumption effects are calculated for those sectors 
where intra-EAC trade dominates.  
The results for Tanzania show that trade diversion effect, i.e. the second type, 
dominates leading to net welfare losses equivalent to 0.5 percent of GDP. The study 
identifies the most affected sectors by each type of the generated effects. While both 
consumption effect and trade creation effect are primarily reported in the 
manufacturing sectors, many agro-processing sectors (i.e. food products; coffee, 
cotton and sugar; manufactured food and beverages and tobacco), as well as all 
manufacturing sectors, are subject to trade diversion. Furthermore, the study finds 
that more than half of the Tanzanian tariff revenue is estimated to vanish.      
The study adopts strong assumptions on perfect competition and perfect 
substitutability between domestic products and imports, as well as between imports 
from different origins. Such assumptions entail that changes in trade measures, e.g. 
tariff reductions, are entirely transmitted into price and quantity changes in domestic 
markets. Therefore, the study’s findings are interpreted as the upper bound of the 
potential effects of the EU-EAC EPAs. Another limitation is that the analysis does not 
provide quantitative assessment for the associated changes in production. 
                                                          
19 The analytical framework of the study is an extension of Panagariya’s (1998, pp. 89-95) approach. 
Panagariya develops an analytical framework in order to examine the impacts of moving from non-
discriminatory trade barriers to preferential trade liberalization. He demonstrates that the home 
country gains from entering a RTA are mainly induced by the preferential access it receives to its 
partner’s market rather than opening its own market. 
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Milner (2006) examines the different types of adjustment costs associated with the 
EU-ACP EPAs. The study identifies five sources of adjustment costs: fiscal adjustment, 
trade facilitation and export diversification, production and employment adjustment, 
skills development and productivity enhancement, and negotiating and legislative 
costs. Instead of employing intensive modelling work, the study composes a range of 
practical indicators for each type of adjustment costs in individual ACP states. It thus 
provides proxies for the potential adjustment costs for each economy. 
Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2007) examine the potential welfare, trade and 
production effects as well as the associated adjustment implications of the Mauritius-
EU EPA. In order to quantify the trade and production changes, they follow the partial 
equilibrium analysis developed by Milner, Morrissey and McKay (2005).20 Building on 
the model estimations of the potential changes in Mauritian production and trade 
structures, they provide inferences on the associated adjustment costs. For this 
purpose, they follow the approach introduced by Milner (2006) in defining and 
examining different types of adjustment costs. Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2007) 
find that under a full EPA scenario, Mauritius experiences substantial resource losses 
due to diverting imports from more efficient producers in the rest of the world to less 
efficient EU producers. These losses are estimated at 361 million - Mauritian rupee 
2002. The experienced resource losses are, however, offset by welfare gains, the bulk 
of which (274 million - Mauritian rupee 2002) is driven by efficiency gains from 
resource reallocation. Net welfare gains are thus limited. The study highlights the 
importance of substantial adjustment costs that are primarily driven by fiscal losses 
and reductions in employment, particularly in manufacturing sectors.         
Fontagné, Laborde and Mitaritonna (2010) develop a partial equilibrium model to 
examine the effects of the ACP-EU EPAs in contrast with the corresponding effects 
drawn under a counterfactual scenario. The study is comprehensive not only in terms 
of country coverage, but also regarding analytical perspective. It covers the six ACP 
negotiating regions, including all SADC members except South Africa. The study 
                                                          
20 Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2008) combine the results on trade and welfare effects for EAC along 
with the induced effects and adjustment costs for Mauritius and provide overall conclusions and policy 
implications. Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2009) provide some inferences on potential adjustment 
costs for EAC and ACP members as a whole.    
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specifies the WTO-compatible counterfactual scenario that applies the EBA for LDC 
ACP and GSP for non-LDC ACP. 
The study results are computed as deviations from the counterfactual scenario that 
gives SADC less preferential access to the EU markets compared to the status quo. 
Results show that SADC exports to the EU increase by 30 percent in volume terms in 
2022 whereas SADC imports from the EU rise by only 11 percent. At the sectoral level, 
results show substantial export expansions to the EU for few products. In 2022, sugar 
exports to the EU increase by 511 (from Mauritius), 398 (from Swaziland) and 145 
(from Zimbabwe) million euro - 2004. In addition, the study shows an increment in 
Mauritian textiles and apparel exports to the EU worth euro 108 million. 
The study examines trade diversion and creation effects (as well as fiscal impacts) in 
isolation of the induced terms of trade and resource reallocation effects. Accordingly, 
it does not provide inferences on EPA welfare implication. These exclusions might 
lead to flawed results. It is difficult to conceive a situation where liberalizing trade 
affects only consumer prices, whereas production prices remain unchanged. Trade 
policy instruments have direct and indirect impacts on relative prices of domestic 
production. Increased competitive imports push domestic prices to decline. Demand 
is switched to imports away from domestic products. Depending on the forward and 
backward linkages across sectors, the new production mix is defined. Simultaneously, 
factor demand and supply decisions for different sectors are made. These entail 
changes in factor prices (in the case of limited factor supply) or factor employment (in 
case of abundant factors). In the course of production process, relative prices of 
primary inputs change, which in turn generate second round effects on relative prices 
of final products. 
These interlinked relationships between agents, forward and backward linkages 
across sectors and the associated second round economic effects cannot be grasped 
properly within partial equilibrium framework. From general equilibrium 
perspective, empirical studies demonstrate important terms of trade effects in the 
case of the EU-SADC EPA. For example, Keck and Piermartini (2008) argue that, under 
a complete EU-SADC EPA scenario, changes in terms of trade are the driving element 
of the incurred welfare impacts for almost all SADC regions. 
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In one of a series of the EU-ACP Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) studies, the 
European Commission (2006b) employs a partial equilibrium model to assess the 
effects driven by relaxing RoOs in the context of the EU-EPAs compared to those 
prevailing under the pre-EPA RoOs. Two case studies are conducted for the SADC-EPA 
group: garments sector in Lesotho and fisheries in Namibia. The results demonstrate 
that the members of the SADC-EPA group can reap gains from liberalizing RoOs. Trade 
expands in both sectors not only for the economies under consideration but also for 
other members in the group. Furthermore, processed fish exports increase for 
Namibia and Mozambique with potential development for the other coastal countries 
in the group, i.e. Angola and Tanzania. 
 
3.4.2. General Equilibrium Analysis 
Perez (2006) calibrates the CGE GTAP model to a global SAM derived from the GTAP 
database version 6 (hereafter referred to as GTAP6) that is referenced to 2001.21 The 
study contrasts the effects of the EU-ACP EPAs with those induced under alternative 
trade arrangements with the EU, i.e. EBA for LDCs and GSP and GSP+ for non-LDCs. 
The analysis covers all ACP groups, including South Africa, SADC and Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) regions.22  
The study finds substantial terms of trade and welfare losses, particularly for SSA 
region. Asymmetric liberalization for ACP trade alleviates these adverse effects. 
Removing tariff on only 50 percent of ACP imports from the EU reduces the 
experienced welfare losses for SSA region under a symmetric scenario by 73 percent. 
This asymmetric liberalization barely affects output and welfare for the SADC region. 
By contrasting welfare and GDP results with the corresponding consequences driven 
by the EBA/GSP scenario, the study concludes that the EU-EPA is the best option for 
the SADC region. In contrast, SSA, ACP regions and the world as a whole are better off 
                                                          
21 The GTAP model is widely implemented in analyzing trade policy and other issues. The model 
specification is documented in Hertel (1997). The model is implemented using the GEMPACK software 
as documented in Harrison and Pearson (1996).  
22 SADC region identified by the study includes four GTAP regions: Botswana, Mozambique, Rest of 
SACU and Rest of SADC. The latter is counted here since Angola was firstly part of the SADC-EPA 
negotiating group. The remaining five SADC members as represented in GTAP6 (Malawi, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Madagascar) are lumped together with the other Sub-Saharan African countries 
in one region. 
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under the EBA/GSP scenario. Not only do they experience less welfare and output 
losses, but industrialization and regional trade integration are also enhanced.    
Curran (2007) criticises the way Perez (2006) identifies and simulates those ACP 
products that graduate to GSP+. She demonstrates some contradictions with the WTO 
regulations. More importantly, she argues that excluding both sugar and bananas from 
the GSP+ privileged list of exports leads to misleading conclusions on the GSP+ as an 
alternative trade arrangement to the EU-EPAs. 
Bouët, Laborde and Mevel (2007) calibrate the Modeling International Relationships 
in Applied General Equilibrium (MIRAGE) model to a global SAM for 2001 derived 
from GTAP6.2.23 The study examines the effects of the EU-EPAs in contrast with the 
results driven under alternative scenarios for ACP regions. Among the ACP regions 
are: South Africa, SADC (according to the EPAs negotiation configuration), part of ESA 
(including Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Madagascar) and Angola, 
Seychelles and D.R. Congo as one region. Results for 2018 and 2035 are contrasted 
with the findings in the baseline year, i.e. 2008.   
The study finds that the SADC region experiences substantial export expansions, 
mostly as a result of removing EU tariffs on meat and sugar, whereas imports increase 
proportionally less leading to appreciation of real exchange rate. The same findings, 
albeit in smaller magnitudes, are reported for ESA region. Assuming constant current 
account balance, these changes entail increasing imports from other partners and 
more tariff revenue. Interestingly, the study quantifies a 5 percent long term increase 
in real income for SADC, relative to the baseline level, under the EPA scenario. In 
contrast to the EPA scenario, effects induced by the GSP scenario for the SADC region 
are negligible. For Angola, Seychelles and D.R. Congo, EPA does not provide an 
improvement in access to EU markets. Therefore, their imports increase 
proportionally higher than exports, yielding real depreciations with substantial tariff 
losses. The GSP scenario alleviates tariff losses, albeit the long term declines in real 
income remain unchanged.        
                                                          
23 The MIRAGE model is developed by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII), available at http://www.cepii.fr/. For a detailed description of the model, see 
Bchir et al. (2002). In addition to GTAP6.2, the study uses data on tariff for 2004 abstracted from 
MAcMapsHS6-v2. 
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In another study that employs MIRAGE model in examining EU-EPA impacts, with 
particular attention given to Senegal, Berisha-Krasniqi, Bouët and Mevel (2008) 
second these results for SADC and ESA regions. The study provides results on 
increasing exports, to the EU as well as to other partners, and imports from all 
partners. Therefore, it concludes that the EU-EPAs are trade-creating for SADC and 
ESA regions. It also finds that terms of trade, allocation efficiency and real income 
gains for the SADC region are substantially lower under a multilateral trade scenario. 
Clearly, these findings contradict the negative change in GDP (in both value and 
volume terms) for the SADC region concluded by Perez (2006). 
Keck and Piermartini (2008) analyze the effects on SADC members using a CGE model. 
The study comprises all SADC non-EU trade partners into two aggregated groups only, 
i.e. rest of developed and developing countries. The study’s innovation is examining 
how other EU-EPAs (namely with the EU-Mercosur EPA) could possibly affect the 
induced effects on SADC. The sectoral breakdown is highly aggregated. Within the four 
agricultural sectors, sugar is added to other crops. All manufacturing is represented 
by only three sectors without giving special focus on important industrial sectors.  
Assuming an ambitious liberalization scenario, they find that the EU-EPAs are welfare-
improving for SADC, which accrues gains worth US$ 1.5 billion. The study emphasizes 
that intra-SADC trade liberalization enhances the accrued gains, whereas the EU tariff 
removal for other ACP countries reduces SADC gains. Sectoral results show that SADC 
welfare gains are primarily driven by improving its access to EU markets, particularly 
for the animal agriculture and processed food sectors. The study, however, provokes 
concerns about de-industrialization risks24 and argues that multilateral liberalization 
lessens the reported welfare gains. 
                                                          
24 In an earlier version of the study, Keck and Piermartini (2005) argue that multilateral liberalization 
would instead enhance some manufacturing sectors, e.g. textile and clothing and light manufacturing 
sectors. 
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3.4.3. Complementary Approaches 
In a comprehensive study, United Nations-Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) 
(2005) adopts complementary partial and general equilibrium analyses to quantify 
the effects of the EU-EPAs on African countries. The study uses both the CGE GTAP 
model and the partial equilibrium Software on Market Analysis and Restrictions on 
Trade (SMART) model.25 The study provides results on the induced impacts for 
fourteen SADC members; either as members of the SADC-EPA region (i.e. Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania) or as part of the 
ESA-EPA region (i.e. D.R. Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe).  
The study finds trade creation effects outweigh trade diversion in all SADC regions 
and the highest net gains are reported for Angola, Mauritius followed by D.R. Congo 
and Tanzania. The study quantifies the part of the diverted trade that is originally 
sourced in the regional group, i.e. COMESA in the case of the ESA-EPA region and 
SADC for the SADC-EPA region. Diversion of trade sourced in the region is far higher 
for SADC members in the ESA-EPA compared to the SADC-EPA group. The study 
argues that reciprocity occurs at the expense of deeper regional integration for both 
regions.  
Increases in imports from the EU are more profound for SADC members in the ESA-
EPA compared to those in the SADC-EPA. Imports from the EU rise by more than 70 
percent for Mauritius and 30-40 percent for Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Malawi. For 
the SADC-EPA region, the highest increase in imports from the EU roughly ranges 
between 28 and 33 percent for Tanzania, Swaziland and Namibia.  
In addition to the welfare gains associated with trade creation, the study reports 
positive changes in consumer surplus for all SADC members in both regions. The gains 
accrued by SADC members in the ESA-EPA group are higher, in value terms, compared 
to the corresponding results for the SADC-EPA group, the result that is perceivable in 
                                                          
25 The SMART model is developed by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the World Bank in order to quantify trade effects generated by changes in market access. Owing to 
its simplicity, the model is widely employed in analyzing various types of trade liberalization. For an 
empirical example on constructing the SMART model and a critical discussion of the model outcomes, 
see Jachia and Teljeur (1999). 
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light of the reported trade effects. SMART model employed by the study does not 
capture the changes in producer surplus associated with the experienced trade effects. 
The study, therefore, does not provide insights on overall net welfare impacts.      
The study estimates substantial tariff losses, particularly for Angola, Mauritius and 
Tanzania. Accordingly, the study highlights the importance of tax reforms and the 
associated adjustment costs. Similar results on substantial fiscal losses for Mauritius, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe are also obtained by the SMART model in Tekere and Ndlela 
(2003). 
 
 
3.5 Syntheses of the Literature 
This chapter provides a detailed review of the main strands of the theoretical 
literature of preferential trade liberalization and highlights the different underlying 
analytical approaches. It also presents a list of selected empirical studies on the EU-
SADC EPAs. These studies adopt different methodological frameworks: partial 
equilibrium analysis, general equilibrium analysis and complementary approaches. 
Based on this review, four main conclusions that are relevant to this study can be 
drawn. First, preferential trade liberalization not only generates welfare impact in 
member countries but it also affects third parties and the world as a whole. Second, 
among the main determinants of the net effect of preferential trade liberalization are 
the degree of trade liberalization, the pre-liberalization trade patterns and protection 
structures and the degree of substitutability between imports from member and 
imports from non-member countries. Third, removing barriers to trade alters the 
production mix in relation to the prevailing forward and backward linkages across 
sectors in a given economy. The induced structural change might entail immediate 
shrinkages in manufacturing sectors. This type of effect does not necessarily imply de-
industrialization. Fourth, discriminatory trade liberalization embodied in RTAs can 
fragment free world trade. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances the 
proliferation of RTAs can eventually enhance multilateral trade liberalization. 
 
 
  
4 Main Structural Features of the SADC Economies 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
For a given economy, structural features, trade relationships as well as initial 
protection conditions are among major determinants of its response to changes in 
trade policy. Therefore, a close inspection of these features for the economies under 
consideration provides preliminary suggestions on potential welfare and trade effects 
of the simulated changes in trade policy. Furthermore, they are essential for 
identifying the main transmission channels and thus for understanding the dominant 
causal mechanisms that drive the results of the quantitative simulation analysis.  
Therefore, this chapter aims to provide detailed analyses of SADC production and 
trade structures. The objective is twofold. First and foremost, it portrays SADC 
economies at the baseline scenario. This provides a sound background against which 
to contrast the post-simulation economic status. Secondly, rigorous descriptive 
analysis of SADC economies provides indications of potential implications of the 
envisaged EU-SADC EPAs.   
The chapter starts by deriving and aggregating data from the GTAP database (Section 
4.2). Section 4.3 analyzes the structural characteristics and initial conditions of SADC 
economies as captured at the baseline scenario. Section 4.4 provides detailed 
examination of the nature of SADC trade and protection profiles at four levels: total 
trade, SADC trade with the EU, intra-SADC trade and SADC trade with other major 
trade partners. Drawing from the thematic analyses conducted in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, 
inferences around the likely implications of the EPAs on SADC economies are 
provided. Section 4.5 summarizes potential implications of the EU-SADC EPAs. 
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4.2 Global Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
The underlying database for CGE models is typically represented as a social 
accounting matrix (SAM) where flows of income and expenditure for different agents 
are recorded.1  
“The relationship between SAMs and models is twofold. On the one hand, 
modeling is a major area of application of SAMs … On the other hand, 
models are important as a formalization of particular conceptual 
frameworks. Without such frameworks, data gathering is largely an empty 
exercise”, (Pyatt and Round 1985, p. 8). 
The model implemented in this study, which is described in detail in the following 
chapter, is calibrated to a global SAM derived from the GTAP database version 7 
(hereafter referred to as GTAP7) that is referenced to 2004. The GTAP database is 
sorted in a Header Array (HAR) file format. The model employed in this study is coded 
and implemented using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). Therefore, 
the GAMS – Data Exchange (GDX) tool is used to extract data from GTAP7 and to 
transform it into a GAMS-compatible format.2 
The next sub-section provides an overview of the main components of the GTAP7 
database and its limitations. The aggregation schemes and the global SAM dimensions 
used in this study are then described. Lastly, benchmark parameters are declared.   
 
4.2.1. GTAP7 Database: Coverage and Limitations 
The GTAP database is widely used in multi-region, multi-sector trade-focused CGE 
modelling. It is characterised by its comprehensive regional coverage and high 
sectoral disaggregation. GTAP7 includes data on 113 regions, 57 sectors and 5 
production factors.3  
                                                          
1 For a detailed description of SAMs, see Pyatt (1988, pp. 329-337). One of the earliest applications of 
SAMs to developing countries is provided by Pyatt and Round (1977, pp. 339-364). 
2 I participated in two live forums organized by the Center for Global Trade Analysis: GTAP7 Data Base 
(13th January 2009) and Bilateral Services Trade Data in the GTAP7 Database (18th Feb 2010). For a 
detailed description of the GTAP7 database, see Narayanan and Walmsley (2008). For a detailed, 
technical explanation on deriving a global SAM from the GTAP database, see McDonald and Thierfelder 
(2004).  
3 The GTAP Sectoral Classification (GSC) follows the Central Product Classification (CPC) for 
agricultural and food processing sectors. It, however, defines all other sectors according to the 
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Bilateral trade flows are at the core of the GTAP database. Trade transactions are 
recorded by both country of origin and country of destination. Due to lack of 
information, data on trade and transportation margins as well as remittances is 
identified by either the source or the destination only, rather than by both.4  
The GTAP7 database provides information on protection for merchandise trade. This 
includes bilateral applied tariff rates, ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific and 
compound tariffs and TRQs (measured on the basis of the binding tariff, i.e. in- or out-
of-quota tariffs). The estimated tariff quota rents, for the filled quotas, are supposed to 
be reaped by exporters.5  
In addition, data on anti-dumping, domestic and export subsidies and export tax 
equivalents (ETE) is also included in GTAP7. Data on agricultural domestic support 
are based on the OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for four support measures, 
i.e. output subsidies, intermediate input subsidies, land-based payments and capital-
based payments. Data on agricultural export taxes and subsidies are based on country 
notifications to the WTO Secretariat. For the EU-25 members, data derived from the 
Financial Report on the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(FREAGGF) is used to calculate agricultural export subsidies.6 
It is worth mentioning that the GTAP7 database includes updated estimations of ETE 
of export quotas on textiles and clothing covered by the Agreement on Textile and 
Clothing (ATC). Among the updates introduced into the GTAP7 database are EU 
enlargement and phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). Many of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC, Rev. 3). For the mapping between GTAP sectors 
and the corresponding CPC and ISIC3 sectors, see Narayanan, Dimaranan and McDougall (2008). 
4 Trade data is mainly sourced from the United Nations Commodity Trade (UN-COMTRADE) database 
supplemented by trade data from IMF, FAO and WB. 
5 Data on tariff and the estimated tariff equivalents are based on the Market Access Maps (MAcMapHS6) 
– version 2.1 database that compiles information from UNCTAD-TRAINS, WTO, the Agricultural Market 
Access Database (AMAD), and the national customs databases. The MAcMap database is jointly 
developed by International Trade Centre (ITC UNCTAD-WTO) and The Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII), available at http://www.cepii.fr/. MAcMapHS6 - version 2.1 
provides comprehensive data on trade protection detailed at the 6 digit level of the harmonized system 
(HS6, Rev. 1) for 2004. Trade protection data includes ad valorem equivalents of MFN tariffs for 169 
countries, preferential provisions for 220 countries and bound tariffs. For a detailed description of the 
MAcMapHS6 - version 2 database, see Boumellassa, Laborde and Mitaritonna (2009). 
6 In 2007, the EAGGF was replaced by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). 
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working reciprocal and non-reciprocal preferential arrangements are also considered 
in calculating the GTAP7 tariff rates.  
Bilateral services trade data has been improved in GTAP7 in the way that different 
data sources (i.e. IMF and OECD/Eurostat) are compiled to ensure data quality. In 
addition, different indices are employed to test reliability of the data. Furthermore, 
the most recent arrangements for trade in services (e.g. intra-EU services directives 
that has been in force in 2004) are taken into account.7 One of the main limitations 
with GTAP7 is the lack of estimations of barriers to trade in services. This, however, is 
a common limitation among most multi-region, multi-sector trade-focused CGE 
studies. 
Another limitation for GTAP7 is related to income taxes. In the GTAP database, private 
income taxes are represented as factor income taxes. Personal income tax is assigned 
to skilled and unskilled labour income taxes whereas corporate income tax is assigned 
to land, natural resources and capital income taxes. This data limitation restricts the 
model’s ability to examine trade shock impacts on personal income distribution. 
The issues of data availability and reliability are particularly relevant in the SADC 
context. The GTAP7 database suffers from lack of up-to-date data for African 
countries. Input-output tables for Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe are for early/mid nineties. This implies low quality data for African 
regions.8  
There are also reasons of concerns with respect to the quality of data on intra-African 
trade. Using the earlier version GTAP6 database, Villoria (2008) estimates $300 
million of missing intra-Africa manufacturing exports in 2001. This represents nearly 
41 percent of the potential bilateral trade flows in Africa. The extent of the missing 
data issues varies by region. Southern Africa shows the lowest estimated incidences 
for missing exports compared to low income countries of Central and West Africa. 
Once again, unrecorded trade data is problematic for all international trade databases. 
                                                          
7 For a detailed discussion of constructing data on trade in services in GTAP7 and its quality, see Lejour, 
van Leeuwen and McDougall (2008) and Lejour, van Leeuwen and ten Cate (2008). 
8 The GTAP database relies mainly on contributions by researchers on single-country input-output 
tables. As a step towards improving data quality, for African regions in particular, a special version of 
the GTAP6 database called the GTAP Africa database has been released.     
84 
 
 
 
In an effort to overcome this problem, the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) 
monitors informal cross border trade in Africa. As for Southern Africa, the FEWS, 
however, reports informal trade flows for only three major crops, i.e. maize, rice and 
beans.9   
By acknowledging wide discrepancies in reported bilateral trade flows, the GTAP7 
database examines merchandise trade data reliability using the reliability index 
provided by Gehlhar (1996). The index employs several tests for trading reporter 
reliability based on reports provided by all trade partners as well as reliability 
indicators for sectoral trade flows for reporting countries. The relatively less reliable 
trade transactions are selected and bilateral trade flows are, accordingly, reconciled.10 
Among the least reliable importing/exporting reporters in 2004 are Botswana, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
 
4.2.2. Aggregation Scheme 
In trade policy analysis, the aggregation scheme should be elaborated to a level 
sufficient for pinpointing the targeted variables, and transparent enough to enable the 
modeller to trace generated results and identify underlying transmission channels. 
This dilemma reflects the common trade-off between policy relevance and 
transparency in the context of CGE models.11 
As noted above, GTAP7 covers data on 113 regions, 57 sectors and 5 production 
factors. For the purposes of this study, GTAP7 is aggregated into 17 regions (i.e. 11 
SADC sub-regions, European Union, ‘United States of America’, ‘East Asia’, ‘Southeast 
and South Asia’, ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ and ‘Rest of the World’) 20 sectors (i.e. 10 
agricultural, 7 industrial and 3 service sectors) and five production factors, i.e. natural 
resources, land, unskilled labour, skilled labour and capital. The adopted level of 
                                                          
9 For the most recent monthly report on informal cross border trade in Southern Africa, see Famine 
Early Warning System (FEWS) and USAID (2011).   
10 For a detailed description of the adopted selection procedures and reconciliation approaches, see 
Gehlhar, Wang and Yao (2008: pp. 1- 23).  
11 In an interesting review of the CGE policy models, Devarajan and Robinson (2002, pp. 2-3) suggest 
that “The issue of transparency argues for the use of stylized models, since it is relatively easy to 
describe the results and the causal chains involved. Policy relevance, however, often requires more 
sectoral and institutional detail, which mandates the use of applied models that are larger and more 
complex”. 
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aggregation for regions and sectors along with associated mappings from GTAP7 into 
the model regions and sectors are provided in Tables A4-1 and A4-2. 
 
4.2.2.1 Region Aggregation 
For the purposes of this study, the individual regions that represent SADC members 
are kept at the most detailed disaggregation level supported by the GTAP7 database. 
Nine (Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe) out of the fifteen SADC members are identified separately in the 
database. Two composite regions are retained as they are in GTAP7: ‘Rest of SACU’ 
region, which contains Lesotho, Namibia12 and Swaziland, and ‘Rest of SADC’ region 
that includes Angola and D.R. Congo. Due to lack of data, Seychelles, which is lumped 
into ‘Rest of Eastern Africa’ region in GTAP7, is not identified as a SADC region by the 
model.13 This detailed representation of SADC members allows for undertaking an 
accurate country-specific analysis. The analysis distinguishes country-specific effects 
induced by the simulated scenarios and captures implications for intra-SADC trade, 
giving special attention to the sectors of interest for each SADC member.  
The purpose of the study is to examine impacts of the EU-SADC EPAs on SADC 
members. The effects on individual EU member states are beyond the scope of this 
study. Therefore, the 27 EU members (i.e. the original 15 members in addition to the 
12 new members) are combined into one region; ‘EU-27’. 
In order to accurately examine welfare and trade implications of a trade shock, the 
model should represent the main trade partners of the economies under 
consideration, albeit without losing transparency. SADC’s main non-EU trade partners 
are identified and, accordingly, the remaining 75 GTAP regions are grouped into five 
separate regions: ‘United States of America’, ‘East Asia’, ‘Southeast and South Asia’, 
‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ and ‘Rest of the World’.14  
                                                          
12 Namibia is identified as a separate region in the GTAP8 database; which has been recently released in 
March 2012. 
13 By the time GTAP7 was being constructed, Seychelles membership in SADC was still ceased. 
14 Within the overall framework of the EU-ACP EPAs, other EU-ACP EPA groups should be separately 
identified, however, due to lack of detailed data, no clear-cut geographical representation of the EU-ACP 
EPA configuration is provided by GTAP7. A collaborative project between the EC and the World Bank 
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4.2.2.2 Sector Aggregation 
The 57 GTAP7 sectors are aggregated into 20, half of which are agricultural and agro-
processing sectors. In this sectoral decomposition, three sectors represent agro-
processing activities (i.e. beverages, ‘food products’ and ‘meat and dairy products’), 
whereas the sugar sector is identified separately. The model specifies 7 industrial 
sectors. Extracting activities are represented by ‘oil and minerals’, while petroleum 
and other mineral products are specified as ‘chemical and mineral products’. Two 
sectors represent light manufacturing activities, i.e. textiles and ‘other manufactures’. 
Heavy manufacturing activities are split into three sectors: ‘metals and metal 
products’, vehicles and ‘electronic equipments’. Services activities are represented by 
three sectors: ‘public utilities’, ‘trade and communication’ and ‘other services’. 
The chosen sectoral aggregation scheme is sufficiently detailed to capture distinctive 
features and structural differences across SADC economies, and to reflect trade 
compositions of SADC members and their main trade partners. The detailed 
agricultural representation reflects the importance of agricultural and agro-
processing activities for SADC economies. It also allows for considering specific 
arrangements for agricultural trade and for simulating Doha commitments regarding 
European agriculture. Furthermore, the chosen sectoral scheme permits identification 
of sensitive sectors that might be excluded from the simulated trade liberalization 
arrangements.15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
aims to disaggregate the GTAP database according to the EPA/ACP regions. The aforementioned GTAP 
Africa database is a provisional output of this project.     
15 Some preliminary experiments with alternative sectoral aggregation schemes have been employed in 
order to define the appropriate aggregation scheme that best serves the study objectives.  
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4.2.2.3 Production Factor Aggregation 
Production factors are maintained at the disaggregated level provided by GTAP7. Five 
factors are represented separately: ‘natural resources’, land, ‘unskilled labour’, ‘skilled 
labour’ and capital. Within the sectoral aggregation scheme for this study, two 
activities (i.e. livestock and ‘oil and minerals’) are the only natural resources-using 
activities. Land is allocated across nine out of the ten agricultural and agro-processing 
activities. The only exception is beverages activity that is not a land-using activity. All 
sectors are unskilled labour-, skilled labour- and capital-using activities. 
 
4.2.3. Benchmark Parameters 
Three types of elasticities are extracted from the GTAP7 database: elasticities of 
substitution between domestic products and imports (Armington elasticities), 
elasticities of substitution between imports from different origins and elasticities of 
substitution between production factors.16  
The GTAP database sets the elasticities of substitution between imports from different 
origins, for a given product, to be double the corresponding values of Armington 
elasticities. This is known as the ‘rule of two’.17  
Armington elasticities taken from GTAP7 are aggregated according to the sector 
aggregation scheme employed by the study. The aggregated Armington elasticities are 
measured as weighted averages of the GTAP7 Armington elasticities. The employed 
weights are the shares for the individual GTAP7 sectors in domestic demand (valued 
at producer price) for the corresponding aggregated sector by region. Armington 
elasticity value for an aggregated sector, thus, varies across regions, according to the 
relative weight of the GTAP7 sector in domestic demand for the corresponding 
aggregated sector for each region.       
Similarly, the GTAP7 elasticity values for import from different origins are weighted 
according to the shares for the individual GTAP7 sectors in total import (valued at 
                                                          
16 The import elasticity values derived from GTAP7 are based on confidence intervals estimations 
provided by Hertel et al. (2007).  
17 Liu, Arndt and Hertel (2001) use an econometric approach to test the validity of trade elasticities in 
the earlier GTAP database, version 4. The study rejects the GTAP4 trade elasticity values, although it 
supports the underlying ‘rule of two’ for calculating the elasticities of substitution among imports from 
different sources. 
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market price) for the corresponding aggregated sector by region. Import elasticity 
value for an aggregated sector is, thus, varied across regions according to the relative 
weights of the GTAP7 sectors in import demand for the corresponding aggregated 
sector for each region. Tables A4-3 and A4-4 present the aggregated Armington and 
import elasticities extracted from GTAP7.  
The model applies the same values for both types of import elasticities on the export 
side keeping the ‘rule of two’ valid. The elasticities of transformation between exports 
to different destinations are set at double the corresponding values of the elasticities 
of transformation between domestic supply and exports.  
Elasticities of substitution between production factors are extracted from GTAP7 and 
aggregated according to the sector aggregation scheme employed by the study. The 
weights employed are the shares for the individual GTAP7 sectors in total value added 
of the corresponding aggregated sector. Table A4-5 presents the aggregated 
elasticities of substitution between production factors.  
Due to lack of data, the model applies the same values of elasticities of substitution 
between production factors to the elasticities of substitution between aggregated 
valued added and aggregated intermediate demand at the top level of production 
function. 
 
 
4.3 SADC Economies: Systematic Analyses  
4.3.1. Country Size and Development Level  
As depicted in Table 4-1, SADC countries vary considerably in terms of geography and 
demographics. The 15 SADC members together cover 9,641 thousand square km, with 
a combined population of 237 million. D.R. Congo is the largest country both in terms 
of area and population. The Seychelles is the smallest. The island covers only 455 
square km and has the smallest population, not only in SADC but in Africa as a whole, 
with only 86,525 inhabitants.  
Furthermore, the region includes 6 landlocked states, i.e. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. D.R. Congo has a short coastline whereas the other 
7 members are advantaged by very long coastlines. This topographic feature has 
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important implications for SADC trade. Landlocked countries face challenges in 
accessing world markets since they rely on coastal neighbours for transmitting trade, 
thereby facing high transportation costs. 
The heterogeneity among SADC members is not limited to size and topography. The 
region represents a mixture of diversified economies in terms of income level and 
distribution as well as development stage. SADC economies are classified, according to 
the World Bank, into three income groups: low income (D.R. Congo, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), lower-middle income 
(Angola, Lesotho and Swaziland) and upper-middle income (Botswana, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa). The GNI per capita ranges widely from US$ 110 
(Congo, D.R.) to US$ 8,190 (Seychelles). In addition, eight members (Angola, D.R. 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) are LDCs 
whilst the remaining seven (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe) are non-LDC developing countries.18  
Another salient feature of the SADC region is the dominance of South Africa, which is 
by far the largest economy in the region. As shown in Figure 4-1, South Africa alone 
constitutes around three quarters of total GDP of SADC and more than 90 percent of 
SACU GDP in 2004. South Africa also plays a crucial role in SADC trade; this is 
explained in detail in Section 4.4. The country is an important gateway for other 
members’ trade. Within SACU, Lesotho is entirely enclosed by South Africa; part of 
Swaziland’s trade and most of Botswana’s passes through South Africa.19 
Furthermore, Malawi’s trade with the rest of the world is shipped from Durban port in 
South Africa passing through Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where the latter also 
depend on South African ports. 
 
                                                          
18 The UN Committee for Development Policy (CDP) graduated Botswana from LDC status in 1994. In 
2006, the committee identified Zimbabwe to be downgraded to LDC status. This recommendation, 
however, is not yet in force since Zimbabwe does not give its consent (United Nations, 2006). In the 
Cotonou Agreement, therefore, Zimbabwe is not classified as an LDC. 
19 Lee (2003) provides a critical assessment of South African hegemony in SACU. 
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Figure 4-1: Relative Economic Size of SADC Members (% of SADC GDP at market 
prices, 2004) 
 
 
‘Rest of SADC’ is the second largest economy in the region followed by Tanzania, 
Botswana and ‘Rest of SACU’. Malawi, Zimbabwe and Madagascar are the smallest 
economies, each with a GDP of less than US$ 5 billion. Given this disparity, it is 
expected that the EU-SADC EPAs yield differential implications for different SADC 
members. This highlights the importance of conducting thorough country-specific 
analyses of the EU-SADC EPA outcomes. 
 
4.3.2. Economic Structures  
Economic structures across SADC are also heterogeneous. Figure 4-2, which is based 
on Table A4-6, presents activity shares in total gross output value by country in 
2004.20 The figure classifies SADC domestic activities into three plot areas; the 
agricultural and agro-processing activities, the manufacturing and mining activities, 
and the services activities, respectively. The columns next to the back wall present the 
aggregated figures for each of the three sub-groups. 
As reflected in the figure, some SADC economies are either agricultural-based or 
mineral-based whereas others have a relatively more industrialized base. Agricultural 
and agro-processing are the main activities for Madagascar, Malawi and Tanzania. 
                                                          
20 Since the study contemplates impact analyses of eleven SADC regions at a disaggregation level of 
twenty sectors, transferring tables onto figures presents a logical means for displaying the content of 
the underlying tables.       
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Within this group, some activities have particular importance, e.g. rice, beverages and 
livestock in Madagascar; ‘other crops’ in Malawi and ‘food products’ in Tanzania. For 
Mauritius, sugar is the main agricultural and agro-processing activity. Excluding these 
sectors from EPA liberalization programmes, based on infant industry protection 
arguments, as well as issues like reducing the EU support for agricultural production 
and exports within the Doha Round agenda is crucial for these cases. 
‘Rest of SADC’ (namely Angola) as well as Botswana relies primarily on ‘oil and 
minerals’ (mainly oil and diamonds); the sector that solely contributes 21 percent and 
30 percent of the total domestic output value for these economies, respectively. 
Overall, manufacturing activities in SADC are undiversified and the associated 
technologies are unsophisticated. However, for the cases of Mauritius, South Africa, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest of SACU’, production structures are more diversified 
with relatively more advanced manufacturing activities. Within this category, textiles, 
‘chemical and mineral products’ and ‘metals and metal products’ are among the main 
activities.  
Services sectors constitute major shares of domestic output for many SADC 
economies; Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa in particular. In the context of 
the EU-SADC EPAs, liberalizing trade in services will have important implications for 
these economies. 
Economic structures reflect the production factor abundance in different SADC 
economies. Tables A4-7 and A4-8 present factor intensity and factor allocation in 
SADC economies, respectively. The former reflects the prevailing technology in 
different activities while the latter represents factor usage across activities. These two 
indicators are essential for understanding any potential change in factor rents and the 
consequent changes in factor allocation after a trade policy shock.   
Unskilled labour constitutes high shares of total value added in Madagascar, Malawi, 
Tanzania and Mozambique. As we saw above, Madagascar, Malawi and Tanzania are 
primarily agricultural-based economies. For these cases, agricultural and agro-
processing activities are highly unskilled labour-intensive and utilize the bulk of 
unskilled labour. In Mozambique, unskilled labour is mainly allocated to services; the 
activities that altogether contribute the majority of domestic output.  
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Figure 4-2: SADC Output Structures (% shares in total gross output value, 2004) 
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In light of the importance of unskilled labour, special attention should be given to 
potential efficiency gains and adjustment costs associated with reallocation of this 
factor in response to trade shocks. Furthermore, issues like low factor mobility and 
elasticity of substitution as well as under-employment are worth special examination 
in the context of the EU-SADC EPAs.  
Manufacturing and mining are highly capital intensive. Therefore, manufacturing- and 
mining-based economies exhibit high capital share in total value added. That is in 
particular the case for South Africa, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest of SACU’ where capital 
accounts for more than 45 percent of total value added. In Botswana and ‘Rest of 
SADC’, where mining activities dominate, high overall capital intensity of production 
prevails. 
The point to highlight here is that capital returns derived from the GTAP database 
include remunerations for self-employed labour. This might overvalue capital shares 
in value added for some sectors. In effect, high capital intensity reflects the 
importance of self-employment labour that is observed in some SADC agricultural and 
agro-processing activities. This is particularly the case for rice activity in Zimbabwe 
and beverages activity in Malawi, each with capital intensity of more than 80 
percent.21 Overall, these variant factor intensities for activities across different 
producers might imply potential for complementarities among SADC economies on 
the production side.    
 
 
4.4 Trade Structures and Protection Profiles 
The importance of trade for many SADC economies is worth highlighting in the 
context of this study. As seen in Table 4-1, trade openness ratio is particularly high in 
‘Rest of SACU’, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest of SADC’. In addition, Malawi is highly 
dependent on imports and reports a sizable baseline trade deficit equivalent to more 
                                                          
21 Hertel et al. (2003) employ household survey data for Malawi, as well as Chile and Vietnam, in order 
to examine the impact of trade liberalization on poverty within a micro-simulation model and the GTAP 
model. The study provides empirical evidence on the importance of self-employed labour in 
agricultural activities in Malawi. According to the Malawi’s Integrated Household Survey for 1998 cited 
by the study, wage labour accounts for only 15 percent of the population.       
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than a quarter of its GDP. These figures entail high degrees of vulnerability for SADC 
economies to external trade shocks and, thereby, provide indication of the likely 
important impacts of the EPAs. It is worth noting here that, in general, small 
economies tend to have large trade openness ratios. 
High dependency on trade is reflected in the structure of public revenue, Table 4-1. 
Tariff revenue share in total public revenue ranges from 26 to 38 percent for 
Mauritius, Madagascar and Zimbabwe and exceeds 10 percent for all SADC countries 
except Botswana and South Africa. Tariff shares are the lowest for Botswana, South 
Africa and ‘Rest of SACU’. As described in Chapter 2, the SACU-CU pursues a revenue-
sharing formula for pooling and distributing tariff revenue which is not entirely based 
on trade shares. 
This brings to the forefront concerns about the potentially sizable fiscal losses 
resulting from reciprocal trade liberalization with the EU. Taking these potential fiscal 
losses into consideration gives issues like ex-ante structural reforms, adoption of 
compensation instruments and aid-for-trade great prominence in the context of the 
EU-SADC EPAs. 
The next four sub-sections provide country- and sector-specific analyses of SADC 
trade classified according to the quantifiable EPAs trade effects under the study’s 
considerations. In addition, Sub-section 4.4.4 examines the most recent trends in 
intra-SADC trade beyond the 2004 benchmark equilibrium; i.e. the period 2004-2008.  
 
4.4.1. Total Trade 
Import shares for SADC members, and for SADC as a whole, in world imports are 
small. As is apparent in Table A4-9, none of the individual SADC members’ sectoral 
imports accounts for more than 2 percent of total world imports. Furthermore, SADC 
total demand for any of the importing commodities is less than 5 percent of total 
world imports. Similarly, SADC shares in world export supply are evidently small, 
except for sugar, Table A4-10. SADC sugar exports, which are primarily provided by 
Mauritius, South Africa and ‘Rest of SACU’, account for 9 percent of world sugar 
exports. Overall, SADC’s small trade shares in world markets entail that SADC 
economies are price takers and have little influence on the world prices. 
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South Africa is the largest importer and exporter in the region. At the aggregate level, 
South Africa constitutes 60 percent of total SADC trade, Tables A4-11 and A4-12. 
Nevertheless, trade contributions by other SADC members in specific commodity 
markets are more important than South African shares in those markets. These 
include imports of beverages (‘Rest of SADC’) and exports of ‘oil and minerals’ (‘Rest 
of SADC’); sugar (Mauritius and ‘Rest of SACU’); ‘plant fibres’ (Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
Tanzania) and ‘other crops’ (Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania). 
Figure 4-3 presents SADC trade composition based on commodity shares in imports 
and exports given by Tables A4-13 and A4-14, respectively. SADC imports are 
concentrated in a few commodities and yet, the import structures are, to a great 
extent, similar across members. SADC imports are mainly manufacturing and mining 
commodities, which constitute more than half of total imports for all cases. Moreover, 
for most of the cases, the three main imports are ‘chemical and mineral products’, 
‘metals and metal products’ and ‘electronic equipments’. 
SADC export structures exhibit high levels of concentration in a narrow range of 
commodity groups, Table A4-14. Manufacturing and mining exports contribute more 
than half of total exports for all SADC members, except Malawi and Tanzania. Within 
this group, ‘oil and minerals’ is among the main export for most of the cases, 
particularly Botswana and ‘Rest of SADC’. Other important manufacturing exports 
include textiles for Madagascar, Mauritius and ‘Rest of SACU’; ‘metals and metal 
products’ for Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe and ‘chemical and 
mineral products’ for ‘Rest of SACU’ and South Africa. 
The homogeneity of import and export structures across SADC members has 
important implications for SADC regional integration. It entails limited potential for 
export expansion and, more broadly, weak trade complementarity within the region. 
Similarity in import structures implies that SADC import demand is very likely to be 
met by third parties. The opportunities for creating trade as a result of removing 
barriers to intra-SADC trade are small.  
These inferences are in line with the results derived from an ex-ante analysis of the 
SADC-FTA welfare impacts conducted by Pratt, Diao and Bahta (2009). The study 
employs a partial equilibrium model using the SITC four- digit level data over the 
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period 2000-2005. For most of the cases, the estimated welfare effects are small, 
which is attributed to low diversification of intra-SADC exports. Based on measures of 
revealed comparative advantages, the study identifies industries with high trade 
complementarity. Consequently, potential export expansions are reported for the net 
exporters of products of these industries, i.e. SACU, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. In 
contrast, Angola and DR Congo, who experience comparative disadvantages for 
agricultural products, would be affected negatively by the SADC-FTA. 
From an economic policy perspective, SADC structural features suggest that removing 
barriers to intra-SADC trade is not the most effective measure for deepening SADC 
regional integration. Reforms aimed at diversifying production and export structures, 
stimulating investment and pursuing trade facilitation policies, on the other hand, 
have great merit in this regard. 
Using United Nations Commodity Trade (UN-COMTRADE) data at the two-digit 
classification level, Khandelwal (2005) measures bilateral product complementarity 
indices among SADC members. The index value ranges from zero (i.e. no 
complementarity between bilateral trade balances) to one hundred, i.e. perfect 
complementarity. The measured indices show weak trade complementarity (less than 
30 percent) between exports for individual SADC members and imports by their other 
SADC partners. South Africa is the only exception where exports have a high degree of 
complementarity (50 percent or more) with imports by its other SADC members.  
Tables A4-15 and A4-16 depict import shares in total demand by commodity and 
export to domestic output ratios by activity, respectively. Together with the import 
and export compositions, these indicators determine the importance of tradable 
sectors for SADC economies.   
Manufacturing and mining commodities are not only the main imports for SADC, but 
the bulk of their demand is met by importing. Among the main imports for Botswana, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest of SADC’, more than 70 percent 
of total domestic demand is imported.  
Likewise on the export side, the main agricultural and agro-processing, and 
manufacturing and mining exports are simultaneously export-oriented sectors. For 
the main exports in almost all SADC members, more than half of the domestic output 
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values are directed to export. As aforementioned, the textiles sector is one of the few 
manufacturing activities and exports for SADC. Textiles activity is particularly 
important for Mauritius where it is predominantly export-oriented.  
Overall, the main imports and exports constitute high ratios of import to total demand 
and export to total supply for most of the cases. These indicate that potential trade 
effects will be accompanied by strong consumption effects and structural changes in 
SADC economies. 
 
4.4.2. SADC-EU Trade 
SADC imports from the EU are dominated in most cases by ‘chemical and mineral 
products’, ‘electronic equipments’ and ‘other services’, Table A4-17. ‘Rest of SACU’ is 
an exceptional case where 58 percent of imports from the EU are ‘other services’.  
The EU accrues sizable shares in SADC markets, particularly for heavy manufacturing 
and services. As shown in Table A4-18, heavy manufacturing imports from the EU 
make up more than 40 percent of total heavy manufacturing imports for countries like 
‘Rest of SADC’, South Africa and Madagascar. Besides, services imports from the EU 
range from 40 to 60 percent of total services imports for all SADC countries, except 
Zimbabwe. The EU also has considerable shares in specific agricultural and agro-
processing markets. For example, more than half of Madagascan grains and beverages 
imports are sourced in the EU.  
From the EU perspective, SADC commodity imports comprise very small portions of 
total EU commodity exports, Table A4-19. However, some SADC markets absorb 
relatively large shares of EU trade with non-EU partners. This is the case for EU 
vehicle and ‘oil and minerals’ exports (South Africa) and EU ‘public utilities’ exports 
(‘Rest of SADC’), Table A4-20. 
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Figure 4-3: SADC Trade Composition (%, volume, 2004) 
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Trade concentration is more pronounced on the export side where the three main 
exports constitute more than two-thirds of total exports to the EU in most of the cases, 
Table A4-21. In extreme cases, only one commodity group makes up for more than 
three quarters of total exports to the EU. This is the case for ‘oil and minerals’ exports 
(Botswana and ‘Rest of SADC’) as well as ‘metals and metal products’ exports 
(Mozambique). SADC exports to the EU are basically agricultural, agro-processing and 
mining products with a small portion of light manufacturing. 
Among these main exports to the EU, EU exporting markets are particularly important 
for ‘other crops’ (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), sugar (Mauritius), ‘food 
products’ (Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania), ‘oil and minerals’ (Botswana, 
South Africa and ‘Rest of SACU’), textiles (Mauritius and Zambia), ‘metals and metal 
products’ (Mozambique) and ‘other services’ (‘Rest of SACU’), Table A4-22. 
This compatibility in SADC export bundles to EU markets provides indication for 
potential increases in competition between SADC exporters in EU markets due to the 
EU tariff removal. In other words, potential export expansions for some SADC 
members in EU markets are very likely to occur at the expense of exports by other 
SADC members. 
Despite the overall importance of the EU market for SADC exporters, SADC shares in 
the EU market are noticeably small, Table A4-23. The only exception is Mauritius, 
which has a share of over 8 percent in total EU sugar imports.   
At this stage of descriptive analysis, it is important to examine the protection levels 
and structures that prevail at the benchmark scenario for SADC-EU trade. Tables A4-
24 and A4-25 portray the applied tariff rates on SADC imports from the EU and on EU 
imports from SADC, respectively. These figures serve as a benchmark for assessing the 
simulated trade liberalization scenarios, and help to illustrate potential welfare 
impacts on individual SADC members. 
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Figure 4-4: SADC-EU Trade Composition (%, volume, 2004) 
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The structure of tariffs imposed on EU products in SADC markets reveals different 
protection profiles. Some members are protective (e.g. Mauritius, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe), whereas tariff levels in other cases are relatively low (e.g. Botswana, 
Madagascar and Malawi). Generally, tariff profiles reflect SADC industrial strategy to 
protect specific sectors (mainly agro-processing and light manufacturing) against 
competition from EU substitutes. This applies particularly to sugar and beverage 
(Mauritius), ‘meat and dairy products’ (South Africa and ‘Rest of SACU’) and textiles 
(Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique). 
These high tariffs together with the low importance of agro-processing imports from 
the EU might imply that such imports are suppressed and, consequently, indicate high 
probability of experiencing import surge as a result of liberalizing trade with the EU. 
In order to explore possibilities for trade creation and diversion effects, SADC tariff 
profiles with their non-EU partners should be examined thoroughly, which will be 
dealt with in Sub-sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.5. 
EU applied tariffs on imports from SADC are fairly low with a few high tariff peaks, 
Table A4-25. As shown in Chapter 2, most SADC members are granted duty-free 
access for the majority of their MFN tariff lines, whereas a few members have some 
non zero-rated lines. Extremely high protection levels are imposed on sugar imports 
from all SADC members, ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe and Madagascar in particular. High 
tariffs are also imposed on rice imports (from Malawi, Mauritius and South Africa) and 
on ‘meat and dairy products’ imports from ‘Rest of SACU’ and Botswana. These high 
protection rates reflect EU import quotas for these product groups. Tariff rates on 
other non zero-rated lines are fairly low, e.g. grains, beverages and ‘food products’.  
Taking into consideration comparative advantage for SADC economies vis-à-vis the 
EU in these protected activities, it is plausible to expect strong reallocation effects as a 
result of EU tariff removal. Production factors are expected to be reallocated away 
from manufacturing activities towards activities like sugar, rice and ‘meat and dairy 
products’. 
Table A4-26 shows the EU applied tariffs on imports from non-SADC exporters. 
Analogue high tariff levels are imposed on EU imports of sugar (‘Rest of the World’, 
‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ and ‘East Asia’), rice (‘East Asia’, ‘Southeast and South 
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Asia’, ‘United States of America’ and ‘Rest of the World’) and ‘meat and dairy products’ 
(‘Rest of the World’, ‘Southeast and South Asia’ and ‘United States of America’).  
These protection profiles provide indications of the potential export expansion for 
SADC products in these protected EU markets due to the EU-SADC EPAs. In effect, 
SADC opportunities to gain shares in EU markets depend, inter alia, on production 
capacity and export capability of SADC economies. In addition, the proliferation of the 
EU unilateral sugar reforms and trade liberalization (as described in detail in Chapter 
2) as well as the envisaged EU-EPAs with non-SADC ACP countries influences the 
potential preference margins SADC trade will acquire in EU markets.      
   
4.4.3. Intra-SADC Trade  
Table A4-27 illustrates market shares for SADC exporters in different SADC 
commodity markets. Evidently, South Africa is the main supplier for many imports 
particularly in the other SACU markets. Some evidence on trade deflection within the 
SACU region supports that EU products flow through South Africa to its SACU-CU 
partners. This partially explains extremely high South African shares and low EU 
shares (shown in Table A4-18) in the SACU markets.22  
South Africa also acquires sizable market shares in Mauritius, Mozambique, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. These large shares refer, inter alia, to agricultural and agro-processing 
markets where South African products face high tariffs, Table A4-28. This might entail 
high risk for South Africa in terms of losing its regional market shares as a result of 
launching EPAs with the EU, particularly in the absence of intra-SADC trade 
liberalization. 
Other SADC members are of great importance as sources of regional imports. As 
shown in Table A4-27, ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and, to a lesser extent, 
Mozambique and Malawi seize large shares in SADC markets. Among the main 
regionally traded commodities are grains, vegetables, ‘other crops’, beverages, sugar 
and livestock. Clearly, none of these products provides substitutes for SADC’s main 
imports from the EU. This makes the potential import surge due to the reciprocal 
                                                          
22 Lack of adequate capacity and operative RoO to monitor such indirect trade prove to be serious 
challenges in the SADC and SACU contexts.    
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trade liberalization with the EU inevitable for many SADC members even with 
liberalizing intra-SADC trade.  
SADC markets are also important destinations for regional exports. South Africa is an 
important market for many SADC exporters, Table A4-29. Furthermore, substantial 
shares of SADC exports are destined for Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, ‘Rest of SACU’ 
and ‘Rest of SADC’. Among the important exporting regional markets are those for 
rice, grains, vegetables, ‘other crops’ and ‘food products’. These exporting markets are 
transformable with SADC’s main exporting markets in the EU. Therefore, potential 
expansions in SADC exports to EU markets as a result of the envisaged EPAs are likely 
to be at the expense of intra-SADC exports.  
This argument is also supported by the figures on intra-SADC tariff profiles, Table A4-
28. High protection levels are imposed on exports by Mozambique, South Africa, 
Tanzania and ‘Rest of SACU’. It is, thus, rational to expect large variance in the EPA’s 
impacts when intra-SADC trade is liberalized.   
These inferences are in line with empirical evidence provided by Chauvin and Gaulier 
(2002). Using World Trade Analyzer Data at SITC 2-digit level, the study calculates 
indices of revealed comparative advantage (1999) and export diversification (1996-
1999) for ten SADC members. For most of the cases, the reported sectors with 
comparative advantage are not the sectors of interest to SADC imports, e.g. machinery 
and transport equipments. Furthermore, the measured export diversification indices 
are lower than the indices values reported for other emerging economies like 
Malaysia and Chile. This is the case for all SADC members considered by the study 
except South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
The question to be raised here is whether these intra-SADC trade relationships have 
changed in recent years. The next sub-section addresses this question. 
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4.4.4. Recent Trends in Intra-SADC Trade23  
As depicted by Figure 4-5, South Africa exports to the region have increased 
considerably over the period 2004-2008. Nevertheless, the South African share of 
total intra-SADC exports has remained within a range of 35-50 percent, Table 4-2. 
Besides, it is worth noting that the South African importance as a source of regional 
imports is still far greater than its importance as a market for regional SADC exports, 
as we will see next. Zimbabwe regional exports increased considerably in 2006 and 
have diminished thenceforth. This trend is reflected in the outstanding accretion in 
the Zimbabwean share of intra-SADC exports to almost 30 percent in 2006. Both the 
Swazi and the Angolan shares in regional exports were volatile over the period 2004-
2008. Swaziland, which was the second SADC regional exporter in 2004, contributes 
only 1 percent of intra-SADC exports in 2008, whereas Angola, whose intra-SADC 
export share was 3 percent in 2004, becomes the second SADC regional exporter in 
2008. Trends in intra-SADC export flows and shares for all other members have not 
experienced significant changes over this period. 
 
Figure 4-5: Intra-SADC Export Trends (Million US$) 
 
Source: Aggregated by the author based on the UN-COMTRADE Database. 
 
                                                          
23 Data used in this sub-section is derived from the UN-COMTRADE database for all SADC members 
during the period 2004-2008. For some cases, the database does not provide trade data reported by 
SADC importers. In these cases, I have used available ‘mirror data’ reported by exporters to SADC 
members.  
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Table 4-2: Intra-SADC Export Shares, (Percent) 
Exporters 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
BWA 4.9 5.9 3.9 5.6 6.5 
MDG 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
MWI 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.0 
MUS 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.2 
MOZ  3.2 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.2 
ZAF 43.0 48.9 35.2 39.4 46.0 
TZA 2.3 4.0 2.7 2.2 2.8 
ZMB 8.0 7.0 4.8 6.4 5.2 
ZWE 8.3 7.6 29.7 13.4 5.6 
XSC 
LSO 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 
NAM 9.5 9.8 7.5 9.4 10.6 
SWZ 12.7 5.9 7.5 5.8 0.8 
XSD 
AGO 2.8 2.9 2.5 10.1 13.9 
COD 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.8 2.9 
SYC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the UN-COMTRADE Database. 
 
Table 4-3: Intra-SADC Exports to Total Exports Ratios, (Percent) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
BWA 13.4 13.7 13.0 18.0 26.0 
MDG 3.9 2.8 2.7 3.7 3.4 
MWI 24.3 27.2 31.3 35.7 21.8 
MUS 7.7 7.6 7.5 9.7 9.8 
MOZ  20.3 22.0 20.2 22.5 15.9 
ZAF 10.2 10.7 10.0 10.1 12.1 
TZA 14.9 24.5 21.7 17.2 17.6 
ZMB 48.6 39.7 18.8 22.8 20.0 
ZWE 41.2 55.6 69.0 66.6 64.3 
XSC 
LSO 18.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.9 
NAM 37.4 40.1 33.1 38.0 43.4 
SWZ 56.7 47.1 76.6 85.0 n.a. 
XSD 
AGO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
COD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SYC 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the UN-COMTRADE Database. 
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As seen in Table 4-3, few countries (e.g. SACU and Zimbabwe) become more 
dependent on SADC as a market for their exports whereas many member countries 
maintain relatively stronger trade ties with the rest of the world. Swaziland and 
Namibia depend mainly on the South African markets for their exports. Interestingly, 
SADC absorbs the bulk of total Zimbabwean exports. This is partly attributed to 
sanctions imposed on Zimbabwean extra-regional trade, which push the country to 
intensively sell its trade regionally.24 
Trends in intra-SADC imports show fluctuations over the period 2004-2008, Figure 4-
6. Regional imports for South Africa, Botswana, Namibia as well as Zambia and 
Zimbabwe have increased steadily. These trends are corroborated by the increments 
in their shares in intra-SADC imports for most of the cases, Table 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-6: Intra-SADC Import Trends (Million US$) 
 
Source: Aggregated by the author based on the UN-COMTRADE Database. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Economic sanctions on Zimbabwe were introduced by the USA in 2001, after declaring the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA), and were then adopted by the EU in 2002.  
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Table 4-4: Intra-SADC Import Shares, (Percent) 
Importers 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
BWA 19.0 18.3 15.6 16.0 15.8 
MDG 1.1 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.4 
MWI 3.7 4.8 4.2 3.5 4.9 
MUS 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.8 
MOZ  5.1 7.1 6.0 4.9 4.8 
ZAF 6.9 10.6 13.5 17.5 19.7 
TZA 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.2 3.7 
ZMB 8.2 9.8 10.2 10.7 11.4 
ZWE 9.7 10.4 9.6 11.1 8.3 
XSC 
LSO 7.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 3.9 
NAM 14.4 14.2 13.5 14.9 12.5 
SWZ 10.9 9.5 5.9 5.0 0.1 
XSD 
AGO 5.0 4.9 5.2 4.9 5.1 
COD 2.6 3.0 9.0 5.1 6.3 
SYC 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the UN-COMTRADE Database. 
  
Table 4-5: Intra-SADC Imports to Total Imports Ratios, (Percent) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
BWA 85.5 86.6 88.8 85.8 80.8 
MDG 9.7 15.0 10.7 10.1 9.3 
MWI 57.4 62.0 59.8 53.9 58.3 
MUS 13.9 10.5 9.5 9.6 9.9 
MOZ  36.8 44.4 36.1 34.1 31.6 
ZAF 2.1 2.9 3.4 4.7 5.9 
TZA 14.5 13.7 13.9 11.6 12.0 
ZMB 55.6 57.2 57.6 57.1 58.9 
ZWE 64.1 75.4 64.6 69.0 76.2 
XSC 
LSO 78.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.0 
NAM 86.8 84.5 83.7 79.3 69.7 
SWZ 89.6 86.4 82.8 84.6 n.a. 
XSD 
AGO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
COD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SYC 13.4 8.6 9.8 9.1 10.9 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the UN-COMTRADE Database. 
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SADC is the main supplier for imports by many member countries, Table 4-5. This is 
particularly the case for Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Over the period 
2004-2008, SADC’s importance has increased for some importers, e.g. Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. These increasing trends in regional import flows and dependency might 
indicate that SADC-FTA has already promoted intra-SADC imports. But, does this 
inference per se mean that SADC becomes more integrated? 
Behar and Edwards (2011) address this question. The study examines the extent to 
which SADC is integrated into the regional and world markets over the period 1991-
2005. Using the gravity model,25 the study demonstrates that intra-SADC trade level is 
more than double the estimated level that is regressed against the prevailing incomes 
and distances for SADC trade partners. In addition, the model results, as well as a 
‘thickness’ of trade measure, show that intra-SADC trade is more diversified vis-à-vis 
extra-SADC trade.26 Accordingly, the study concludes that SADC experiences high 
degree of regionalization. 
This conclusion is in line with the results provided by Afesorgbor and Bergeijk (2011). 
The study estimates a modified version of the gravity model that includes, in addition 
to the traditional controlling variables, dummy variables for RTAs and overlapping 
membership. The model is estimated for 35 African countries, among which are SADC 
members, over the period 1995-2006. Gravity model estimates demonstrate that 
SADC integration enhances intra-SADC trade by 6.2-10.4 times in comparison to no-
RTA reference scenario. 
 
                                                          
25 The study employs the gravity model used by Behar and Manners (2010). 
26 The study adopts a modified version of the trade ‘thickness’ measure developed by Knetter and 
Slaughter (2001).  
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4.4.5. Trade with Third Parties 
Table A4-30 presents the shares for non-SADC non-EU partners in SADC markets. 
‘East Asia’ and ‘Southeast and South Asia’ acquire significant shares in many SADC 
markets. Therefore, liberalizing trade with the EU might mean reduced markets 
shares for third parties in the SADC region. This means more geographic 
concentration for SADC trade. In effect, these non-SADC non-EU products face high 
levels of protection in SADC markets, Table A4-31. This indicates potential for adverse 
trade diversion effects as a result of discriminatory trade liberalization with the EU.    
On the export side, Table A4-32 presents the importance of non-SADC non-EU 
markets for SADC trade. ‘United States of America’ and ‘Southeast and South Asia’ are 
among main destinations for SADC exports. Significant levels of protection are 
imposed on SADC agricultural and agro-processing exports. This is particularly the 
case for sugar, ‘other crops’, beverages and ‘meat and dairy products’.       
Zambia destines more than half of its sugar exports for ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’; 
this portion exceeds its sugar exports to the EU. In contrast, Malawi destines 37 
percent of its sugar exports for ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’; this portion is less than its 
exports to the EU (45 percent). Zambia and Malawi are among the main sugar 
suppliers within the COMESA region, Kenya in particular. Sugar exports above the 
export ceiling are eligible for a special safeguard duty of 40 percent. 
The bulk of Zimbabwean sugar exports are destined for the EU markets, i.e. 59 
percent. The second exporting market for Zimbabwean sugar are SADC markets; ‘Rest 
of SACU’, Botswana and South Africa in particular. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
SADC Protocol on Trade includes a non-reciprocal arrangement that grants non-SACU 
SADC sugar exporters duty-free access to SACU markets. SACU sugar exports, 
however, face a high degree of protection in SADC markets, South African exports to 
Mauritius in particular. 
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4.5 Conclusions: What Difference Can the EU-SADC EPAs Make? 
Based on the detailed descriptive analysis undertaken in this chapter for individual 
SADC economies, three main conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there are reasons to 
expect that the EU-SADC EPAs will yield a wide range of impacts across SADC 
economies. Secondly, in light of strong trade ties with the EU, reciprocal trade 
liberalization is likely to have strong welfare and trade impacts for many SADC 
members. Lastly, intra-SADC liberalization and the evolution of multilateral trade 
arrangements are influential in shaping the final impacts generated by the envisaged 
EPAs. Measuring the net welfare and trade effects is, thus, an empirical exercise that 
requires thorough country- and sector-specific impact analyses and considers crucial 
changes in regional and international trade policy.  
  
5 GLOBE Model: Analytical Methodology for Regional Integration 
Analysis 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in detail in Chapter 3, trade theory provides ambiguous conclusions 
about the signs and orders of magnitudes for the final welfare impact of preferential 
trade liberalization. The descriptive empirical analyses of SADC economic and trade 
structures presented in Chapter 4 suggest that the potential impacts of the envisaged 
EU-SADC EPAs will vary widely across SADC members. Quantifying the magnitudes of 
the effects assigned by trade theory and the resulting net welfare impacts requires 
therefore detailed systematic empirical analysis. The adopted framework for 
conducting such exercise should be based on relevant theoretical foundations and 
accommodate particular empirical propositions. CGE models provide a theoretically 
consistent and empirically sensible framework for regional integration analysis, given 
that the choices for the behavioural parameters in the model are informed by 
secondary empirical studies. 
Since the EU-SADC EPAs affect multiple countries and sectors simultaneously, the 
adoption of a multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium framework appears 
preferable to the use of partial equilibrium approaches of the type reviewed in Sub-
section 3.4.1. The underlying assumption of partial equilibrium studies that cross-
price effects, economy-wide factor-price effects, aggregate income and terms-of-trade 
effects as well as input-output linkage effects are negligible and can safely be ignored 
is hardly defendable in the context of the EU-SADC EPAs.1 
                                                          
1 As Willenbockel (1994: p. 27 and p. 39) puts it, “if the policy scenario under consideration is a 
multisectoral ... trade liberalization plan, ... failure to take account of cross-industry linkages and 
general-equilibrium feedbacks may result in seriously misleading predictions …”. “The resort to 
successive sector-by-sector partial equilibrium analyses in situations where the implied ceteris paribus 
assumptions do not even approximately apply is a controvertible practice. The preferability of a 
coherent quantitative multisectoral general equilibrium approach ... has long been acknowledged by 
protagonists of the traditional partial approaches” in such situations. 
On the other hand, partial equilibrium analysis allows a finer level of commodity disaggregation than 
what CGE models do. Recently, Narayanan, Hertel and Horridge (2010) have proposed to link CGE and 
partial equilibrium models to capture the advantages of both approaches. 
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In this chapter, a comparative static version of the multi-region, multi-sector CGE 
GLOBE model is calibrated to a global SAM referenced to 2004. Deriving data from the 
GTAP7 database and constructing the global SAM are already presented in Chapter 4.  
This chapter is set out as follows. Section 5.2 describes the behavioural specification 
for the different agents in the model. Section 5.3 describes the different closure rules 
employed under the simulation scenarios, which are implemented later in Chapters 6 
and 7. Section 5.4 introduces macroeconomic indicators employed by the study in 
order to measure welfare, terms of trade and the adjustment degree in factor markets. 
Section 5.5 discusses the rationale behind choosing the GLOBE model as an analytical 
framework for the study and the limitations of the analysis.  
 
 
5.2 GLOBE Behavioural Specification      
The study uses a comparative static version of the multi-region, multi-sector CGE 
GLOBE model. The GLOBE model is a developed version of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service (ERS) CGE model (Robinson, Kilkenny 
and Hanson, 1990) and its extension; the NAFTA-FTA CGE model (Robinson et al. 
1993). By and large, the model is based on the basic principles of trade treatment 
within the CGE framework that are established in an early ‘minimalist’ 1-2-3 model by 
de Melo and Robinson (1989) and Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1990).2 A 
complete exposition of the model is documented in McDonald, Thierfelder and 
Robinson (2007).3  
The core specification of the GLOBE model is based on neo-classical real trade theory, 
albeit it embodies some structuralist features. It drops into the neo-classical 
                                                          
2 1-2-3 model is a simple CGE model for one region with two activities and three commodities. The 
model serves as a good representation of the majority of trade-focused CGE models since it embodies 
their main analytical foundations.  
3 The GLOBE model is extensively used to examine regional trade arrangements, e.g. McDonald, 
Robinson and Thierfelder (2008) and McDonald and Willenbockel (2008). Among the most recent 
applications of the model are studies by Willenbockel and Robinson (2009a) and (2009b) on the 
impacts of the current financial crisis on developing countries and the mid-term evaluation of the EU-
GSP (CARIS, 2010). For an interesting application of the model in health economics, see Keogh-Brown 
et al. (2009). 
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structuralist category of CGE models.4 The model allows for adopting assumptions 
that reflect imperfections and rigidities in some markets. As we will see later, the 
model specification assumes imperfect substitutability between domestically 
produced and imported commodities as well as between imports from different 
sources. It also differentiates between domestic and export supply and between 
exports to different destinations. Furthermore, the model allows for adopting 
assumptions on factor immobility and assumption on underemployment and factor 
price rigidity.  
The model is a powerful tool for analyzing trade policy within a general equilibrium 
framework that considers the structural features, trade patterns and trade 
compositions not only for the countries under examination but also for their trade 
partners and the world as a whole. These aspects are of particular importance for 
analyzing regional trade policy that has price and quantity implications in the world 
markets. “The strength of the multi-country CGE model is that it elegantly 
incorporates the features of neoclassical general equilibrium and real international 
trade models in an empirical framework, …”, (McDonald, Robinson and Thierfelder 
2008, p. 216). 
Within this multi-region, multi-sector framework, international markets are linked 
through bilateral trade flows only, which implies no factor mobility across borders.5 
Due to lack of information, some inter regional transactions (i.e. bilateral trade data 
on trade and transportation margins) are defined by either the region of origin or the 
region of destination whereas the other is missing. To deal with this missing data, the 
model distinctively defines a dummy region known as ‘Globe’ where these 
transactions are recorded.6 
 
                                                          
4 Robinson (1991) classifies CGE models into macro structuralist and neo-classical structuralist CGE 
models. The equilibrating variables in the neo-classical CGE models are commodity and factor prices 
that adjust to clear markets. These models assume, inter alia, perfect mobility for production factors 
and savings-driven closure rule. On the other hand, structuralist CGE models reflect the structural 
characteristics of the economy under discussion. Taylor (1990) provides detailed presentation of the 
structuralist CGE models and their applications in developing countries. 
5 McDonald, Sonmez and Perraton (2006) have introduced remittance flows as an additional channel 
that links international markets. 
6 From this perspective, inter alia, the GLOBE model differs from the multi-region, multi-sector CGE 
GTAP model, which is widely implemented in analyzing trade policy and other issues.  
115 
 
 
 
5.2.1. Production Block 
Figure 5-1 depicts the nesting structure for output flows in a typical region in the 
model. Output in each activity       is specified as a two-level nested constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function. At the top level, aggregate intermediate 
inputs         and aggregate primary inputs        are compounded through a CES 
aggregator.7 
 
                    
          
     
 
          
            
     
 
 
      
  
 
                  1  
 
where        is the shift parameter and      
  is the share parameter for      . The 
elasticity of substitution between value added and intermediate demand is given 
by     
           
   .  
Price for composite output for an activity       is a weighted average of producer 
prices for the domestic commodities produced by this activity        where the 
weights are the volume shares of different commodities in this activity output; 
            . In this version of GLOBE model,              is an identity matrix since 
one-to-one mapping sets from activities to commodities are declared.    
 
                           
 
           2  
 
The first order condition for profit maximization determines the optimal mix of 
        and       as follows,  
                                                          
7 The model allows for assuming perfect complementarity between value added and intermediate 
inputs by using a Leontief aggregator at this top level of the production function. For this purpose, a 
sub-set of activities and/or regions          is defined and then the Leontief aggregator compiles 
aggregate intermediate inputs and aggregate primary inputs for the members of this sub-set as follows 
                                               
                                             
where             and            are the volume share of aggregate intermediate and value added in 
output by activity. 
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where         and        are the prices for aggregate intermediate input and for 
aggregate primary input, respectively.  
        is defined as a weighted average of the domestic prices for the corresponding 
intermediate commodities (      ) where the weights are the fixed intermediate 
input/output coefficients            . 
     
                              
 
           4  
 
In this general equilibrium framework, not only direct effects but also feedback effects 
generated by the simulated external shock are considered. Feedback effects from 
using imported intermediate inputs are particularly important for trade policy 
analysis. In this context, specifying price of intermediate inputs according to domestic 
price of intermediate commodity entails considering effective protection rate in the 
analysis since the latter incorporates import tariffs, as we will see later in Equation 24.            
Value added payments (i.e. price of aggregate value added        times aggregate 
volume of primary inputs) is the residual of output value after paying the indirect tax 
on activity (rated at      ) and after deducting the intermediate inputs cost.   
  
                                                                   
           5  
 
At the bottom level of the production function, a composite intermediate commodity 
is specified as a Leontief aggregate of its individual intermediate inputs according to 
the fixed intermediate input/output coefficients. 
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At this bottom level also, a CES production technology specifies the aggregate value 
added as a function of the primary inputs demand in each activity, i.e.        .  
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where          is the shift parameter and       
   is the share parameter for         and 
          are the shift parameters for factor efficiency in each activity. The elasticity 
of substitution between production factors is given by     
            
    .  
The tangency condition for the production function at this level is given by 
 
                               
  
                         
               
     
  
            
     
    
 
        
  
                          
     
   
           8  
 
where      is the average price for factor   in region  ,            are the ratios for 
factor price in each activity to the average factor price and          is the factor use tax 
rate.8          
By maximizing profit, producers determine the optimal supply level of output 
according to the production technology prevailing in each activity. This per se 
                                                          
8 The model allows for simulating changes in the values of the production function shift parameters at 
both the top and bottom levels (i.e.       ,         ). This can be done in two ways: either 
adding/deducting a uniform change to/from the parameters values or scaling the parameters values 
up/down according to a certain rate. Furthermore, different simulation exercises can be conducted for 
factor efficiency parameter, i.e.         .   
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specifies their derived demand levels for production factors. Producers demand a 
production factor at the level that equalizes the value of its marginal product with its 
wage rate in each activity. 
Total factor income       is computed by summing the factor payments over different 
activities. The residual income after deducting depreciation allowance           and 
direct tax on factor income (rated at       ) is the factor income available for 
distribution to households according to specific shares, as we will see later in 
Equation 31, i.e.          . 
  
                                  
 
           9  
                                                                 10  
 
Domestic production for a commodity        is determined according to the shares of 
the commodity in output produced by each activity,             . As explained above, 
              used in this version of the model is an identity matrix. 
 
                           
 
           11  
 
Supply of each composite commodity is a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
aggregation of the output supplied in the domestic market and a composite 
commodity of exports to different destinations.9 This part is explained in detail in the 
Sub-section (5.2.2.2) on export supply.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 The CET function is originated by Powell and Gruen (1968). 
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Figure 5-1: Production Flows in GLOBE Model 
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5.2.2. International Trade Block 
In common with most of the trade-focused CGE models, the GLOBE model assumes 
imperfect substitution/transformation for import demand/export supply functions. 
Domestically produced commodities are imperfect substitutes to imports and to 
exports and sectoral imports and exports are differentiated by country of origins and 
by country of destinations. This approach in modelling trade was first developed by 
Armington (1969, p. 171) who argues that “…the assumption that products are 
distinguished by place of production is a very convenient point of departure toward a 
rigorous theory of market growth and share adjustment”. The assumption was then 
extended to the export side such that imperfect transformability is assumed between 
supply in the domestic and export markets, (Derviş, de Melo and Robinson 1982, pp. 
224-230). De Melo and Robinson (1989, pp. 47-67) provide general justification for 
extending product differentiation to the export side and conclude that “An external 
closure with symmetric product differentiation for imports and exports is 
theoretically well behaved and gives rise to normally shaped offer curves”.  
Armington specification is commonly used in trade-focused CGE models. “It is a 
theoretically consistent generalization of the “standard” trade model with nontraded 
goods, introducing degrees of substitutability and transformability rather than 
assuming a rigid dichotomy between tradable and nontradable goods” (Robinson 
2006, p. 211). Furthermore, imperfect substitutability between domestic products and 
both imports and exports entails more plausible domestic price and, thereby, quantity 
responses to the simulated trade shocks vis-à-vis the generated responses under 
perfect substitutability assumption. For a given trade policy shock (e.g. tariff removal) 
changes in domestic price do not reflect the full external shock. Changes in domestic 
prices depend on the degrees of substitutability between domestic and imported 
commodities. This specification also allows for intra-industry trade (i.e. cross 
hauling), which is of particular importance for developing countries.10 
The following two sub-sections provide detailed description for import demand and 
export supply specifications and Figure 5-2 outlines import and export components of 
domestic demand and domestic output, respectively, in the model. 
                                                          
10 For a detailed explanation, see Derviş, de Melo and Robinson (1982, pp. 219-254). 
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5.2.2.1 Import Demand 
In this version of GLOBE model, import demand is represented by a three-level nested 
CES function.11 For each commodity, imports from different sources are imperfect 
substitutes and their aggregated composite commodity is an imperfect substitute for 
its domestic equivalent. The imperfect substitutability assumption between imports 
from different regions, at the bottom level of the nest, draws only on commodity 
imports from source regions that account for large shares of a commodity imports by 
the region of destination.12 
At the top level, demand for composite imports and demand for domestic production 
are imperfect substitutes.13  
 
                            
     
 
                     
     
 
 
      
  
 
                        12  
 
In this CES aggregation,       denotes the composite good for domestic consumption, 
      is the composite import commodity,       is the domestic supply commodity, 
      and      are the shift and share parameters.14 The elasticity of substitution 
between composite imports and the domestic substitute (Armington elasticity) is 
given by     
         
   .  
Using a CES aggregation function implies that preferences between imports and 
domestic commodity in each sector are homothetic while preferences between 
                                                          
11 Product differentiation embodied in the model specification is implemented ‘at the border’ and, thus, 
is not agent-specific according to the product differentiation classification by Hertel, Ianchovichina and 
McDonald (1997, pp. 262-266). 
12 The model allows for alternative formulations for CES import demand and CET export supply 
functions expressed in share forms and in forms where prices are dependent variables. See McDonald, 
Thierfelder and Robinson (2007, pp. 72-74).  
13 For the commodity accounts where there is no imports and all domestic consumption is domestically 
produced (i.e.        ) and for the commodity accounts where there is no domestic production and 
all domestic consumption is imported (i.e.       ), a homogeneous aggregator for import and 
domestic demand is specified as follows,  
                                             
 OR                         
14 As Willenbockel (1999) clarifies, in his reply to some critiques on using Armington aggregator in CGE 
models, the term ‘share parameter’ should not be interpreted as the value share of the imported 
commodity       in the composite consumption commodity      .    
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different commodities are not. In other words, the import composition of domestic 
demand for a given commodity is determined by relative prices of domestic and 
import commodities in the domestic market               and not by income. The 
tangency condition for minimizing cost according to this function is as follows, 
 
                                               
       
  
 
                        13  
 
Supply price of a composite commodity        can be expressed as a weighted 
average of the consumer price for domestic commodity       and the domestic price 
of its imported substitute       where the weights are the correspodening commodity 
quantities.    
 
                                                          14  
 
By adding sales tax rated at       , that is imposed on domestic demand as we will see 
later in Equation 36, consumer price of composite commodity        is computed.  
 
                                                   15  
 
For each region of destination, the model distinguishes between imports from regions 
that comprise ‘large’ shares and imports from regions that comprise ‘small’ shares, 
each has a different specification.15  
At the second level, Leontief function is used to aggregate ‘big’ share imports (       ) 
and ‘small’ share imports (       ) that form the composite import commodity.  
 
                                                          
15 In the present study, value shares of imports by the region of destination are computed and the 
source regions that account for greater/less than 0.00001 of import value of a specific commodity by 
the region of destination are assigned to the large/small share imported commodity sub-set. For 
example, if the ratio of Botswana rice imports from the EU relative to Botswana total rice imports is less 
than 0.00001, then the EU is a ‘small’ share source region for Botswana rice imports.  
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                                     16  
                                     17  
 
where            and            are the ratios of aggregate ‘big’ share imports and 
‘small’ share imports in     . 
Domestic price of composite commodity       can, thus, be expressed as a weighted 
average of the domestic price of ‘large’ share imports (      ) and the domestic price 
of ‘small’ share imports (      ) where the weights are the corresponding import 
volumes. 
       
                                                             18  
 
At the bottom level, imperfect substitutability between imports from different sources 
(        ) is assumed for imports from ‘big’ share regions only (i.e.         ) as 
follows, 
 
                                       
    
 
               
   
        
  
  
           19  
 
where           is the price of imports   from region   in the domestic market of 
region  . The shift and share parmeters for this CES nest are        and       
 , 
respectively. The elasticity of substitution between imports from different origins is 
given by     
         
   . 
It is noteworthy here that the standard version of the model applies the same 
elasticity of substitution to imports from different regions. However, an additional 
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nest can be introduced to the CES import demand function in order to distinguish 
groups of regions that have different elasticity of substitution.16  
Domestic price of a composite import commodity        is a weighted average of 
domestic price of the import commodities from different ‘big’ share regions where the 
weights are the quantities imported from these regions.       
 
                            
 
                   20  
 
For ‘small’ share imports (i.e.         ) a fixed import share (Leontief) aggregator 
is implemented as follows,  
 
                                            21  
 
where               represents the volume ratios of imports from different ‘small’ 
share regions in      . 
Domestic price of a composite ‘small’ share import commodity        is a weighted 
average of domestic price of the import commodities from different ‘small’ share 
regions where the weights are the fixed quantity shares for these regions.       
 
                               
 
           22  
 
In order to calculate cif price of import commodity   from region   in region   
(        ), the total value of trade and transportation service required to import this 
commodity is added to its fob price (           ) as follows, 
 
                                                          
16 In order to reduce the restrictiveness of applying common elasticities between imports from 
different regions, McDonald and Thierfelder (2006) adopt a three-level nested CES function that 
distinguishes imports from regions that have common CES elasticities. They argue that the model 
results are sensitive to the embodied degree of product differentiation in different regions.  
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where                 is the quantity of trade and transport commodity    required 
for each unit of import commodity   by region   from region   and        is the price 
for trade transport commodity   . 
Price of import commodity   from region   in the domestic market of region   
(        ) is computed by converting its cif import price after adding tariffs rate 
        into domestic currency units using the prevailing exchange rate    .       
 
                                                   24  
 
5.2.2.2 Export Supply 
The GLOBE model specifies a two-level nested CET export supply function.17 For each 
export commodity, exports to different destinations are imperfect substitutes and that 
specific composite export commodity is an imperfect substitute to its counterpart 
supplied in the domestic market.18  
At the top level, producers allocate their output between domestic and foreign 
markets according to the following CET export supply function.   
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17 For the commodity accounts where there is no exports and all domestic production is directed to 
domestic supply (i.e.    ), for the commodity accounts where there is no domestic supply and all 
domestic production is exported (i.e.    ) or for homogeneous domestic/export supply, the 
specification is as follows,   
                                               
 OR                          
18 Here is another difference between the GLOBE model and the GTAP model where export supply is 
not specified by a CET function. The CET export function is, however, commonly used in the majority 
trade-focused CGE models. 
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where       is the domestic supply,       is a composite export commodity,       and 
     are the respective intercept and share parameters for the CET function. The 
elasticity of transformation between a composite export commodity and its domestic 
supply is given by     
        
      .  
The tangency condition implies that export supply decision depends on changes in the 
relative prices of exported and domestically supplied commodities              . 
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Producer price of a composite output commodity        can be expressed as a 
weighted average of the consumer price for domestic supply of the commodity (     ) 
and the domestic price of its exported equivalent (     ) where the weights are the 
correspodening commodity quantities.  
 
                                                                  27  
 
At the second level of export function, imperfect transformability is assumed between 
exports to different destinations. The first order condition for the optimal choice of 
exports to each region (       ) is given by   
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where        and      
  are the shift and share parameters for this CET function. The 
elasticity of transformation between exports to different destinations is given by 
    
        
      .  
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Figure 5-2: Domestic Demand and Domestic Output in GLOBE Model 
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Domestic price of export commodity   to region  by region   (        ) is computed 
by converting its world price         into domestic currency units, after deducting 
export tax rate       , using the prevailing exchange rate    .    
 
                                                29  
 
Domestic price of composite export commodity   by region   (      ) is measured as 
weighted average of domestic prices for exports to different destinations where the 
quantities exported to regions are the weights. 
 
                         
 
                       30  
 
5.2.3. Institutions Block 
This sub-section deals with the model accounts that represent the domestic 
institutions in the economy at hand: household, government and capital accounts.19 
Demand by these accounts for private consumption, public expenditure and capital 
final commodities compose total absorption.         
 
5.2.3.1 Household Account  
In the words of Shoven and Whalley (1984, p. 1017), “… demand and production 
functions in all the applied models … [should] be both consistent with the theoretical 
approach and analytically tractable”. These two prerequisites limit the options of the 
employed demand function in CGE models to be Cobb-Douglas, CES, LES or (Constant 
Difference of Elasticity) CDE functions.20   
In this version of GLOBE model, the private consumer demand decision is undertaken 
by a representative household in each region. Households receive income from 
                                                          
19 For each region  , the ‘Rest of the World’ institution account is represented by a whole set of regions  
  where one-to-one mapping sets, from regions   to trade partners  and vice versa, are declared. 
20 More flexible utility functions (e.g. translog function) could have been used. However, they might 
complicate the analysis. For different functional forms, see Annabi, Cockburn and Decaluwé (2006, pp. 
7-17).  
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production factors according to the household share (          ) in factor income 
after depreciation and direct tax on factor income (         ). Household income 
(     ) is represented as follows,   
 
                              
 
           31  
 
Households pay income taxes rated at        and save according to a ration of their 
disposable income,       .21 Household consumption expenditure (       ) is, thus, 
determined by  
  
                                                        32  
 
Each household maximizes a Stone-Geary utility function subject to its budget 
constraint. The resulting linear expenditure system (LES) represents two demand 
components for each consumption commodity; subsistence and discretionary 
demand. As its name suggests, LES specifies expenditure of each commodity as a 
linear function of prices and total non-subsistence expenditure. 
 
                
                                    
                                    
 
   
           33  
 
In this LES demand function,                is subsistence consumption volume and 
       is the marginal budget share according to which the supernumerary income (the 
                                                          
21 The model specification does not allow for any transfers from the other institution accounts to 
household. This implies that selling factor service is the only income source for household. 
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excess of total spending over subsistence consumption) is divided among different 
commodities. 
 
5.2.3.2 Government Account 
Government income     consists of tax revenues only. The model does not allow for 
transfers from other institution accounts, located either inside or outside the region, 
to the government. Seven types of taxes are identified by the model: import ad 
valorem tariffs (        ), export taxes (      ), sales taxes on domestic demand 
(     ), indirect production tax on activity output (     ) and indirect tax on activity 
use of production factors (        ), direct taxes on household income (       ) and 
direct taxes on factor income (       ).22 The following Equations represent 
government revenues from these taxes in a respective order.   
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22 As discussed before in Chapter 4, tariff data extracted from the GTAP7 database covers AVEs of 
specific and compound tariffs as well as TRQs. In this stage, import-weights derived from the GTAP7 
database are used to aggregate import duties before calibrating the model. 
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The model allows for altering the tax rates through two types of scaling factors. The 
first is an additive scaling factor that imposes a uniform scalar to all rates for a specific 
tax in the region. Using this scalar entails altering the relative rates for a specific tax in 
the region. The other is a multiplicative scaling factor that scales all rates for a specific 
tax in the region whilst keeping its relative rates fixed. For the purposes of this study, 
different simulation scenarios, undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7, apply uniform changes 
to import and export tax rates. Therefore, additive factors are used to scale tax rates 
up/down.      
Government expenditure     is given by  
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where        and             are the variable and parameter that represent 
government demand volume and        is a multiplicative scaling factor for 
government consumption. 
 
5.2.3.3 Capital Account  
Capital account collects savings from different sources and allocates them to different 
capital commodities. Total savings         comprises of four components: private 
savings, depreciation, government savings         and trade balance surplus 
        as follows,            
 
132 
 
 
 
                                     
 
 
                    
 
                        
           44  
 
By summing values of investment demand by commodity (        ), total investment 
expenditure (       ) is computed. 
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5.2.3.4 Total Domestic Demand  
Demand for each composite consumption commodity is a CES aggregation of the 
domestically produced commodity and a composite of its imported substitutes, as 
seen in Figure 5-3. Domestic demand consists of intermediate demand, private 
consumer demand         , government demand        and investment demand 
        . 
 
                          
 
                 
                         47  
 
We have seen how the intermediate demand decision is taken by firms in the course 
of the production process. Household and government accounts represent how 
income is generated and spent by the domestic institutions in the model. 
Furthermore, capital account handles savings and investment demand. The following 
figure summarizes the functional specifications for domestic demand components. 
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 Figure 5-3: Domestic Demand Flows in GLOBE Model 
 
 
 
Domestic Demand  
Investment Demand 
Commodity  
 
Intermediate Demand 
Commodity  
Private Demand Commodity 
 
Government Demand 
Commodity  
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5.2.1. Exchange Rate and Multiple Numéraire 
Exchange rate in the GLOBE model is expressed as units of domestic currency per a 
unit of foreign currency. It is not a financial variable in the sense that it is solely 
determined by the relative prices of tradable and non tradable commodities in the 
domestic markets.23 
Neoclassical CGE models are money-neutral; models are solved for relative prices 
where the absolute price levels are specified exogenously.24 In other words, 
neoclassical CGE models are homogenous of degree zero in nominal prices. As such, 
one nominal price variable is specified as exogenous and all other prices are measured 
relative to this chosen numéraire. 
The GLOBE model identifies a global numéraire to which foreign transactions and 
regional exchange rates are calculated in relative terms. This global numéraire is 
specified as the exchange rate index for a reference region chosen by the modeller. In 
this version of the model, a single region is assigned to the reference region sub-set 
i.e.   United States of America .25 
 
                       
 
             48  
             A.  
 
                                                          
23 Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1993, pp. 45-63) present different approaches for measuring the 
equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER), i.e. purchasing power parity (PPP) and Salter-Swan model 
approaches. The authors argue that the framework that incorporates product differentiation for 
imports and exports generates ERER that is consistent with both approaches. For an elaborated 
explanation of exchange rate and its role within the CGE framework, see De Melo and Robinson (1989). 
24 Money-neutrality implies that changes in money supply only affect nominal variables. Changes in 
money supply generate proportional changes in all nominal prices (including factor prices) leaving real 
variables constant. 
25 Choosing a group of countries, instead of a single country, as the model reference region might 
facilitate the iteration process for the model to find its new equilibrium point and, thereby, enhance the 
model performance.  
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In addition, the model introduces consumer price indices (    ) as a price numéraire 
for each region.      is measured as a weighted average of consumer prices of 
composite commodities where the weights are the value shares of each commodity in 
the total private consumer demand,            .      are specified exogenously and, 
for each region, prices are normalized to the region numéraire.26  
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As such, all results are expressed in real terms. Intra-region transactions are 
measured relative to the      in each region whereas inter-region transactions are 
measured relative to the constant global numéraire.27 In the words of Lewis, Robinson 
and Thierfelder (1999, p. 13)  
“The advantage of this choice is that solution wages and incomes are in real 
terms. The solution exchange rates in the sub-regions are also in real terms, 
and can be seen as equilibrium price-level-deflated (PLD) exchange rates, 
using the country consumer price indices as deflators”. 
 
 
                                                          
26 Alternatively, the GLOBE model allows for identifying producer price indices (    ) as the region 
numéraire. In such case,      is calculated as a weighted average of consumer price of domestic supply 
      according to the value shares of each commodity in the total domestic output;            . Prices 
for each region are, then, normalized to the exogenous region numéraire as follows,   
                                                                                 
                                                                                                                     
27 Likewise, the Global Trade and Environment Model (GTEM) CGE model identifies multiple 
numéraire. The GTEM model is documented in Pant (2007). 
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5.3 GLOBE Closure Rules 
At this stage of methodology development, a set of closure rules are specified in the 
way that ensures the mathematical consistency required to solve a model of 
simultaneous equations,28 reflects the embodied assumptions on economic behaviour 
and represents the economic logic on how the general equilibrium is achieved. These 
“… “system constraints” … must be satisfied, but … are not taken into account by any 
agent in making his decisions” (Robinson 1989, pp. 907-8). The choice of macro and 
factor market closure rules has substantial influence upon the model findings. 
 
5.3.1. Total Absorption Closure 
The present study adopts a ‘balanced’ closure rule that implies constant total 
absorption shares. In other words, proportions of private consumption, government 
expenditure and investment to domestic final demand are fixed at their benchmark 
ratios. The term ‘balanced’ refers to the closure rule function in maintaining the total 
absorption shares and hence the generated changes in domestic final demand, in 
response to exogenous shocks, are evenly distributed among its components.29 
The following three Equations determine total value of domestic final demand 
(       ) and the value shares for two of its components (i.e. government 
expenditure        and investment demand          ).   
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28 For the model to be squared and therein has a general equilibrium solution, the number of 
independent equations should equal the number of endogenous variables.  
29 For more details and alternative closure rules, see Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2001, pp. 13-17).      
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Setting the proportions of government expenditure and investment in total 
absorption fixed (i.e. Inequalities C and D) entails that the complementary share (i.e. 
ratio of private consumption in total absorption) is necessarily fixed. 
   
                           C.  
                                   D.  
 
Two points are worth mentioning here. Firstly, total absorption shares are fixed in 
nominal terms. This implies that volumes of domestic final demand components (i.e. 
        ,        and         ) change as the result of changes in relative prices; 
      . Secondly, this ‘balanced’ closure rule has considerable implications in the 
context of this study. Trade policy and, more specifically, tariff changes do not affect 
public spending directly. The model assumes fiscal exogeneity, thereby excluding the 
government spending channel from the trade liberalization-welfare linkages by 
assumption. 
 
5.3.2. Government Account Closure  
For the purposes of this study, two closure rules are implemented to government 
account. The main simulation scenarios undertaken in Chapter 6 and all the scenarios 
provided in Chapter 7 adopt the basic closure rule. A separate set of simulation 
scenarios, which is provided in Chapter 6, adopts an alternative closure rule for 
government account. The following is a detailed explanation for these closure rules.     
 
5.3.2.1 Basic Closure Rule 
As discussed before, value share of government expenditure in total absorption is set 
to be fixed; Inequality C. Government savings is endogenously determined as the 
residual difference between government income and government expenditure. 
 
                             53  
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Taxes that are not targeted by the simulation shock are fixed at their baseline rates. 
This is undertaken by setting the relevant additive and multiplicative scaling factors 
for each tax type fixed at their baseline values which are 1 for the multiplicative 
scaling factor and 0 for the additive scaling factor.   
 
5.3.2.2 Alternative Closure Rule 
In an alternative closure rule, the study assumes that tariff revenue losses generated 
by the simulated tariff reductions are offset through a rise in domestic sales tax 
rates.30 Accordingly, government income is set to be fixed while allowing sales tax rate 
to endogenously adjust through its additive scaling parameter,     . The next two 
conditions are added.  
 
                    E.  
                     F.  
 
5.3.3. Savings-Investment Closure 
Two alternative closure rules could be employed: the Johansen investment-driven and 
the neo-classical savings-driven closure rules. The former assumes that savings level 
adjusts endogenously in order to generate the required fund to finance the base year 
fixed investment. In contrast, the neo-classical closure assumes that investment 
adjusts endogenously in order to match the fixed savings level. Robinson and Lofgren 
(2005, p. 274) demonstrate that both closure rules do not rigorously represent the 
savings/investment behaviour in the model. However, the authors argue that they “… 
are theoretically coherent within the flow-equilibrium specification of the CGE 
model”.  
                                                          
30 This alternative closure rule is adopted in Chapter 6 for the two main scenarios under the simulation 
set (Set3), i.e. Sim13 and Sim23.  
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This version of the model adopts investment-driven closure. Savings level adjusts to 
generate the required savings to finance the base year fixed investment. As 
aforementioned, investment demand by commodity alters in response to relative 
price changes (Equation 46) keeping value share of investment expenditure in total 
absorption fixed; Inequality D. The required changes in total savings are generated 
through endogenous changes in private and government savings levels. Both variables 
are set to be endogenous; Equations 32 and 53. Foreign savings level is fixed 
according to the external balance closure rule, as we will see in the following sub-
section. 
 
5.3.4. External Account Closure  
The two alternative closure rules are either to fix exchange rate and specify foreign 
savings as the equilibrating variable that clears the foreign exchange market or to fix 
foreign savings while permitting exchange rate to adjust endogenously. The choice 
between these two alternatives has been a subject of debate in the literature.  
Welfare implication is one of the key elements in this study. It is, therefore, important 
to specify endogenous changes in terms of trade and fix current accounts (i.e. foreign 
savings). This specification ensures that trade partners do not accrue a ‘free lunch’ 
when a country liberalizes its trade.  
Trade balance for a region   (i.e.        ) is computed by summing its bilateral 
trade balances with all trade parterns   (i.e.          ). Trade balances for all non-
‘Globe’ regions are fixed at their initial benchmark levels and real exchange rates are 
allowed to vary in such a way that clears the foreign exchange markets, i.e. trade 
balances.31   
 
                                                          
31 Three points are worth noting here. Firstly, current and trade balances are identical since there are 
no remittances or foreign transfers in this version of the model. Secondly, trade/current account 
deficits, which are evaluated in terms of the global numéraire, must sum to zero for the whole world in 
order to equilibrate the model. Finally, the model specification allows for assigning flexible external 
balances, and hence fixed exchange rates, for chosen regions. 
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                               G.  
 
From this perspective, any external shock that might decrease export earnings for a 
region, e.g. reducing tariffs on its imports, generates, ceteris paribus, an increase in 
real exchange rate. This real depreciation improves competitiveness of exports in 
foreign markets whereas import-competing products become more expensive in 
domestic markets. Such changes entail export expansions and import decreases, 
keeping the trade account balanced. 
 
5.3.5. Commodity Trade Account Closure  
In order to ensure consistency across bilateral trade accounts, import volume of 
commodity   by region   from region  is, by definition, equalized with export volume 
of the same commodity by region    to region   . Likewise, fob price of import 
commodity   by region   from region   is, by definition, equalized with the world 
price of the same commodity export by region    to region   . For these two 
Equations to be implemented without corruption, a mapping set from         to 
       is used to swap the labels for importing and exporting regions.    
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5.3.6. Factor Market Closure 
In order to close factor market accounts, modellers either fix factor quantity (factor 
total supply that sums over demand by activities) allowing factor rent to adjust or fix 
factor rent assuming flexible factor supply. The former is labelled in the literature as 
the full-employment closure rule. It is more accurate, though, to call it unchanged 
employment closure since it sets factor supply at its unchanged baseline level, 
(Pycroft 2009, p. 130). 
For the purposes of this study, two closure rules are implemented for production 
factor markets. All the simulation scenarios, undertaken in both Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7, adopt the basic closure rule whereas the sensitivity analysis, provided in 
Chapter 6, assumes an alternative closure rule. The following is a detailed explanation 
for these closure rules.     
 
5.3.6.1 Basic Closure Rule 
In the basic set of closure rules, all production factors are assumed to be fully 
employed. The model also assumes that production factors, except natural resources, 
are mobile across activities. As Inequalities H and I show, factor supply       is fixed at 
its baseline level whereas factor price      is allowed to adjust in order to clear the 
factor market. In each region, factor demand by different activities is determined 
endogenously and thereby fixing the sectoral proportions for factor prices in different 
activities,           . 
  
              
 
           58  
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             I.  
                        J.  
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It is appropriate to assume that natural resources are not flexible to be reallocated to 
alternative production activities. Therefore, natural resources are specified to be 
activity-specific. The model specifies its demand to be determined exogenously while 
allowing its rent to vary across activities. Accordingly, Inequalities H and J are relaxed 
for natural resources. Like all other factors, natural resources are assumed to be fully 
employed. Therefore, Inequality I is retained. A new condition is imposed as follows, 
 
                          K.  
 
This specification entails that sectoral proportions for natural resources rent vary 
across activities reflecting the prevailing utilization level in each activity. Relaxing a 
condition requires imposing a new one in order to ensure a unique equilibrium 
solution for the model.32 An additional condition is, thus, specified such that the 
proportions of the natural resources returns for ‘oil and minerals’ activity to its total 
returns are fixed at their baseline ratios in all non-reference regions.33 
 
                                               L.  
 
5.3.6.2 Alternative Closure Rule 
The induced changes in output and trade structures in response to the trade 
simulated shocks are among the key examined variables in this study. It is, thus, 
necessary for the model specification to reflect rigidity in factor markets for the 
regions at hand. From this perspective, the model employs a different closure rule that 
assumes unemployment for unskilled labour markets in SADC regions. According to 
this closure set, unskilled labour wages (relative to the region numéraire) are 
specified to be fixed at their baseline rates in all SADC regions whereas their 
                                                          
32 In order to ensure a unique solution for non-linear simultaneous systems of equations, where the 
number of variables   is greater than the number of equations  , the     number of variables should 
be specified exogenously. That is to say, the number of endogenous variables should equal the number 
of independent equations. 
33 Under the adopted aggregation scheme, only two activities are natural resources-using; livestock 
(    ) and ‘oil and minerals’ (    ). 
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employment levels are determined endogenously to reflect abundant supply of 
unskilled workers who are willing to offer their services at the prevailing wage rates 
in SADC regions.34 
This is undertaken by specifying a sub-set of regions        to which the regions with 
unemployment are assigned, i.e. SADC regions. Inequality H that fixes factor supply 
and Inequality I that specifies factor wage as a free variable are relaxed for      . Like 
the basic closure rule, unskilled labour in SADC regions is assumed to be mobile 
across activities. Therefore, Inequality J is retained for      . Two additional 
conditions are imposed as follows, 
  
                              M.  
                               N.  
 
where    is the unskilled labour and SADC regions are assigned to the sub-set      .      
Like the basic closure rule, all other production factors (skilled labour, land and 
capital in all regions as well as unskilled labour outside SADC regions) are specified to 
be fully employed and mobile across activities. Furthermore, natural resources are 
assumed to be immobile across activities. Therefore, the specification for these factors 
is the same as represented in inequalities H - L.  
 
5.3.7. ‘Globe’ Region and Equilibrating the Model 
As aforementioned, the GTAP7 database does not include bilateral trade data for trade 
and transportation margins. Therefore, trade in these commodities are undertaken by 
the artificial region called ‘Globe’. The quantity of a trade margin commodity   
demanded by region   from region  (i.e.       ) is determined as follows,  
 
                                                          
34 This is undertaken in the course of the sensitivity analysis provided in Chapter 6, i.e. the sensitivity 
scenario Sim21-lun. 
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where       is a sub-set of commodities to which trade and transportion margins 
are assigned. As described before, the quantity parameter                 is the 
quantity of trade and transport commodity   required for each unit of import 
commodity    by region   from region . 
In order to close the trade and transportation margins account, import demand of a 
trade margin commodity   by region   from all regions   is equalized with ‘Globe’ 
export supply of the trade margin commodity   to all regions   . Import price of a 
trade margin commodity   by region   is equalized with world price of its export by 
‘Globe’ to different regions  .     
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where   in the right hand-sides of both Equations represent ‘Globe’ region.             
Trade and transportation margins commodities are set to be homogenous. 
Accordingly, ‘Globe’ exports to different regions are perfect substitutes, i.e. Equation 
62. In addtition, different importing regions   of a trade and transportation margin 
commodity     pay the same price, i.e. Equation 63.     
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There is neither domestic demand nor domestic production undertaken by ‘Globe’ 
region. Therefore, its imports and exports of trade and transportation margins are 
necessarily identical. Bilateral trade balances for ‘Globe’ region and its zero-trade 
balance are given by, 
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Unlike other regions in the model, exchange rate for ‘Globe’ is set to be fixed.  
 
                       O.  
 
According to Walras’s Law, if all markets, but one, are in equilibrium, then this last 
market is also cleared. Therefore, one of the model equations is redundant and can be 
omitted. Alternatively, the model identifies slack variables that have null values. The 
savings-investment equation for all regions but ‘Globe’ region is excluded. Total 
savings and investment expenditure are implicitly balanced if the rest of the equations 
are solved and the model reaches its equilibrium position.  
 
                                    66  
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In order to close ‘Globe’ region account, a slack variable (i.e.          ) is defined 
as follows,  
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5.4 Calibration and Preparation for Simulation 
CGE models assume that economies are in equilibrium at the baseline year. 
Accordingly, variables and parameters values are numerically calibrated in such a way 
that this initial equilibrium point replicates the baseline dataset. This implies no 
stochastic disturbance is embodied in the model equations. The model is, thus, 
specified as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and solved using a solver called 
‘PATH’.35 
The following three sub-sections describe various measurements implemented by the 
model. 
 
5.4.1. Welfare Measures 
In this general equilibrium framework, changes in trade policy generate changes in all 
prices and quantities which determine the new equilibrium point. Comparative static 
analysis of values of the relevant variables between these two equilibria provides 
indications of the welfare impact. Changes in trade policy generate efficiency effects 
which can be traced through changes in aggregate production, income and demand. 
Changes in GDP, factor returns and household incomes, total absorption as well as 
equivalent and compensating variations are commonly used as welfare indicators in 
the empirical literature.36 Using the 1-2-3 model, Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) 
demonstrate that changes in real factor returns do not accurately reflect the welfare 
impact of trade policy that embodies changes in indirect taxes. Such changes induce 
both efficiency and transfer effects. While the former has welfare implications, the 
latter does not necessarily mean changes in household income and/or total 
absorption. Therefore, interpreting changes in factor returns in the context of welfare 
analysis should be done with caution. 
                                                          
35 For more on calibrating CGE models, see Shoven and Whalley (1984 and 1992). Rutherford (1995) 
provides detailed mathematical explanation of MCP and the MCP solvers.  
36 Some problems related to comparing welfare across different households and measuring welfare in 
dynamic models are reported in the applied general equilibrium literature. For a detailed discussion, 
see Shoven and Whalley (1992, pp. 123-129).   
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In this model, welfare impact is measured by the equivalent variation on household 
consumption and changes in total absorption. The equivalent variation measures the 
amount of income (million US$ 2004) consumers would have to be given or taken at 
the pre-simulation utility levels in order to yield an equivalent effect on their welfare 
as the simulated policy change does. The equivalent variation           for household 
  in region   under any scenario     is given by 
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where            is consumer price of composite commodity   in region   at the new 
equilibrium point,             is household consumption expenditure at the new 
equilibrium point,         and          are the corresponding initial equilibrium 
levels of these variables,                is the volume of subsistence consumption for 
commodity   and the         are the marginal budget shares.   
In order to compare changes in welfare across regions, the welfare measure should be 
standardized by an indicator of the economy size. Therefore, proportional changes in 
total absorption provide comparable indications of changes in welfare across regions. 
Under the ‘balanced’ macro closure adopted in this study, changes in total absorption 
generated by GLOBE are a good proxy for changes in the Hicksian measure for 
consumer welfare.37  
                                                          
37 Robinson and Willenbockel (2009, p. 26) estimate the correlation coefficient between changes in real 
absorption and the equivalent variation in percent of baseline consumption by country to be 0.9946. 
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5.4.2. Terms of Trade Computation 
In this multi-sector, multi-country model, a Laspeyres price index is used for 
computing terms of trade. The export price index is the current value of the baseline 
exports divided by the baseline value of the baseline exports. Similarly, the import 
price index represents the current value of the baseline imports divided by the 
baseline value of the baseline imports. Terms of trade          for region   under any 
scenario     is calculated as follows, 
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where              is world price for exports of commodity   by region   to region   
at the new equilibrium point,              is world cif price for imports of commodity 
  by region   from region   at the new equilibrium point,          and           
are the corresponding initial equilibrium levels of these world prices,          is the 
initial equilibrium exports of commodity   by region   to region  and           is the 
initial equilibrium imports of commodity   by region   from region . 
 
5.4.3. Factor Market Adjustment Measure  
The study employs a measure of the degree of structural change that takes place in 
each economy after the simulated trade shocks. During the adjustment process to a 
trade liberalization shock, resources move towards activities with comparative 
advantage. The employed measure                considers the amount of 
production factors that have to move across activities for the economy to achieve the 
new equilibrium point after any simulation shock    . It is given by  
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where             is demand for factor   by activity   in region   at the new 
equilibrium point and           is its corresponding initial equilibrium level,            
is total supply of factor   in region   at the new equilibrium point. 
It measures the degree of structural change and, hence, serves as an indication of the 
potential costs each economy will have to bear during its adjustment process to a 
policy shock. However, three limitations on measuring the degree of structural change 
and reflecting on the associated adjustment costs are valid here. The critical one is 
that, as a comparative static model, GLOBE does not consider the path through which 
the economy moves to reach the new equilibrium point. Therefore, any indicator of 
structural change gives only a measure of the distance between the old and new 
equilibrium points and does not reflect how easy it is for the economy to achieve the 
new equilibrium.  
Secondly, this measure does not consider the differences among activities in terms of 
their ability to expand or contract. Practically speaking, how easy it is to withdraw 
factors from an activity and reallocate them to another activity depends on the 
acquired and required skills in different activities. Accounting for this, however, 
requires information at the industry level that is not readily available for this multi-
region model.38  
Finally, recalling that full employment and free factor mobility (except for natural 
resources) are assumed under the basic closure rule, the measured degree of 
structural change reflects factor movements along the production possibility frontier. 
The possible shift of the production point below the production frontier is only 
accounted for under the alternative closure rule that relaxes the full employment 
                                                          
38 Milner (2006) provides indicative scales for the potential adjustment costs associated with the EU-
ACP EPAs. The study uses crude indicators in estimating the potentially required adjustment costs in 
each economy; like secondary school enrolment rate for factor reallocation adjustment costs and the 
share of manufactures in total exports for export diversification adjustment costs. 
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assumption for unskilled labour markets in SADC regions as described before in Sub-
section 5.3.6.2. Rigorous analysis of structural adjustment costs should account for 
costs the economy as a whole bears during its movement between equilibria. 
Nevertheless, structural adjustment imposed on labour has a special importance in 
the SADC context where unskilled labour-intensive sectors are predominant. 
Therefore, unskilled labour unemployment associated with structural change could be 
influential from a political economy perspective. Overall, the employed measure for 
factor market adjustment gives broad indications of the potential adjustment costs 
associated with each simulation scenario. 
 
 
5.5 Capabilities and Limitations for Regional Integration Analysis 
5.5.1. Rationale for Using GLOBE Model  
There are a number of reasons that justify adopting the multi-region, multi-sector CGE 
GLOBE model as a framework for regional trade analysis. The main advantage is that 
the model provides a theoretically consistent economy-wide framework that takes 
into consideration direct and indirect effects of trade shocks not only on the economy 
at hand but also on its trade partners and on the world as a whole. Forming RTAs 
generates implications at the sectoral, national, regional and global levels. The model 
captures the forward and backward linkages among different sectors in a way that 
reflects their relative strength prevailing in the output and trade structures. CGE 
models derive their strength from the sound theoretical foundations of 
microeconomic theory and general equilibrium theory. In addition, they are flexible to 
accommodate alternative assumptions that reflect structural features and/or market 
rigidities. 
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5.5.2. Limitations and Areas for Developments 
In analyzing trade policy using a standard CGE model, the counterfactual approach is 
employed in the sense that the model examines what would have happened in the 
baseline year if a specific trade shock was in place ceteris paribus. Therefore, the main 
concern is about a specific trade change in isolation of any other changes that might 
have happened in the domestic and/or foreign policies.    
The employed version of the GLOBE model is a comparative static that contrasts two 
equilibrium positions for a particular economy: the pre- and the post- simulation 
equilibrium points. The generated changes in the endogenous variables compared to 
their baseline levels are examined. The model does not, however, consider the path 
through which the economy moves until reaching the new equilibrium point. 
Therefore, it does not provide any indications on how long it takes, nor how easy it is, 
for an economy to reach the new equilibrium position. It is worth bearing these two 
conceptual issues in mind when interpreting the generated findings.   
Other welfare gains are expected by considering trade aspects like technology 
transfers, economies of scale, trade externalities and dynamic trade impacts on 
productivity, capital accumulation and, eventually, growth in the model specification.  
Arguably, most of the findings from trade CGE models are known to be driven, at least 
partly, by the behavioural characteristics built into the model. It is thus likely for the 
simulation results to be, partially, driven by model specification and to be sensitive to 
the employed elasticity values. Therefore, conducting sensitivity analyses of the 
results against alternative assumptions and elasticities is particularly important. 
Another limitation on the analysis is related to the restrictive assumptions of 
Armington specification for trade behaviour in the model.39 The Armington 
specification implies that the elasticity of substitution does not depend on the 
quantity demanded and, thus, the import demand responsiveness to price changes is 
constant and, thereby, preferences are homothetic. Yang and Koo (1993) specify a 
generalized version of the Armington trade model by relaxing the single elasticity of 
                                                          
39 For more on the critiques directed to the Armington specification, see Winters (1984) and Alston et 
al. (1990). Furthermore, Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001) critically review the CGE model-based 
results and argue that combining Armington assumption with fixed terms of trade generate misleading 
results. 
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substitution and the homotheticity assumptions. Furthermore, more flexible 
functional forms are used in the literature. Robinson et al. (1993) use the non-
homothetic almost ideal demand system (AIDS) specification in their one-region 
model. Nevertheless, some empirical issues hinder the efforts to include these forms 
in the highly disaggregated global models. 
It is worth mentioning here that, under the Armington assumption, products are 
exogenously differentiated in the sense that sources of differentiation are not dealt 
with in the model. Another trend of critical literature of the Armington assumption is 
based on the exclusion of endogenous product differentiation. Brown and Stern (1989, 
p. 243) demonstrate that “… differentiating products at the firm level sidesteps many 
of the problems associated with differentiation at the national level” and thus “… the 
development of computational models with imperfectly competitive firms offers an 
attractive alternative” compared to differentiating products by source. Nevertheless, 
inclusion of the endogenous product differentiation requires data on industry 
concentration that is practically hard to compile for multi-region, multi-sector CGE 
models. 
 
  
  
6 Quantitative Impact of the Alternative EU-SADC EPA Scenarios 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter 2, in the course of the EPA negotiation process, SADC members 
have aligned themselves with four different negotiating groups: the SADC-EPA, the 
EAC-EPA, the ESA-EPA and the Central Africa-EPA groups. Participating in the SADC-
EPA group is exclusive for SADC members. This group includes SACU members 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa) and Mozambique. In 
contrast, the other three negotiating groups include SADC as well as non-SADC 
members. It is, thus, plausible to conceive two possible scenarios for the final EU-
SADC EPAs. The first assumes that the SADC-EPA group concludes final EPAs with the 
EU. The latter represents the ultimate goal of the EU-SADC EPAs where all SADC 
members conclude final EPAs with the EU. 
The envisaged final EPAs have to be WTO-compatible. That is to say, trade 
liberalization should cover ‘substantially all trade’. Given the complexities 
surrounding the negotiation process as well as overlapping membership for SADC 
members, it is not evident how different negotiating groups, and members within each 
negotiating group, will agree on a precise definition for ‘substantially all trade’ with 
the EU. Therefore, the study assumes that all SADC regions involved in a liberalization 
scenario apply a uniform 90 percent cut of the applied tariffs on imports from the EU. 
This assumption is in accordance with the comparative static analysis undertaken by 
the CGE GLOBE model. As described in the preceding chapter, GLOBE quantifies the 
generated changes in the endogenous variables as a result of exogenous shocks by 
comparing between the pre- and post-shock equilibria. It does account for the path of 
movement for the model variables between the two equilibrium points. SADC 
members are not foreseen to liberalize ‘substantially all trade’ with the EU 
immediately; transition periods vary across negotiating groups and among members 
in a given group. Therefore, the model findings represent the full magnitude of the 
potential effects generated under the envisaged final EPAs. 
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This chapter provides thorough analyses of the alternative EU-SADC EPA scenarios.1 
The analyses are undertaken at both the aggregate and the sectoral levels. At the 
aggregate level, the impact analyses are undertaken for welfare, terms of trade and 
real exchange rates, fiscal revenue, factor income and factor market adjustment. 
Changes in SADC total trade and in SADC trade relations with the EU, with third 
parties and within the SADC region are then examined. 
Subsequently, the underlying price changes and structural change for output and 
trade are contemplated. Conducting detailed sectoral analyses on a country-basis is 
crucial to understand the consequent welfare impacts. Furthermore, such analyses 
determine the most affected sectors, the sensitive sectors to be excluded from the 
proposed liberalization schedules and, therefore, provide policy inferences for 
different SADC members. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the different 
simulation sets and scenarios implemented by this chapter. Impact analyses of the 
simulation findings generated by the two liberalization scenarios (SADC-EPA Group 
and All SADC Regions) under the different simulation sets are provided in Sections 6.3 
and 6.4, respectively. Section 6.5 conducts sensitivity analyses of the simulation 
findings to variations in the model settings and the liberalization degree and coverage. 
Section 6.6 summarizes the main conclusions. As noted in the introductory chapter, 
results at the aggregate level are depicted in the main text of the chapter whereas 
additional exposition of the sectoral results is provided by Appendix to Chapter 6 at 
the end of the thesis.     
  
      
                                                          
1 I have presented preliminary drafts of this chapter at two international Economics events. The first is 
the UNU-CRIS and UNU-WIDER International Workshop on “South-South and North-South Trade 
Agreements: Compatibility Issues”, November 2009, Bruges. A peer-reviewed version of the presented 
paper is forthcoming in the South African Journal of Economics, see Osman (forthcoming). The second 
is the International Conference on Economic Modeling (EcoMod 2010), July 2010, Istanbul. See Osman 
(2010). I wish to acknowledge useful participants comments received at these events. 
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6.2 Simulation Description 
The study carries out a series of three simulation sets; each set consists of two 
liberalization scenarios, as portrayed in Table 6-1.2  
The first scenario “SADC-EPA Group” represents the case in which the negotiations 
are confined to the SADC-EPA group only. The SADC-EPA group is represented in the 
GTAP7 database by four separate regions: Botswana, South Africa, ‘Rest of SACU’ and 
Mozambique.3 This scenario simulates a 90 percent cut of the applied tariff rates on 
imports by these regions from the EU. This is implemented simultaneously with a full 
elimination of the applied tariffs on the EU imports from these specific regions.  
The other scenario “All SADC Regions” represents the ultimate goal of the EU-SADC 
EPAs; launching a FTA between the EU and all SADC members.4 Presuming that a FTA 
is implemented through a once-off tariff reduction, a uniform 90 percent cut of the 
applied tariff rates is undertaken by all SADC regions simultaneously with full removal 
of the applied tariffs by the EU. The first simulation set (Set1) maintains the “Current 
Intra-SADC Protection” level as represented in the GTAP7 database. These two 
scenarios are firstly implemented without applying any other trade liberalization 
measures, i.e. Sim11 and Sim21.5  
                                                          
2 Each simulation experiment is tagged by two digits; the first represents the liberalization scenario 
while the other refers to the simulation set under which the experiment is conducted. As we will see 
later, letters are added to the simulation codes in order to represent variations in the model and 
liberalization settings that are adopted by the sensitivity scenarios.    
3 Due to data restrictions, Angola is not represented as a separate region in the GTAP7 database. 
Instead, Angola and D.R. Congo form ‘Rest of SADC’ region. Therefore, this scenario does not simulate 
Angola within the SADC-EPA group. As described in detail in Chapter 2, Angola has not signed an IEPA 
with the EU and has opted to maintain the EBA provisions. It is, thus, more likely for Angola not to sign 
a final EPA with the EU along with other members of the SADC-EPA group. South Africa and Namibia 
have not signed IEPAs with the EU. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive a scenario for final EPA 
between the EU and the SADC-EPA group, which includes all SACU-CU members, without South Africa. 
Namibia is represented in the GTAP7 database as part of ‘Rest of SACU’ region. Therefore, it has to be 
assumed that Namibia concludes a final EPA with the other members of the SADC-EPA group.     
4 Due to data restrictions, Seychelles is not included in this scenario. Seychelles is represented in the 
GTAP7 database as part of ‘Rest of Eastern Africa’ region. This is not expected to affect the results, 
though. 
5 It is worth recalling here that data on trade barriers derived from the GTAP7 database are inclusive of 
tariff and NTBs. Therefore, all the scenarios implicitly simulate reducing (or removing) both tariff and 
NTBs to the trade flows that are subject to liberalization. Data coverage and limitations are described 
earlier in Chapter 4. 
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In order to gain clear insights of the results and their determinants, each of these two 
main simulation scenarios is decomposed into two components according to the 
source of the simulated tariff cuts; the SADC and the European side. The fist scenario 
(Sim11) is decomposed into a 90 percent cut of the applied tariff rates on the SADC-
EPA group imports from the EU (Sim11-SADC) and a full elimination of the applied 
tariffs on the EU imports from the SADC-EPA group (Sim11-EU). Likewise, Sim21 is 
decomposed into Sim21-SADC and Sim21-EU.  
The second simulation set (Set 2) represents the case in which SADC liberalizes its 
trade with the EU according to the previous two scenarios and simultaneously 
completes its intra-regional trade liberalization. In other words, each of the two 
liberalization scenarios is run presuming “Full Intra-SADC Trade Liberalization”.6 
Intra-SADC trade might be affected by liberalizing trade with the EU. Therefore, it is 
interesting to examine the EU-SADC EPA implications under the alternative that intra-
SADC trade barriers are removed. The purpose of conducting this simulation set is to 
measure the extent to which the potential contractions in intra-SADC trade can be 
avoided by liberalizing intra-SADC trade alongside with SADC-EU trade.7  
 
 
                                                          
6 In order to better reflect a deeper SADC integration scenario, reductions in domestic marketing 
margins should have been considered here. This, however, might require large scale government 
investments to improve trade and transportation infrastructure within the region. Given the short-run 
perspective of the study, such investments do not seem to be feasible.    
7 Other hypothetical scenarios that assume tariff reductions on SADC imports from all trade partners 
(including trade partners inside the SADC region) are simulated to test trade diversion from third 
parties. These scenarios are not presented here, albeit their results are used for results interpretation 
when required.  
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Table 6-1: Simulation Scenarios 
Scenario 
Code 
Scenario 
Name 
Scenario Description 
SADC Side EU Side 
Set1 
Current Intra-SADC Protection 
Sim11 
SADC-
EPA 
Group 
Sim11-SADC 
Cutting the applied tariff rates 
on imports from the EU by the 
SADC-EPA Group (Botswana, 
South Africa, ‘Rest of SACU’ & 
Mozambique) by 90 percent 
Sim11-EU 
Eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on 
imports from the SADC-
EPA Group (Botswana, 
South Africa, ‘Rest of 
SACU’ & Mozambique) 
Sim21 
All SADC 
Regions 
Sim21-SADC 
Cutting the applied tariff rates 
on imports from the EU by all 
SADC regions by 90 percent 
Sim21-EU 
Eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on 
imports from all SADC 
members 
Set2 
Full Intra-SADC Trade Liberalization 
Sim12 
SADC-
EPA 
Group 
Sim11 & eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on intra-SADC 
trade 
Sim11 
Sim22 
All SADC 
Regions 
Sim21 & eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on intra-SADC 
trade 
Sim21 
Set3  
Domestic Tax Replacement 
Sim13 
SADC-
EPA 
Group 
Sim11 &  
compensating tariff losses by 
raising domestic sales taxes in 
the SADC-EPA Group 
(Botswana, South Africa, ‘Rest 
of SACU’ & Mozambique) 
Sim11 
Sim23 
All SADC 
Regions 
Sim21 &  
compensating tariff losses by 
raising domestic sales taxes in 
all SADC regions 
Sim21 
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The last simulation set (Set3) assumes that tariff revenue losses generated by each of 
the two main scenarios are offset through a rise in domestic sales tax rates. It is 
expected that the EU-SADC EPAs will induce considerable public revenue losses. In 
light of the contentions in the negotiations regarding the compensation programs, it 
seems reasonable for SADC to consider implementing “Domestic Tax Replacement” 
instruments to mitigate the associated tariff losses. By measuring tariff losses, policy 
makers can have an indication of the potential revenue losses under each 
liberalization scenario and, thus, decide on the required tax replacement measure. It is 
worth keeping in mind that sales tax is levied on domestic demand, including the 
imported component. Therefore, the increases in sales tax in this general equilibrium 
framework influence demand for imports symmetrically with demand for domestic 
products. 
In addition to these simulation scenarios, the study runs a series of sensitivity 
analyses in order to test the robustness of the model results with respect to variations 
in the model settings and the liberalization degree and coverage. In the first phase of 
the sensitivity analysis, seven scenarios are run to represent variations in the model 
settings, i.e. behavioural parameters and unskilled labour market closure rule. The 
other phase employs two scenarios in order to examine the sensitivity to variations in 
the liberalization degree and coverage. A detailed description of these scenarios is 
provided later in Section 6.5 on Sensitivity Analysis.    
For the normative interpretation of the results presented below it is important to bear 
in mind that, as explained at the outset, in this Chapter the benchmark for the 
comparative-static analysis is a status quo ante, in which trade barriers between all 
regions including barriers to EU-SADC trade are kept at 2004 levels. The analysis 
addresses the intriguing question whether SADC members would have been better off 
under a permanent extension of the WTO Cotonou waiver compared to a switch to the 
final EPA regime. In contrast, the simulation scenarios in Chapter 7 take into account 
that a return to the status quo ante is not a politically feasible option and compare the 
EPA scenarios with the WTO-compatible alternative scenarios. 
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6.3 SADC-EPA Group 
This section presents the results for the first main simulation scenario “SADC-EPA 
Group”. The core of the analysis deals with the results generated under the first 
simulation set; Sim11 as well as Sim11-SADC and Sim11-EU. Results for the second 
and third sets (Sim12 and Sim13) are used for comparison with the main simulation 
results.  
 
6.3.1. Aggregate Results 
6.3.1.1 Welfare Impact 
Sim11 is confined to the SADC-EPA group that is represented in the model by four 
regions: Botswana, South Africa, ‘Rest of SACU’ and Mozambique. Table A6-1 reports 
the simulated changes in tariffs (measured in percentage points) under Sim11-SADC 
and Sim11-EU. Welfare indicators measured by real absorption and equivalent 
variation for households (Table 6-2) reveal that ‘Rest of SACU’ benefits very strongly 
from this liberalization scenario. Botswana and South Africa experience moderate 
welfare gains, whereas Mozambique loses. The other SADC regions not directly 
involved in this scenario lose and the biggest welfare loss is reported for Mauritius. 
Table 6-2 in its first two columns outlines decomposition of the results according to 
the source of the simulated tariff cuts: Sim11-SADC and Sim11-EU. It shows that the 
previously reported welfare impacts are primarily driven by the EU tariff removal 
whereas tariff reductions by the SADC-EPA group generate small welfare impacts. 
In this general equilibrium framework, welfare impacts are determined, inter alia, by 
comparative advantage along with the pre-liberalization trade patterns and 
protection structures. As described in detail in Chapter 3, trade liberalization yields 
gains from more efficient allocation of resources across activities. Sectors with 
comparative advantage accrue gains from export expansions. World export prices for 
these sectors rise and, consequently, terms of trade improve. Theory suggests that the 
higher the pre-liberalization protection levels, the greater are the experienced gains in 
the post-liberalization scenario. Therefore, protected sectors experience positive 
consumption effects induced by lower import prices in the domestic markets. These 
effects imply welfare gains. According to this theoretical framework, the generated 
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changes in welfare are attributed, inter alia, to changes in terms of trade and these 
changes in terms of trade should be interpreted in light of the pre-liberalization trade 
patterns and protection structures. 
 
Table 6-2: Welfare Impact, “SADC-EPA Group” 
 
Sim11-
SADC 
Sim11
-EU 
Sim11 Sim12 
Sim11-
SADC 
Sim11-
EU 
Sim11 Sim12 
Equivalent Variation  
($USD billion) 
Total Absorption  
(Percentage change) 
BWA 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.58 0.8 0.6 
MDG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.0 0.2 
MWI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.23 -0.2 -0.1 
MUS 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.66 -0.6 -0.9 
MOZ 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.15 -0.2 0.4 
ZAF -0.24 0.29 0.03 0.21 -0.16 0.22 0.0 0.2 
TZA 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.1 0.0 
ZMB 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.16 -0.1 -0.3 
ZWE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.12 0.0 -0.2 
XSC 0.00 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.00 9.36 9.5 9.4 
XSD 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.15 -0.1 -0.2 
 
6.3.1.2 Terms of Trade Impact  
Changes in terms of trade and real exchange rates (Table 6-3) partially explain the 
reported welfare effects for different SADC regions. Among the four regions involved 
in this liberalization scenario, ‘Rest of SACU’ and, to a limited extent, Botswana benefit 
from favourable changes in their terms of trade with appreciations of their real 
exchange rates. Mozambique and South Africa as well as the other SADC regions not 
directly involved in this liberalization scenario experience deteriorations in their 
terms of trade. Mauritius undergoes the biggest deterioration in terms of trade and 
real depreciation.  
Once again, these effects are mainly driven by the EU tariff removal; Sim11-EU. The 
simulated tariff reductions by the SADC-EPA group (Sim11-SADC) generate very small 
changes in terms of trade and real exchange rates. Interestingly, Mozambique 
experiences deterioration in its terms of trade under Sim11-EU. The EU tariff cuts 
boost world prices for ‘Rest of SACU’, Botswana and South Africa exports not only to 
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the EU but to other destinations as well. On the other hand, Mozambique experiences 
very little increases in world prices of its exports. In this general equilibrium 
framework, these changes in world prices entail terms of trade deteriorations for 
Mozambique since the previously reported increases in world prices of its imports 
from ‘Rest of SACU’, Botswana and South Africa are proportionally higher than the 
increases in world prices of its exports. In other words, the EU tariff cuts on imports 
from the SADC-EPA group generate improvements in terms of trade for ‘Rest of SACU’, 
Botswana and South Africa vis-à-vis Mozambique. These adverse terms of trade 
effects for Mozambique partially explain its welfare losses as seen before in Table 6-2.  
 
Table 6-3: Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate, “SADC-EPA Group” 
(Percentage change) 
 
Sim11-
SADC 
Sim11-
EU 
Sim11 Sim12 
Sim11-
SADC 
Sim11-
EU 
Sim11 Sim12 
 Terms of Trade Real Exchange Rate 
BWA 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 -2.4 -1.8 -1.9 
MDG 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
MWI 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.2 0.4 2.5 
MUS 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 0.0 0.9 0.9 1.8 
MOZ -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 0.2 0.3 -0.6 -0.3 1.3 
ZAF -0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.0 -0.9 0.1 -0.4 
TZA 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
ZMB 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.4 
ZWE 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 0.2 -0.6 -0.4 5.0 
XSC 0.0 5.3 5.4 5.3 0.5 -16.2 -15.9 -16.1 
XSD 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 
 
A closer look at the trade patterns and protection structures in the baseline scenario is 
necessary to explain these macroeconomic results. Further investigations are, thus, 
conducted by decomposing the scenario according to the source of the simulated tariff 
cuts (i.e. Sim11-SADC and Sim11-EU) and contemplating the trade relations in the 
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baseline scenario. The next are detailed explanations of the findings for the main 
winner (‘Rest of SACU’) and the main loser (Mauritius) under this scenario.8  
Figures on trade protection reveal that the highest tariff rates on ‘Rest of SACU’ 
imports from the EU are imposed on ‘meat and dairy products’ (68 percent) followed 
by textiles (17 percent).9 Nevertheless, the EU is not a main supplier of either 
commodity to the ‘Rest of SACU’ markets.10 ‘Rest of SACU’ imports from the EU 
account for less than 2 percent of its total imports of each of these two commodities.11 
Therefore, reducing tariffs on imports from the EU (Sim11-SADC) has a limited terms 
of trade effect in ‘Rest of SACU’. On the export side, extremely high tariff peaks are 
imposed on the EU imports of sugar (242 percent) and ‘meat and dairy products’ (98 
percent) from ‘Rest of SACU’.12 The EU sugar and ‘meat and dairy products’ markets 
are of a great importance for ‘Rest of SACU’. Sugar is an export-oriented sector in ‘Rest 
of SACU’; around three-quarters of sugar output is exported. Virtually one-third of its 
sugar exports are destined for the EU markets. Besides, the EU markets absorb almost 
half of its ‘meat and dairy products’ exports.13 It is, thus, reasonable that the EU tariff 
removal yields strong and favourable changes in terms of trade and real exchange rate 
for ‘Rest of SACU’. 
Mauritius is not directly involved in this trade liberalization scenario. Therefore, 
neither terms of trade nor real exchange rate changes under Sim11-SADC. However, 
removing the EU tariffs on imports from the SADC-EPA group (Sim11-EU) adversely 
affects the Mauritian terms of trade and real exchange rate. The EU is the primary 
exporting market for many of Mauritius products. This is particularly the case for 
sugar and textile exports. Mauritius exports half of its sugar output and the bulk of its 
sugar exports (96 percent) are directed to the EU markets.14 Textiles are the main 
                                                          
8 Chapter 4 provides detailed analyses of trade structures and protection profiles for all SADC regions. 
The required data are presented in the Appendix to Chapter 4. See, for example, Tables A4-13, A4-14, 
A4-22, A4-24, A4-28 and A4-25.  
9 See Table A4-24. 
10 Instead, South Africa provides the bulk of ‘Rest of SACU’ imports of both products, Table A4-27. 
11 See Table A4-18. 
12 Recalling from Chapter 4, tariff data derived from the GTAP7 database cover both import tariffs and 
AVEs of specific and compound tariffs and TRQs. These tariff peaks reflect TRQs for the EU sugar and 
‘meat and dairy products’ imports, Table A4-25.  
13 See Tables A4-16 and A4-22, respectively.  
14 See Tables A4-16 and A4-22, respectively. 
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export sector in Mauritius; it accounts for 27 percent of its total exports. The EU 
markets absorb almost 68 percent of Mauritius textile exports.15 In this general 
equilibrium framework, Sim11-EU reduces the EU demand for sugar exported by 
Mauritius and, hence, world prices of Mauritius sugar exports drop.16 As will be 
demonstrated later by the detailed sectoral analyses, Mauritius loses some of its share 
in the EU sugar markets. By and large, world prices of Mauritius exports decrease 
proportionally more than the experienced decreases in world prices of its imports and 
thereof it experiences a deterioration in its terms of trade.  
 
6.3.1.3 Trade Impact 
The model does not account for remittances and foreign transfers and maintains the 
trade balances fixed.17 This specification implies that the generated changes in terms 
of trade reflect real changes in total trade. Unlike the total trade balances, bilateral 
trade balances for each pair of trade partners are allowed to vary. Therefore, changes 
in bilateral trade balances are not entirely explained by changes in terms of trade and 
require more detailed analyses of the underlying changes in price as well as industrial 
and trade structures at the sectoral level. The next sub-section interprets changes in 
SADC total trade taking into consideration the previously reported terms of trade 
effects for each SADC region. The other three sub-sections address changes in SADC 
trade with the EU, SADC trade with third parties and intra-SADC trade, respectively.    
 
6.3.1.3.1 Total Trade 
Results generated by Sim11 (Figure 6-1) show that ‘Rest of SACU’ only experiences 
significant changes in total trade and these changes are mainly driven by the EU tariff 
cuts, Sim11-EU. The favourable changes in its terms of trade imply more affordable 
imports. In other words, ‘Rest of SACU’ exports increase proportionally less than the 
increases in its imports which become relatively cheaper. Less than 10 percent 
                                                          
15 See Tables A4-14 and A4-22, respectively. 
16 The extent to which the EU sugar imports from Mauritius drop in response to the decreases in 
relative price of its sugar imports from the SADC-EPA group to its sugar imports from Mauritius 
depends, inter alia, on the elasticity of substitution at the third level of the CES import demand function 
as represented by Equation 19 in Chapter 5. 
17 External account closure is specified by Equations 54 and 55 and Inequality G in Chapter 5. 
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increase in real exports allows ‘Rest of SACU’ to afford a 30 percent increase in its real 
imports.  
These trade figures change under the full intra-SADC trade liberalization assumption, 
Sim12. As depicted in Table 6-1, this scenario simulates eliminating all barriers to 
intra-SADC trade along with liberalizing trade between the SADC-EPA group and the 
EU. Under this scenario, other SADC regions (i.e. Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and 
Malawi) experience increases in total trade ranging from 5 to 10 percent, Table A6-2. 
       
Figure 6-1: Changes in SADC Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
6.3.1.3.2 Trade with the EU 
Results on SADC trade with the EU (Figure 6-2) show that tariff cuts by the four SADC 
regions boost their imports from the EU. On the other hand, the EU tariff removal 
significantly stimulates exports by ‘Rest of SACU’ to the EU. ‘Rest of SACU’ imports 
from the EU also rise, albeit at a lower rate compared to its exports to the EU. 
However, the other SADC regions (Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique) do not 
experience expansions in their exports to the EU.      
By running the same scenario under the full intra-SADC trade liberalization 
assumption (Sim12) results do not change for three out of the four SADC regions, 
Table A6-3. Compared to Sim11, Mozambique imports proportionally less and exports 
proportionally more with the EU. Some SADC regions that are not directly involved in 
this simulated trade liberalization with the EU (i.e. Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi) 
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experience drops in their imports from the EU with increases in their exports to the 
EU. These results are suggestive of some, albeit small, export opportunities for SADC 
regions in the EU markets by liberalizing trade between the SADC-EPA group and the 
EU simultaneously with liberalizing intra-SADC trade.          
 
Figure 6-2: Changes in SADC-EU Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
Two relevant questions arise here. Firstly, how do these changes in SADC trade with 
the EU affect its trade with third parties and within the SADC region? The next two 
sub-sections (6.3.1.3.3 and 6.3.1.3.4) address this question.18 Secondly, to what extent 
do the experienced expansions in SADC trade with the EU reflect trade diversion from 
more efficient non-EU producers towards higher-cost European producers and/or 
trade creation associated with more efficient allocation of resources towards activities 
with comparative advantage? Clearly, answering this question requires more detailed 
country- and sector-specific analyses which will be dealt with in Sub-section 6.3.2. 
 
                                                          
18 Analysis of SADC trade with third parties is conducted for SADC trade with its non-EU non-SADC 
trade partners who are represented in this model by five regions: ‘United States of America’, ‘East Asia’, 
‘Southeast and South Asia’, ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ and ‘Rest of the World’. Analysing the generated 
impacts on intra-SADC trade is one of the key purposes of this study. Therefore, a separate sub-section 
(6.3.1.3.4) is assigned for the generated impacts on intra-SADC trade.    
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6.3.1.3.3 Trade with Third Parties 
As portrayed in Figure 6-3, changes in trade with third parties are concentrated in 
‘Rest of SACU’ and, to a moderate extent, Botswana. ‘Rest of SACU’ imports more and 
exports less with its non-EU non-SADC trade partners. Changes in trade between the 
other SADC regions and their non-EU non-SADC partners generated by Sim11-SADC 
and Sim11-EU are in similar magnitudes but run in opposite directions. These effects 
virtually cancel each other out and, thus, trade with third parties hardly changes 
under Sim11. Interestingly, Malawi, which is not directly involved in this liberalization 
scenario, experiences drops in exports to ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’.19       
 
Figure 6-3: Changes in SADC Trade with Third Parties (Valued at baseline world 
prices, %) 
 
 
In comparison to the generated results under full intra-SADC trade liberalization 
(Sim12) Mozambique only, among the four SADC regions, experiences changes in the 
generated impact on its trade with third parties. Mozambique as well as the other 
SADC regions not directly involved in this liberalization scenario experiences drops in 
imports from third parties, Table A6-4.   
 
                                                          
19 As we will see later, these exports rise significantly under Sim21 where Malawi liberalizes its trade 
with the EU.   
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6.3.1.3.4 Intra-SADC Trade 
‘Rest of SACU’ experiences increases in its intra-SADC imports with considerable 
drops in its intra-SADC exports. To summarize, ‘Rest of SACU’ total exports and its 
exports to the EU rise while its exports to third parties as well as to its SADC partners 
drop. These results imply that part of ‘Rest of SACU’ pre-simulation exports to both 
third parties and its SADC partners is redirected to the EU markets under this 
scenario.   
 
Figure 6-4: Changes in Intra-SADC Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
Once again, these trade effects do not change under the full intra-SADC trade 
liberalization assumption (Sim12) for three out of the four SADC regions, Table A6-5. 
These findings mean that intra-SADC trade liberalization does not prevent the 
previously reported redirection of part of ‘Rest of SACU’ exports from markets in third 
parties and in the SADC region towards the EU markets. Among the four SADC regions, 
only Mozambique experiences significant increases in its intra-SADC trade. It is worth 
highlighting here that Mozambique, which experiences welfare losses under Sim11, 
gains by liberalizing intra-SADC trade simultaneously with the SADC-EPA group trade 
with the EU, Table 6-2. Mozambican exports to its SADC partners face very high tariff 
peaks, particularly in the South African and Zimbabwean markets.20 Removing these 
                                                          
20 See Table A4-28. 
-30.0 
-20.0 
-10.0 
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
B
W
A
 
M
D
G
 
M
W
I 
M
U
S 
M
O
Z
 
Z
A
F
 
T
Z
A
 
Z
M
B
 
Z
W
E
 
X
SC
 
X
SD
 
Sim11-SADC 
Sim11-EU 
Sim11 
Intra-SADC Imports 
-45.0 
-40.0 
-35.0 
-30.0 
-25.0 
-20.0 
-15.0 
-10.0 
-5.0 
0.0 
5.0 
10.0 
B
W
A
 
M
D
G
 
M
W
I 
M
U
S 
M
O
Z
 
Z
A
F
 
T
Z
A
 
Z
M
B
 
Z
W
E
 
X
SC
 
X
SD
 
Sim11-SADC 
Sim11-EU 
Sim11 
Intra-SADC Exports 
168 
 
 
 
trade barriers boosts world prices of its exports and, hence, protects its terms of trade 
from deteriorating (Table 6-3) when the EU eliminates tariffs on imports from the 
SADC-EPA group; the generated changes in prices will be dealt with later in detail.            
 
6.3.1.4 Fiscal Impact  
Among the four regions directly involved in this liberalization scenario, ‘Rest of SACU’ 
only does not experience fiscal losses, Table 6-4.21 As explained earlier, the EU shares 
in ‘Rest of SACU’ merchandise markets in the baseline scenario are small. The only 
exception is ‘oil and minerals’ imports; 24 percent of which originates in the EU. 
However, these import flows enter ‘Rest of SACU’ duty-free.22 Besides, ‘Rest of SACU’ 
imports from third parties (Table A6-4) and from its SADC partners (Table A6-5) 
experience increases under this scenario. This explains why the simulated tariff cuts 
on imports from the EU do not affect tariff revenues for ‘Rest of SACU’. In contrast, 
Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique incur strong tariff losses.  
The last column to the right of Table 6-4 presents the required sales tax replacement 
that compensates the experienced fiscal losses. Sales tax replacement is measured as 
percentage changes in sales tax revenue and percentage-points changes in the 
weighted average sales tax rates. 
In order to domestically compensate the experienced tariff losses, Mozambique needs 
to raise its sales tax rate by 0.3 percentage points. It is worth noting that fiscal losses 
for Mozambique are far worse under the intra-SADC liberalization scenario, Sim12. 
Mozambique imposes high tariff peaks on imports from South Africa, which provides 
the bulk of merchandise imports in the baseline scenario.23 Taking into consideration 
the tariff losses associated with intra-SADC liberalization, the required sales tax 
replacement will be more pronounced for Mozambique under full intra-SADC trade 
liberalization. 
 
                                                          
21 Due to data restrictions, the GTAP7 database does not include data on household income taxes. Data 
coverage and limitations are described earlier in Chapter 4. 
22 See Tables A4-18 and A4-24, respectively.  
23 See Tables A4-28 and A4-27, respectively. 
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Table 6-4: Fiscal Revenue by Source, “SADC-EPA Group” 
(Percentage change, nominal) 
 
Sim11 Sim13 
Import 
Tariffs 
Export 
Taxes* 
Sales 
Taxes 
Taxes 
on 
Output  
Taxes 
on 
Factor 
Use  
Sales Tax Replacement 
Revenue 
Rate** 
(Change, 
percentage 
points) 
BWA -36.5     26.6 0.8   0.1 
MDG 0.2     0.0 0.0   0.0 
MWI -0.5   -0.2 1.1 -0.3 1.9 0.1 
MUS -0.5 -64.9 -0.4 1.8 -0.6 1.1 0.1 
MOZ -15.6   0.0 -1.7 0.1 12.1 0.3 
ZAF -36.9 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 7.5 0.2 
TZA -0.3   -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.1 0.0 
ZMB -0.5   -0.1 0.0 -0.1 2.0 0.0 
ZWE -0.2     0.0 -0.1   0.0 
XSC 0.6 -57.8 8.3 -4.3 6.2 4.9 0.0 
XSD -0.5   0.0 0.1 -0.2 2.1 0.0 
* These percentage changes are calculated based on very small baseline levels. Export taxes 
revenue is less than US$ 0.05 billion in Mauritius and ‘Rest of SACU’. 
** Weighted average sales tax rates where the employed weights are commodity shares in 
domestic demand by region.    
 
It is worth mentioning here that the ability to raise the required fiscal resources 
depends, inter alia, on the degree of diversity in the tax base and the overall economic 
structures. For this reason, Milner (2006) argues that the fiscal adjustment costs 
associated with the EU-EPAs are not entirely attributed to the magnitude of tariff 
losses but rather to how easy is it for an economy to offset the fiscal losses. The study 
estimates a high scale of fiscal adjustment costs for Swaziland whereas Mozambique is 
ranked in the lowest category of the scale.  
From this perspective, the reported 12 percent increment in the sales tax revenue 
might be easier to be collected in Mozambique than the required 5 percent in ‘Rest of 
SACU’. 
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6.3.1.5 Factor Returns 
As comprised of heterogeneous economies as the SADC region is, it is expected that 
trade liberalization will induce diversified effects on factor incomes across countries 
and activities. These effects depend, inter alia, on the prevailing economic structures 
and factor intensities in each country in the baseline scenario.24 Furthermore, 
according to the basic closure rule that adopts a full employment assumption for all 
factor markets, changes in factor incomes should be explained by the changes in factor 
return rates.25    
Table 6-5 shows that land incomes rise in three out of the four regions involved in this 
scenario, i.e. ‘Rest of SACU’, Botswana and South Africa. As we will shortly discuss in 
detail, this scenario induces strong structural change in ‘Rest of SACU’.26 Therefore, 
the highest increases in land rent, wage and capital rent occur in ‘Rest of SACU’. The 
expanding activities (i.e. sugar, ‘meat and dairy products’, vegetables, livestock and 
services) withdraw the mobile factors from other activities and push their income to 
rise.27 Natural resources are not allowed to be utilized by different activities other 
than livestock and ‘oil and minerals’, thereby shrinking ‘oil and minerals’, the activity 
that absorbs 86 percent of natural resources in the baseline scenario,28 induces a 74 
percent drop in natural resources rent.  
                                                          
24 Figures on factor intensity and factor allocation across activities in the baseline scenario are reported 
in Tables A4-7 and A4-8. 
25 It is reasonable to recall two points here. First, factor incomes and factor return rates are calculated 
in real terms relative to the region numéraire, i.e. CPIs. Second, production factors move across 
activities as a result of changes in sectoral demand for factor service according to fixed sectoral returns. 
Simultaneously, average return rates change endogenously to clear the markets. In the sensitivity 
exercise, unskilled labour in SADC regions is assumed to be underutilized. Therefore, changes in 
unskilled labour income are explained by changes in both real wage rates and utilization levels in the 
SADC unskilled labour markets.   
26 The results on changes in domestic production under Sim11-EU (presented in Table A6-16) and 
Sim11 are quite similar, with slight differences in the magnitudes.   
27 In this general equilibrium framework, the causal relationship between factor demand and factor 
rents works in two directions. Excess demand (summed over sectoral demand for different activities) 
for a production factor pushes its average rent to rise in order to clear the market. Simultaneously, 
producers substitute this factor, which became relatively more expensive, for other factors according 
the elasticity of substitution at the second level of the CES production function, as described by 
Equation 7 in Chapter 5. 
28 See Table A4-8. 
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In Botswana, expanding livestock, to which 66 percent of the utilized land is allocated 
in the baseline scenario,29 generates outstanding increases in land rent.  
Almost two-thirds of the cultivated land in South Africa is utilized by only two 
activities (i.e. grains and vegetables) in the baseline scenario.30 Therefore, increasing 
demand for land used by these two activities, as well as by the rice and ‘other crops’ 
activities, pushes land rent to rise. 
 
Table 6-5: Structural Change in Factor Markets, “SADC-EPA Group”, Sim11 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Factor Income, Percentage Change 
Land 168.5 -0.4 1.7 -37.3 0.2 9.1 -0.2 -0.4 2.2 262.1 -0.5 
NatRes -17.8 0.2 1.7 4.8 3.1 0.6 -0.1 0.6 -0.9 -74.0 -0.3 
UnSkLab 1.6 0.0 -0.3 -1.0 0.2 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 3.7 -0.2 
SkLab 0.6 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 3.6 -0.2 
Capital 0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 8.9 -0.2 
 Factor Adjustment, Percent 
Land 10.0 0.1 0.5 7.8 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.2 1.6 23.6 0.1 
UnSkLab 3.3 0.1 0.4 2.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 14.7 0.1 
SkLab 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 6.1 0.0 
Capital 2.2 0.1 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 17.1 0.0 
 
Although not being directly involved in this liberalization scenario, Mauritius 
experiences changes in its factor incomes. The shrinkage of the sugar activity that 
utilizes half of the land used in the baseline scenario31 generates excess land supply. 
The experienced excess land supply pushes land rent to drop in order to clear the 
market. Higher land utilization in all other land-use activities is not sufficient to 
prevent the 37 percent drop in the land rent, Table 6-5. In contrast, expanding the two 
natural resources-using activities (i.e. livestock and ‘oil and minerals’) leads to higher 
natural resources rent since this production factor is sector-specific. 
                                                          
29 See Table A4-8. 
30 See Table A4-8. 
31 See Table A4-8. 
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6.3.1.6 Factor Market Adjustment 
Figures in Table 6-5 indicate moderate degree of structural adjustment in most of the 
SADC regions. Less than 3 percent of each of the utilized production factors in the 
baseline scenario is reallocated among different activities in the post-liberalization 
scenario in eight SADC regions. The highest degree of structural adjustment occurs in 
‘Rest of SACU’ following by Botswana and Mauritius. The welfare gains accrued by 
‘Rest of SACU’ are associated with significant changes in its production and trade 
structures, changes in production and trade structures are elaborated in the next sub-
section. This structural change requires reallocating one quarter of the used land 
across different activities. Capital and unskilled labour also experience high degrees of 
structural adjustment, ranging from 15 to 17 percent of their baseline utilization 
levels. Moreover, 8 to 10 percent of the utilized land in Mauritius and Botswana is 
reallocated across activities.  
 
6.3.2. Sector-specific Impacts 
For better interpretation of the determinants of the previous macroeconomic findings, 
detailed sector-specific analyses are needed. These detailed analyses allow for tracing 
the induced price and volume changes in the production and trade structures and, 
subsequently, permit one to identify the sectors of interests for each of SADC regions 
under the simulated trade liberalization scenarios. In order to gain more accurate 
insights of the transmission channels and the direction of effects, these analyses are 
undertaken for the two components which form each scenario. For the first main 
scenario, detailed sector-specific analyses are conducted for the main winner (‘Rest of 
SACU’) only.32  
 
                                                          
32 More general sectoral analyses of all SADC regions are undertaken for the results generated by the 
next scenario.        
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6.3.2.1 Price Changes 
Referring back to Table A6-1, under Sim11-SADC, tariff rates on ‘Rest of SACU’ 
imports of  ‘meat and dairy products’ and textiles drop by 61 and 15 percentage 
points with some drops of 5 to 6 percentage points in other sectors (e.g. vegetables, 
vehicles and other manufactures). The increases in cif price of ‘Rest of SACU’ imports 
from the EU are virtually limited to two sectors: ‘meat and dairy products’ and 
textiles, Table A6-6.33 These limited changes in the world prices are explained by the 
low import shares for ‘Rest of SACU’ (and all the participant regions) in total world 
imports.34 Sectoral imports by the four participant regions together (Botswana, South 
Africa, ‘Rest of SACU’ and Mozambique) account for less than 3 percent of total world 
imports. The reason is that the lower the import share for the importing country is, 
the weaker is the generated impact on world prices, and, consequently, the less is the 
deterioration in its terms of trade. This explains the small changes in terms of trade 
and real exchange rates generated by Sim11-SADC, as described before at the 
aggregate level.  
Sim11-SADC generates moderate real depreciation for ‘Rest of SACU’; real exchange 
rate rises by only 0.5 percent. Therefore, the simulated tariff reductions are translated 
into lower domestic prices of ‘Rest of SACU’ imports from the EU in these two 
sectors.35 Nevertheless, domestic prices of composite sectoral imports hardly change 
owing to the low shares of the EU imports in these commodity markets, as explained 
before.  
On the export side, world prices of ‘Rest of SACU’ exports to the EU, and yet world 
prices of exports by all the participant regions to the EU, hardly change under Sim11-
SADC, Table A6-7. 
                                                          
33 Beside these two sectors, world price of the EU exports to the other signatory regions rises in other 
sectors, e.g. food products, beverage and vegetables (Mozambique) and vehicles (Botswana and South 
Africa). It is worth noting here, and hereafter, that the generated changes in world prices are relative to 
the CPI for ‘United States of America’. 
34 See Table A4-9. 
35
 The generated changes in domestic prices are relative to the region numéraire, i.e. the CPI for ‘Rest of 
SACU’. This is valid for all generated changes in domestic prices. 
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Referring back to Table A6-1, Sim11-EU simulates strong tariff cuts on the EU imports 
from ‘Rest of SACU’; represented by 242 and 98 percentage point tariff cuts in sugar 
and ‘meat and dairy products’ sectors. These tariff cuts boost world prices of ‘Rest of 
SACU’ exports to the EU in these two sectors by more than 50 percent, Table A6-8. 
Furthermore, world prices of all other sectoral exports rise by more than 10 percent. 
The EU contributes large shares to total world imports. Therefore, the EU import 
demand has significant impacts on world prices of its imports. This explains the 
remarkable changes in world prices of ‘Rest of SACU’ exports induced by the EU tariff 
cuts. 
The EU experiences trivial real depreciation under Sim11-EU; the real exchange rate 
rises by 0.07 percent. Therefore, the EU tariff removal is transmitted into lower 
domestic prices of the EU sugar and ‘meat and dairy products’ imports from ‘Rest of 
SACU’ whereas domestic prices for all other imports are higher, Table A6-8. These 
price changes mean that the ‘Rest of SACU’ sugar and ‘meat and dairy products’ 
exports are more competitive in the EU markets.36  
On the import side, cif prices of the ‘Rest of SACU’ imports from the EU rise under 
Sim11-EU, Table A6-9. These increases in the sectoral import prices are relatively 
lower than the corresponding increases in the sectoral export prices. Therefore, ‘Rest 
of SACU’ experiences favourable changes in its terms of trade under Sim11-EU, as seen 
before. The real exchange rates adjust after a trade shock in order to maintain the 
trade balances fixed at their baseline levels. Therefore, the accrued terms of trade 
gains are associated with a drop in the ‘Rest of SACU’ real exchange rate by 16 
percent, as seen in Table 6-3. This strong real appreciation means that the ‘Rest of 
SACU’ sectoral imports, not only from the EU but from all other regions as well, are 
sold in the domestic market at lower prices and consequently domestic prices of 
composite imports drop considerably, Table A6-9.    
 
                                                          
36 In addition, sugar and ‘meat and dairy products’ exports by the other participant regions become 
more competitive in the EU market. However, the highest competiveness gains, indicated by the 
generated drops in export prices in the EU markets, are accrued by ‘Rest of SACU’. 
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6.3.2.2 Structural Change 
With the small price changes induced by Sim11-SADC, no significant changes in the 
‘Rest of SACU’ production structure occur. The only exception is ‘meat and dairy 
products’ sector. Shift and share analysis of output and import structures indicates 
both trade creation and trade diversion effects in the ‘meat and dairy products’ sector 
and the net welfare effect is trivial. Trade is created for imports from the EU whereas 
domestic production is deflated, imports from intra-SADC partners are contracted and 
imports are diverted away from more efficient exporters outside the region. The 
following paragraphs provide a detailed elucidation of these types of effects. 
‘Meat and dairy products’ domestic output is replaced by the cheaper imported 
substitutes. Domestic production shrinks (Table A6-10) whereas total imports rise, 
Table A6-11. These volume changes lead to a higher share of imports in total domestic 
demand, Table A6-12. In light of the small importance of this sector in the ‘Rest of 
SACU’ total output37 and the small changes in output structure, the expected efficiency 
gains associated with reallocating production factors to other activities are negligible.  
Imports of ‘meat and dairy products’ from the EU rise by more than five-fold, 
calculated from a small base, Table A6-13. This import surge leads to gains for the EU 
by more than 10 percentage points of share in the ‘Rest of SACU’ market, Table A6-14. 
These gains occur mainly at the expense of the South African share in the ‘Rest of 
SACU’ market, Table A6-15. This contraction in intra-SACD trade is unavoidable under 
the full intra-SADC liberalization assumption since ‘Rest of SACU’ and South Africa are 
members of the SACU-CUs.38 ‘Meat and dairy products’ imports from ‘United States of 
America’ and ‘Rest of the World’ worth US$ 0.03 million and US$ 0.16 million (valued 
in fob prices) are diverted towards less efficient European producers.39 
                                                          
37 ‘Meat and dairy products’ constitutes less than 2 percent of total output (Table A4-6) and utilizes tiny 
fractions of production factors (Table A4-8) in ‘Rest of SACU’. 
38 See Table A4-28. 
39 The European ‘meat and dairy products’ producers are less efficient compared to their 
corresponding in ‘United States of America’ and ‘Rest of the World’. If all exporters were treated 
equally, the EU would be a higher-cost producer. Under a hypothetical scenario that considers the same 
liberalization for all trade partners (including partners inside the SADC region) prices of ‘meat and 
dairy products’ imports from EU are higher than the corresponding prices of imports from both ‘United 
States of America’ and ‘Rest of the World’. If this has been the case, equivalent variation for ‘Rest of 
SACU’ would have been more than fivefold its level under Sim11-SADC. 
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As seen before, the EU tariff cuts (Sim11-EU) boosts world prices of the ‘Rest of SACU’ 
sugar and ‘meat and dairy products’ exports to the EU. Consequently, resources are 
shifted towards these two sectors, Table A6-16. ‘Rest of SACU’ accrues gains through 
its improved terms of trade and more efficient allocation of resources which 
eventually enhanced its welfare as demonstrated earlier. Under the full employment 
assumption, expansions in some sectors (i.e. sugar, ‘meat and dairy products’ and, to a 
lesser extent, vegetables, livestock and services) entail fewer resources available for 
all other sectors that, accordingly, contract. From the ‘Rest of SACU’ perspective, 
liberalizing trade with the EU enhances specialization in few agricultural and agro-
processing activities at the expense of all the manufacturing and mining sectors. As 
explained in detail in Chapter 3, these contractions in manufactures do not necessarily 
mean de-industrialization. In addition to the structural change examination, dynamic 
comparative advantage for the manufacturing sectors should be diagnosed before 
conclusions on de-industrialization are drawn. Owing to the lower domestic price of 
composite imports, domestic production in almost all sectors is replaced by imported 
substitutes, which become relatively cheaper, in total demand, Table A6-17.  
Sugar output, which is an export-oriented activity, expands by more than ten times 
compared to its baseline level, Table A6-16. Sugar exports also expand and these 
expansions are mainly directed to the EU markets. ‘Rest of SACU’ sugar exports to 
third countries rise in percentage terms, Table A6-18. However, their shares in ‘Rest 
of SACU’ sugar exports drop, Table A6-19. In contrast, the EU share in ‘Rest of SACU’ 
sugar exports rises by 67 percentage points.  
‘Rest of SACU’ gains 59 percentage points in its share of the EU sugar market at the 
expense of exporters in the EU, ‘Rest of the World’ and other SADC regions, Table A6-
20. This is particularly the case for Mauritius which loses 5 percentage points of its 
share in the EU sugar market. Among SADC members, Mauritius is the main sugar 
supplier to the EU markets followed by ‘Rest of SACU’ and both are net exporters in 
the baseline scenario.40 The results are, thus, suggestive of a situation in which ‘Rest of 
SACU’ under this liberalization scenario, which is limited to the SADC-EPA group, 
threatens the Mauritian trade position as the main sugar supplier to the EU markets. It 
                                                          
40 See Table A4-23. 
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is, therefore, important for SADC members to collectively negotiate on EPAs in order 
to ensure harmonization in their liberalization offers to the EU. This result is in line 
with the inferences provided by the conducted descriptive analysis of SADC-EU trade 
structures, Chapter 4. The similarity in SADC export bundles to the EU entails 
increasing competition among SADC exporters in the EU markets after launching EPAs 
with the EU.  
 
 
6.4 All SADC Regions 
This section addresses the results for the comprehensive simulation scenario “All 
SADC Regions”. Results for the first simulation set (Sim21 as well as Sim21-SADC and 
Sim21-EU) are interpreted in detail. Comparisons with the results generated under 
the second and third sets (Sim22 and Sim23) are provided when required. 
 
6.4.1. Aggregate Results 
6.4.1.1 Welfare Impact 
This comprehensive scenario covers all SADC regions. Table A6-21 presents the 
simulated changes in tariffs (measured in percentage points) according to the source 
of the tariff cuts: Sim21-SADC and Sim21-EU. Welfare indicators, measured by real 
absorption (Table 6-6), reveal that this comprehensive liberalization scenario is 
welfare-improving for many SADC regions: ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, and, 
to a lesser extent, Botswana, Malawi and Madagascar. Interestingly, Mauritian 
households, who would have lost US$ 19 million under Sim11, accrue gains worth US$ 
118 million measured by equivalent variation. Although ‘Rest of SACU’ is worse off 
under this scenario compared to Sim11, it is the main winner under both 
liberalization scenarios.41  
                                                          
41 I run an additional scenario that simulates a different degree of asymmetric trade liberalization 
between all SADC regions and the EU. It assumes that all SADC regions reduce 60 percent of the applied 
tariff rates on their imports from the EU whereas the EU fully eliminates all the applied tariffs on its 
imports from all SADC regions. Welfare measures generated by this scenario are similar to the 
corresponding results driven by Sim21. South Africa only is better off under this more asymmetric 
liberalization scenario.   
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The scenario is decomposed into two components, a 90 percent cut of the applied 
tariff rates on SADC imports from the EU (Sim21-SADC) and a full removal of the EU 
tariffs on imports from SADC (Sim21-EU). Results support the general result obtained 
by Sim11. Reducing tariffs on SADC imports from the EU yields small negative welfare 
impact on SADC regions and virtually all the accrued welfare gains are attributed to 
the EU tariff removal. Welfare losses induced by Sim21-SADC are cancelled by welfare 
gains under Sim21-EU (i.e. South Africa and Zambia). Mozambique, Tanzania and ‘Rest 
of SADC’ experience slight welfare losses.    
 
Table 6-6: Welfare Impact, “All SADC Regions” 
 
Sim21-
SADC 
Sim21
-EU 
Sim21 Sim22 
Sim21-
SADC 
Sim21-
EU 
Sim21 Sim22 
Equivalent Variation  
($USD billion) 
Total Absorption  
(Percentage change) 
BWA 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.6 
MDG 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 
MWI 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 
MUS -0.02 0.14 0.12 0.11 -0.6 4.9 4.3 4.0 
MOZ 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.5 
ZAF -0.28 0.29 0.00 0.19 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 
TZA -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
ZMB 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 
ZWE -0.01 0.12 0.11 0.13 -0.2 5.1 4.9 5.2 
XSC 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.32 -0.1 8.0 8.1 8.0 
XSD 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 
 
6.4.1.2 Terms of Trade Impact  
Results on terms of trade and real exchange rates (Table 6-7) support the same 
finding.  Most SADC members are better off under this scenario compared to Sim11, 
particularly the regions which would have been adversely affected by removing tariffs 
on the EU imports from the SADC-EPA group only (e.g. Mauritius and Zimbabwe). 
Once again, ‘Rest of SACU’ experiences very strong favourable changes in its terms of 
trade and real exchange rate, albeit less pronounced compared to Sim11.    
Improvements in terms of trade and the experienced real appreciations are associated 
with Sim21-EU, whereas Sim21-SADC generates small negative effects. Reducing 
179 
 
 
 
tariffs on SADC imports from the EU leads to deteriorations in terms of trade and real 
depreciations in almost all SADC regions. In contrast, eliminating tariffs on the EU 
imports from SADC boosts world prices of SADC exports with proportionally less 
increases in world prices of SADC imports. These changes in world prices imply 
improvements in terms of trade for almost all SADC regions. The results generated by 
Sim21 reflect the net effect of Sim21-SADC (towards terms of trade deterioration and 
real depreciation) and Sim21-EU (towards terms of trade improvement and real 
appreciation). For the beneficiary regions (‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, 
Malawi and Botswana) the favourable effects induced by Sim21-EU offset the adverse 
effects induced by Sim21-SADC. According to the basic closure rule, the real exchange 
rates have to decrease responding to the experienced favourable changes in terms of 
trade in order to keep the trade balances fixed at their baseline levels.42     
 
Table 6-7: Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate, “All SADC Regions” 
(Percentage change) 
 
Sim21-
SADC 
Sim21-
EU 
Sim21 Sim22 
Sim21-
SADC 
Sim21-
EU 
Sim21 Sim22 
 Terms of Trade Real Exchange Rate 
BWA 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.7 -2.3 -1.7 -1.9 
MDG -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 
MWI -0.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 -5.1 -4.5 -2.5 
MUS -0.8 3.8 2.9 2.5 2.6 -6.3 -3.8 -3.1 
MOZ -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.5 0.4 -0.9 -0.5 1.0 
ZAF -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.9 0.2 -0.4 
TZA -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.9 -0.5 0.4 0.8 
ZMB -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.7 0.5 -1.6 -1.1 0.3 
ZWE -0.2 5.5 5.3 4.7 1.1 -8.9 -7.9 -2.8 
XSC 0.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 0.6 -14.5 -14.1 -14.2 
XSD -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 2.2 -0.3 1.9 2.7 
 
                                                          
42 Using their 1-2-3 CGE model, Devarajan et al. (1997, pp. 166-169) demonstrate that responses of 
exchange rate to changes in terms of trade depend on values of Armington elasticity. This highlights the 
importance of testing the robustness of these results with respect to variations in Armington elasticity 
values; this sensitivity analysis is provided later in Section 6.5. 
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6.4.1.3 Trade Impact 
6.4.1.3.1 Total Trade 
As portrayed in Figure 6-5, changes in total trade occur in the same beneficiary 
regions (‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi) where increases in imports 
are proportionally higher than the increases in exports. These changes in total trade 
can be interpreted by the experienced changes in terms of trade. The adverse changes 
in terms of trade induced by Sim21-SADC imply lower affordable imports (for the 
same amount of exports) and, thus, the increases in imports are proportionally less 
than the increases in exports for virtually all SADC regions.43 Results for Sim21-EU 
reflect more affordable imports in the regions that experience favourable effects in 
their terms of trade, i.e. ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. Results for Sim21 
reflect net effect of Sim21-SADC and Sim21-EU. Since the latter generates trade effects 
in greater magnitudes, exports by these four regions increase proportionally lower 
than the increases in their imports which become relatively cheaper.  
Three conclusions can be drawn here. Firstly, reducing tariffs on SADC imports from 
the EU does not stimulate SADC exports. Under Sim21-SADC, exports rise by less than 
2 percent in all SADC regions. Exports by Mauritius only rise by 4 percent, Table A6-2. 
Secondly, the EU tariff removal generates export expansions in Malawi and ‘Rest of 
SACU’ only whereas exports by all other SADC regions hardly change. Interestingly, 
the EU tariff removal yields significant increases in imports by ‘Rest of SACU’, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi. Production structures in these regions become 
more concentrated in export-oriented sectors; this type of impact will be dealt with 
later in detail. Therefore, they tend to be more dependent on imports to meet the 
domestic demand for the sectors which shrink. 
 
                                                          
43 Botswana whose terms-of-trade improves is the only exception, but the same rationale is still valid. 
With higher terms of trade, Botswana is able to fund more imports by less exports.    
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Figure 6-5: Changes in SADC Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
These trade effects (Table A6-2) alter under the full intra-SADC trade liberalization 
assumption, Sim22. This scenario simulates eliminating all barriers to intra-SADC 
trade along with liberalizing trade with EU, as described in Table 6-1. The inclusion of 
intra-SADC trade liberalization yields trade expansions in regions which would not 
have experienced any changes in trade under EU-SADC trade liberalization in 
isolation, i.e. Mozambique and Zambia. Furthermore, trade figures for other regions 
(i.e. Malawi and Zimbabwe) expand more than proportionally under Sim22 compared 
to Sim21.   
 
6.4.1.3.2 Trade with the EU  
As portrayed in Figure 6-6, SADC imports from the EU rise in all regions while export 
expansions are concentrated in a few regions: ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and, 
to a lesser extent, Mauritius and Zambia.44 Reducing tariffs on imports from the EU 
(Sim21-SADC) boosts imports from the EU by all SADC members with negligible 
changes in their exports to the EU. Mauritius is the only exception; its exports to the 
                                                          
44 These outstanding expansions in exports to the EU are calculated based on small baseline levels for 
SADC trade with the EU in volume terms. As a general observation, percentage changes should be read 
in light of the corresponding baseline levels. For example, the 1.9 percentage change in South Africa 
exports to the EU is calculated based on a high baseline level whereas the 40.4 percentage change in 
Malawi exports to the EU is based on a very low level. The absolute increment in South Africa exports to 
the EU is more than that in Malawi exports to the EU, both measured in real terms. 
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EU rise by 5 percent. In contrast, the EU tariffs removal (Sim21-EU) triggers exports to 
the EU by these five regions only. It also boosts their imports from the EU. The point to 
highlight here is that the regions whose exports to the EU expand are mainly the same 
beneficiary regions. In other words, benefits from launching EPAs with the EU depend 
mainly on SADC’s capacity to export and on its export’s ability to compete in the EU 
markets. 
Under the full intra-SADC trade liberalization assumption (Sim22) the same effects on 
SADC trade with the EU are held albeit with different magnitudes, Table A6-3. The 
increases in imports by Malawi and Zimbabwe from the EU are proportionally much 
less compared to the generated increases under Sim21. Mozambican and Zambian 
imports from the EU, which increase under Sim21, experience only very slight 
increases. No substantive difference in the generated effects on SADC exports to the 
EU is reported. 
 
Figure 6-6: Changes in Trade with the EU (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
6.4.1.3.3 Trade with Third Parties  
Results on SADC trade with third parties (Figure 6-7) indicate that the beneficiary 
regions (‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi) import more from and 
export less to their non-EU non-SADC partners. As shown by Tables A6-4 and A6-5, 
there are only two exceptions for these four beneficiary regions. Firstly, Mauritius 
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imports from ‘East Asia’, ‘Southeast and South Asia’ and the SADC region drop. This 
means that not only the increments in Mauritius total imports that are now sourced in 
the EU markets but also part of its pre-simulation imports from ‘East Asia’, ‘Southeast 
and South Asia’ and the SADC region are now redirected towards their European 
substitutes. Secondly, Malawi exports to ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ rise by almost 30 
percent. 
The generated effects on SADC trade with the non-EU non-SADC partners run in 
opposite directions. By reducing tariffs on SADC imports from the EU (Sim21-SADC) 
imports by all SADC regions from third parties drop whereas their exports to third 
parties rise. Removing the EU tariffs on imports from SADC (Sim21-EU), on the other 
hand, leads to increases in imports by these specific regions from third parties and 
decreases in their exports to third parties.45  
 
Figure 6-7: Changes in SADC Trade with Third Parties  
(Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
                                                          
45 The extent to which SADC imports from the non-EU regions drop in response to the decreases in 
relative price of imports from the EU to imports from other regions depends, inter alia, on the elasticity 
of substitution at the third level of the CES import demand function as represented in Equation 19 in 
Chapter 5. Similarly, the extent to which SADC exports to non-EU regions drop in response to the 
increases in relative price of exports to the EU to exports to other regions depends, inter alia, on the 
elasticity of transformation at the second level of the CET export supply function as represented in 
Equation 28 in Chapter 5. 
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Effects on the import side in the beneficiary regions can be explained in Figure 6-8. 
Sim21-SADC implies lower relative prices of SADC imports from the EU to their 
imports from third parties. The generated impact is, thus, represented by moving 
from a to b on a higher CES import demand curve.46 These changes in relative prices 
lead to increases in their imports from the EU (by higher rates compared to their total 
import growth rates) and drops in their imports from third parties. Sim21-EU is 
represented by moving from a to c. Under Sim21-EU, these regions experience 
improvements in their terms of trade and rises in their imports from all trade 
partners. Trade effects generated by Sim21-EU are of greater magnitudes compared to 
Sim21-SADC. Evidently, the increases in imports from third parties (induced by 
Sim21-EU) are greater than the drops in their imports from third parties (induced by 
Sim21-SADC) and, consequently, their imports from third parties increase under 
Sim21.47  
 
 
  
                                                          
46 The label ‘row’ in the diagram refers to all non-EU partners since these effects are valid on imports 
from their SADC trade partners as well. The higher CES demand curve implies greater total import 
level.  
47 For all other SADC regions, the increases in their imports from third parties (induced by improving 
terms of trade under Sim21-EU) are not strong enough to offset the decreases in their imports from 
third parties (induced by changes in relative prices under Sim21-SADC) and, consequently, their 
imports from third parties drop under Sim21.   
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Figure 6-8: Trade Effects in the Beneficiary Regions 
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Table 6-8: Changes in Trade Effects across Scenarios 
 
Proportional Changes in SADC Imports 
Total EU Third Parties Intra-SADC 
Sim21 Sim22 Sim21 Sim22 Sim21 Sim22 Sim21 Sim22 
BWA     + +         
MDG     + +     - + 
MWI + ++ +++ + + - + ++ 
MUS + + + + + + - + 
MOZ   + +++     - - + 
ZAF     + +     - - 
TZA     + +     - + 
ZMB   + +++     - - + 
ZWE + ++ +++ + + - + ++ 
XSC + + + + + + + + 
XSD     + +     - + 
 
Proportional Changes in SADC Exports 
Total EU Third Parties Intra-SADC 
Sim21 Sim22 Sim21 Sim22 Sim21 Sim22 Sim21 Sim22 
BWA             - - 
MDG             - - 
MWI + ++ + + - - - + 
MUS + + + + - - - - 
MOZ   +         + ++ 
ZAF             + ++ 
TZA             + ++ 
ZMB   + + +       + 
ZWE + ++ + + - - -- - 
XSC + + + + - - - - 
XSD                 
Note: These are broad indications of the differences in direction and magnitudes of the trade 
effects generated by Sim22 compared to Sim21. No implications on the differences in the 
effects magnitudes across regions can be drawn here. For example, +++ (in the third column, 
third row) is not comparable with + (in the third column, fourth row). Under Sim21, Malawi 
imports from the EU rise proportionally less than the increases in Mauritius imports from the 
EU. Comparison is valid between +++ (in the third column, third row) and + (in the fourth 
column, third row). Malawi imports from the EU rise under Sim22 proportionally less than 
the experienced increases under Sim21. Comparison is also valid between + (in the third 
column, fourth row) and + (in the fourth column, fourth row). Mauritius imports from the EU 
rise by almost the same rate under both Sim21 and Sim22. 
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Table 6-8 provides broad indications of the differences in direction and magnitudes of 
the trade effects generated by Sim22 compared to Sim21. By and large, these effects 
on SADC trade with third parties do not change by simulating full intra-SADC trade 
liberalization along with the EU-SADC trade liberalization, Sim22. However, imports 
from third parties by Mozambique, Zambia (which would have stagnated under 
Sim21) Malawi and Zimbabwe (which would have increased under Sim21) drop. The 
generated effects on SADC exports to third parties under Sim22 are quite similar to 
those generated by Sim21, Table A6-4.   
 
6.4.1.3.4 Intra-SADC Trade  
Figure 6-9 shows that intra-SADC trade is negatively affected by liberalizing trade 
with the EU. Intra-SADC imports rise only in ‘Rest of SACU’ and Zimbabwe. South 
Africa, which is a main source of imports for many SADC regions,48 experiences 
expansions in its intra-SADC exports by 8 percent, Table A6-5. On the other hand, 
exports by ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi to their SADC partners 
drop outstandingly. These drops are mainly driven by removing tariffs on the EU 
imports from SADC (Sim21-EU). Recall that total exports and exports to the EU by 
these regions rise and that their exports to third parties and to their SADC partners 
drop; this means that not only the increments in their total exports that are now sold 
in the EU markets but also part of their pre-simulation exports to third parties and 
their SADC partners are redirected to the EU markets.49  
 
                                                          
48 See Table A4-27. 
49 As reported before, Malawi exports to ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ increase outstandingly. Therefore, 
it experiences export redirection away from the third parties (excluding ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’) 
and SADC markets towards markets in ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ and the EU.  
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Figure 6-9: Changes in Intra-SADC Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
Effects on intra-SADC trade change dramatically by simulating intra-SADC trade 
liberalization simultaneously with the EU-SADC liberalization scenario, Sim22. The 
inclusion of intra-SADC trade liberalization strongly boosts imports in regions where 
intra-SADC imports would have either dropped (i.e. Madagascar, Mauritius 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and ‘Rest of SADC’) or experienced slight increases 
(i.e. Malawi and Zimbabwe) under Sim21, Table A6-5. On the export side, the 
directions of effects are similar to those generated by Sim21, albeit the magnitude of 
the effects is different in most of the SADC regions. This means that intra-SADC trade 
liberalization does not prevent the previously reported redirection of part of ‘Rest of 
SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius exports away from the third parties and SADC 
markets to the EU markets. Only Malawian exports to its SADC partners (which would 
have dropped and redirected to the EU and ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ markets 
under Sim21) experience slight increases, Table A6-5.  
 
6.4.1.4 Fiscal Impact 
Under this comprehensive scenario, tariff revenue drops substantially for most SADC 
regions, Table 6-9. Some regions (i.e. Botswana, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa 
and ‘Rest of SADC’) incur remarkable tariff losses which exceed 35 percent of the 
baseline levels.  
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The required increases in sales tax to offset these tariff losses depend, however, on the 
structure of public budget in the baseline scenario.50 For example, tariffs and sales tax 
are the main sources of public revenue in Mauritius, each accounting for 38 percent. 
South Africa depends mainly on indirect taxes on production factor use followed by 
sales tax while tariff revenue contributes 5 percent only to its public revenue. 
Mauritius needs to raise sales tax rate by 1.3 percentage points whereas an increment 
of only 0.2 percentage points of sales tax rate is required by South Africa to offset the 
experienced 35 percent tariff loss in both countries. In ‘Rest of SADC’, where tariffs 
account for only 12 percent of public revenue in the baseline scenario, an increase of 
0.7 percentage points in sales tax rate is required to offset a tariff loss of 42 percent. 
 
Table 6-9: Fiscal Revenue by Source, “All SADC Regions” 
(Percentage change, nominal) 
 
Sim21 Sim23 
Import 
Tariffs 
Export 
Taxes* 
Sales 
Taxes 
Taxes 
on 
Output  
Taxes 
on 
Factor 
Use  
Sales Tax Replacement 
Revenue 
Rate** 
(Change, 
percentage 
points) 
BWA -35.7     26.9 0.8   0.1 
MDG -39.9     0.4 0.7   0.2 
MWI -10.7   1.3 -12.0 2.5 0.5 0.0 
MUS -34.9 139.6 2.4 -5.3 6.1 34.1 1.3 
MOZ -15.2   0.1 -0.8 0.2 11.5 0.3 
ZAF -36.9 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 7.6 0.2 
TZA -19.6   -0.2 0.6 0.4 28.2 0.3 
ZMB -10.6   -0.1 -1.4 0.2 37.5 0.2 
ZWE -9.4     6.2 4.8   -0.1 
XSC 0.2 -53.7 7.1 -4.3 5.2 5.5 0.0 
XSD -42.3   -0.5 -0.5 1.4 64.3 0.7 
* As explained in Table 6-4, these percentage changes are calculated based on very small 
baseline levels.  
** As noted in Table 6-4, sales tax rates are weighted by commodity shares in domestic demand 
by region. 
 
                                                          
50 See Table 4-1. 
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6.4.1.5 Factor Returns 
Changes in factor returns are positive in most of the cases with the exception of 
natural resources, Table 6-10. These changes reflect the experienced changes in 
output structures, this type of impact will be dealt with later.51 Output expansions 
occur mainly in agricultural and agro-processing sectors in five regions, i.e. ‘Rest of 
SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Botswana and Malawi. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the increases in factor incomes are the greatest for land in these specific regions. 
Recalling that natural resources is sector-specific, decreasing demand for output of ‘oil 
and minerals’, which is the main natural resources-using activity, pushes its rent to 
drop in the same regions.  
 
Table 6-10: Structural Change in Factor Markets, “All SADC Regions”, Sim21 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Factor Income, Percentage Change 
Land 169.9 3.0 -12.2 324.7 1.0 9.6 0.9 12.4 103.6 238.4 0.0 
NatRes -17.5 0.5 -14.3 -19.9 2.3 1.0 0.4 -1.3 -29.9 -63.9 4.5 
UnSkLab 1.5 0.7 2.4 8.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.2 2.9 0.4 
SkLab 0.6 0.3 3.7 1.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.4 1.7 2.8 0.7 
Capital 0.2 0.5 3.9 -0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 -0.6 1.4 7.5 1.1 
 Factor Adjustment, Percent 
Land 9.9 0.7 4.6 21.3 0.2 0.9 0.3 2.1 39.8 21.1 0.3 
UnSkLab 3.3 0.7 3.6 13.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.0 9.7 13.2 0.4 
SkLab 0.9 0.3 2.0 2.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.4 5.5 0.1 
Capital 2.2 0.5 4.5 6.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 7.5 15.2 0.4 
 
Expanding sugar activities in ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius imply 
outstanding increases in demand for land. Accordingly, land rents rise by very high 
rates, albeit based on low benchmark rent levels. In Botswana, expanding livestock, 
the activity that occupies 66 percent of the utilized land in the baseline scenario,52 
pushes land rent to rise by almost two fold. Despite the increased demand for land 
used in sugar and rice in Malawi, land rent drops. This is attributed to the shrinkage of 
‘other crops’, the large activity that contributes 14 percent to total output and uses 
                                                          
51 The point to mention here is that changes in output structure generated under Sim21-EU are quite 
similar to those induced by Sim21 with slight differences in magnitudes. 
52 See Table A4-8. 
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more than one third of the cultivated land in the baseline scenario.53 Excess supply of 
land released from ‘other crops’ activity pushes average land rent to fall until the sum 
of sectoral demand for land equilibrates its total supply. Sugar activity expansion in 
Mauritius explains the relatively high increase in unskilled labour wage. This activity 
is unskilled labour-intensive and solely absorbs 9 percent of unskilled labour in the 
baseline scenario.54     
 
6.4.1.6 Factor Market Adjustment 
Sim21 generates significant changes in output structures and shifts of production 
factors across activities in many SADC regions. The highest degrees of structural 
adjustment occur in the same beneficiary regions: ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, 
Mauritius and Botswana, Table 6-10. Land and unskilled labour experience 
substantial structural adjustment for these economies to reach their new equilibrium 
points after the simulated trade shock. For example, 40 percent of the utilized land in 
Zimbabwe in the baseline scenario is reallocated among different activities in the 
post-liberalization scenario. 
As expected, structural adjustment imposed by Sim21-SADC; the scenario that does 
not generate significant structural change, is trivial. Apart from Mauritius that 
experiences changes in its output structure, the structural adjustment degree is less 
than 0.5 percent for each production factor in the other SADC regions. To conclude, 
structural adjustment is mainly driven by the generated changes in output structure 
after simulating the EU tariff removal.  
 
                                                          
53 See Tables A4-6 and A4-8, respectively.  
54 See Tables A4-7 and A4-8, respectively. It is expected that unemployment level for unskilled labour 
drops under the alternative closure rule.  
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6.4.2. Sectoral Results 
6.4.2.1 Price Changes 
By removing 90 of the applied tariff rates on SADC imports from the EU (Sim21-SADC) 
cif prices of SADC imports from the EU increase, Table A6-22.55 The extent to which 
the simulated tariff cuts are transmitted into lower domestic prices of SADC imports 
from the EU depends on several factors, among which are the associated changes in 
real exchange rate. For the same tariff reduction, domestic prices ceteris paribus drop 
proportionally less in countries which experience higher increases in their real 
exchange rates. This explains the relatively low decreases in domestic prices of 
imports from the EU for Mauritius, ‘Rest of SADC’, Zimbabwe and South Africa, Table 
A6-23.56    
Owing inter alia to the low shares for the EU in some SADC markets,57 Sim21-SADC 
does not generate significant changes in domestic prices of SADC composite imports 
except for few cases, e.g. beverage and vehicles, Table A6-24. The experienced large 
decreases in domestic prices of composite beverage imports by Mauritius, ‘Rest of 
SADC’ and Tanzania are attributable to the big EU shares in their beverage markets.   
On the export side, no significant changes in SADC production and export structures 
are reported under Sim21-SADC. This type of effect will be dealt with later in detail. 
Therefore, world prices of SADC exports to the EU hardly change.  
Given the increases in world prices of SADC imports with the slight drops in world 
prices of SADC exports, terms of trade deteriorates in some regions, e.g. Mauritius, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. Real exchange rates increase accordingly to maintain the 
trade balances fixed at their baseline levels as demonstrated by the aggregate results.        
Eliminating the EU tariffs on imports from SADC (Sim21-EU) triggers world prices of 
SADC exports to the EU in some sectors, Table A6-25. This is particularly the case for 
                                                          
55 Since Sim21-SADC includes all SADC members, these price changes are more evident compared to 
the corresponding increases induced by Sim11-SADC. On the other hand, world prices of SADC imports 
from the EU rise under Sim21-SADC by lower rates compared to the corresponding rises in world 
prices of SADC exports to the EU under Sim21-EU. These differences are attributed to the size 
difference between SADC’s and the EU’s shares in total world imports, Table A4-9.    
56 For example, the same tariff cut is simulated for Mauritius vegetables imports and Madagascar sugar 
imports from the EU. The Mauritian real exchange rate rises by a higher rate than the Madagascan real 
exchange rate. Therefore, domestic price for Mauritius vegetables imports drops proportionally less 
than the drops in domestic price for Madagascar sugar imports.          
57 See Table A4-18. 
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rice, sugar and ‘meat and dairy products’.58 In addition, world prices of other sectoral 
exports rise for ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Botswana. Not only do world 
prices of SADC exports to the EU rise but also SADC exports to other regions 
experience price increases.59 These world price increases of SADC exports with 
relatively less increases in world prices of SADC imports from the EU entail terms of 
trade improvements and real appreciations for almost all SADC regions, as 
demonstrated by the aggregate results.  
It is worth noting here that the strong real appreciations for ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, 
Mauritius and Malawi mean that their imports, not only from the EU but also from all 
other sources, are sold in their domestic markets at lower prices and, consequently, 
domestic prices of their composite imports drop considerably relative to the 
numéraire. 
 
6.4.2.2 Structural Change 
Generally speaking, Sim21-SADC does not generate significant changes in the SADC 
economic structure with very few exceptions, e.g. Mauritius and Zimbabwe, Table A6-
26.  
This scenario generates structural change in Mauritius with indications of both trade 
creation and diversion in the beverage sector. The EU is the main beverage exporter to 
Mauritius with a market share of 64 percent at the baseline scenario.60 By removing 
tariffs on Mauritius beverage imports from the EU, domestic beverage production 
shrinks and resources are reallocated into textiles activity, Figure 6-10. Domestic 
beverage production is replaced by the relatively cheaper imports; beverage imports 
increase in both volume terms and as ratio of total demand, Tables A6-27 and A6-28. 
The associated gains in consumer surplus are affirmed by the lower consumer price of 
composite commodity and the higher level of private consumption in this sector. 
                                                          
58 Unlike Sim11-EU in which prices for exports from the other SADC countries that are not involved in 
the liberalization drop, export prices for all SADC members rise under this scenario. 
59 There are very few exceptions of price decreases that occur mainly in the sugar exports to the non-
EU importers. 
60 See Table A4-18. 
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In volume terms, imports from the EU rise with declines in imports from all other 
partners except Mozambique. This result implies that the increment in beverage 
imports is mainly sourced in the EU. Share analysis supports the diagnosis of trade 
diversion effects; the EU gains 16 percentage points of share in the Mauritian 
beverage market at the expense of more efficient producers in ‘Rest of the World’, 
Table A6-29.61 Beverage imports worth US$ 1.06 million (valued at fob prices) are 
diverted from ‘Rest of the World’ leading to a 7 percentage-points loss of its share in 
the Mauritian beverage market. 
Evidence on export expansions in the textiles sector is suggested by the results. 
Within this general equilibrium framework, export expansions can be attributed to 
changes in two effects: output and relative price. The former reflects 
upward/downward shifts of the CET export supply frontier due to increases/decrease 
in domestic output whereas the latter reflects movements along the CET export 
supply frontier due to changes in relative prices of domestic commodities and 
exports.62 At this stage of analysis evolution, output effect is valid only at the sectoral 
level. The full employment assumption with no technical progress implies fixed output 
at the aggregate level. 
Textiles activity gains one percentage point of share in output structure which in turn 
contributes to the 10 percent increase in export volumes that is worth US$ 104.7 
million. In addition, producers shift toward exporting market since textile exports 
become relatively more profitable compared to domestic sales. This relative price 
effect leads to a higher ratio of textile export in total supply. These increments in 
exports are mainly directed to the EU that gains share in Mauritius textile exports. It is 
noteworthy that the textiles sector forms 15 percent of total output in Mauritius in the 
baseline scenario. Almost three-quarters of output is exported, 68 percent of which is 
                                                          
61 The European beverage producers are less efficient compared to their corresponding in ‘Rest of the 
World’. If all exporters were treated equally, the EU would be a higher-cost producer. Under a 
hypothetical scenario that considers the same tariff cuts on SADC imports from all trade partners 
(including partners inside the SADC region) fob world prices and domestic prices of beverage imports 
from the EU are higher than the corresponding prices of beverage imports from  ‘Rest of the World’. 
62 For a detailed explanation, see Blonigen, Flynn and Reinert (1997, p. 217). 
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destined for the EU markets, forming the bulk of Mauritius total exports and of its 
exports to the EU.63  
 
Figure 6-10: Changes in Activity Shares in Output Structure (Percentage points) 
 
 
Table A6-30 reveals considerable changes in output structures for many SADC 
countries under Sim21-EU. It is not hard to explain these volume changes in light of 
the substantial price changes for SADC exports, as seen before. The reported 
shrinkage of manufacturing production for Mauritius concurs with the conclusion 
reached by Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2007). Using a partial equilibrium model, 
the study estimates 24 percent average decline in domestic production of 
manufactures and primary products under a full Mauritius-EU EPA. 
Figure 6-10 shows that the highest changes are in ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius 
and Malawi where resources are reallocated into sugar activity. ‘Meat and dairy 
products’ also attracts some resources in Botswana and ‘Rest of SACU’.  
                                                          
63 See Tables A4-6, A4-16, A4-22, A4-14 and A4-21, respectively. In light of the importance of textiles 
activity in Mauritius, the associated factor allocation, as well as factor adjustment, effects should have 
been influential. Nevertheless, the expanded sugar activity, under Sim21-EU, draws resources out of all 
other activities including textiles. The decline in textiles output (under Sim21-EU) outweighs the 
expansion (under Sim21-SAD) leading to shrinkage in this activity under Sim21.        
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Efficiency gains and the export expansions, as we will see next, associated with this 
structural change are consistent with the welfare gains accrued by these beneficiary 
regions as revealed at the aggregate level. These expanded sectors draw resources 
from higher value-added activities; among which are textiles and all the other the 
manufactures.  
Under Sim21-EU, sugar exports by all SADC members expand, Table A6-31. Other 
exports also expand, i.e. ‘meat and dairy products’ (by ‘Rest of SACU’, Botswana and 
South Africa) and rice (by Madagascar, Malawi and South Africa). Almost all other 
SADC commodity exports experience drops. Following the same rationale, the 
observed expansions in sugar exports in the beneficiary regions are attributed to two 
effects. The first is output effect; sugar output raises in volume terms and as ratio of 
total output the effect that boosts sugar exports. The latter is relative price effect that 
leads to higher export shares in total supply. These export expansions are directed 
mainly to the EU sugar markets. SADC sugar exports to the EU surge at higher rates 
compared to SADC total sugar exports, Table A6-32.  
Many SADC members gain extra share in the EU sugar markets. The main winners are 
‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius, Table A6-33.64 Compared to Sim11, under 
which some SADC members (Mauritius and Zimbabwe) lose share in the EU sugar 
market, this scenario allows many SADC sugar exporters to gain shares in the EU 
markets. It is, thus, evident why ‘Rest of SACU’ is worse off, whereas many SADC 
regions are better off, under this scenario, the conclusion that is derived from the 
aggregate welfare measure. The additional shares in the EU markets, which would 
have been accrued by ‘Rest of SACU’ only under Sim11, are spread among the other 
beneficiary regions under this comprehensive scenario.     
These findings are in line with the conclusions obtained by the CGE MIRAGE model in 
Bouët, Laborde and Mevel (2007) and Berisha-Krasniqi, Bouët and Mevel (2008). Both 
studies find positive real income and welfare impact for SADC and ESA regions under 
a full EU-EPA scenario.65 These macroeconomic gains are primarily attributed to 
                                                          
64 In addition, Botswana and ‘Rest of SACU’ gain extra shares in the EU ‘meat and dairy products’ 
markets. 
65 The two regions together include all SADC countries, except South Africa, Angola, Seychelles and D.R. 
Congo.  
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substantial export expansions for meat and sugar sectors as a result of removing the 
EU trade barriers. In addition, Fontagné, Laborde and Mitaritonna (2010) estimate 
substantial expansions in sugar exports to the EU driven by a complete EPA scenario 
for the same beneficiary regions. These sugar export increases, valued in million euro 
2004, are sourced in Mauritius (511) Swaziland (398) and Zimbabwe (145).  
 
 
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis  
CGE models are criticized, inter alia, by their sensitivity to the chosen behavioural 
parameters and assumptions. The purpose of this section is, thus, to examine the 
robustness of the results with respect to variations in the main settings of the model 
and in the liberalization degree and coverage. If the model generates similar results 
under these variations, then this will provide evidence that the adopted elasticities, 
assumptions, and liberalization degree and coverage are not the important 
determinants of the observed changes in welfare, trade and structural change. Results 
from sensitivity scenarios are compared to those generated by the comprehensive 
liberalization scenario that covers all SADC regions under the current intra-SADC 
protection status, Sim21.  
 
6.5.1. Sensitivity to the Model Settings 
6.5.1.1 Behavioural Parameters 
This sub-section conducts six scenarios in order to examine the sensitivity of the 
results to variations in the model behavioural parameters, i.e. the trade elasticities 
and factor substitution elasticities. As presented in Table 6-11, the first two sensitivity 
scenarios (Sim21-mph, Sim21-mpl) adopt higher and lower values of import 
elasticities. In the main scenarios, the elasticities of substitution between domestic 
products and imports (Armington elasticities) as well as the elasticities of substitution 
between imports from different origins are derived from the GTAP7 database.66 As 
described earlier in Chapter 4, the GTAP7 database sets the elasticities of substitution 
between imports from different origins, for a given product, to be double the 
                                                          
66 Trade elasticity values are presented in Tables A4-3 and A4-4. 
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corresponding values of Armington elasticities; the ‘rule of two’. Therefore, both 
Armington elasticities and the elasticities of substitution between imports from 
different origins are simultaneously doubled under Sim21-mph and then they are 
simultaneously halved under Sim21-mpl.  
 
Table 6-11: Sensitivity Scenarios 
Simulation 
Code 
Simulation Description 
Phase1: Model Settings 
Trade Elasticities 
Sim21-mph Sim21, doubling import substitution elasticities for all regions 
Sim21-mpl Sim21, halving import substitution elasticities for all regions 
Sim21-xph 
Sim21, doubling export transformation elasticities for all 
regions 
Sim21-xpl Sim21, halving export transformation elasticities for all regions 
Production Factors Elasticities   
Sim21-prh Sim21, doubling factors substitution elasticities for all regions 
Sim21-prl Sim21, halving factors substitution elasticities for all regions 
 SADC Side EU Side 
Labour Market Closure Rule 
Sim21-lun 
Sim21, flexible unskilled labour 
supply in all SADC regions 
Sim21 
Phase2: Liberalization Degree and Coverage 
Sim21-asy 
Removing 60 percent of the applied 
tariff rates on imports from the EU 
by all SADC regions 
Sim21 
Sim21-eus Sim21 
Sim21, except tariffs on 
sugar imports from all 
SADC regions 
 
The following two scenarios (Sim21-xph, Sim21-xpl) assume higher and lower values 
of export elasticities. Likewise the first two scenarios, each change is done 
simultaneously for both the elasticities of transformation between domestic supply 
and exports and the elasticities of transformation between exports to different 
destinations keeping the ‘rule of two’ valid on the export supply side.  
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It is reasonable to expect greater (smaller) welfare impacts with the higher (lower) 
values of trade elasticities. Higher trade elasticities mean greater responsiveness of 
quantity traded to changes in prices for tradable sectors. In this general equilibrium 
framework, changes in quantity supplied and demanded and, hence, price changes for 
all sectors become also more pronounced. Therefore, the generated trade creation as 
well as diversion effects and allocation efficiency are stronger under the higher trade 
elasticities. 
Two scenarios adopt higher and lower values of elasticities of substitution between 
production factors, Sim21-prh, Sim21-prl. The elasticity values at the second level of 
the production function67 are set to be double their initial values (Sim21-prh) and 
then half their initial values (Sim21-prl). It is worth noting here that Sim21-prl implies 
factor markets rigidity by assuming low substitutability between production factors. 
Tables 6-12 and 6-13 show that the generated impacts in the four beneficiary regions 
(‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi) are more pronounced under the 
alternative trade elasticities. This is particularly the case for the import substitution 
elasticities. The higher import elasticities considerably raise welfare gains in ‘Rest of 
SACU’ and Zimbabwe. The generated changes in imports and exports for the four 
regions are almost doubled under the higher import elasticities, whereas they are 
halved under the lower import elasticities. Interestingly, the accrued terms of trade 
gains by ‘Rest of SACU’ become slightly smaller under the higher import elasticities 
and significantly stronger under the higher export elasticities. Results on factor 
market adjustment (Table 6-14) support the same finding. The required degree of 
adjustment for the four beneficiary regions (‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and 
Malawi) is larger under the higher trade elasticities and vice versa. Once again, results 
are particularly sensitive to variations in import elasticities. Results for all other SADC 
regions do not show substantial changes under the alternative trade elasticities.            
A comparison of welfare and trade results generated under alternative factor 
substitution elasticities with the main simulation results does not reveal any 
substantial differences. However, results on factors adjustment show that the 
required adjustment for the four beneficiary regions is slightly greater, the higher the 
                                                          
67 Table A4-5 presents elasticity of substitution between production factors. 
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production factor substitutability and vice versa. Overall, the simulation results are 
robust to variations in the factor substitution elasticities. 
 
Table 6-12: Sensitivity Analysis Phase1: Welfare and Terms of Trade Impact 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim21 
Sim21-
mph 
Sim21-
mpl 
Sim21-
xph 
Sim21-
xpl 
Sim21-
prh 
Sim21-
prl 
Sim21-
lun 
 Total Absorption 
BWA 0.8 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.5 
MDG 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 
MWI 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.6 
MUS 4.3 3.6 4.2 4.6 3.7 4.3 4.2 7.6 
MOZ -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
ZAF 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
TZA -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
ZMB 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 
ZWE 4.9 7.9 2.6 5.8 3.7 4.7 5.2 5.5 
XSC 8.1 14.4 3.9 12.3 4.1 7.9 8.3 9.6 
XSD -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 
 Terms of Trade 
BWA 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 
MDG 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 
MWI 0.9 0.0 1.1 1.6 -0.1 0.9 0.9 0.5 
MUS 2.9 1.8 3.5 3.4 1.9 3.0 3.0 1.9 
MOZ -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
ZAF -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
TZA -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
ZMB 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
ZWE 5.3 5.4 3.3 6.8 3.2 4.9 5.6 5.2 
XSC 4.5 2.5 3.3 9.1 0.8 4.5 4.5 4.1 
XSD -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
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Table 6-13: Sensitivity Analysis Phase1: Total Trade Impact 
(Percentage change) 
 
Sim21 
Sim21-
mph 
Sim21-
mpl 
Sim21-
xph 
Sim21-
xpl 
Sim21-
prh 
Sim21
-prl 
Sim21-
lun 
Total Imports 
BWA 1.8 1.9 1.4 3.4 0.8 1.7 1.8 2.3 
MDG 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.8 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.7 
MWI 7.5 12.3 4.0 8.1 6.4 6.9 7.9 8.2 
MUS 10.8 11.7 8.7 11.6 9.5 12.1 9.7 13.4 
MOZ 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 
ZAF 1.8 2.7 1.2 2.4 1.3 1.8 1.8 2.1 
TZA 1.1 1.3 0.8 1.6 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 
ZMB 0.4 -0.2 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 
ZWE 11.4 21.2 5.2 12.5 9.4 12.1 11.0 11.8 
XSC 25.9 62.8 8.0 36.1 16.0 25.8 25.8 27.0 
XSD 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 
 Total Exports 
BWA -0.9 -1.4 -0.4 -0.5 -1.0 -1.2 -0.7 -0.3 
MDG 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 
MWI 10.2 18.0 4.9 10.4 9.8 9.5 10.9 11.8 
MUS 4.2 5.8 2.9 4.8 3.6 5.6 3.4 7.6 
MOZ 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 
ZAF 1.7 2.0 1.4 2.3 1.2 1.7 1.7 2.0 
TZA 2.0 2.5 1.5 2.8 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.3 
ZMB 0.0 -1.0 0.4 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.2 
ZWE 2.9 6.5 1.3 2.9 2.7 4.2 2.0 3.4 
XSC 8.4 25.5 1.5 11.2 5.6 8.5 7.9 9.6 
XSD 0.9 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.9 
Note: Percentage changes are calculated based on figures valued at baseline world prices. 
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Table 6-14: Sensitivity Analysis Phase1: Factor Adjustment 
(Percent) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
 Sim21 
Land 9.9 0.7 4.6 21.3 0.2 0.9 0.3 2.1 39.8 21.1 0.3 
UnSkLab 3.3 0.7 3.6 13.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.0 9.7 13.2 0.4 
SkLab 0.9 0.3 2.0 2.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.4 5.5 0.1 
Capital 2.2 0.5 4.5 6.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 7.5 15.2 0.4 
 Sim21-mph 
Land 14.6 0.7 9.1 26.9 0.4 2.4 0.3 3.0 66.6 41.6 0.4 
UnSkLab 4.9 0.7 6.6 15.9 0.5 0.4 0.2 1.9 18.1 28.3 0.5 
SkLab 1.3 0.3 3.9 3.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 4.4 12.4 0.2 
Capital 3.0 0.5 8.3 8.9 0.5 0.4 0.2 1.1 14.1 32.4 0.5 
 Sim21-mpl 
Land 5.4 0.5 1.8 14.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 15.6 7.5 0.2 
UnSkLab 1.7 0.5 1.6 9.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 3.5 4.2 0.2 
SkLab 0.4 0.2 0.8 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 1.7 0.1 
Capital 1.3 0.4 2.0 4.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.7 4.5 0.4 
 Sim21-xph 
Land 13.0 1.3 4.6 20.9 0.2 0.9 0.4 2.5 41.7 21.4 0.4 
UnSkLab 4.8 1.2 3.6 13.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.1 10.1 15.5 0.4 
SkLab 1.3 0.5 2.1 2.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.5 6.5 0.2 
Capital 3.2 0.9 4.7 6.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 7.8 17.8 0.4 
 Sim21-xpl 
Land 6.8 0.4 4.6 21.7 0.2 0.9 0.2 1.5 36.4 19.5 0.2 
UnSkLab 2.0 0.4 3.5 14.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 8.9 10.3 0.3 
SkLab 0.5 0.1 2.0 2.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.3 4.2 0.1 
Capital 1.4 0.3 4.3 7.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 7.0 11.9 0.4 
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Table 6-14 (cont.) 
(Percent) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Sim21-prh 
Land 11.0 0.7 4.6 21.9 0.1 0.9 0.3 2.0 38.9 18.8 0.3 
UnSkLab 4.0 0.7 3.7 18.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.2 10.1 13.8 0.4 
SkLab 1.0 0.3 2.0 3.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.6 5.7 0.1 
Capital 3.1 0.5 4.5 9.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 7.9 16.0 0.6 
 Sim21-prl 
Land 9.0 0.8 4.5 21.3 0.2 0.9 0.3 2.1 40.8 25.0 0.4 
UnSkLab 2.9 0.7 3.6 8.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 9.4 12.8 0.3 
SkLab 0.8 0.3 2.1 2.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.3 5.2 0.1 
Capital 1.9 0.5 4.7 5.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 7.2 14.4 0.3 
 Sim21-lun 
Land 10.0 0.6 4.3 21.0 0.2 0.9 0.3 2.0 39.6 20.8 0.3 
UnSkLab 2.9 0.7 4.0 10.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.8 9.5 13.8 0.5 
SkLab 0.8 0.3 1.9 2.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.4 5.3 0.1 
Capital 2.3 0.6 4.5 6.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 7.5 15.0 0.4 
 
6.5.1.2 Labour Market Closure Rule 
This sub-section examines the results sensitivity to the unskilled labour market 
closure rule. Under this sensitivity scenario (Sim21-lun) the full employment 
assumption is ceteris paribus relaxed for the unskilled labour markets in all SADC 
regions. Unskilled labour real wages are specified to be fixed at their baseline rates 
whereas employment levels are determined endogenously to reflect abundant supply 
of unskilled workers who are willing to offer their services at the prevailing wage 
rates in all SADC regions. 
As reported in Table 6-12, welfare gains are slightly stronger whereas terms of trade 
improvements are weaker for almost all SADC regions. Changes in trade (Table 6-13) 
become more pronounced. Allowing for unemployment of unskilled labour in SADC 
regions implies more pronounced changes in the output structure and, hence, trade 
flows after the simulated tariff cuts. Therefore, efficiency gains and the associated 
changes in real trade figures are stronger while terms of trade changes are 
proportionally less. Interestingly, results on factor market adjustment (Table 6-14) do 
not show substantial differences. The flexibility of unskilled labour supply is 
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effectively restricted by factor substitution elasticities and, maybe more importantly, 
by the limited supply of other production factors that are fully employed. 
 
6.5.2. Sensitivity to the Liberalization Degree and Coverage  
6.5.2.1 Asymmetric Liberalization   
This sensitivity scenario (Sim21-asy) assumes asymmetric trade liberalization 
between SADC regions and the EU. All SADC regions employ 60 percent cut of the 
applied tariff rates on their imports from the EU whereas the EU eliminates all the 
applied tariffs on imports from SADC.  
Results from this sensitivity scenario (as shown in Tables 6-15 and 6-16) are quite 
similar to the main simulation results. Welfare and terms of trade losses for some 
regions (i.e. Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and ‘Rest of SADC’) are 
slightly less. This means that the regions that lose from liberalizing trade with the EU 
might have reasons to prefer asymmetric over symmetric liberalization module. 
Figures on the required factor adjustment (Table 6-17) under symmetric and 
asymmetric liberalization scenarios are almost identical for all SADC regions.  
 
Table 6-15: Sensitivity Analysis Phase2: Welfare and Terms of Trade Impact 
(Percentage change) 
 
Sim21 Sim21-asy Sim21-eus Sim21 Sim21-asy Sim21-eus 
Total Absorption Terms of Trade 
BWA 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.9 
MDG 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 
MWI 0.6 0.6 -0.1 0.9 0.9 -0.2 
MUS 4.3 4.7 -0.6 2.9 3.2 -0.8 
MOZ -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 
ZAF 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 
TZA -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 
ZMB 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.3 
ZWE 4.9 5.1 -0.3 5.3 5.3 -0.2 
XSC 8.1 8.1 2.2 4.5 4.5 0.9 
XSD -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 
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Table 6-16: Sensitivity Analysis Phase1: Total Trade Impact 
(Percentage change) 
 
Sim21 Sim21-asy Sim21-eus Sim21 Sim21-asy Sim21-eus 
Total Imports Total Exports 
BWA 1.8 1.7 2.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 
MDG 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.3 -0.1 1.0 
MWI 7.5 7.2 0.6 10.2 9.7 1.2 
MUS 10.8 9.7 3.1 4.2 2.7 4.2 
MOZ 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.4 1.0 
ZAF 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.8 
TZA 1.1 0.9 0.6 2.0 1.4 1.6 
ZMB 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.9 
ZWE 11.4 11.1 0.7 2.9 2.3 1.3 
XSC 25.9 25.7 5.9 8.4 8.2 0.7 
XSD 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.9 
Note: Percentage changes are calculated based on figures valued at baseline world prices. 
 
Table 6-17: Sensitivity Analysis Phase2: Factor Adjustment 
(Percent) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Sim21 
Land 9.9 0.7 4.6 21.3 0.2 0.9 0.3 2.1 39.8 21.1 0.3 
UnSkLab 3.3 0.7 3.6 13.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.0 9.7 13.2 0.4 
SkLab 0.9 0.3 2.0 2.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.4 5.5 0.1 
Capital 2.2 0.5 4.5 6.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 7.5 15.2 0.4 
 Sim21-asy 
Land 9.9 0.7 4.8 21.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.0 39.6 21.1 0.3 
UnSkLab 3.3 0.7 3.6 13.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.1 9.7 13.2 0.2 
SkLab 0.8 0.3 2.0 2.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.4 5.5 0.1 
Capital 2.2 0.5 4.5 7.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 7.5 15.2 0.3 
 Sim21-eus 
Land 10.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 10.3 0.1 
UnSkLab 3.3 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 3.2 0.3 
SkLab 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.2 
Capital 2.2 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.7 0.4 
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6.5.2.2 Partial Liberalization Coverage 
Regarding sensitivity with respect to liberalization coverage, this scenario (Sim21-
eus) excludes sugar from the EU liberalization schedule. A comparison of this scenario 
results with Sim21 results (Tables 6-15 and 6-16) indicates high sensitivity to this 
alternative liberalization coverage. Under this sensitivity scenario, almost all SADC 
regions experience welfare losses and deteriorations in their terms of trade. The 
previously reported welfare and terms of trade gains for ‘Rest of SACU’ become 
significantly less. Only Botswana experiences slightly higher welfare and terms of 
trade gains. Changes in trade figures for the beneficiary regions (‘Rest of SACU’, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi) are significantly smaller. Table 6-17 shows minor 
degrees of factor adjustment; less than 1 percent of production factors have to move 
across activities in almost all SADC regions. Factor adjustment that would have taken 
place in ‘Rest of SACU’ under the full coverage liberalization scenario is significantly 
less after the sugar exclusion. Factor adjustment for Botswana is almost the same 
under this scenario. These results support the main finding derived from the 
simulation scenarios that the experienced welfare gains are primarily driven by 
removing trade barriers to SADC sugar exports to the EU markets. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
Under the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario, ‘Rest of SACU’ is the main winner. This 
scenario generates moderate welfare gains for Botswana and South Africa and welfare 
losses for Mozambique. “SADC-EPA Group” is disadvantageous to Mozambique unless 
barriers to its intra-SADC trade are removed simultaneously. The other SADC regions 
not directly involved in this scenario lose and the biggest welfare loss is reported for 
Mauritius.  
“All SADC Regions” is welfare-improving for many SADC regions: ‘Rest of SACU’, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius, and, to a lesser extent, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South 
Africa and Madagascar. Besides, Malawi, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are outstandingly 
better off under this comprehensive scenario compared to the “SADC-EPA Group” 
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scenario. For ‘Rest of SACU’, the “All SADC Regions” scenario is less advantageous 
compared to the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario.  
SADC preferential access to the EU markets is the key source for the reported welfare 
and terms of trade gains under both EPA scenarios. Reducing tariffs on SADC imports 
from the EU yields small negative welfare impact on SADC regions. Whenever the 
former favourable effects offset the latter adverse effects, regions experience welfare 
gains, i.e. ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Malawi and Botswana. 
Reciprocal trade liberalization with the EU neither stimulates exports nor provides 
export opportunities in the EU markets for most SADC members. Opening SADC 
markets to the EU products boosts SADC imports from the EU whereas the EU tariff 
removal stimulates exports to the EU by only ‘Rest of SACU’, under the “SADC-EPA 
Group” scenario, and by a few regions (i.e. ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and, to a 
lesser extent, Mauritius and Zambia) under the comprehensive scenario.  
  
  
7 Comparative Assessment of the Alternative Scenarios to the 
EU-SADC EPAs 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
According to the WTO waiver for the Cotonou preferences, the EU was allowed to 
provide non-reciprocal preferences until December 2007, and thereafter EU-ACP 
trade should be based on reciprocal preferences in compliance with the WTO rules, 
particularly Article XXIV of the GATT. Therefore, the status quo for SADC-EU trade (i.e. 
the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement) is no longer legally sustainable.  
From this perspective, the impact of the EU-SADC EPAs cannot be properly grasped 
without conducting comparative analyses with the impact generated under their 
WTO-compatible trade alternatives. The consequences of the EU-SADC EPAs should 
be assessed in comparison with the corresponding consequences that might take 
place in the case of not signing final EPAs.  
This chapter aims to examine the possible ways for different SADC members to 
liberalize their trade with the EU in the case of not agreeing on final EPAs. The 
underlying research question is whether these alternatives are preferable for SADC 
members to the EU-SADC EPAs.  
Different alternatives to the EU-SADC EPAs are simulated and their implications for 
individual SADC members are examined.1 As described in detail in Chapter 2, in the 
case of not signing final EPAs, SADC-EU trade should be governed by the alternative 
constitutional framework, i.e. the ‘Enabling Clause’. This in practice means that the 
SADC LDCs maintain their current EU-EBA initiative whereas the SADC non-LDCs 
switch to the EU-GSP. South Africa is the only exception since it has already a WTO-
compatible FTA with the EU, i.e. the EU-South Africa TDCA. In addition to these 
alternative trade arrangements, the EU sugar reforms and trade liberalization as well 
                                                          
1 I have presented the bulk of the results generated under this phase of simulation scenarios at the 14 th 
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis - “Governing Global Challenges: Climate Change, Trade, 
Finance and Development”, June 2011, Venice. See Osman (2011). 
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as the Doha Round are simulated to examine their implications for the assessment of 
the EU-SADC EPAs.   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 explains the importance, 
scope and limitations of the analysis. Section 7.3 describes the design of the 
simulation experiments. Section 7.4 provides comparative analyses of the simulation 
findings. The next two sections conclude the findings by ranking the different trade 
arrangements for individual SADC members (Section 7.5) and by presenting the 
patterns of gains and losses under each of the examined trade arrangements (Section 
7.6). Finally, Section 7.7 provides the chapter’s main conclusions. Like the preceding 
chapter, results at the aggregate level are displayed in the main text of the chapter 
whereas detailed display of the sectoral results is provided by Appendix to Chapter 7 
at the end of the thesis. 
 
 
7.2 Relevance, Scope and Limitations of the Analysis 
An impact analysis of the alternatives to the EU-SADC EPAs is particularly relevant for 
SADC regions. SADC includes two groups of economies (i.e. SADC LDCs and SADC non-
LDCs); each is eligible for a different preferential trade arrangement. 
Table 7-1 portrays the trade preferential arrangement for which each SADC member 
is eligible, and the simulated trade regime for each SADC region. The eight SADC LDCs 
are represented in the GTAP7 database by six separate regions: Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and ‘Rest of SADC’ (i.e. Angola and D.R. Congo) 
whereas Lesotho is part of ‘Rest of SACU’ region.2 The seven SADC non-LDCs members 
are represented in GTAP7 by four separate regions (i.e. Botswana, Mauritius, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe) and Namibia and Swaziland are part of ‘Rest of SACU’ region.3 
In the case of not signing final EPAs with the EU, the SADC LDCs could continue 
benefiting from the EU-EBA initiative granted to all LDCs. The alternative 
                                                          
2 Due to data restrictions, Lesotho is represented in GTAP7 as part of the ‘Rest of SACU’ region, along 
with Namibia and Swaziland. Thus, this region is modelled as a non-LDC developing region. This, 
however, is not expected to affect the results.  
3 As for the preceding chapter, Seychelles is not included in these scenarios. Seychelles is the only SADC 
member that is not a WTO member and, thereby, is not accorded MFN treatment. 
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arrangement for the SADC non-LDCs is the EU-GSP which entails a deterioration in 
their preferential access to the EU markets granted under the Cotonou Agreement.4 
This per se might mean wider preferential access for the SADC LDCs vis-à-vis the 
SADC non-LDCs. Furthermore, completing the EU-EBA means improving market 
access for SADC LDCs trade without being committed to open their markets to EU 
exports in return.  
Switching to the GSP tariffs also means less preferential margins for SADC non-LDCs 
vis-à-vis other non-ACP developing countries. This is of particular concern for SADC 
non-LDCs exports that are expected to face very high competition in the EU markets 
by Chinese and Indian products. 
This comparative case is interesting, bearing in mind that the results derived from the 
first simulation phase indicate that the main winners from liberalizing trade within 
the EPA framework are mainly the SADC non-LDCs. By removing barriers to trade for 
all SADC members, the SADC LDCs preferential access to the EU markets, granted 
under the EU-EBA initiative, is eroded. SADC LDCs exports face high competition with 
corresponding exports from the SADC non-LDCs in the EU markets. Thus, the 
questions are to what extent this preference erosion for SADC LDCs differs under the 
alternatives to the EU-SADC EPA and how this influences the accrued gains for SADC 
non-LDCs. 
The purpose of this simulation phase is to compare the EU-SADC EPAs with other 
alternative arrangements for SADC-EU trade. In other words, it examines the EU-SADC 
EPAs impacts vis-à-vis impacts generated under other trade arrangements for SADC 
members. Assessing the impacts of these alternatives themselves is, however, beyond 
the focus of this study.  
Not signing final EPAs with SADC members does not necessarily mean that the EU 
negotiations with the other ACP states fail. Therefore, the simulation design is limited 
to the alternatives to the EU-SADC EPAs and does not consider the alternatives to the 
EU EPAs with the other ACP states.5 
                                                          
4 Seychelles’ application to become a GSP+ beneficiary was rejected by the EC since Seychelles does not 
meet some of the required conditions (e.g. labour, human rights and environmental conditions). 
5 Some non-SADC ACP states (e.g. Mongolia, Venezuela and Sri Lanka) are eligible for the EU-GSP+. 
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Table 7-1: Trade Preferential Regime by Region 
Model 
Region 
Country Region Classification 
Trade Preferences 
Preferential 
Regime 
Simulated 
Regime 
BWA Botswana 
Non-LDC Developing 
Region 
GSP GSP 
MDG Madagascar LDC Region EBA EBA 
MWI Malawi LDC Region EBA EBA 
MUS Mauritius 
Non-LDC Developing 
Region 
GSP GSP 
MOZ Mozambique LDC Region EBA EBA 
TZA Tanzania LDC Region EBA EBA 
ZAF South Africa 
Non-LDC Developing 
Region 
TDCA TDCA 
ZMB Zambia LDC Region EBA EBA 
ZWE Zimbabwe 
Non-LDC Developing 
Region 
GSP GSP 
Lesotho 
XSC Non-LDC Developing 
EBA 
GSP Namibia GSP 
Swaziland GSP 
Angola 
XSD LDC Region 
EBA 
EBA Congo, 
D.R. 
EBA 
Seychelles 
Included in 
SSA 
Included in SSA GSP 
Not 
simulated 
Model 
Region 
Country Region Classification 
Weights for Composite 
Regions 
EU 
EU – 27 
members 
Developed Region  
USA 
‘United States 
of America’ 
Developed Region  
EAS ‘East Asia’ 
Developing/Developed 
Region 
23:77 
SAS 
‘Southeast 
and South 
Asia’ 
Developing/Developed 
Region 
90:10 
SSA 
‘Rest of Sub-
Saharan 
Africa’ 
LDC/Developing Region 70:30 
ROW 
‘Rest of the 
World’ 
Developing/Developed 
Region 
51:49 
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The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, this approach ensures comparability of the 
results with those derived from the first phase of simulation that only considers the 
EU-SADC EPAs without reflecting on the EU EPAs with other ACP states. Secondly, this 
simulation design aims to isolate the impact of the EU-SADC trade arrangements from 
the feedback effects generated by the EU trade arrangements with third parties on 
SADC trade.  
Two limitations are valid here. Firstly, the analysis omits the potential effects on SADC 
non-LDC exports to the EU markets driven by completing the EU-EBA arrangements 
for non-SADC LDC exporters. Secondly, it does not consider the potential effects on 
SADC non-LDCs induced by raising the applied tariffs faced by the other ACP non-
LDCs in the EU markets to the GSP tariffs. While the former means that the analysis 
overestimates the SADC non-LDCs preferential access to the EU markets (vis-à-vis 
non-SADC LDCs), the latter implies underestimating their preferential access (vis-à-
vis other ACP non-LDCs) to the EU markets.  
 
 
7.3 Simulation Description 
In line with the objective of this simulation phase, three scenarios are designed, as 
portrayed in Table 7-2. In the case of not signing final EPAs, three alternative 
preferential arrangements will organize SADC-EU trade. These alternatives are the 
EU-EBA (for SADC LDCs), the EU-GSP (for SADC non-LDCs) and the EU-South Africa 
TDCA (for South Africa).  
As the outcome of comparisons between EPAs and its alternatives might be affected 
by other potentially crucial policy changes with respect to SADC-EU trade beyond 
2004, the EU sugar reforms and trade liberalization in addition to a complete Doha 
Round are taken into account in two additional scenarios. Detailed description for 
each of these scenarios is provided in the following sub-sections.  
All scenarios, including the baseline scenarios, assume full SADC-FTA. The SADC-FTA 
is the most likely scenario for intra-SADC integration taking into consideration that 
the complex pattern of trade arrangements lessens the possibility of SADC-CUs. 
212 
 
 
 
7.3.1. Alter: “EBA, GSP and TDCA”  
The first scenario “EBA, GSP and TDCA” represents the alternatives to the two SADC 
groups of economies (LDCs and non-LDCs excluding South Africa) as well as South 
Africa. This scenario is composed of three components (i.e. Alter-SADC_EBA, Alter-
SADC_GSP and Alter-SA_TDCA) each represents a different trade arrangement 
depending on the SADC members involved. The first two components of the scenario 
represent non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements whereas the last one 
simulates reciprocal asymmetric trade liberalization. Therefore, neither groups of 
economies (SADC LDCs and SADC non-LDCs excluding South Africa) has to open its 
markets to the EU exports. In other words, no tariff change is simulated on the SADC 
side under Alter-SADC_EBA and Alter-SADC_GSP. 
 
7.3.1.1 Alter-SADC_EBA  
In the case of completing the SADC-EBA arrangements (Alter-SADC_EBA), the EU 
eliminates tariffs on all imports from the SADC LDCs. The only exception is sugar 
imports that was planned to be multilaterally liberalized in conjunction with other 
reform measures under the EU sugar reforms. 
 
7.3.1.2 Alter-SADC_GSP 
Regarding GSP (Alter-SADC_GSP), the applied tariffs on imports from SADC non-LDCs 
are adapted to the GSP tariff rates. In order to keep quota-tariff equivalents for 
sensitive sectors valid, the EU tariff rates on imports of sugar (from all SADC regions), 
‘meat and dairy products’ (from Botswana and ‘Rest of SACU’) and rice and grains 
(from Mauritius) are kept at their baseline rates. 
 
7.3.1.3 Alter-SA_TDCA 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the TDCA-FTA between the EU and South Africa imposes 
reciprocal asymmetric trade liberalization. South Africa eliminates tariffs on only 86 
percent of imports from the EU whereas the EU eliminates tariffs on 95 percent of 
imports from South Africa. Sensitive sectors include textiles and clothing products and 
motor vehicles for South Africa, and mainly agricultural products for the EU. 
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Table 7-2: Simulation Scenarios 
Scenario 
Title 
Scenario Code 
Scenario Description 
SADC Side EU Side 
Baseline 
scenario:  
EU-SADC 
EPAs 
Full EPA 
Cutting the applied tariff 
rates on imports from 
the EU by all SADC 
regions by 90 percent 
Eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on intra-
SADC trade 
Eliminating all the applied 
tariffs on imports from all 
SADC members 
Simulation 
scenario:  
EBA, GSP and 
TDCA 
Alter 
Alter-
SADC_ EBA 
 
Eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on 
intra-SADC trade 
Eliminating all the applied 
tariffs on imports from 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia 
and ‘Rest of SADC’ 
Keeping tariffs on sugar imports 
at their baseline rates 
Alter-
SADC_ GSP 
 
Eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on 
intra-SADC trade 
Applying the GSP tariff rates on 
imports from Botswana, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest 
of SACU’ 
Keeping tariffs on sugar imports 
at their baseline rates 
Keeping tariffs on ‘meat and 
dairy products’ (from Botswana 
& ‘Rest of SACU’) and rice and 
grains (from Mauritius) at their 
baseline rates 
Alter-
SA_TDCA 
 
Eliminating tariffs on 
85% of South Africa 
imports from the EU, 
i.e. removing tariffs on 
all imports except 
textiles & applying a 
40% tariff cut on 
vehicle imports 
Eliminating all the 
applied tariffs on 
intra-SADC trade 
Eliminating tariffs on 94.7% 
of the EU imports from South 
Africa, i.e. removing tariffs on 
all imports except rice, 
grains, sugar, beverages, 
‘food products’ and ‘meat 
and dairy products’  
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Table 7-2 (cont.) 
Scenario Title Scenario Code 
Scenario Description 
SADC Side EU Side 
Baseline 
scenario:  
EU-SADC EPAs 
with the EU 
Sugar Reforms 
Full EPA_Sug Full EPA 
Full EPA  
Eliminating tariffs on the EU sugar 
imports from all regions  
Eliminating subsidies for the EU sugar 
exports to all regions 
Eliminating the EU sugar domestic 
subsidies 
Simulation 
scenario:  
EBA, GSP and 
TDCA with the 
EU Sugar 
Reforms 
Alter_Sug Alter 
Alter  
Eliminating tariffs on the EU sugar 
imports from all regions  
Eliminating subsidies for the EU sugar 
exports to all regions 
Eliminating the EU sugar domestic 
subsidies 
Baseline 
scenario:  
EU-SADC EPAs 
with the EU 
Sugar Reforms 
and Doha Round 
Full EPA_Sug & 
Doha* 
Full 
EPA_Sug 
Full EPA_Sug 
Doha round tariff cuts and reductions in 
agricultural production subsidies 
Simulation 
scenario:  
EBA, GSP and 
TDCA with the 
EU Sugar 
Reforms and 
Doha Round 
Alter_Sug & 
Doha* 
Alter 
Alter_Sug  
Doha round tariff cuts and reductions in 
agricultural production subsidies 
* Specification of Doha Round is described in detail in Table 7-3 below. 
 
According to this background, this component of the scenario (Alter-SA_TDCA) 
represents asymmetric liberalization between the EU and South Africa and excludes 
sensitive sectors from the simulated tariff removal. For South Africa, textile imports 
from the EU are exempted from trade liberalization whereas vehicle imports are 
partially liberalized, i.e. tariff cut by 40 percent. On the EU side, the sensitive sectors 
are mainly agricultural, i.e. rice, grains, sugar, beverages, ‘food products’ and ‘meat 
and dairy products’. The EU tariffs on these imports from South Africa, which account 
for 5 percent of EU total imports from South Africa, are kept at their baseline rates. 
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The status quo ante (i.e. the initial EU-ACP Cotonou preferences) is no longer legally 
tenable. Therefore, a counterfactual scenario is designed to simulate the stylized “EU-
SADC EPAs” with full SADC-FTA. The inclusion of SADC-FTA ensures consistent 
comparative analysis between the three alternative scenarios and the counterfactual 
scenario.6 
 
7.3.2. Alter_Sug: “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU Sugar Reforms”  
The second scenario “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU Sugar Reforms” represents the 
case in which the previous trade arrangements (EBA, GSP and TDCA) are 
implemented simultaneously with the EU sugar reforms. The results derived by the 
first phase of simulation highlight the importance of the EU sugar market for some 
SADC countries. It is, thus, essential to undertake a thorough examination of the 
incremental impact of applying the EU reforms for sugar industry and trade. Sugar 
trade liberalization is one of the most contentious topics during the EU negotiations 
with ACP countries. Therefore, it is more likely for sugar trade to be liberalized on a 
multilateral, rather than regional, basis.   
As we saw in Chapter 2, the EC initiative for sugar reforms deals with both 
interventions in domestic markets and preferential trade arrangements. Cuts in the 
EU intervention sugar price were scheduled for 2006/07 (20 percent), 2007/08 (27.5 
percent), 2008/09 (35 percent) and 2009/10 (36 percent). These price cuts 
effectively lessen the price wedge between world and domestic prices and, thereby, 
were envisaged to be reflected in reduced export subsidies. In addition, the reforms 
include simplifying the EU system of production quotas as well as improving market 
access for preferential sugar trade. The latter includes reducing import tariffs and 
phasing out TRQs. 
This scenario represents completing the EU sugar trade liberalization and reforms, 
Table 7-2. It simulates full elimination of the EU tariffs on sugar imports from all 
regions. The scenario, therefore, serves to measure the full magnitude of the potential 
preference erosions for SADC in the EU sugar market. Furthermore, subsidies on the 
                                                          
6 The “EU-SADC EPAs” scenario (i.e. Full EPA) is the scenario labelled “All SADC Regions” under “Full 
Intra-SADC Trade Liberalization” simulation set (i.e. Sim22) in Chapter 6. 
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EU sugar exports and domestic production (both factor usage subsidies and output 
subsidies) are fully eliminated. Removing barriers to EU sugar trade and eliminating 
production subsidies implies lessening the wedges between sugar world price and the 
EU domestic price. Due to data restrictions and model limitations, the cuts in the EU 
price intervention are not directly simulated by this scenario and, accordingly, are not 
fully transmitted into changes in domestic price.7 A comprehensive analysis of the EU 
sugar reforms is not the focus of this study.8 
The benchmark scenario for a meaningful comparison is in this case a scenario that 
includes the stylized “EU-SADC EPAs” with full SADC-FTA plus the EU sugar reforms 
as specified above. 
 
7.3.3. Alter_Sug & Doha: “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU Sugar Reforms 
and Doha Round” 
The final scenario “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU Sugar Reforms and Doha Round” 
aims to explore whether a successful completion of the Doha Round would affect the 
comparison between EPA and its alternative. 
Based on the Doha draft modality revisions,9 this scenario accounts for market access 
commitments (regarding agricultural and non-agricultural products), phasing out 
agricultural export subsidies by developed countries and reductions in domestic 
support for agricultural production. The scenario distinguishes between different 
groups of WTO members (e.g. net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs) 
versus non-LDC developing countries) and different groups of products (e.g. products 
not included in the Agreement on Agriculture (NAMA) versus agricultural products) 
as well as other details described in the Doha draft modality revisions.10 
                                                          
7 In their study on the CAP reforms, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2002) employ an endogenous price 
transmission mechanism from the intervention price to the market price within the GTAP model.     
8 A recent Ph.D. thesis on the implications of the EU sugar reforms for poverty reduction in ACP 
countries is undertaken by Facello (2008). 
9 The Doha draft modality revisions are documented in World Trade Organization (2008a) and World 
Trade Organization (2008b). 
10 The scenario does not, however, consider some elements of the Doha Round. These include barriers 
to trade in services, trade facilitation, intellectual property rights and movements of natural resources. 
This entails that the simulation results omit (or underestimate) some of the potential gains from a 
complete Doha Round implementation. 
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It is worth highlighting here that this scenario takes into account the potential erosion 
for SADC non-LDC preferences in the EU markets as simulated by the first scenario; 
Alter. Furthermore, it considers completing the EU sugar liberalization and reforms as 
represented by the second scenario; Alter_Sugar. It also examines the effect of 
potential preference erosion driven by the conclusion of the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations. Reducing the MFN bound tariffs means preference erosion for both 
SADC LDC and non-LDC members. 
 
7.3.3.1 Tariff Cuts 
The planned tariff cuts according to the Doha Round are conducted on the basis of the 
MFN bound rates. This scenario, however, implements the tariff reductions on the 
applied tariff rates. The underlying assumption is that the planned cuts in bound 
tariffs entail proportional cuts in the applied tariff rates. In other words, the ratios of 
bound to applied tariffs (i.e. the ‘binding overhang’ ratios) are kept fixed.11  
Regarding agriculture, a tiered formula is used to cut the applied tariffs on agricultural 
imports by non-LDC developing countries as well as developed countries. This 
formula ensures larger cuts in higher tariffs and vice versa, Table 7-3.  
For NAMA products, which correspond to the manufacturing sectors including fish 
and forestry products as well as fuels and mining products, the following Swiss 
Formula12 for tariff cuts is implemented. 
 
     
    
        
  
          
 
 
where      
  and      
  are the new and old bound tariff rates imposed by region    
on imports    from partner , and   is the agreed ceiling for the tariff rate. 
                                                          
11 The term ‘binding overhang’ is assigned by Francois and Martin (2003). For a CGE-based study on the 
Doha Round and the binding overhangs in the pre-Doha tariff schedules, see Willenbockel (2009). 
12 This non-linear formula for tariff cuts was introduced by Switzerland in the 1973-79 Tokyo Round 
negotiations. It implies an inverse relation between the employed tariff cuts and the initial tariff rates. 
In other words, high tariffs are reduced proportionally more than the reductions in low tariffs. As the 
old tariff rate tends to infinity, the new tariff rate tends to A. As the old tariff rate tends to zero, the new 
tariff rate tends to the old tariff rate, i.e. no tariff cut, since the old tariff rate is barely distorting.      
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In accordance with the Doha draft modality, the coefficient used to measure the cut in 
bound tariffs for non-agricultural imports by developed countries is 8 percent, 
whereas it ranges between three rates (i.e. x = 20, y = 22, z = 25) for developing 
countries. Developing countries are also granted other flexibilities. For example, they 
might choose to keep tariff lines unbound or not to use the Swiss formula for a ceiling 
of non-agricultural tariff lines conditioned that these imports do not exceed a certain 
limit of the total value of the country’s non-agricultural imports. These flexibilities 
cannot, however, be combined with the z coefficient.13 Therefore, the study adopts the 
coefficient z (i.e. 25 percent) for all developing countries assuming that they do not 
benefit from other flexibilities. 
As explained earlier, some aggregated regions used in the model are composites of 
developing and developed countries (i.e. ‘East Asia’, ‘South East and South Asia’ and 
‘Rest of the World’), whereas ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ is a composite of non-LDCs 
and LDCs. Therefore, weights based on the country share in the total GDP (by 
expenditure) for the aggregated region are used to calculate the Doha tariff cuts as 
well as the post-Doha tariff ceiling rate for composite regions. Tables 7-1 and 7-3 
present the measured weights and the simulated tariff cuts and tariff ceiling rates for 
both the agricultural and NAMA imports for non-LDC regions. Tariffs on imports by 
the eight SADC LDCs remain unchanged. 
 
 
                                                          
13 SACU-CU members should altogether choose a common list of these granted flexibilities. During the 
negotiations, special concerns are raised regarding the potential tariff revenue losses for BLNS 
countries, Lesotho in particular. Therefore, they are targeted for aid-for-trade financial compensation. 
For a detailed description, see World Trade Organization (2008a, pp. 1-5). 
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Table 7-3: Trade Measures Simulated in Doha Round Scenario 
Model Region Simulation Description 
1. Tariffs on Agricultural Imports 
Pre-Doha 
Applied Rate 
 
Tariff Cut, % 
SADC 
non-LDCs  
EU & USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
> 130 46.7 70.0 64.6 49.0 14.0 58.1 
> 80 – 130 42.7 70.0 63.7 45.4 12.8 56.1 
> 75 – 80 38.0 70.0 62.6 41.2 11.4 53.7 
> 50 – 75 38.0 64.0 58.0 40.6 11.4 50.7 
> 30 – 50 38.0 57.0 52.6 39.9 11.4 47.3 
> 20 – 30 33.3 57.0 51.5 35.7 10.0 44.9 
≤ 20 33.3 54.0 49.2 35.4 10.0 43.4 
2. Tariffs on Non-Agricultural Imports 
Post-Doha 
Ceiling Bound 
Rate, % 
SADC 
non-LDCs  
EU & USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
25.0 8.0 12.0 23.0 78.0 17.0 
3. Agricultural Export Subsidy 
Export Subsidy 
Cut, % 
SADC 
non-LDCs  
EU & USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 
4. Agricultural Production Subsidy 
Factors & 
Output Subsidy 
Cut, % 
SADC 
non-
LDCs*  
EU & USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
45.0 70.0 64.0 48.0 10.0 50.0 
* Except Botswana and Mauritius which are included in NFIDCs. 
 
7.3.3.2 Reducing Agriculture Domestic Support 
Subsidies on agricultural exports by developed countries are assumed to be fully 
eliminated. In the baseline scenario, subsidies on agricultural exports are granted only 
by EU, ‘United States of America’ and ‘Rest of the World’ regions.14 As seen before, the 
‘Rest of the World’ region encompasses developed and developing countries. In the 
baseline scenario, only three developing countries (i.e. Morocco, Panama and Tunisia) 
                                                          
14 Contradicting the reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU re-introduced export 
subsidies for some dairy products (i.e. butter, cheese and milk powder) in February 2009 aiming to 
enhancing its products competitiveness in the world markets.  
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subsidize agricultural exports. Therefore, agricultural export subsidies are fully 
eliminated for the EU and ‘United States of America’, whereas an 80 percent cut is 
implemented for agricultural export subsidies by ‘Rest of the World’, Table 7-3. 
According to the Doha Round modality for agriculture, domestic production support 
should be reduced using tiered formulas. These tiered formulas of subsidy cuts are 
implemented on both Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support (OTDS) and the final 
bound Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS).15 Along the lines of the Special and 
Differential Treatment (SDT), the cuts in agricultural production subsidies are 
simulated to be less constraining for developing countries. Furthermore, NFIDCs are 
exempted from the reductions in both OTDS and AMS.16  
Subsidies for domestic agricultural production (both factor usage subsidies and 
output subsidies) are cut by 70 percent for developed countries and 45 percent for 
non-LDC developing countries, Table 7-3. As for tariff cuts, weights based on the 
country share in the total GDP (by expenditure) for the aggregated region are used to 
calculate the reductions in agricultural production subsidies for composite non-LDC 
developing/developed regions. Agricultural production subsidies for SADC LDCs as 
well as Botswana and Mauritius are exempted from the planned reductions. 
The benchmark scenario, for a meaningful comparison, is in this case a scenario that 
includes the stylized “EU-SADC EPAs” with full SADC-FTA plus the EU sugar reforms 
and a complete Doha Round as specified above. 
 
 
                                                          
15 The base level for reductions in OTDS includes three components. The first is the final bound AMS. 
Besides, a ratio of the average agricultural production values during the base period (1995-2000) that 
is defined to be 10 percent for developed countries and 20 percent for developing countries. The last 
component is either the average Blue Box payments or 5 percent of the average agricultural production 
values during the base period (1995-2000), whichever is higher. Blue Box payments are specific 
domestic support payments that are excluded from the AMS but are counted for in measuring the 
OTDS. For detailed a description on reducing domestic support in agriculture, see World Trade 
Organization (2008b, pp. 4-13). Bouët et al. (2005, p. 1332) argue that the AMS figures notified to WTO 
do not reflect the actual agricultural subsidy, particularly for the EU. Therefore, the reductions in 
agricultural subsidy imply only reductions in a small fraction of actual agricultural subsidy. 
16 NFIDCs include LDCs as well as some non-LDC developing countries including Botswana, Mauritius 
and Namibia. For a full list of NFIDCs, see World Trade Organization (2005). 
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7.4 Simulation Analyses 
The simulation scenarios represent the alternative preferential arrangements 
between the EU and SADC members in the case of not signing final EPAs. These 
alternatives are the EU-EBA (for SADC LDCs), the EU-GSP (for SADC non-LDCs) and 
the EU-South Africa TDCA (for South Africa). In addition, the EU sugar reforms as well 
as a complete Doha Round are simulated. This section deals with the results derived 
under the three scenarios (i.e. Alter, Alter_Sug and Alter_Sug & Doha) compared to the 
corresponding relevant baseline scenario (i.e. Full EPA, Full EPA_Sug and Full EPA_Sug 
& Doha). All scenarios, including the baseline scenarios, assume full SADC-FTA.17 
The implications of these alternative scenarios for each SADC member depend on 
several factors, among which are the share of exports to the EU market, composition 
of trade and the initial tariff level. Moreover, the magnitude of the tariff cuts and the 
resulting change in SADC preference margins vis-à-vis its preference margins under 
the counterfactual scenarios are among the main determinants of the impacts.  
 
7.4.1. Welfare Impact 
Table 7-4 reports the resulting welfare impact measured by equivalent variation for 
households and changes in real absorption. Welfare results derived under Alter are 
worse for SADC non-LDCs (‘Rest of SACU’, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Botswana) 
compared to the welfare results associated with the Full EPA scenario. These welfare 
losses generally become less pronounced when the EU sugar reforms are included 
(Alter_Sug) and are the lowest under Alter_Sug & Doha. 
To conclude, SADC non-LDCs experience welfare losses under the alternatives to 
EPAs, compared to the Full EPA scenario, particularly without considering the EU 
sugar reforms and the Doha Round. In other words, the Full EPA scenario is the best 
option for Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest of SACU’. Mauritius is, however, 
indifferent between Full EPA and its WTO-compatible alternative scenario should 
both the EU sugar reforms and a complete Doha round come into force. 
                                                          
17 In this section, SADC non-LDCs refer only to four SADC regions (i.e. Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe 
and ‘Rest of SACU’) and do not include South Africa. 
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Compared to the Full EPA baseline scenario, no significant changes in welfare are 
reported for either SADC LDCs or South Africa under the Alter scenario. The generated 
changes in total absorption are negative for Madagascar, Malawi and South Africa. 
Slight positive changes are reported for ‘Rest of SADC’. Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia do not experience any welfare change under the Alter scenario compared to 
Full EPA. Changes in welfare become positive for all SADC LDCs and South Africa 
when the EU sugar reforms are taken into account (Alter_Sug). By including a 
complete Doha Round (Alter_Sug & Doha), the results remain quite similar to those 
generated under Alter_Sug. 
These findings suggest that the Full EPA scenario is a more favourable option 
compared to its WTO-compatible alternative scenarios for Madagascar, Malawi and 
South Africa. Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are indifferent between the Full EPA 
scenario and the WTO-compatible alternative scenario. ‘Rest of SADC’ is better off 
under the WTO-compatible alternative scenario compared to the Full EPA scenario. In 
the case of completing the EU sugar reforms and the Doha round, SADC LDCs and 
South Africa would have reasons to prefer the WTO-compatible alternative scenarios 
to the Full EPA scenario. 
Three points are worth mentioning here. First, the non-reciprocal arrangements for 
SADC (except South Africa) trade with the EU do not necessarily mean more 
favourable trade alternatives compared to the reciprocal EPAs. The “EBA, GSP and 
TDCA” scenario entails, inter alia, maintaining the applied tariffs on SADC (except 
South Africa) imports from the EU. This per se does not lead to a more welfare-
improving equilibrium compared to the “EU-SADC EPAs” scenario except for ‘Rest of 
SADC’. This conclusion is in line with the general finding derived from the first 
simulation phase that reciprocal trade liberalization by SADC, i.e. the SADC tariff 
reductions, generates very small negative welfare impacts. 
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Table 7-4: Welfare Impact 
 
Alter Alter_Sug 
Alter_Sug 
& Doha 
Alter Alter_Sug 
Alter_Sug 
& Doha 
Equivalent Variation  
($USD billion) 
Total Absorption  
(Percentage change) 
BWA -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.9 -1.1 -0.7 
MDG -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
MWI 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.5 0.1 0.1 
MUS -0.14 0.00 0.00 -4.5 -0.1 0.0 
MOZ 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.0 0.1 0.1 
ZAF -0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
TZA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.1 0.1 
ZMB 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.1 0.1 
ZWE -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -5.5 -0.5 -0.2 
XSC -0.32 -0.08 -0.05 -7.3 -1.7 -1.1 
XSD -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.2 0.1 0.1 
 
Second, taking the EU sugar reforms into consideration has significant implications for 
the assessment of the EU-SADC EPAs. The generated welfare impacts for all SADC 
members show significant changes in magnitude and, more importantly, in direction 
under “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU Sugar Reforms” in comparison to those 
generated under “EBA, GSP and TDCA”.  
Third, a complete Doha Round multilateral trade liberalization does not alter the EPAs 
welfare implications for individual SADC members. The observed deviations of 
welfare effects generated under “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU Sugar Reforms and 
Doha Round”, from the corresponding baseline scenario, are virtually the same as for 
welfare deviations between “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU Sugar Reforms” and the 
underlying baseline scenario. 
 
7.4.2. Terms of Trade Impact  
Changes in terms of trade under the Alter scenario, for example, represent 
proportional changes in relative price of exports to imports under each scenario 
compared to relative price of exports to imports under the Full EPA scenario where 
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the latter is initialized to one.18 For example, 0.5 percent for ‘Rest of SADC’ under Alter 
(Table 7-5) means that relative price of exports to imports under Alter is higher than 
the level of terms of trade that would prevail if the Full EPA scenario took place. 
SADC non-LDCs (‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Botswana) experience 
deteriorations in their terms of trade with depreciation of their real exchange rates 
under Alter compared to the Full EPA scenario, Table 7-5. These adverse effects are 
outstandingly smaller under the Alter_Sug and the Alter_Sug & Doha scenarios. This is 
particularly the case for ‘Rest of SACU’ and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, these losses turn 
into terms of trade gains for Mauritius under both the Alter_Sug and the Alter_Sug & 
Doha scenarios.  
These figures support the same finding that Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest 
of SACU’ are better off under the Full EPA scenario compared to the WTO-compatible 
alternative scenario particularly without completing the EU sugar reforms and the 
Doha Round.  
Among SADC LDCs, ‘Rest of SADC’ only experiences slightly more favourable changes 
in its terms of trade and real exchange rates under Alter, as well as Alter_Sug and 
Alter_Sug & Doha, compared to the corresponding changes under the baseline 
scenarios. Therefore, ‘Rest of SADC’ has reasons, albeit not strong, to opt out of the 
EU-SADC EPAs in favour of its WTO-compatible alternative scenario. Malawi 
experiences terms of trade losses with strong depreciation of its real exchange rate 
under the Alter scenario. From this perspective, the EU-SADC EPAs might be its best 
option particularly without completing the EU sugar reforms and the Doha round. For 
all other SADC non-LDCs (Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) as well as 
South Africa, results show adverse, albeit moderate, changes in terms of trade and real 
exchange rate, under Alter compared to the baseline scenario. Changes in the 
direction of these experienced effects are reported for the five regions under the 
Alter_Sug and the Alter_Sug & Doha scenarios. 
 
                                                          
18 Laspeyres price index is used in computing terms of trade, as described earlier in Chapter 5. 
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Table 7-5: Terms of Trade Impact 
 (Percentage change) 
 
Alter Alter_Sug 
Alter_Sug 
& Doha 
Alter Alter_Sug 
Alter_Sug 
& Doha 
Terms of Trade Real Exchange Rate 
BWA -2.5 -2.9 -1.5 2.2 1.9 1.3 
MDG -0.7 0.3 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
MWI -2.7 0.3 0.3 4.8 -0.3 -0.3 
MUS -5.7 0.8 0.3 5.0 -1.7 -0.9 
MOZ 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.8 -0.1 -0.2 
ZAF -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
TZA -0.1 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.8 
ZMB -0.4 0.3 0.3 1.2 -0.2 -0.3 
ZWE -9.8 -0.5 -0.3 9.5 0.0 0.0 
XSC -16.0 -3.6 -1.5 16.5 2.0 1.5 
XSD 0.5 0.3 0.3 -1.6 -1.9 -2.0 
   
7.4.3. Trade Impacts 
7.4.3.1 Total Trade 
Figure 7-1 presents changes in SADC total trade under Alter, Alter_Sug and Alter_Sug 
& Doha measured as deviations from the corresponding baseline levels. These real 
changes are calculated based on trade figures valued at the world prices prevailed 
under the baseline scenarios. 
Results suggest proportionally less trade for SADC non-LDCs as well as Malawi under 
Alter compared to the corresponding levels under the “EU-SADC EPAs” scenario, Table 
A7-1. These difference gaps become less pronounced after considering the EU sugar 
reforms (Alter_Sug) and are the lowest under Alter_Sug & Doha.  
Results for SADC LDCs, except Malawi, as well as South Africa show very small 
differences compared to the trade levels generated under the Full EPA scenario. 
Percentage changes in trade volumes compared to their Full EPA levels are less than 5 
percent for Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, ‘Rest of SADC’ and South 
Africa. The EU sugar reforms as well as the Doha Round do not alter these trade 
results. Furthermore, Malawian trade under the baseline scenarios remains 
unchanged under the WTO-compatible alternative scenario should the EU sugar 
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reforms and the Doha round are completed. 
 
Figure 7-1: Changes in SADC Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
7.4.3.2 Trade with the EU 
SADC imports from the EU are considerably less under the Alter scenario compared to 
the Full EPA scenario, Table A7-1. This is particularly the case for SADC non-LDCs as 
well as Malawi.  
These differences in imports from the EU compared to Full EPA are explained by two 
factors. Firstly, under Alter, SADC regions do not reciprocate in the sense that no tariff 
cuts are applied on their imports from the EU, except for imports by South Africa. 
Accordingly, SADC imports from the EU are lower than the corresponding levels 
generated under the reciprocal trade arrangement that is simulated by the Full EPA 
scenario. Secondly, part of the increments in SADC imports from the EU under Full 
EPA is driven by the generated patterns of structural change. As we saw in Chapter 6, 
production structures in ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi become 
more concentrated in export-oriented sectors after the EU tariff removal and, 
consequently, their imports from the EU rise.19 Under the WTO-compatible alternative 
                                                          
19 This is explained in detail in Chapter 6 by decomposing the Sim21 scenario, which is almost the same 
as the Full EPA scenario, into two components; Sim21-SADC and Sim21-EU. The latter yields noticeable 
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scenarios, the generated patterns of structural change are different than the Full EPA 
scenario, particularly for SADC non-LDCs.20 With the generated changes in the 
production structures, imports by these regions from the EU are lower under Alter 
compared to Full EPA. Results for ‘Rest of SACU’, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Malawi 
alter considerably under Alter_Sug and Alter_Sug & Doha.  
 
Figure 7-2: Changes in SADC-EU Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
 
 
On the export side, sharp differences are recorded for SADC non-LDCs as well as 
Malawi.21 Under Alter, ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius export only 35, 54 and 
78 percent, respectively, of the volumes that they would export to the EU if Full EPA 
took place. In the case of not signing final EPAs with the EU, SADC non-LDCs exports 
face the GSP tariffs in the EU markets. This entails less preference margins (GSP tariffs 
vis-à-vis MFN tariffs) compared to their preference margins under Full EPA. Not 
surprisingly, after considering the EU sugar reforms, Alter_Sug, the reported 
differences in exports to the EU, compared to the baseline levels, are considerably less 
for ‘Rest of SACU’ and Mauritius and virtually vanish for Zimbabwe and Malawi. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
increases in these regions imports from the EU. For a detailed discussion, see Sub-sections 6.4.1.3.2 and 
6.4.2.2. 
20 This type of changes in the SADC output and trade structures will be dealt with later in detail. 
21 Although SADC exports to the EU generally expand under the alternative scenarios (measured as 
percentage changes compared to the original GTAP benchmark) these increments are considerably less 
than the corresponding export expansions generated by the Full EPA scenario. 
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Nevertheless, these negative differences indicate that this scenario provides less 
preferential access for SADC non-LDCs in the EU markets compared to the Full 
EPA_Sug scenario. Results are quite similar after considering a complete Doha Round, 
Alter_Sug & Doha. 
 
7.4.3.3 Trade with Third Parties 
Results on SADC trade with third parties (Figure 7-3 and Table A7-2) show strong 
differences for SADC non-LDCs and Malawi under Alter versus the trade levels 
prevailing under Full EPA. Generally, ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi 
import less and export more with third parties under Alter compared to Full EPA. As 
we saw in Chapter 6, the increments in these regions imports from third parties under 
Full EPA are mainly driven by improvements in their terms of trade associated with 
the EU tariff removal. The Alter scenario implies less favourable terms of trade effects 
for these regions and, consequently, less imports from third parties compared to Full 
EPA. Furthermore, the EU tariff removal also leads to drops in their exports to third 
parties since they export more to the EU under Full EPA.22 This explains the 
experienced increments in their exports to third parties under Alter compared to the 
export levels prevailed under the Full EPA scenario. 
Both the direction and the magnitude of these experienced trade effects change under 
Alter_Sug. Generally, SADC imports and exports more with third parties under 
Alter_Sug compared to the underlying baseline scenario, Full EPA_Sug. These trade 
gaps are moderate. The Alter_Sug & Doha scenario does not alter the experienced 
trade effects. 
 
                                                          
22 This type of effect is explained in detail in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 7-3: Changes in SADC Trade with Third Parties (Valued at baseline world 
prices, %) 
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7.4.3.4 Intra-SADC Trade 
An important difference between the EU-SADC EPAs and the WTO-compatible 
alternative scenarios is related to the intra-SADC integration process. Results suggest 
that Alter has more favourable impacts on intra-SADC trade compared to the Full EPA 
scenario. As shown in Figure 7-4, for most of the cases, trade levels among SADC 
regions are higher than the corresponding levels under Full EPA. Some trade 
differences become considerably less under Alter_Sug and Alter_Sug & Doha, but 
remain positive.     
In summary, the WTO-compatible alternative scenarios generally boost trade among 
SADC members compared to trade levels under the “EU-SADC EPAs” scenario. These 
positive trade effects are less pronounced should the EU sugar reforms come into 
force. Nevertheless, intra-SADC trade levels under “EBA, GSP and TDCA with the EU 
Sugar Reforms” are higher than those might prevail under “EU-SADC EPAs with the EU 
Sugar Reforms”.        
 
Figure 7-4: Changes in Intra-SADC Trade (Valued at baseline world prices, %) 
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7.4.4. Structural Change 
In order to gain more detailed insights of the impacts generated under the 
alternatives to the EU-SADC EPAs, this sub-section examines how the sectoral impacts 
derived by the Full EPA scenario differ under the WTO-compatible alternative 
scenarios. These sectoral analyses are undertaken for two crucial variables for the 
purposes of this study; volume changes in sectoral output and volume changes in 
sectoral exports to the EU. 
For both variables, the sectoral levels prevailing under Full EPA, as well as the 
generated deviations from these levels as a result of adopting the Alter scenario, are 
depicted in Figures 7-5 and 7-6. In each figure, the left vertical axis measures the 
variable level under the Full EPA scenario; real sectoral output and sectoral export 
volume to the EU. According to the simulation design, variable volumes and values 
under this baseline scenario are identical. Therefore, column bars present variable 
levels (measured in billion US$ - 2004) under Full EPA. The right vertical axis 
measures the generated differences (percentage changes) in the variable level under 
the Alter scenario as deviations from the Full EPA level. The × marker displays the 
difference gaps in percentage changes. 
 
7.4.4.1 Sectoral Output 
Figure 7-5 shows percentage changes in real sectoral output under Alter versus the 
generated sectoral output level under Full EPA. Percentage changes in sectoral output 
under the three scenarios (Alter, Alter_Sug and Alter_Sug & Doha) compared to the 
baseline scenarios are reported in Tables A7-3, A7-4 and A7-5, respectively.  
For SADC non-LDCs, significant differences in the output structure generated under 
Alter compared to Full EPA are recorded for the sugar sector, Table A7-3. Sugar 
output levels in ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius under Alter are less than the 
prevailing levels under Full EPA by 90, 86 and 58 percent, respectively. ‘Meat and 
dairy products’ also shrinks by 55 and 36 percent in the case of ‘Rest of SACU’ and 
Zimbabwe, respectively. Other sectors expand considerably under Alter compared to 
the prevailing levels under Full EPA. Output levels for ‘other crops’ and rice (for 
Mauritius) and textiles and ‘plant fibres’ (for ‘Rest of SACU’) are more than doubled 
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under Alter compared to Full EPA. Changes in the output structure for South Africa 
are generally moderate under the Alter scenario compared to Full EPA.  
Under Alter_Sug and Alter_Sug & Doha, changes in output structures are generally 
moderate with exceptions of the experienced shrinkages of ‘meat and dairy products’ 
for ‘Rest of SACU’ and Botswana, Tables A7-4 and A7-5. 
Generally speaking, the pattern of structural change that occurs under Alter in SADC 
LDCs does not deviate from that prevails under Full EPA. Sugar output levels in 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia under Alter are virtually half the prevailing levels 
under Full EPA. No significant changes in output structures under Alter_Sug and 
Alter_Sug & Doha compared to the baseline scenarios are reported for SADC LDCs. 
 
Figure 7-5: Real Output by Sector (Level in billion US$ 2004 and percentage change) 
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Figure 7-5 (cont.) (Level in billion US$ 2004 and percentage change) 
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Figure 7-5 (cont.) (Level in billion US$ 2004 and percentage change) 
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Figure 7-5 (cont.) (Level in billion US$ 2004 and percentage change) 
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7.4.4.2 Sectoral Exports to the EU     
Figure 7-6 shows percentage changes in real sectoral exports to the EU under Alter 
versus the generated levels under Full EPA. Tables A7-6, A7-7 and A7-8 present 
percentage changes in exports to the EU by sector under the three scenarios as 
deviations from the corresponding export levels under the corresponding baseline 
scenarios. 
The previous changes in the output structure for SADC regions under Alter versus Full 
EPA are reflected in corresponding changes in their sectoral exports to the EU. As 
shown in Figure 7-6, sugar exports to the EU are far less for SADC non-LDCs under 
Alter versus their sugar export levels under Full EPA. Sugar exports are less than the 
prevailing levels under Full EPA by more than 90 percent, for ‘Rest of SACU’ and 
Zimbabwe, and by more than 50 percent for Mauritius and South Africa. ‘Meat and 
dairy products’ exports by SADC non-LDCs are less than the corresponding export 
levels under Full EPA by 50 to 87 percent.   
Table A7-9 shows the generated changes in SADC shares in the EU markets under 
Alter compared to their market shares under Full EPA. In the case of not signing final 
EPAs and applying the GSP tariffs on the EU imports from SADC non-LDCs, ‘Rest of 
SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius lose 41, 10 and 7 percentage points of shares in the 
EU sugar market compared to their market shares under Full EPA.  
Results change significantly by considering the EU sugar reforms. Under Alter_Sug, 
sugar exports by SADC non-LDCs to the EU are slightly higher than their sugar exports 
to the EU under Full EPA_Sug.  
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Figure 7-6: Export Volume to the EU by Commodity (Level in billion US$ 2004 and 
percentage change) 
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Figure 7-6 (cont.) (Level in billion US$ 2004 and percentage change) 
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Figure 7-6 (cont.) (Level in billion US$ 2004 and percentage change) 
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Figure 7-6 (cont.) (Level in billion US$ 2004 and percentage change) 
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EPA. It is worth recalling here that these higher tariff revenues, compared to Full EPA, 
are levied on less import levels generated by Alter, as we saw in Sub-section 7.4.4.1.   
 
Table 7-6: Fiscal Revenue by Source (Percentage change, nominal) 
 
Import Tariffs Export Taxes Sales Taxes Taxes on Output  Taxes on Factor Use 
Alter 
BWA 59.0     -21.7 -0.9 
MDG 72.9     -0.4 -0.6 
MWI 23.3   -1.2 14.9 -2.3 
MUS 67.9 99.7 -2.9 0.7 -6.3 
MOZ 30.9   -0.1 1.0 -0.1 
ZAF 24.1 2.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
TZA 26.9   0.1 -0.5 -0.4 
ZMB 27.3   0.1 1.4 -0.1 
ZWE 26.8     -6.2 -5.1 
XSC 5.2 117.3 -6.6 4.5 -5.0 
XSD 88.1   0.4 0.4 -1.2 
 Alter_Sug 
BWA 62.0     -20.5 -1.2 
MDG 74.3     -0.3 -0.3 
MWI 28.7   0.1 -0.8 -0.3 
MUS 69.4 23.1 -0.5 -9.2 -2.8 
MOZ 34.7   0.0 -0.3 -0.2 
ZAF 26.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
TZA 28.5   0.2 -0.5 -0.2 
ZMB 29.5   0.0 0.1 -0.1 
ZWE 34.7     -0.9 -1.0 
XSC 8.2 9.4 -2.2 0.8 -1.4 
XSD 90.5   0.4 0.6 -1.4 
 Alter_Sug & Doha 
BWA 52.9     -13.4 -0.7 
MDG 74.8     -0.3 -0.3 
MWI 28.6   0.1 -0.9 -0.3 
MUS 57.9 19.5 -0.3 -5.7 -1.6 
MOZ 34.9   0.0 -0.4 -0.2 
ZAF 22.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
TZA 28.6   0.2 -0.5 -0.2 
ZMB 29.6   0.0 0.0 -0.1 
ZWE 30.1     -0.5 -0.5 
XSC 10.2 6.0 -1.4 0.7 -0.8 
XSD 90.5   0.4 0.6 -1.4 
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7.5 Preferable Trade Arrangement 
This section helps to rank SADC members’ preferences toward the EPA and the non-
EPA scenarios, under different trade regimes, according to the simulated welfare 
impacts. 
Table 7-7 shows that the Full EPA scenario is preferable compared with the WTO-
compatible alternative scenarios for SADC non-LDCs (excluding South Africa). Under 
Full EPA, Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest of SACU’ are better off in terms of 
the generated changes in total absorption. Only Mauritius is indifferent between EPA 
and non-EPA if the EU sugar reforms and the Doha Round are completed.  
South Africa prefers Full EPA to non-EPA, but is indifferent between EPA and non-EPA 
should the EU sugar reforms and the Doha Round come into force.  
 
Table 7-7: Preferable Scenario for SADC Regions 
 
WTO-Compatible  
Alternatives 
With the EU Sugar 
Reforms 
With the EU Sugar 
Reforms & Doha Round 
BWA EPA EPA EPA 
MDG EPA Non-EPA Non-EPA 
MWI EPA Non-EPA Non-EPA 
MUS EPA EPA Indifferent 
MOZ Indifferent Non-EPA Non-EPA 
ZAF EPA Indifferent Indifferent 
TZA Indifferent Non-EPA Non-EPA 
ZMB Indifferent Non-EPA Non-EPA 
ZWE EPA EPA EPA 
XSC EPA EPA EPA 
XSD Non- EPA Non- EPA Non- EPA 
 
Three conclusions can be drawn for SADC LDCs. For two regions (Madagascar and 
Malawi), Full EPA is preferable compared with the non-EPA scenario, however, they 
opt for non-EPA if the EU sugar reforms are completed. Other regions (Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia) are indifferent between EPA and non-EPA, however, they 
prefer non-EPA if the EU sugar reforms come into force. For ‘Rest of SADC’, non-EPA is 
preferable to Full EPA under all scenarios. In summary, SADC LDCs have reasons to 
opt out the EU-SADC EPAs and prefer other alternatives. 
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These results are in line with Perez (2006). As aforementioned, the study calibrates 
the CGE GTAP model to a global SAM derived from the GTAP6 database. The author 
finds that the EU-EPA is the best option for the SADC region. According to the 
aggregation scheme employed by the study, the SADC region is mainly composed of 
the SADC non-LDCs. The study findings suggest that the other SADC LDCs are better 
off under the EBA/GSP scenario.   
 
 
7.6 Patterns of Gains and Losses 
This section aims at drawing an overall picture of which regions gain and which 
regions lose under the three scenarios, i.e. Alter, Alter_Sug and Alter_Sug & Doha. 
Percentage changes in total absorption are used to indicate the welfare gains/losses 
under each scenario. To highlight the strong association between welfare and terms-
of-trade effects, Figure 7-7 plots both against each other. The regions that accrue 
welfare and terms of trade gains appear in the first quadrant while the regions that 
experience welfare and terms of trade losses are located in the third quadrant. To give 
an idea about the relative size of the regions that gain and those which lose, different 
weights are given to each SADC region based on the region’s contribution to the SADC 
total GDP. These weights are reflected in the size of the bubbles.   
As can be seen in the first panel of Figure 7-7, Zimbabwe, ‘Rest of SAC’, Mauritius and 
Botswana only are the main losers under the non-EPA scenarios in terms of welfare 
and terms of trade impacts. All other SADC members experience very slight benefits 
under the non-EPA scenarios, particularly if the EU sugar reforms and the Doha 
Round are completed.   
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Figure 7-7: Gains and Losses Patterns 
 
 
BWA 
MDG 
MWI 
MUS 
MOZ 
ZAF TZA ZMB 
ZWE 
XSC 
XSD 
-20.0 
-15.0 
-10.0 
-5.0 
0.0 
5.0 
-10.0 -8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 
Alter Welfare 
TOT  
BWA 
MDG 
MWI 
MUS MOZ 
ZAF 
TZA 
ZMB 
ZWE 
XSC 
XSD 
-5.0 
-4.0 
-3.0 
-2.0 
-1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 
 Alter_Sug                   Welfare 
TOT  
BWA 
MDG 
MWI MUS 
MOZ 
ZAF 
TZA 
ZMB 
ZWE 
XSC 
XSD 
-2.0 
-1.5 
-1.0 
-0.5 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
-1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 
Alter_Sug & Doha 
TOT  
Welfare 
245 
 
 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
Welfare figures associated with the WTO-compatible alternative scenarios are worse 
for SADC non-LDCs than welfare results derived under the EU-SADC EPAs scenario. 
The WTO-compatible alternative scenarios are less advantageous, for SADC non-LDCs, 
than the EU-SADC EPAs scenario in terms of the preferential access to the EU markets. 
For SADC LDCs, however, welfare findings are roughly the same under the EU-EPAs 
scenario and its WTO-compatible alternative options.  
The EU sugar reforms are an important determinant for an impact analysis of the EU-
SADC EPAs. A complete Doha Round, however, does not have strong implications for 
the EU-SADC EPA assessment. 
The WTO-compatible alternative scenarios are generally more favourable from the 
SADC integration perspective. For most of the cases, Intra-SADC trade levels are 
higher under each of the three scenarios compared to the corresponding levels 
generated under the underlying baseline scenarios.   
  
8 Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has employed the comparative static multi-region, multi-sector CGE 
GLOBE model as a tool for conducting various simulation scenarios in order to 
examine the effects of the envisaged EU-SADC EPAs on individual SADC economies. 
The modelling work utilizes the most recent GTAP database (version 7) from which a 
global SAM for 2004 is extracted. The modelling framework for this thesis covers not 
only SADC members and their EU trade partners but also SADC’s main non-EU trade 
partners.   
This chapter summarizes the main findings (Section 8.2), concludes with some policy 
implications (Section 8.3) and outlines the limitations of the thesis and areas of future 
research work, Section 8.4. 
 
 
8.2 Insights from the Simulation Scenarios  
The core quantitative assessment consists of two simulation phases: the first phase 
quantifies the potential impacts of the envisaged EPA liberalisation scenarios in 
comparison to the 2004 benchmark equilibrium. This first phase simulates two main 
EU-SADC EPA scenarios: the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario (which is confined to 
Botswana, South Africa, ‘Rest of SACU’ and Mozambique) and “All SADC Regions” that 
covers all SADC members. These scenarios intend to throw light on the question how 
the EPAs compare to the status quo ante prior to the expiry of the WTO waiver for the 
Cotonou preferences. The second simulation phase takes into account that a return to 
the status quo ante is actually not a politically feasible option at this point in time and 
compares the EU-SADC EPAs with the WTO-compatible alternative options that reflect 
other possible ways for individual SADC members to liberalise their trade with the EU 
in the case of not reaching agreement on final EU-SADC EPAs. The simulation results 
are meant to address the research questions posed in the introductory chapter. 
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8.2.1. Who Gains and Who Loses from the EU-SADC EPAs?  
Under the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario, ‘Rest of SACU’ is the main winner. This 
scenario generates moderate welfare gains for Botswana and South Africa and welfare 
losses for Mozambique. The other SADC regions not directly involved in this 
liberalization scenario lose and the biggest welfare loss is reported for Mauritius.  
“All SADC Regions” is welfare-improving for many SADC regions: ‘Rest of SACU’, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius, and, to a lesser extent, Botswana, Malawi and Madagascar. For 
‘Rest of SACU’, this scenario is less advantageous compared to the “SADC-EPA Group” 
scenario. Malawi, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are noticeably better off under this 
comprehensive scenario compared to the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario.  
 
8.2.2. What are the Main Determinants for the Outcomes of the EU-SADC 
EPAs? 
The analysis suggests outstanding welfare gains for the ‘Rest of SACU’ region under 
both scenarios. Liberalizing trade with the EU yields strong favourable changes in its 
terms of trade and real exchange rate and, accordingly, big welfare gains. These gains 
are primarily driven by the preferential access to the EU sugar, as well ‘meat and dairy 
products’, markets where ‘Rest of SACU’ accrues extra shares.     
Under both scenarios, Botswana and South Africa experience moderate welfare gains. 
Botswana gains are explained by the favourable, albeit small, changes in its terms of 
trade and appreciations of its real exchange rate. In contrast, the South African 
welfare gains are associated with terms of trade losses.  
Under the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario, the biggest welfare loss is reported for 
Mauritius. These losses are attributable to a strong deterioration in its terms of trade 
and real depreciation. The “SADC-EPA Group” scenario entails less preferential access 
for Mauritius vis-à-vis the SADC-EPA group in the EU sugar markets. The results 
demonstrate that ‘Rest of SACU’ under this liberalization scenario threatens the 
Mauritian trade position as the main sugar supplier to the EU markets. It is, therefore, 
important for Mauritius to collectively negotiate on EPAs with its SADC partners. 
Mauritius has strong reasons to prefer the comprehensive “All SADC Regions” 
scenario to the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario.   
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The overarching result is that SADC preferential access to the EU markets is the key 
source for the reported welfare and terms of trade gains under both EPA scenarios. 
Reducing tariffs on SADC imports from the EU yields small negative welfare impact on 
SADC regions. Whenever the former favourable effects offset the latter adverse effects, 
regions experience welfare gains. That is in particular the case for ‘Rest of SACU’, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Malawi and Botswana. 
 
8.2.3. Will Liberalizing Intra-SADC Trade Affect the Potential Impacts? 
The “SADC-EPA Group” scenario is disadvantageous to Mozambique unless barriers to 
its intra-SADC trade are removed simultaneously. Mozambique experiences welfare 
losses by liberalizing its trade within the SADC-EPA group. The EU tariff cuts on 
imports from the SADC-EPA grouping members generate improvements in terms of 
trade for ‘Rest of SACU’, Botswana and South Africa vis-à-vis Mozambique. Removing 
the high trade barriers to Mozambique trade within the SADC region boosts world 
prices of Mozambique exports and, thereby, protects its terms of trade from 
deteriorating when the EU eliminates tariffs on imports from the SADC-EPA group. In 
addition, intra-SADC trade liberalization generates significant increases for 
Mozambique trade within the SADC region. Consequently, Mozambique accrues 
welfare gains by liberalizing intra-SADC trade simultaneously with the SADC-EPA 
group trade with the EU.1  
 
8.2.4. Do the EU-SADC EPAs Help SADC to Effectively Integrate into the 
World Economy?    
The EU-SADC regional integration does not serve as a stumbling block towards more 
integration for SADC members into the world markets. By liberalizing trade with the 
SADC-EPA group, ‘Rest of SACU’ experiences significant changes in total trade. 
Furthermore, under the comprehensive scenario, total trade changes for ‘Rest of 
SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi.  
                                                          
1 Further insights are also provided in the course of the following three research questions.  
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Under “All SADC Regions”, the inclusion of intra-SADC trade liberalization yields trade 
expansions in regions which would not have experienced any changes in trade under 
EU-SADC trade liberalization in isolation, i.e. Mozambique and Zambia. Furthermore, 
trade figures expand proportionally higher for Malawi and Zimbabwe. The same 
expansions in these regions’ trade are reported when intra-SADC trade liberalization 
is simultaneously simulated with the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario as well.   
 
8.2.5. Do the EU-SADC EPAs Offer Export Opportunities for SADC 
Products in the EU Markets? 
Reciprocal trade liberalization with the EU neither stimulates exports nor provides 
export opportunities in the EU markets for most SADC members. The “SADC-EPA 
Group” scenario yields export expansions only for ‘Rest of SACU’. Under the 
comprehensive scenario, export expansions occur only in Malawi and ‘Rest of SACU’ 
and these expansions are driven by the EU tariff removal. Opening SADC markets to 
the EU products boosts SADC imports from the EU whereas the EU tariff removal 
stimulates exports to the EU by only ‘Rest of SACU’, under the “SADC-EPA Group” 
scenario, and by a few regions (i.e. ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and, to a lesser 
extent, Mauritius and Zambia) under the comprehensive scenario.   
Results are suggestive of some, albeit small, export opportunities for SADC regions in 
the EU markets by liberalizing intra-SADC trade simultaneously with the “SADC-EPA 
Group” scenario. This is the case for Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 
contrast, the inclusion of intra-SADC liberalization with the comprehensive scenario 
does not show any substantive difference in the experienced effects on SADC exports 
to the EU.  
 
8.2.6. How Do the EU-SADC EPAs Affect SADC Trade with Third Parties 
and with Other SADC Partners? 
SADC regional integration is negatively affected by the envisaged EU-SADC EPAs. 
Reciprocal trade liberalization with the EU undermines the existing weak intra-SADC 
trade relations. Results demonstrate that part of ‘Rest of SACU’ pre-simulation exports 
to both third parties and its SADC partners is redirected to the EU markets under the 
250 
 
 
 
“SADC-EPA Group” scenario. Furthermore, part of the pre-simulation exports by ‘Rest 
of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi to their third parties and to their SADC 
partners is redirected to the EU markets under the comprehensive scenario.  
Intra-SADC trade liberalization does not prevent this trade redirection from SADC 
markets towards the EU markets. This is the case under both scenarios for ‘Rest of 
SACU’, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. As aforementioned, Mozambique only experiences 
significant increases in its intra-SADC trade when intra-SADC liberalization is 
simultaneously simulated with the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario. Malawi exports to its 
SADC partners experience slight increases when intra-SADC liberalization is 
simultaneously simulated with the “All SADC Regions” scenario. 
 
8.2.7. What Type of Structural Change Might SADC Experience under the 
EU-SADC EPA Scenarios? 
Liberalizing ‘Rest of SACU’ trade with the EU under the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario 
enhances its specialization in a few agricultural and agro-processing activities at the 
expense of all the manufacturing and mining sectors. The expanded activities are 
sugar, ‘meat and dairy products’ and, to a lesser extent, vegetables and livestock. The 
reported contractions in manufactures do not necessarily mean de-industrialization. 
In addition to the structural change examination, dynamic comparative advantage for 
the manufacturing sectors should be diagnosed before conclusions on de-
industrialization are drawn.  
Opening the EU markets to SADC products under a comprehensive EPA scenario (“All 
SADC Regions”) generates considerable changes in output structures for many SADC 
countries. The highest changes are in ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi 
where resources are reallocated into sugar activity. ‘Meat and dairy products’ also 
attracts some resources in Botswana and ‘Rest of SACU’.  
These expanded sectors draw resources from higher value added-activities; among 
which are textiles and all the other manufactures. This finding is of a great interest for 
Mauritius, where textiles is an export-oriented sector comprising the bulk of 
Mauritius total exports and of its exports to the EU.  
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It is noteworthy that these potential expansions in sugar output would virtually 
vanish (‘Rest of SACU’ and Zimbabwe) or halved (Mauritius and Malawi) if a final EPA 
is not reached and the WTO-compatible alternatives take place without completing 
the EU sugar reforms and trade liberalization.   
 
8.2.8. How Significant are Potential Adjustment and Fiscal Costs for the 
SADC Members Likely to Be? 
The welfare gains accrued by ‘Rest of SACU’ under the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario are 
associated with significant changes in its production and trade structures. This 
structural change requires reallocating one quarter of the used land across different 
activities. Capital and unskilled labour also experience high degrees of structural 
adjustment. ‘Rest of SACU’, however, does not experience fiscal losses. This is because 
its markets are already relatively less protective towards imports from the EU.  
Important portions of the utilized land in Botswana and Mauritius are required to be 
reallocated across activities for these two economies to achieve the new equilibrium 
point after launching the “SADC-EPA Group” scenario. Besides, Botswana, 
Mozambique and South Africa incur strong tariff losses. Fiscal losses for Mozambique 
are far worse under the intra-SADC liberalization scenario.  
The comprehensive “All SADC Regions” scenario entails high degree of structural 
adjustment in many SADC regions. This is particularly the case for the regions which 
accrue welfare gains, ‘Rest of SACU’, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Botswana. Structural 
adjustment is mainly driven by the generated changes in output structure after 
simulating the EU tariff removal. Furthermore, most of the SADC regions experience 
substantial fiscal losses. 
 
8.2.9. Do the EU-SADC EPAs Help SADC members to Diversify their Export 
Structures? 
The “SADC-EPA Group” scenario generates expansions in ‘Rest of SACU’ sugar exports. 
These expansions are mainly directed to the EU markets. ‘Rest of SACU’ sugar exports 
to third countries rise in percentage terms. However, their shares in ‘Rest of SACU’ 
sugar exports drop. In contrast, the EU share in ‘Rest of SACU’ sugar exports rises.  
252 
 
 
 
As anticipated by the conducted descriptive analyses of SADC economies, the 
similarity in SADC export bundles to the EU entails increasing competition among 
SADC exporters in the EU markets as a result of the EU-SADC EPAs. Indeed, simulation 
results demonstrate that these accrued shares for ‘Rest of SACU’ in the EU sugar 
markets are at the expense of other SADC members’ shares, Mauritius in particular.  
The comprehensive “All SADC Regions” scenario induces expansions in sugar exports 
by all SADC members. Other exports also expand, i.e. ‘meat and dairy products’ (by 
‘Rest of SACU’, Botswana and South Africa) and rice (by Madagascar, Malawi and 
South Africa). These export expansions are directed mainly to the EU sugar markets. 
Many SADC members gain extra share in the EU sugar markets.  
The point to highlight here is that almost all other SADC commodity exports 
experience drops. This finding is suggestive of more concentration of the already 
undiversified SADC export structures as a result of the EU-SADC EPAs.  
 
8.2.10. Is a Complete Breakdown of the EPA Negotiations a Preferable 
Option for any of the SADC Members? 
Simulation results show that SADC non-LDCs experience welfare losses under the 
WTO-compatible alternatives to EPAs, compared to the Full EPA scenario, particularly 
without considering the EU sugar reforms and the Doha Round. Based on this finding, 
the study concludes that the Full EPA scenario is the best option for Botswana, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe and ‘Rest of SACU’. Mauritius is, however, indifferent between 
Full EPA and its WTO-compatible alternative should both the EU sugar reforms and a 
complete Doha round come into force. The Full EPA scenario is more preferable for 
South Africa compared with the non-EPA scenario. However, it has no preferences for 
the two scenarios if the EU sugar reforms are completed.    
Results for SADC LDCs are mixed. For two regions (Madagascar and Malawi), Full EPA 
is preferable compared with the non-EPA scenario. Other regions (Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia) are indifferent between the EPA and the non-EPA scenarios. 
‘Rest of SADC’ is better off under the non-EPA scenario. All SADC LDCs would, actually, 
have reasons to break the EPA negotiations and opt for the WTO-compatible 
alternatives if the EU sugar reforms and trade liberalization are completed. 
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8.3 Policy Implications 
Based on the previously reported results, three main policy implications can be 
drawn.  
Firstly, SADC negotiators should aim for a more comprehensive scenario that covers 
all member states, the scenario that is welfare-improving for many SADC regions. 
Concluding final EPAs with the EU is particularly in SADC non-LDCs’ interests since 
they are anticipated to lose should the EPA negotiations break. 
Secondly, constraints to intra-SADC trade need to be mitigated prior to full reciprocal 
liberalization with the EU. The envisaged EU-SADC EPAs impose threats to SADC 
regional integration. These adverse effects, however, change dramatically if SADC 
liberalizes internal trade simultaneously EU trade. Furthermore, more liberalized 
intra-SADC trade would yield trade expansions and additional export opportunities 
for SADC members in the EU markets compared with EU-SADC trade liberalization in 
isolation. The WTO-compatible alternatives, on the other hand, are particularly 
advantageous to SADC regional integration. 
Thirdly, SADC negotiators should push for adequate compensating measures given the 
reported fiscal losses and potential adjustment costs. By the same token, it is 
important for SADC members to pursue strategies that are directed to diversifying 
their industrial and export structures before launching final EPAs with the EU. Such 
strategies, in conjunction with fiscal reforms aimed at reducing dependency on tariff 
revenues and broadening the tax bases, would alleviate the prospective costs 
associated with implementing final EPAs.  
 
  
8.4 Limitations and Extensions for Future Research 
The employed modelling framework allows for quantifying a wide range of 
prospective effects of the EPAs at the aggregate and sectoral levels for individual 
SADC members. This internally consistent CGE framework is more advantageous 
compared to partial equilibrium analysis in terms of capturing direct and indirect 
effects among trade partners as well as forward and backward sectoral linkages.  
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Nevertheless, three main limitations apply to the provided findings. Firstly, the study 
examines the trade components of the EU-SADC EPAs without attempting to address 
the non-trade aspects. There are several reasons behind this omission. As explained in 
detail, defining the contents of the EPA development agenda is problematic in light of 
the observed procrastination in negotiating the EPA development provisions. Besides, 
some non-trade aspects that affect development prospects of ACP states are more 
likely to be implemented at an all-ACP, rather than a regional, level. Furthermore, 
realizing the potential benefits of the EPA development dimensions requires a long 
time span that goes beyond the scope of the present study. Lastly, and more 
importantly, the non-trade aspects of the envisaged EPAs are, particularly, difficult to 
quantify. 
The second limitation is due to issues with data availability and quality. Employing the 
multi-region, multi-sector GLOBE CGE model requires an enormous amount of data 
which is adequately derived from the GTAP7 database. Such large database would not 
be constructed without omissions. Lack of data on barriers to trade in services is the 
most relevant shortfall to the current research topic. Proceeding with examining 
potential impacts of removing barriers to SADC-EU trade in services, maybe within a 
single-region CGE framework, would be an interesting topic for future research. 
Besides, the quality of the data for many African regions in the GTAP7 database is of 
low quality. As aforementioned, input-output tables are, for many cases, for early/mid 
nineties.     
There is always a trade-off between extending the study scope and considering fine 
details. Conducting quantitative examination of the EPA implications for all SADC 
members under different scenarios comes at the expense of considering a more 
disaggregated sectoral level. Modelling SADC-EU trade liberalization at the HS6 level 
would have allowed for reflecting variations in the planned liberalization schedules 
and various sensitive sectors.   
The last limitation pertains to dynamic aspects of the EU-SADC EPAs. The present 
study implements a comparative static analysis of the agreements for individual SADC 
members. The study, therefore, does not provide inferences on potential for 
productivity growth. Inclusion of dynamic growth effects of the EU-EPAs is of utmost 
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importance for SADC. SADC members might acquire strong welfare gains from 
specialization according to dynamic, rather than existing, comparative advantage. This 
is another ambitious area for future research. 
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10 Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
Table A4-1 
Region Aggregation 
Model 
No. 
Model 
Code 
Model 
Region 
GTAP 
No. 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Region Member Countries 
1 BWA Botswana 111 BWA Botswana  Botswana 
2 MDG Madagascar 102 MDG Madagascar  Madagascar 
3 MWI Malawi 103 MWI Malawi  Malawi 
4 MUS Mauritius 104 MUS Mauritius Mauritius 
5 MOZ Mozambique 105 MOZ Mozambique  Mozambique 
6 ZAF South Africa 112 ZAF South Africa  South Africa 
7 TZA Tanzania 106 TZA Tanzania  Tanzania, United Republic of 
8 ZMB Zambia 108 ZMB Zambia  Zambia 
9 ZWE Zimbabwe 109 ZWE Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe 
10 XSC 
‘Rest of 
SACU’ 
113 XSC 
Rest of South 
African Customs 
Union 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
11 XSD 
‘Rest of 
SADC’ 
100 XAC 
Rest of South 
Central Africa 
Angola 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 
12 EU ‘EU-27’ 
(46- AUT- Austria) (47- BEL- Belgium) (48- CYP- Cyprus) (49- CZE-Czech Republic) 
(50- DNK- Denmark) (51- EST- Estonia) (52- FIN-Finland) (53- FRA- France) (54- 
DEU- Germany) (55- GRC- Greece) (56- HUN- Hungary) (57- IRL- Ireland) (58- ITA- 
Italy) (59- LVA-Latvia) (60- LTU- Lithuania) (61- LUX- Luxembourg) (62- MLT-Malta) 
(63- NLD- Netherlands) (64- POL- Poland) (65- PRT-Portugal) (66- SVN- Slovenia) 
(67- SVK- Slovakia) (68- ESP- Spain) (69- SWE- Sweden) (70- GBR- United Kingdom) 
(75- BGR- Bulgaria) (78- ROU- Romania) 
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Table A4-1 (cont.) 
 
Model 
No. 
Model 
Code 
Model Region GTAP No. 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Region Member Countries 
13 USA 
‘United States 
of America’ 
26 USA 
United States of 
America  
United States of America 
14 EAS ‘East Asia’ 
(4- CHN- China) (5- HKG- Hong Kong) (6- JPN- Japan) (7- KOR- Republic of Korea) (8- 
TWN- Taiwan) (9- XEA- Rest of East Asia: Macau, Mongolia, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea) 
15 SAS 
‘Southeast 
and South 
Asia’ 
(10- KHM- Cambodia) (11- IDN- Indonesia) (12- LAO- Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic) (13- MMR- Myanmar) (14- MYS- Malaysia) (15- PHL- Philippines) (16- SGP- 
Singapore) (17- THA- Thailand) (18- VNM- Viet Nam) (19- XSE- Rest of Southeast Asia: 
Brunei Darussalam-Timor, Leste) (20- BGD- Bangladesh) (21- IND- India) (22- PAK- 
Pakistan) (23- LKA- Sri Lanka) (24- XSA- Rest of South Asia: Afghanistan- Bhutan- 
Maldives- Nepal)  
16 SSA 
‘Rest of Sub-
Saharan 
Africa’ 
(96- NGA- Nigeria) (97- SEN- Senegal) (98- XWF- Rest of West Africa: Benin- Burkina 
Faso- Cote d'Ivoire- Cape Verde- Ghana- Guinea- Guinea-Bissau- Gambia- Liberia- Mali- 
Mauritania- Niger- Saint Helena- Sierra Leone- Togo) (99- XCF- Rest of Central Africa: 
Central African Republic- Cameroon- Congo- Gabon- Equatorial Guinea- Sao Tome and 
Principe- Chad) (101- ETH- Ethiopia) (107- UGA- Uganda) (110- XEC- Rest of Eastern 
Africa: Burundi- Comoros- Djibouti- Eritrea- Kenya- Mayotte- Reunion- Rwanda- 
Somalia- Sudan- Seychelles) 
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Table A4-1 (cont.) 
Model 
No. 
Model 
Code 
Model 
Region 
GTAP No. GTAP Code GTAP Region Member Countries 
 17 ROW 
‘Rest of 
the 
World’ 
(1- AUS- Australia) (2- NZL- New Zealand) (3- XOC- Rest of Oceania: American Samoa- Cook 
Islands- Fiji- French Polynesia- Guam- Kiribati- Marshall Islands- Federated States of 
Micronesia- Nauru- New Caledonia- Norfolk Island- Northern Mariana Islands- Niue- Palau- 
Papua New Guinea- Samoa- Solomon Islands- Tokelau- Tonga- Tuvalu- Vanuatu- Wallis and 
Futuna) (25- CAN- Canada) (27- MEX- Mexico) (28- XNA- Rest of North America: Bermuda-
Greenland-Saint Pierre and Miquelon) (29- ARG- Argentina) (30- BOL- Bolivia) (31- BRA- 
Brazil) (32- CHL- Chile) (33- COL- Colombia) (34- ECU- Ecuador) (35- PRY- Paraguay) (36- 
PER- Peru) (37- URY- Uruguay) (38- VEN- Venezuela) (39- XSM- Rest of South America: 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)- French Guiana-Guyana-Suriname- Belize) (40- CRI- Costa Rica) 
(41- GTM- Guatemala) (42- NIC- Nicaragua) (43- PAN- Panama) (44- XCA- Central America: El 
Salvador- Honduras) (45- XCB - Caribbean:  Antigua & Barbuda- Bahamas- Barbados- 
Dominica- Dominican Republic- Grenada- Haiti- Jamaica- Puerto Rico- Saint Kitts and Nevis- 
Saint Lucia- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines- Trinidad and Tobago- Virgin Islands, U.S.- 
Anguilla- Aruba- Cayman Islands- Cuba- Guadeloupe- Martinique- Montserrat- Netherlands 
Antilles- Turks and Caicos- Virgin Islands, British) (71- CHE- Switzerland) (72- NOR- Norway) 
(73- XEF-  Rest of EFTA: Iceland - Liechtenstein) (74- ALB- Albania) (76- BLR- Belarus) (77- 
HRV- Croatia) (79- RUS- Russian Federation) (80- UKR- Ukraine) (81- XEE- Rest of Eastern 
Europe: Ukraine- Republic of Moldova) (82- XER- Rest of Europe: Andorra- Bosnia and 
Herzegovina- Faroe Islands- Gibraltar- the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia- Monaco- 
San Marino- Serbia and Montenegro) (83- KAZ- Kazakhstan) (84- KGZ- Kyrgyzstan) (85- XSU- 
Rest of Former Soviet Union: Tajikistan- Turkmenistan- Uzbekistan) (86- ARM- Armenia) (87- 
AZE- Azerbaijan) (88- GEO- Georgia) (89- IRN- Islamic Republic of Iran) (90- TUR- Turkey) (91- 
XWS- Rest of West Asia: Bahrain- Iraq- Israel- Jordan- Kuwait- Lebanon- Palestinian Territory, 
Occupied- Oman- Qatar- Saudi Arabia- Syrian Arab Republic- United Arab Emirates- Yemen) 
(92- EGY- Egypt) (93- MAR- Morocco) (94- TUN- Tunisia) (95- XNF- Rest of North Africa: 
Algeria- Arab Jamahiriya Libyan) 
n.e.c. not elsewhere classified.  
Source: aggregated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-2 
Sector Aggregation 
Model 
No. 
Model 
Code 
Model 
Sector 
Sector Description 
GTAP 
No. 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Sector 
1 Ric Rice Paddy and processed rice 
1 Pdr Paddy rice 
23 Pcr Processed rice 
2 Wgr Grains 
Wheat and other cereal 
grains 
2 Wht Wheat 
3 Gro Cereal grains nec 
3 Vfr Vegetables Vegetables, fruit and nuts 4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
4 Pfb 
‘Plant 
fibres’ 
Plant-based fibres 7 Pfb Plant-based fibres 
5 Xcr 
‘Other 
crops’ 
Other Crops 8 Ocr Crops nec 
6 Sgr Sugar Sugar and sugar cane 
24 Sgr Sugar 
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 
7 Bvt Beverages 
Beverages and tobacco 
products 
26 b_t Beverages and tobacco products 
8 Xfp 
‘Food 
products’ 
Oil seeds, vegetables oils, 
fats and Other food 
products 
5 Osd Oil seeds 
21 Vol Vegetable oils and fats  
25 Ofd Food products nec 
9 Mmp 
‘Meat and 
dairy 
products’ 
Milk, Meat & dairy and 
meat products 
11 Rmk Raw milk 
19 Cmt Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 
20 Omt Meat products nec 
22 Mil Dairy products 
10 Ffp Livestock 
Fishing, forestry and 
other livestock products 
9 Ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 
10 Oap Animal products nec 
12 Wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
13 Frs Forestry 
14 Fsh Fishing 
  
 
2
8
6
 
Table A4-2 (cont.) 
Model 
No. 
Model 
Code 
Model Sector Sector Description 
GTAP 
No. 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Sector 
11 Cog 
‘Oil and 
minerals’ 
Coal, oil, gas and other 
minerals  
15 Coa Coal 
16 Oil Oil 
17 Gas Gas 
18 Omn Minerals nec 
12 Twl Textiles 
Textiles, wearing 
apparel and leather 
products 
27 Tex Textiles 
28 Wap Wearing apparel 
29 Lea Leather products 
13 Pch 
‘Chemical and 
mineral 
products’ 
Petroleum, chemical 
and other mineral 
products 
32 p_c Petroleum, coal products 
33 Crp Chemical, rubber, plastic prods 
34 Nmm Mineral products nec 
14 cMtp 
‘Metals and 
metal products’ 
Metals and metal 
products 
35 i_s Ferrous metals 
36 Nfm Metals nec 
37 Fmp Metal products 
15 Veq Vehicles 
Vehicle and transport 
equipment 
38 Mvh Motor vehicles and parts 
39 Otn Transport equipment nec 
16 Emq 
‘Electronic 
equipments’ 
Electronic, machinery 
and other equipments 
40 Ele Electronic equipment 
41 Ome Machinery and equipment nec 
17 Xmn 
‘Other 
manufactures’ 
Other manufactures 
30 Lum Wood products 
31 Ppp Paper products, publishing 
42 Omf Manufactures nec 
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Table A4-2 (cont.) 
Model 
No. 
Model 
Code 
Model Sector Sector Description 
GTAP 
No. 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Sector 
18 
Utc 
 
‘Public utilities’ 
Public Utilities & 
Construction 
43 Ely Electricity 
44 Gdt Gas manufacture, distribution 
45 Wtr Water 
46 Cns Construction 
19 
Tcm 
 
‘Trade and 
communication’ 
Trade, Transport and 
Communication 
47 Trd Trade 
48 Otp Transport nec 
49 Wtp Sea transport 
50 Atp Air transport 
51 Cmn Communication 
20 Xsr ‘Other services’ Other Services 
52 Ofi Financial services nec 
53 Isr Insurance 
54 Obs Business services nec 
55 Ros Recreation and other services 
56 Osg 
Public Administration 
/Defence/Health/Education 
57 Dwe Dwellings 
n.e.c. not elsewhere classified.  
Source: aggregated by the author from the GTAP7 Database.  
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Table A4-3 
Armington Elasticities 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 3.2 3.8 3.6 2.6 3.4 2.7 4.3 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.8 
Wgr 1.7 2.4 1.5 2.7 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.2 1.6 
Vfr 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Pfb 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Xcr 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Sgr 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
cBvt 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Xfp 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 
Mmp 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.1 
Ffp 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.4 
Cog 1.5 1.7 2.2 1.8 0.9 4.5 1.0 2.7 1.5 1.6 4.1 
Twl 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Pch 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.1 2.7 
Mtp 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.5 
Veq 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 4.0 
Emq 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Xmn 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 
Utc 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.1 
Tcm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Xsr 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
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Table A4-3 (cont.) 
 
 EU USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
Ric 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.6 
Wgr 2.8 1.7 2.8 3.5 1.9 2.7 
Vfr 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Pfb 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Xcr 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Sgr 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
cBvt 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Xfp 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.2 
Mmp 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.8 4.0 3.8 
Ffp 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.9 
Cog 5.8 5.9 4.1 5.4 5.7 7.0 
Twl 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Pch 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Mtp 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.6 
Veq 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.2 
Emq 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 
Xmn 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 
Utc 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 
Tcm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Xsr 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Note: Here and hereafter, shading indicates SADC non-LDCs and vice versa.  
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Table A4-4 
Elasticity of Substitution between Imports by Origin 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 5.7 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.5 5.2 
Wgr 4.8 8.3 5.4 5.3 8.1 7.0 7.8 6.1 4.6 5.4 6.6 
Vfr 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Pfb 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Xcr 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Sgr 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 
cBvt 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Xfp 4.4 5.1 5.1 4.4 5.2 5.1 5.6 5.4 5.2 4.3 4.5 
Mmp 7.5 7.7 7.4 7.7 8.0 8.1 7.7 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 
Ffp 3.3 3.0 2.9 4.1 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.6 2.8 
Cog 1.9 4.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 9.0 1.9 8.8 2.3 2.0 3.0 
Twl 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.6 
Pch 5.7 5.5 6.1 5.7 5.6 6.4 5.8 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.6 
Mtp 7.1 6.7 6.8 6.4 6.8 7.6 7.4 6.9 7.9 7.1 6.8 
Veq 5.8 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.6 6.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 
Emq 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.2 
Xmn 6.5 6.6 6.2 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.7 
Utc 5.0 4.3 5.0 4.5 5.1 5.5 3.9 3.8 5.5 5.4 3.8 
Tcm 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Xsr 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
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Table A4-4 (cont.) 
 
 EU USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
Ric 6.6 5.6 6.1 5.4 5.7 5.9 
Wgr 5.7 4.5 5.2 7.8 8.2 6.0 
Vfr 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Pfb 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Xcr 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Sgr 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 
cBvt 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Xfp 4.4 4.2 4.5 5.2 4.6 4.6 
Mmp 7.9 7.8 8.2 7.6 7.8 7.9 
Ffp 3.7 3.2 4.1 4.3 3.7 3.5 
Cog 12.8 12.4 10.5 9.1 8.5 13.2 
Twl 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Pch 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.7 6.2 
Mtp 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.3 6.8 7.2 
Veq 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.9 7.3 6.3 
Emq 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.3 
Xmn 6.6 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.7 
Utc 4.6 4.8 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.8 
Tcm 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Xsr 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
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Table A4-5 
Elasticity of Substitution between Production Factors 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.7 
Wgr 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Vfr 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Pfb 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Xcr 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Sgr 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.5 
cBvt 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Xfp 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Mmp 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Ffp 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Cog 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Twl 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Pch 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Mtp 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Veq 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Emq 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Xmn 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Utc 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 
Tcm 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Xsr 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
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Table A4-5 (cont.) 
 
 EU USA EAS SAS SSA 
Ric 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Wgr 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Vfr 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Pfb 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Xcr 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Sgr 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 
cBvt 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Xfp 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.9 
Mmp 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Ffp 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Cog 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Twl 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Pch 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Mtp 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Veq 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Emq 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Xmn 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Utc 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Tcm 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Xsr 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
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Table A4-6 
Domestic Production by Activity (Percent, value, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 8.3 44.3 39.9 16.1 24.7 9.5 44.3 25.8 26.3 13.5 17.3 
Ric 0.0 7.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Wgr 0.6 0.1 6.2 0.0 2.7 0.3 6.7 3.2 0.8 0.6 2.5 
Vfr 0.3 1.8 2.6 1.5 4.0 1.0 3.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 
Pfb 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.6 1.3 2.5 0.1 0.1 
Xcr 0.0 4.1 14.4 0.1 5.0 0.1 6.3 4.3 7.2 0.4 2.6 
Sgr 0.0 4.2 2.7 7.0 0.3 0.4 3.4 0.8 2.2 1.5 0.2 
Bvt 1.2 7.8 3.9 0.9 0.5 1.7 4.0 1.9 4.5 1.4 1.6 
Xfp 1.0 4.2 3.6 3.9 6.2 2.7 9.8 6.4 4.2 5.0 4.1 
Mmp 3.4 0.9 2.3 0.7 0.6 1.8 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.1 
Ffp 1.7 13.8 3.2 1.9 4.5 1.3 6.3 5.4 2.7 2.2 4.1 
Mani. 30.0 27.0 21.8 33.9 14.5 34.5 12.6 27.0 31.1 38.2 40.7 
Cog 20.6 5.6 6.4 6.5 0.8 2.5 2.2 2.2 7.1 4.9 30.0 
Twl 1.0 8.7 3.5 14.8 0.6 2.7 2.5 2.6 3.7 6.9 1.5 
Pch 1.3 4.5 5.5 3.9 1.3 9.0 3.3 5.5 7.3 10.9 4.5 
Mtp 3.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 10.8 6.8 2.2 12.4 8.3 4.1 0.8 
Veq 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.0 4.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 2.5 0.3 
Emq 0.4 0.1 0.4 2.8 0.1 4.3 0.4 1.1 0.6 3.7 0.9 
Xmn 2.3 6.7 4.9 3.5 0.9 4.8 1.7 2.7 3.8 5.1 2.6 
Ser. 61.8 28.7 38.2 50.1 60.8 56.0 43.1 47.2 42.6 48.2 42.0 
Utc 13.1 7.5 2.6 6.2 16.9 6.1 6.4 11.3 11.8 5.4 7.0 
Tcm 12.7 7.8 23.2 17.5 27.8 18.0 22.1 20.2 13.3 18.0 16.7 
Xsr 36.0 13.4 12.5 26.3 16.1 31.9 14.6 15.7 17.5 24.8 18.4 
Main* 69.7 35.9 50.1 58.6 60.8 58.9 46.5 48.3 42.6 53.7 65.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rice output constitutes 0.0 percent of total output in Botswana. * Shares of the three main sectors (presented above in italic bold). Here and hereafter, 
Agri. refers to agricultural and agro-processing activities/commodities, Mani. includes manufacturing and mining activities/commodities; and Ser. 
refers to the three services activities/commodities. Figures for Agri., Mani., Ser. and Total are calculated as simple averages. Source: Calculated by the 
author from the GTAP7 Database.  
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Table A4-7 
Factor Shares in Value Added and Factor Intensity by Activity 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Land 
% of VA 0.4 3.2 3.9 1.2 3.5 0.4 5.1 3.1 3.9 0.6 1.4 
Ric 12.6 11.8 13.1 7.5 14.9 8.9 15.0 5.8 1.7 6.6 7.3 
Wgr 14.0 12.0 16.7 15.2 15.0 14.1 15.0 15.0 31.0 14.0 14.2 
Vfr 14.0 12.0 16.7 15.2 15.0 14.1 15.0 15.0 31.0 14.0 14.2 
Pfb 14.0 12.0 16.7 15.2 15.0 13.8 15.0 15.0 31.0 14.0 14.2 
Xcr 14.0 12.0 16.7 15.2 15.0 14.0 15.0 15.0 31.0 14.0 14.2 
Sgr 11.9 6.2 3.2 11.7 1.6 5.2 15.0 12.8 27.3 4.1 10.6 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.8 0.4 7.6 0.0 0.8 0.4 5.9 3.6 2.2 0.5 2.4 
Mmp 0.2 3.1 0.1 0.0 2.6 3.0 0.2 0.1 3.7 2.2 0.2 
Ffp 13.3 3.7 4.8 9.2 5.0 9.1 4.9 4.4 26.0 7.0 4.2 
 Natural Resources 
% of VA 2.4 4.7 3.6 2.8 0.8 1 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.9 15.3 
Ffp 0.7 10.5 19.2 11.7 10.2 8.3 11.2 14.3 2.1 12.5 11.6 
Cog 8.4 38.8 41.7 44.9 10.3 31.6 8.7 16.1 20.6 23.1 34.9 
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Table A4-7 (cont.) 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Unskilled Labour 
% of VA 27.6 44.9 43.7 33.6 40.3 31.5 44.2 40.4 34.5 34.4 26.6 
Ric 35.5 70.8 47.5 44.6 59.5 30.3 59.5 47.3 8.5 36.2 51.4 
Wgr 33.6 71.4 55.1 58.9 59.5 33.1 59.5 59.5 40.7 33.6 62.8 
Vfr 33.6 71.4 55.1 58.9 59.5 33.1 59.5 59.5 40.7 33.6 62.8 
Pfb 33.6 71.4 55.1 58.9 59.5 32.3 59.5 59.5 40.7 33.6 62.8 
Xcr 33.6 71.4 55.1 58.9 59.5 32.9 59.5 59.5 40.7 33.6 62.8 
Sgr 38.1 58.9 32.8 55.6 59.3 24.6 59.5 58.6 37.3 25.9 56.0 
Bvt 37.3 48.8 15.9 24.9 61.2 29.8 45.0 48.5 38.2 35.3 38.3 
Xfp 78.1 46.5 41.6 39.3 58.4 42.9 49.0 54.0 15.4 47.1 53.5 
Mmp 45.6 52.9 27.4 37.3 63.1 47.5 42.9 59.2 18.3 51.6 50.7 
Ffp 33.8 36.9 56.6 43.8 66.7 25.0 66.9 51.2 41.1 33.4 56.4 
Cog 7.4 17.2 19.1 12.7 26.2 27.4 58.5 11.5 23.6 22.5 2.5 
Twl 71.5 46.6 31.6 42.0 36.8 64.7 33.8 36.5 44.7 63.8 37.7 
Pch 51.1 42.9 21.1 44.5 43.7 34.0 17.4 23.4 31.1 35.2 25.4 
Mtp 79.0 44.2 33.4 57.6 23.0 29.7 18.2 11.8 36.0 28.4 33.5 
Veq 49.1 66.6 39.4 21.5 82.4 38.6 17.5 53.4 45.3 42.9 52.5 
Emq 61.7 62.0 33.7 19.2 79.9 45.4 16.3 45.6 38.6 47.5 46.0 
Xmn 52.2 45.3 26.1 53.9 54.1 37.6 33.3 32.9 58.2 41.8 34.7 
Utc 44.1 45.2 33.5 44.6 38.4 38.0 23.2 13.0 29.4 40.6 25.2 
Tcm 33.3 32.8 42.8 30.1 28.9 34.8 34.4 49.0 45.7 39.4 49.6 
Xsr 28.2 37.5 35.8 28.0 31.6 26.4 23.0 30.9 29.0 28.4 33.8 
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Table A4-7 (cont.) 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Skilled Labour 
% of VA 16.9 9.6 9.6 16 10.6 17.8 6.1 10.7 14.8 16.1 9.7 
Ric 1.5 0.6 1.1 3.3 0.5 2.2 0.5 4.9 1.2 4.5 4.0 
Wgr 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Vfr 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Pfb 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Xcr 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Sgr 2.6 5.1 4.9 2.6 11.5 3.0 0.5 2.1 0.6 3.8 2.4 
Bvt 6.1 6.8 2.2 3.5 8.6 4.9 6.3 6.8 5.4 5.8 5.4 
Xfp 17.8 9.6 3.8 8.5 12.0 9.8 5.7 8.8 2.7 10.7 9.4 
Mmp 9.2 6.9 5.2 7.4 10.4 8.2 8.4 11.5 2.7 9.4 9.8 
Ffp 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Cog 1.2 3.2 3.5 2.2 3.8 4.4 8.4 1.7 3.3 4.1 0.4 
Twl 11.7 7.1 4.6 6.5 5.5 10.4 5.0 5.6 7.3 10.3 5.7 
Pch 11.3 8.7 4.1 9.0 8.5 7.6 3.3 4.6 5.5 8.1 4.8 
Mtp 16.3 7.9 6.0 10.4 4.4 5.9 3.3 2.2 6.6 5.7 6.0 
Veq 10.3 12.0 7.1 3.9 14.9 8.1 3.2 9.6 8.2 9.0 9.5 
Emq 15.1 12.8 7.0 4.0 16.5 11.1 3.4 9.4 8.0 11.7 9.5 
Xmn 8.4 6.8 3.6 9.3 7.5 6.8 4.7 5.0 8.8 8.0 5.0 
Utc 10.9 10.9 9.9 10.3 13.6 11.4 5.9 4.1 12.2 10.7 6.5 
Tcm 9.7 9.3 10.2 10.0 7.3 9.8 8.9 12.8 11.9 10.8 12.6 
Xsr 34.9 32.2 27.8 30.9 30.4 28.5 16.2 29.2 36.4 29.8 37.8 
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Table A4-7 (cont.) 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Capital 
% of VA 52.8 37.7 39.3 46.5 44.9 49.4 43.1 44.4 45.4 46.9 47.1 
Ric 50.4 16.7 38.2 44.7 25.1 58.6 25.0 41.9 88.5 52.7 37.3 
Wgr 52.0 16.0 27.8 25.4 25.0 52.4 25.0 25.0 28.0 52.0 22.5 
Vfr 52.0 16.0 27.8 25.4 25.0 52.4 25.0 25.0 28.0 52.0 22.5 
Pfb 52.0 16.0 27.8 25.4 25.0 53.4 25.0 25.0 28.0 52.0 22.5 
Xcr 52.0 16.0 27.8 25.4 25.0 52.7 25.0 25.0 28.0 52.0 22.5 
Sgr 47.4 29.8 59.1 30.1 27.6 67.1 25.0 26.5 34.7 66.1 31.1 
Bvt 56.6 44.5 81.9 71.6 30.2 65.3 48.7 44.7 56.4 58.9 56.4 
Xfp 3.3 43.5 47.0 52.1 28.8 46.9 39.3 33.7 79.6 41.7 34.7 
Mmp 45.0 37.1 67.3 55.3 23.8 41.3 48.6 29.1 75.4 36.9 39.3 
Ffp 51.8 48.6 19.0 35.0 17.5 57.3 16.4 29.7 30.4 46.6 27.4 
Cog 83.0 40.8 35.7 40.1 59.7 36.6 24.3 70.6 52.4 50.2 62.2 
Twl 16.8 46.3 63.8 51.5 57.7 24.9 61.2 57.9 48.1 26.0 56.6 
Pch 37.6 48.4 74.8 46.5 47.8 58.3 79.2 72.0 63.4 56.7 69.9 
Mtp 4.6 47.9 60.6 32.1 72.6 64.3 78.5 85.9 57.4 65.9 60.5 
Veq 40.7 21.3 53.5 74.7 2.7 53.3 79.3 36.9 46.5 48.2 38.1 
Emq 23.1 25.2 59.4 76.9 3.6 43.5 80.3 44.9 53.5 40.8 44.5 
Xmn 39.4 47.9 70.3 36.8 38.4 55.6 62.0 62.1 33.0 50.2 60.3 
Utc 45.0 44.0 56.6 45.1 47.9 50.6 70.9 82.9 58.3 48.7 68.3 
Tcm 57.0 57.9 47.0 59.9 63.8 55.4 56.8 38.2 42.4 49.8 37.8 
Xsr 36.9 30.4 36.4 41.1 38.0 45.1 60.8 39.9 34.7 41.8 28.4 
At the aggregate level, land constitutes 0.4 of total value added (measures at agents prices) in Botswana. At the sectoral level, land composes 12.6 
percent of total factor usage in rice activity in Botswana. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database.  
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Table A4-8 
Factor Allocation across Activities 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Land 
Ric 1.0 23.4 0.7 0.0 3.5 0.0 6.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 
Wgr 19.0 0.8 35.2 0.0 20.3 11.9 27.5 22.1 6.9 18.8 35.5 
Vfr 11.1 12.2 15.4 32.2 26.9 45.0 16.0 10.4 5.2 24.0 12.4 
Pfb 0.2 1.4 4.8 0.0 1.8 0.9 1.5 9.6 16.9 3.7 1.8 
Xcr 1.1 30.6 33.5 2.7 37.0 4.2 29.9 40.0 47.7 19.7 31.6 
Sgr 0.1 8.5 1.2 49.8 0.0 3.4 4.3 2.4 7.3 6.0 1.5 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.9 0.4 4.4 0.0 0.5 1.6 4.8 5.3 2.0 2.4 3.6 
Mmp 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.1 
Ffp 65.5 22.1 4.9 15.4 9.9 28.9 9.8 9.7 13.6 23.8 12.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Natural Resources 
Ffp 0.5 43.2 21.4 8.4 86.9 9.9 80.7 72.2 2.8 13.6 3.3 
Cog 99.5 56.8 78.6 91.6 13.1 90.1 19.3 27.8 97.2 86.4 96.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table A4-8 (cont.) 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Unskilled Labour 
Agri. 8.6 60.5 43.9 20.6 45.5 6.9 64 43.4 21.6 11.2 36.1 
Ric 0.0 10.0 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Wgr 0.6 0.3 12.4 0.0 6.9 0.3 12.6 6.7 1.0 0.8 8.4 
Vfr 0.4 5.2 5.4 4.5 9.1 1.3 7.3 3.1 0.8 1.0 2.9 
Pfb 0.0 0.6 1.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.7 2.9 2.5 0.2 0.4 
Xcr 0.0 13.0 11.8 0.4 12.6 0.1 13.7 12.1 7.0 0.8 7.5 
Sgr 0.0 5.7 1.3 8.5 0.1 0.2 2.0 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 
Bvt 0.6 6.0 1.4 0.8 0.3 1.0 2.6 1.8 5.2 1.0 1.7 
Xfp 1.2 3.1 2.5 2.9 3.3 2.2 4.6 6.2 1.5 4.1 4.4 
Mmp 3.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.8 2.1 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.9 
Ffp 2.2 15.8 6.2 2.7 11.3 1.0 15.6 8.6 2.4 2.0 9.3 
Mani. 23.7 14.9 10.7 30.4 6.6 23.9 6.4 8.2 25.3 28.6 10.4 
Cog 7.6 2.6 3.5 2.2 0.7 2.6 4.2 0.7 4.9 4.7 3.9 
Twl 1.3 5.6 1.5 14.4 0.4 2.9 0.6 1.3 3.7 6.4 1.0 
Pch 1.6 2.3 2.2 7.3 0.9 4.3 0.4 1.1 4.1 5.9 1.1 
Mtp 10.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 3.8 5.8 0.2 1.0 4.9 3.7 0.5 
Veq 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.2 
Emq 0.5 0.0 0.1 2.7 0.1 2.6 0.1 1.0 0.6 2.4 0.8 
Xmn 2.5 3.8 2.6 2.2 0.7 3.9 0.9 2.4 6.9 4.3 2.9 
Ser. 67.5 24.6 45.2 49.1 48 69.2 29.6 48.4 53 60.3 53.3 
Utc 13.0 2.8 1.0 4.4 13.0 6.2 2.9 3.4 12.6 4.7 3.1 
Tcm 16.0 5.3 29.0 12.2 20.0 23.8 18.8 29.5 18.3 25.3 27.3 
Xsr 38.5 16.5 15.2 32.5 15.0 39.2 7.9 15.5 22.1 30.3 22.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table A4-8 (cont.) 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Skilled Labour 
Agri. 1.8 11.4 5 2.7 4.2 1.4 12.5 6.8 2.4 2.8 4.1 
Ric 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Vfr 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Sgr 0.0 2.3 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Bvt 0.2 3.9 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 2.6 1.0 1.7 0.3 0.7 
Xfp 0.4 3.0 1.0 1.3 2.6 0.9 3.9 3.8 0.6 2.0 2.1 
Mmp 1.2 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 2.9 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.5 
Ffp 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Mani. 7.3 11.6 8.4 11.1 4.4 8.2 6.9 5.3 9.6 12 4.9 
Cog 2.1 2.3 2.9 0.8 0.4 0.7 4.3 0.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 
Twl 0.3 4.0 1.0 4.6 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.4 2.2 0.4 
Pch 0.6 2.2 2.0 3.1 0.6 1.7 0.6 0.8 1.7 2.9 0.6 
Mtp 3.4 0.5 0.7 0.1 2.7 2.0 0.3 0.7 2.1 1.6 0.2 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 
Emq 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.3 0.5 
Xmn 0.7 2.6 1.7 0.8 0.3 1.2 0.9 1.4 2.4 1.7 1.1 
Ser. 90.8 76.9 86.7 86 91.4 90.1 80.5 88.1 87.7 85.1 91.1 
Utc 5.2 3.2 1.3 2.1 17.5 3.3 5.3 4.1 12.2 2.6 2.2 
Tcm 7.6 7.1 31.4 8.6 19.1 11.8 35.0 29.0 11.1 14.8 19.0 
Xsr 78.0 66.6 54.0 75.3 54.8 75.0 40.2 55.0 64.4 67.7 69.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table A4-8 (cont.) 
(Percent, 2004) 
 
BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Capital 
Agri. 5 47 30.3 11.3 15.8 6.7 29.9 20 20.8 10.8 10 
Ric 0.0 2.8 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 
Wgr 0.5 0.1 5.8 0.0 2.6 0.3 5.4 2.6 0.5 0.9 1.7 
Vfr 0.3 1.4 2.5 1.4 3.4 1.3 3.2 1.2 0.4 1.2 0.6 
Pfb 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.1 1.3 0.2 0.1 
Xcr 0.0 3.5 5.5 0.1 4.7 0.1 5.9 4.6 3.7 1.0 1.5 
Sgr 0.0 3.5 2.2 3.2 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.8 1.3 0.1 
Bvt 0.5 6.5 6.6 1.6 0.2 1.4 2.9 1.5 5.9 1.2 1.4 
Xfp 0.0 3.5 2.7 2.7 1.5 1.5 3.8 3.5 6.1 2.6 1.6 
Mmp 1.9 0.7 2.1 0.8 0.0 0.4 2.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Ffp 1.8 24.8 1.9 1.5 2.6 1.4 3.9 4.5 1.4 2.1 2.5 
Mani. 47.4 22.6 24.2 34.9 13.9 22.1 8.1 20.9 27.5 29.1 62.5 
Cog 45.1 7.4 6.1 4.9 1.4 2.2 1.8 3.7 8.3 7.7 56.1 
Twl 0.2 6.6 2.7 12.4 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.9 3.0 1.9 0.8 
Pch 0.6 3.2 7.3 5.4 0.9 4.6 1.9 3.1 6.4 6.9 1.7 
Mtp 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.1 10.6 7.8 1.0 6.8 6.0 6.3 0.5 
Veq 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.1 
Emq 0.1 0.0 0.1 7.6 0.0 1.6 0.3 0.9 0.6 1.5 0.5 
Xmn 1.0 4.7 6.6 1.0 0.4 3.6 1.7 4.1 3.0 3.8 2.8 
Ser. 47.6 30.4 45.5 53.7 70.2 71.1 62.3 59 51.9 60.1 27.3 
Utc 6.9 3.2 1.6 3.1 14.5 5.2 9.0 19.9 18.9 4.1 4.8 
Tcm 14.4 11.2 29.5 17.1 39.5 23.8 31.8 20.9 12.9 23.4 11.7 
Xsr 26.3 16.0 14.4 33.5 16.2 42.1 21.5 18.2 20.1 32.6 10.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rice activity occupies 1.0 percent of employed land in Botswana. Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database.  
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Table A4-9 
Import Shares in World Imports by Commodity 
 (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Agri. 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.2 
Ric 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.7 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 4.4 
Wgr 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 2.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.3 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.1 
Sgr 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 2.3 
Bvt 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.4 
Xfp 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.2 
Mmp 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 
Mani. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.4 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
Ser. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 
Utc 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.6 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 
Botswana rice imports make up 0.1 percent of world rice imports. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database.  
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Table A4-10 
Export Shares in World Exports by Commodity 
 (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Agri. 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.8 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Vfr 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 3.4 
Pfb 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 4.5 
Xcr 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 3.9 
Sgr 0.0 0.1 0.5 2.8 0.2 1.9 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.9 0.2 8.7 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.8 
Xfp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.2 
Mmp 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 
Ffp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 2.0 
Mani. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.0 
Cog 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.8 3.8 
Twl 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 3.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 
Ser. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 
Botswana rice exports make up 0.0 percent of world rice exports. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-11 
Import Shares in SADC Total Imports by Commodity 
 (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD Total 
Agri. 5.0 2.0 2.1 5.6 6.0 39.5 5.9 1.9 4.4 9.1 18.5 100.0 
Ric 2.7 4.8 0.3 4.7 13.6 38.0 13.7 1.4 1.0 2.6 17.2 100.0 
Wgr 5.4 0.6 2.3 1.9 10.9 32.6 15.5 1.7 16.8 7.3 4.9 100.0 
Vfr 10.0 0.5 1.7 8.8 9.6 24.6 2.6 3.7 9.8 13.6 15.0 100.0 
Pfb 0.7 0.7 0.5 15.9 0.1 60.9 1.7 2.2 6.1 10.9 0.3 100.0 
Xcr 3.2 1.1 12.1 1.2 2.9 60.9 2.4 1.3 8.4 5.0 1.7 100.0 
Sgr 6.9 2.1 0.5 4.3 12.7 41.9 9.2 0.1 0.2 5.0 17.1 100.0 
Bvt 5.5 1.2 0.7 4.1 3.9 32.7 2.7 1.7 0.7 13.0 33.9 100.0 
Xfp 4.9 2.9 2.4 6.6 4.7 39.5 5.5 2.6 3.8 9.6 17.5 100.0 
Mmp 5.6 0.8 0.8 7.2 3.4 36.2 1.8 0.7 1.0 10.0 32.5 100.0 
Ffp 3.0 0.4 1.0 6.3 1.6 66.2 1.4 0.7 1.2 9.7 8.3 100.0 
Mani. 3.4 1.6 1.2 3.8 1.9 64.3 3.9 2.3 2.4 5.2 9.9 100.0 
Cog 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 95.1 0.1 2.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 100.0 
Twl 3.6 5.2 1.8 7.6 1.8 57.0 4.5 1.3 2.0 9.6 5.4 100.0 
Pch 4.7 2.1 2.1 4.5 3.4 53.2 6.4 3.2 3.9 7.8 8.7 100.0 
Mtp 4.4 1.4 0.9 6.9 2.1 54.1 6.9 2.7 4.6 4.8 11.3 100.0 
Veq 2.8 1.0 0.6 1.4 1.0 67.8 2.0 0.9 1.2 3.7 17.5 100.0 
Emq 3.4 1.3 0.8 3.8 1.8 66.5 3.4 2.8 2.5 4.1 9.5 100.0 
Xmn 4.7 2.1 2.4 5.4 3.0 55.3 5.5 1.9 2.1 8.8 8.8 100.0 
Ser. 3.1 2.5 0.7 5.1 3.1 42.7 4.4 1.9 2.0 6.4 28.0 100.0 
Utc 2.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 9.0 26.0 5.3 2.5 5.7 3.4 45.3 100.0 
Tcm 2.6 1.6 0.7 7.1 1.9 62.0 4.1 2.9 1.2 2.1 13.8 100.0 
Xsr 3.9 3.9 0.9 4.8 2.4 31.3 4.5 0.9 1.6 10.9 35.1 100.0 
Total 3.5 1.8 1.2 4.2 2.5 58.6 4.2 2.2 2.5 5.8 13.5 100.0 
Botswana rice imports make up 2.7 percent of SADC total rice imports. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-12 
Export Shares in SADC Total Exports by Commodity 
 (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Agri. 1.1 4.7 3.4 4.6 2.7 51.7 7.9 3.1 7.4 11.3 2.3 100.0 
Ric 3.6 6.2 0.3 0.4 1.6 74.7 7.8 3.1 0.4 1.2 0.5 100.0 
Wgr 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.7 72.2 11.3 11.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 100.0 
Vfr 0.1 3.3 0.8 0.2 1.4 83.2 4.9 1.4 2.0 2.6 0.1 100.0 
Pfb 0.1 1.8 4.2 0.3 5.0 14.8 16.7 22.0 34.0 1.0 0.1 100.0 
Xcr 0.0 11.4 18.1 0.3 4.9 13.6 15.1 5.8 29.2 0.5 1.1 100.0 
Sgr 0.0 1.2 6.0 32.3 1.8 21.6 2.5 3.0 7.3 22.1 2.1 100.0 
Bvt 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.0 83.0 2.2 0.1 3.9 8.7 0.2 100.0 
Xfp 0.9 7.7 0.3 4.3 4.3 48.9 9.4 1.6 1.3 20.4 0.9 100.0 
Mmp 13.1 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.1 59.8 2.2 0.3 2.9 19.8 0.6 100.0 
Ffp 0.9 2.9 0.2 2.5 2.8 45.0 9.6 1.0 2.0 14.1 18.9 100.0 
Mani. 4.5 1.5 0.4 2.8 1.5 62.1 0.8 2.1 1.6 6.0 16.6 100.0 
Cog 10.5 1.8 0.7 2.3 0.1 31.8 0.5 0.3 1.1 4.2 46.8 100.0 
Twl 2.5 11.7 1.2 22.7 0.2 32.6 2.8 1.0 1.5 23.6 0.2 100.0 
Pch 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.1 80.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 14.3 0.7 100.0 
Mtp 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.3 80.2 1.1 6.7 2.7 2.0 0.4 100.0 
Veq 2.4 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 94.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.0 0.3 100.0 
Emq 0.9 0.2 0.1 2.9 0.1 89.8 0.3 0.4 0.6 4.2 0.5 100.0 
Xmn 0.8 1.5 0.4 3.3 0.2 79.4 0.9 0.4 2.8 8.5 1.7 100.0 
Ser. 4.9 2.9 0.3 9.2 4.6 59.3 6.3 1.1 1.6 5.7 4.2 100.0 
Utc 1.9 2.2 0.1 1.0 42.6 37.2 0.2 1.6 0.6 1.4 11.2 100.0 
Tcm 4.4 3.1 0.5 12.6 2.6 57.6 9.0 1.6 1.6 3.3 3.6 100.0 
Xsr 5.9 2.6 0.1 6.0 0.8 65.2 3.8 0.4 1.8 9.5 3.8 100.0 
Total 4.2 2.1 0.7 3.9 2.1 60.5 2.4 2.1 2.3 6.6 13.2 100.0 
Botswana rice exports constitute 3.6 percent of SADC total rice exports. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-13 
Commodity Composition of SADC Imports (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 13.7 10.6 17.4 13.0 23.3 6.5 13.7 8.3 16.7 15.1 13.2 
Ric 0.5 1.9 0.2 0.8 3.9 0.5 2.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.9 
Wgr 1.5 0.3 1.9 0.4 4.2 0.5 3.5 0.7 6.3 1.2 0.3 
Vfr 1.2 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.6 1.0 0.5 
Pfb 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 
Xcr 0.4 0.3 5.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.6 0.4 0.1 
Sgr 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 
Bvt 1.9 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.3 2.7 3.0 
Xfp 5.1 5.9 7.6 5.9 7.0 2.5 4.8 4.5 5.5 6.2 4.8 
Mmp 1.9 0.5 0.8 2.0 1.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 2.0 2.8 
Ffp 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 
Mani. 72.8 67.8 73.3 68.1 57.6 82.3 69.9 78.1 71.3 67.7 54.9 
Cog 0.8 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2 11.9 0.2 8.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 
Twl 6.2 17.3 9.2 11.1 4.4 5.9 6.5 3.6 4.8 10.0 2.4 
Pch 20.6 17.8 27.5 16.8 21.5 14.1 23.6 23.0 24.0 20.9 9.9 
Mtp 7.8 4.8 4.8 10.5 5.3 5.8 10.4 7.8 11.3 5.2 5.3 
Veq 12.7 8.3 8.4 5.2 6.4 18.2 7.6 6.7 7.5 10.2 20.4 
Emq 18.7 14.0 13.9 17.7 14.4 22.1 15.7 24.6 19.2 13.9 13.7 
Xmn 6.1 5.3 9.0 5.9 5.5 4.3 5.9 4.0 3.8 6.9 2.9 
Ser. 13.6 21.6 9.3 18.9 19.1 11.2 16.4 13.6 11.9 17.1 32.0 
Utc 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 7.4 0.9 2.6 2.3 4.6 1.2 6.8 
Tcm 4.4 5.4 3.6 10.4 4.6 6.4 6.0 8.2 2.9 2.2 6.2 
Xsr 8.0 15.8 5.6 8.3 7.1 3.9 7.8 3.1 4.5 13.7 18.9 
Main* 52.0 50.9 50.6 45.0 43.3 54.4 49.7 55.9 54.5 48.5 53.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rice imports constitute 0.5 percent of total imports for Botswana. * Shares of the three main imports (presented above in italic bold). 
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Table A4-14 
Commodity Composition of SADC Exports (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 3.1 27.4 56.2 14.1 15.8 10.3 39.3 17.8 39.3 20.6 2.2 
Ric 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 3.7 2.6 0.1 1.6 3.2 4.7 1.5 2.1 0.9 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.5 3.0 0.0 1.2 0.1 3.5 5.3 7.6 0.1 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 8.7 39.0 0.1 3.6 0.4 9.7 4.3 20.1 0.1 0.1 
Sgr 0.0 0.6 9.3 9.2 1.0 0.4 1.1 1.6 3.6 3.7 0.2 
Bvt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.9 1.2 0.1 2.3 1.8 0.0 
Xfp 0.7 12.0 1.5 3.5 6.6 2.6 12.5 2.4 1.9 10.0 0.2 
Mmp 1.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.7 1.7 0.0 
Ffp 0.2 1.5 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.8 4.3 0.5 1.0 2.3 1.5 
Mani. 80.9 53.5 37.8 53.7 54.0 76.2 25.0 75.0 51.0 67.6 93.5 
Cog 65.1 22.0 24.5 15.0 0.9 13.5 5.7 3.5 12.6 16.5 91.5 
Twl 2.7 26.2 7.8 26.8 0.4 2.5 5.3 2.2 3.1 16.5 0.1 
Pch 1.1 0.6 1.5 2.4 0.6 10.8 2.1 2.6 3.7 17.5 0.4 
Mtp 6.8 0.4 0.4 0.7 51.3 26.8 9.3 64.7 23.9 6.1 0.6 
Veq 3.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.1 8.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.6 0.1 
Emq 1.2 0.6 0.7 4.3 0.4 8.5 0.6 1.0 1.6 3.6 0.2 
Xmn 0.9 3.4 2.6 3.9 0.4 6.0 1.8 0.9 5.6 5.9 0.6 
Ser. 16.0 19.1 6.0 32.2 30.2 13.4 35.7 7.3 9.8 11.8 4.4 
Utc 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.2 19.0 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.8 
Tcm 7.6 11.0 5.0 23.4 8.9 6.9 27.0 5.5 5.2 3.6 2.0 
Xsr 7.9 7.1 0.9 8.6 2.2 6.0 8.6 1.0 4.4 8.0 1.6 
Main* 80.6 60.2 72.8 65.2 79.2 51.1 49.2 75.5 56.6 50.5 95.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rice exports constitute 0.0 percent of total exports for Botswana. * Shares of the three main exports (presented above in italic bold). 
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Table A4-15 
Import to Total Demand Ratios by Commodity 
(Percent, value, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 85.2 5.0 24.8 99.6 61.3 97.4 18.8 23.5 39.2 76.0 60.4 
Wgr 39.3 38.4 11.0 99.8 27.7 19.8 9.8 4.6 70.6 35.4 4.3 
Vfr 54.5 2.6 10.7 20.4 9.6 3.5 1.9 14.3 58.6 34.3 16.8 
Pfb 62.1 12.4 29.4 99.8 1.9 45.2 7.4 9.4 27.6 43.9 0.9 
Xcr 78.4 2.7 30.9 36.4 3.2 67.0 1.1 1.6 25.9 23.1 0.7 
Sgr 98.6 2.4 17.9 6.0 91.4 10.0 5.8 0.5 0.8 19.2 50.3 
Bvt 29.9 1.9 6.5 39.7 49.3 5.3 3.8 8.4 2.4 42.9 36.8 
Xfp 63.8 43.9 49.0 51.2 26.4 11.8 10.5 12.4 32.0 44.0 27.5 
Mmp 14.6 10.1 12.5 56.6 38.4 4.9 5.3 5.4 15.1 32.9 45.3 
Ffp 4.8 0.1 4.0 12.8 1.4 4.0 0.4 0.4 2.2 9.3 1.9 
Cog 41.4 5.9 44.7 55.5 8.9 66.8 2.5 49.7 6.5 60.8 3.6 
Twl 92.5 55.5 71.2 55.8 66.4 23.5 41.6 23.4 35.3 55.7 34.1 
Pch 84.3 44.5 68.6 71.6 82.0 18.9 61.0 46.1 54.6 48.1 41.7 
Mtp 62.1 45.5 68.7 84.6 87.6 17.9 65.8 67.9 70.0 36.7 72.2 
Veq 99.3 99.8 98.4 66.9 99.2 41.5 80.3 73.7 96.0 55.6 95.9 
Emq 99.0 99.8 95.9 88.5 98.7 46.2 91.9 83.7 97.1 57.1 84.5 
Xmn 43.9 15.0 46.0 57.5 63.2 11.7 44.0 23.1 35.0 34.5 27.8 
Utc 2.3 1.1 1.7 1.4 12.3 1.8 7.4 3.8 10.9 5.5 24.2 
Tcm 10.2 16.8 6.3 36.2 4.2 4.5 6.0 7.4 7.1 3.2 10.9 
Xsr 5.9 20.9 15.6 13.7 10.0 1.5 10.3 3.6 8.0 13.5 25.1 
Botswana imports 85.2 percent of its rice total demand. 
Note: the three main imports, which are previously identified in Table A4-13, are presented in italic bold. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-16 
Export to Domestic Output Ratios by Commodity 
 (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 11.7 14.0 35.3 36.0 13.3 14.2 10.3 12.5 42.4 44.8 3.9 
Ric 33.8 0.5 2.3 61.0 1.3 83.3 0.9 4.4 1.6 8.8 0.3 
Wgr 4.2 0.6 1.4 79.0 2.0 15.8 2.7 9.8 1.6 1.7 0.3 
Vfr 3.6 47.7 24.7 3.8 8.2 41.3 17.0 26.3 62.4 35.9 0.4 
Pfb 28.6 52.6 91.7 95.1 79.5 37.7 70.1 75.5 86.5 18.2 0.6 
Xcr 9.9 48.1 67.8 28.3 15.0 58.8 17.9 18.4 79.4 8.5 1.5 
Sgr 15.9 3.3 87.6 54.3 79.2 12.6 4.0 38.4 46.3 72.6 24.1 
Bvt 5.9 0.5 1.1 11.6 0.9 13.9 3.6 0.7 14.5 36.6 0.4 
Xfp 22.1 64.6 10.6 37.3 22.3 12.6 14.9 6.9 12.6 59.2 1.7 
Mmp 16.2 1.2 0.6 7.5 0.9 4.0 3.1 1.2 20.5 31.9 0.7 
Ffp 4.3 2.5 2.0 14.5 6.7 7.7 7.9 1.8 10.1 30.6 11.5 
Mani. 84.0 45.0 43.3 65.0 77.4 28.8 23.2 50.2 46.5 52.0 71.2 
Cog 98.5 88.8 95.5 94.6 25.6 70.3 29.4 28.5 50.0 97.8 94.3 
Twl 86.6 68.4 56.4 74.3 12.7 11.9 25.2 14.9 24.2 70.4 1.4 
Pch 24.8 2.9 6.8 25.2 9.1 15.6 7.6 8.5 14.4 47.2 3.0 
Mtp 63.0 7.4 9.8 25.5 98.3 51.0 50.2 94.4 81.6 43.5 21.8 
Veq 97.4 96.9 55.5 19.6 52.6 24.6 5.3 5.1 53.6 18.1 13.2 
Emq 87.9 97.0 42.7 63.9 63.5 25.6 21.2 16.8 71.3 28.5 7.3 
Xmn 12.5 11.5 13.1 45.6 8.9 16.3 12.1 6.1 41.9 34.1 7.1 
Ser. 8.0 15.1 3.9 26.4 10.3 3.1 9.7 2.8 6.5 7.2 3.2 
Utc 1.0 3.1 0.6 1.6 23.5 1.2 0.1 1.2 0.5 1.1 3.5 
Tcm 18.8 32.0 5.4 54.7 6.6 5.0 14.3 4.9 11.0 6.0 3.6 
Xsr 6.8 12.0 1.8 13.3 2.9 2.4 6.9 1.2 7.1 9.5 2.7 
Total 31.1 22.7 25.0 41.0 20.8 13.0 11.7 18.1 28.4 29.4 31.0 
Botswana exports 33.8 percent of its rice output. 
Note: the three main exports, which are previously identified in Table A4-14, are presented in italic bold. 
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Table A4-17 
Commodity Composition of SADC Imports from the EU, (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 0.9 8.5 3.4 9.4 4.0 2.6 4.3 1.7 2.9 3.0 12.3 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Vfr 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Bvt 0.1 1.2 0.7 1.4 2.0 0.8 1.5 0.2 0.4 1.5 3.1 
Xfp 0.4 5.7 1.4 5.8 1.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 5.8 
Mmp 0.2 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 3.0 
Ffp 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 
Mani. 47.5 67.3 72.3 60.1 53.3 83.7 62.3 61.2 74.5 28.7 43.2 
Cog 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.1 
Twl 1.3 8.3 0.9 5.7 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.1 3.4 1.0 1.2 
Pch 6.0 14.8 25.0 9.4 14.5 15.0 16.9 16.2 12.9 7.4 11.0 
Mtp 0.6 5.3 0.8 3.6 2.6 4.2 5.2 4.1 3.7 1.8 6.3 
Veq 18.3 9.1 6.8 5.0 4.0 24.7 7.6 5.6 10.7 4.2 5.6 
Emq 18.6 23.0 20.5 29.5 26.9 31.6 24.4 31.5 37.2 11.8 15.7 
Xmn 2.8 6.8 18.3 5.4 4.1 4.3 7.0 2.6 6.6 1.5 3.3 
Ser. 51.6 24.2 24.3 30.5 42.8 13.7 33.3 37.1 22.7 68.3 44.4 
Utc 1.9 0.7 0.3 0.4 16.1 1.3 6.4 9.4 0.8 3.1 10.5 
Tcm 15.9 5.5 8.6 15.7 9.0 7.6 10.9 17.9 8.4 7.2 7.9 
Xsr 33.8 18.1 15.4 14.5 17.7 4.9 16.0 9.8 13.5 58.1 26.0 
Main* 70.7 55.8 63.8 59.6 60.7 71.3 57.3 65.6 63.6 77.4 52.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Botswana rice imports from the EU constitute 0.0 percent of its total imports from the EU. * Shares of the three main imports from the EU (presented 
above in italic bold).  
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Table A4-18 
EU Shares in SADC Markets by Commodity 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Wgr 0.1 67.1 0.3 42.4 0.0 4.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 5.8 
Vfr 0.5 27.2 1.2 5.2 1.3 10.0 7.0 2.9 2.4 1.1 11.3 
Pfb 4.0 2.0 1.5 0.2 17.6 0.6 2.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 13.4 
Xcr 0.7 35.8 0.3 24.7 2.1 12.5 14.3 3.3 2.5 1.9 25.6 
Sgr 0.2 12.2 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.4 1.3 3.5 1.1 0.3 4.5 
Bvt 0.8 65.6 23.8 63.5 28.1 53.2 57.5 3.5 21.7 8.4 52.5 
Xfp 0.9 38.6 4.0 35.2 4.5 16.8 12.1 3.7 2.8 2.1 54.0 
Mmp 1.5 30.2 26.2 17.7 6.7 19.9 21.9 7.7 3.7 1.8 42.8 
Ffp 2.4 40.3 2.0 7.8 6.1 13.9 26.4 18.5 41.0 2.1 32.3 
Cog 1.3 5.9 0.7 46.7 2.3 7.7 4.6 0.1 0.8 23.9 20.8 
Twl 2.8 19.1 2.1 17.7 6.8 13.0 5.4 5.2 9.7 1.6 21.8 
Pch 3.7 32.2 18.7 21.6 15.4 43.3 18.1 11.4 6.7 5.0 47.4 
Mtp 0.9 43.4 3.6 11.7 11.5 28.3 13.4 8.3 3.9 4.9 49.8 
Veq 18.3 43.7 17.3 33.1 14.2 57.8 24.2 13.7 19.6 5.6 10.5 
Emq 12.2 62.9 29.1 57.2 41.4 54.8 38.2 19.2 23.1 11.7 44.5 
Xmn 5.9 51.7 43.2 37.3 18.3 41.6 33.6 11.0 25.0 3.2 51.7 
Utc 19.9 55.3 55.7 56.1 42.9 51.9 54.8 54.8 1.8 33.9 54.8 
Tcm 42.6 35.6 41.6 44.2 38.2 42.7 40.2 29.7 29.7 43.3 45.4 
Xsr 50.3 40.3 48.9 50.9 48.9 45.7 45.2 43.1 31.0 56.4 49.1 
0.1 percent of Botswana rice imports are sourced in the EU. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-19 
Imports from the EU as Ratios to the EU Exports by Commodity 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mani. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Ser. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.2 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
0.0 percent of the EU rice exports are destined for Botswana. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-20 
Imports from the EU as Ratios to the EU Exports to its non-EU Partners by Commodity 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Wgr 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Sgr 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
Xfp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Mani. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Xmn 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Ser. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 
Utc 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 3.1 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Xsr 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
0.0 percent of the EU rice exports to the non-EU partners are destined for Botswana. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-21 
Commodity Composition of Exports to the EU (Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Agri. 2.1 39.8 71.9 22.0 9.6 12.2 51.7 36.4 56.6 27.9 9.0 
Ric 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Vfr 0.0 7.5 1.3 0.2 0.2 5.9 3.2 7.6 5.0 1.8 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.3 0.3 4.2 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 5.9 57.2 0.1 1.9 0.3 15.3 20.7 36.2 0.1 0.8 
Sgr 0.0 1.3 12.0 16.3 0.9 0.0 2.7 5.0 7.2 3.9 0.7 
Bvt 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 2.5 1.6 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.1 
Xfp 0.0 22.6 0.3 4.4 5.5 1.9 20.5 0.7 1.7 16.6 0.6 
Mmp 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.5 3.1 0.1 
Ffp 0.2 1.6 0.4 0.6 0.3 1.3 4.6 1.6 1.1 2.1 6.7 
Mani. 88.7 44.6 21.2 51.4 78.9 70.6 12.6 50.4 34.6 49.9 79.3 
Cog 86.8 14.5 19.9 7.8 0.5 25.4 3.8 6.2 8.0 39.2 74.4 
Twl 0.6 21.2 0.2 33.3 0.2 2.2 4.8 11.3 2.9 1.6 0.2 
Pch 0.1 0.7 0.5 1.5 0.1 5.6 1.4 0.6 0.9 4.4 0.3 
Mtp 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 77.7 17.1 1.0 31.0 20.8 2.3 0.7 
Veq 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.0 6.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.1 
Emq 0.5 1.1 0.1 3.1 0.1 8.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 
Xmn 0.6 6.2 0.3 4.7 0.3 5.4 0.9 0.7 1.5 0.8 2.9 
Ser. 9.2 15.6 6.9 26.6 11.5 17.2 35.8 13.2 8.8 22.1 11.7 
Utc 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.2 6.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 2.2 
Tcm 3.9 9.6 5.8 18.6 4.1 8.8 26.2 9.4 3.9 5.6 4.8 
Xsr 5.0 4.9 1.1 7.8 1.4 7.7 9.5 3.6 4.7 16.1 4.7 
Main* 95.7 58.3 89.1 68.3 89.2 51.3 61.9 63.0 65.0 72.0 85.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rice exports constitute 0.0 percent of Botswana total exports to the EU. * Shares of the three main exports to the EU (presented above in italic bold). 
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Table A4-22 
Exports to the EU to Total Exports Ratios by Commodity 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 1.3 50.8 47.2 3.1 13.4 0.0 45.8 3.6 8.5 7.9 36.3 
Wgr 17.7 97.6 16.2 14.6 9.9 1.3 31.4 1.3 9.0 21.4 36.3 
Vfr 36.0 94.5 17.4 66.5 6.2 65.7 22.5 52.3 71.1 52.1 46.0 
Pfb 18.5 64.5 3.1 0.8 41.1 3.8 12.2 0.5 16.0 2.1 0.9 
Xcr 20.6 31.9 50.9 57.3 34.6 33.6 51.5 51.1 52.7 24.4 64.0 
Sgr 8.6 94.1 44.7 96.3 59.2 3.7 78.0 32.7 58.7 27.2 39.6 
Bvt 35.5 49.6 38.1 46.0 34.1 48.0 43.0 27.2 8.8 4.3 33.5 
Xfp 4.4 87.7 7.6 68.8 54.3 25.8 53.6 3.1 26.5 43.9 26.6 
Mmp 67.6 21.5 42.4 27.3 57.0 16.7 47.1 14.9 19.7 48.7 52.6 
Ffp 58.2 49.8 54.9 49.3 11.9 56.9 35.1 32.5 34.7 24.3 48.2 
Cog 94.8 30.8 28.3 28.3 31.9 66.6 21.9 18.9 18.6 62.8 8.9 
Twl 16.4 37.9 1.0 67.7 37.0 30.9 29.5 55.4 27.2 2.6 40.0 
Pch 5.5 56.0 10.5 33.6 8.7 18.4 21.6 2.6 7.2 6.6 7.2 
Mtp 0.7 23.6 4.0 42.3 98.5 22.7 3.5 5.1 25.5 10.0 13.6 
Veq 0.6 92.6 10.1 41.1 11.1 28.5 17.2 6.9 1.9 15.7 10.6 
Emq 32.2 84.8 5.6 38.5 16.3 35.3 28.2 4.7 7.2 5.1 37.7 
Xmn 42.3 85.9 4.6 66.7 54.8 32.2 16.3 8.7 7.7 3.4 52.7 
Utc 48.8 48.8 11.7 49.1 20.5 43.6 40.1 3.1 31.5 49.5 29.8 
Tcm 36.4 40.8 39.8 43.3 30.1 45.3 31.7 18.2 22.0 40.6 26.7 
Xsr 44.7 32.3 42.5 49.4 41.7 45.7 36.1 38.2 31.5 53.3 32.3 
Total 71.1 46.8 34.7 54.4 65.1 35.6 32.7 10.7 29.3 26.3 11.0 
1.3 percent of Botswana rice exports are destined for the EU. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
  
 
3
1
7
 
Table A4-23 
SADC Shares in the EU Commodity Markets 
 (Percent, fob price, 2004) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.1 
Sgr 0.0 0.3 0.7 8.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 1.2 1.6 0.2 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Mmp 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 
Cog 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 
Twl 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
0.0 percent of the EU rice imports are sourced in Botswana. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-24 
Applied Tariffs on Imports from the EU 
(Percent, imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 4.0 0.0 8.8 3.3 9.2 0.0 2.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 6.9 2.7 0.0 0.6 4.5 
Vfr 0.0 8.7 5.3 12.2 15.8 1.0 12.8 13.5 17.2 7.2 7.8 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Xcr 0.0 4.0 5.8 13.7 3.0 6.6 1.3 6.9 4.0 2.1 14.8 
Sgr 2.6 12.4 0.0 50.2 5.5 4.7 22.9 0.0 0.0 3.7 5.5 
Bvt 3.3 3.4 13.3 70.6 17.2 5.9 18.0 21.1 23.5 2.8 27.4 
Xfp 1.6 2.7 16.7 10.3 19.0 7.4 20.5 21.5 24.2 4.9 10.6 
Mmp 0.0 5.0 11.7 12.6 19.4 37.1 18.7 12.0 25.7 67.5 11.5 
Ffp 0.0 0.7 0.9 3.9 10.0 0.9 10.3 6.0 10.5 0.2 10.9 
Cog 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 5.6 0.0 2.3 4.8 8.6 0.0 9.5 
Twl 11.5 6.8 17.1 16.5 19.1 12.3 19.9 18.4 28.3 16.6 14.5 
Pch 1.5 2.0 1.9 23.3 4.8 2.8 7.2 6.4 8.2 2.9 10.5 
Mtp 2.6 3.6 13.9 16.6 8.5 3.1 15.2 9.7 14.5 1.3 7.0 
Veq 20.4 6.3 11.8 9.0 7.9 13.6 6.6 11.8 30.6 5.3 6.8 
Emq 0.8 4.6 7.7 12.1 7.7 1.1 6.5 5.0 10.2 0.7 4.7 
Xmn 3.1 3.7 7.9 35.7 14.8 4.4 11.8 13.0 19.6 6.9 11.1 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Data covers all import distortions; ad valorem tariff rates (including quotas) and the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs GTAP7 data 
for trade protection covers all import distortions; ad valorem tariff rates (including quotas) and the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-25 
Applied Tariffs on Exports to the EU 
(Percent, imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 36.9 125.8 115.7 0.0 57.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.1 0.0 10.2 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.3 0.0 7.7 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.3 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 112.0 87.3 79.2 48.1 60.6 82.0 90.2 146.3 242.2 67.4 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 10.4 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Xfp 4.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 10.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Mmp 70.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 0.0 34.8 0.0 0.0 10.7 97.9 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Data covers all import distortions; ad valorem tariff rates (including quotas) and the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs GTAP7 data 
for trade protection covers all import distortions; ad valorem tariff rates (including quotas) and the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-26 
Applied Tariffs on the EU Trade with non-SADC Partners 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer USA EAS SAS SSA ROW EU 
Exporter EU USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
Ric 6.8 47.9 19.2 13.5 16.7 68.4 107.5 89.8 1.3 50.3 
Wgr 0.1 9.3 4.1 8.4 23.8 19.3 28.1 12.4 1.8 22.4 
Vfr 2.6 8.4 19.8 21.1 16.3 2.9 41.6 3.4 10.9 20.3 
Pfb 5.4 0.4 3.5 2.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 10.1 4.6 26.6 9.6 18.7 35.5 4.7 2.1 0.0 11.0 
Sgr 27.5 27.9 18.1 17.3 15.1 18.9 56.8 28.3 111.4 160.6 
Bvt 1.9 18.7 36.6 34.7 23.7 10.1 9.1 14.6 1.2 8.8 
Xfp 6.3 21.1 15.3 23.8 13.9 9.5 13.3 9.6 0.1 5.5 
Mmp 16.2 43.5 8.6 16.5 28.2 32.2 10.5 33.8 3.6 47.3 
Ffp 0.2 6.5 6.4 14.7 7.8 3.1 0.8 2.1 0.0 2.3 
Cog 0.3 2.2 13.5 7.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 8.2 10.0 11.7 26.0 9.3 6.6 10.0 5.8 0.0 1.1 
Pch 1.9 4.6 7.9 16.5 4.6 1.9 3.2 1.2 0.0 0.8 
Mtp 1.6 4.1 9.6 17.7 5.2 2.3 2.4 0.4 0.0 0.6 
Veq 1.7 9.1 13.8 13.7 6.5 2.8 6.6 4.1 0.0 0.6 
Emq 1.0 4.2 5.3 11.5 4.5 1.0 1.9 0.8 0.0 0.2 
Xmn 0.8 3.2 9.8 20.3 5.5 0.8 1.6 0.6 0.0 0.3 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Data covers all import distortions; ad valorem tariff rates (including quotas) and the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs GTAP7 data for 
trade protection covers all import distortions; ad valorem tariff rates (including quotas) and the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of specific tariffs. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-27 
Shares for SADC Exporters in SADC Importing Markets 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter BWA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.1 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.6 2.5 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.9 0.1 0.5 2.6 0.1 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 14.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3 17.6 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 29.3 0.1 0.0 
Veq 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.7 1.9 0.2 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MDG 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MWI 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.3 
Vfr 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.0 
Pfb 21.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 9.3 49.2 47.0 0.0 23.7 0.0 
Xcr 5.7 0.0 3.2 9.5 5.9 2.2 3.7 3.0 0.0 11.2 
Sgr 1.3 3.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 10.4 16.7 4.3 0.0 1.4 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 1.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.1 0.0 0.0 11.8 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MUS 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 18.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 9.7 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.3 0.0 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 18.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.4 9.6 0.1 2.6 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.2 3.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Mtp 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.1 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MOZ 
Ric 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 11.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 47.9 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 5.5 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 74.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 7.7 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 5.6 1.4 0.0 0.1 2.8 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 19.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 2.6 1.8 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Utc 4.9 0.2 0.4 0.2 2.6 0.1 0.0 86.4 3.5 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter ZAF 
Ric 98.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 64.3 14.0 86.1 0.3 
Wgr 98.3 1.9 1.3 0.1 7.6 3.3 89.4 51.1 68.0 22.6 
Vfr 94.6 4.8 12.7 35.8 87.0 7.5 23.7 27.7 93.4 34.8 
Pfb 9.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.1 6.1 92.4 6.4 0.1 
Xcr 90.2 0.7 1.9 10.8 48.0 1.5 35.1 15.1 88.8 29.9 
Sgr 64.8 13.6 1.1 98.0 78.4 31.1 35.0 8.8 29.8 9.8 
Bvt 94.0 4.5 23.2 13.6 33.3 19.0 58.1 54.9 88.1 28.0 
Xfp 94.8 1.1 18.1 9.0 32.4 2.8 56.3 47.9 89.3 3.2 
Mmp 91.2 0.5 22.0 4.0 52.4 7.8 52.5 74.4 94.9 2.2 
Ffp 69.1 1.4 14.5 56.0 48.8 11.1 40.1 41.5 93.1 9.5 
Cog 61.0 27.5 12.6 18.5 59.6 11.9 3.7 28.5 34.7 9.3 
Twl 70.1 1.5 13.8 5.6 15.6 2.1 22.1 27.7 46.4 3.8 
Pch 89.2 25.5 43.9 12.0 53.5 10.8 57.7 68.3 86.5 12.4 
Mtp 91.6 10.2 43.9 14.7 68.0 22.4 61.5 60.2 90.4 14.7 
Veq 74.7 5.7 43.2 9.1 49.5 9.6 53.4 42.6 82.7 0.9 
Emq 71.2 2.5 34.0 4.7 37.5 12.6 50.7 40.8 74.6 7.1 
Xmn 86.8 14.1 27.7 15.8 44.2 14.0 53.6 55.3 77.3 8.6 
Utc 58.5 0.7 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.1 7.9 15.7 0.1 
Tcm 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Xsr 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter TZA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.1 16.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 2.1 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 3.8 32.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.1 0.1 0.9 2.0 0.0 1.6 1.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.3 4.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.5 9.3 0.0 1.4 0.2 4.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.4 2.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.1 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter ZMB 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.7 0.0 33.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.2 17.6 0.8 0.4 
Vfr 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 45.8 0.1 0.2 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 87.7 14.0 0.0 39.8 0.0 5.1 14.4 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 21.3 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.0 59.5 0.0 0.2 
Sgr 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.3 3.7 1.2 0.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.2 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.1 2.6 0.0 3.7 0.1 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.1 0.1 9.2 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.6 3.3 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 23.0 0.1 0.0 
Twl 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.2 0.0 3.0 0.1 0.4 2.0 31.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 2.4 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.5 0.0 7.5 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZMB XSC XSD 
Exporter ZWE 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 2.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.0 55.2 0.6 0.0 
Pfb 45.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 12.5 38.6 0.0 42.5 15.9 0.0 
Xcr 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.2 31.5 10.6 25.2 49.1 0.3 2.7 
Sgr 32.8 0.0 40.7 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 19.2 66.8 0.0 
Bvt 2.5 0.0 40.6 1.2 12.8 0.4 0.0 22.0 0.7 1.2 
Xfp 2.3 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.2 9.4 0.1 0.0 
Mmp 3.3 0.0 23.1 2.9 0.9 1.3 2.2 6.4 0.6 0.0 
Ffp 18.1 0.0 66.8 0.0 4.8 0.5 1.3 5.8 0.1 0.2 
Cog 0.1 0.0 62.9 0.0 7.2 3.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.1 
Twl 1.8 0.0 3.5 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.1 4.9 0.2 0.0 
Pch 1.4 0.0 4.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 3.8 0.0 10.9 0.0 0.8 1.9 0.0 8.2 0.2 0.0 
Veq 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.3 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.9 0.1 0.0 
Xmn 2.8 0.0 6.3 0.0 1.0 3.6 0.2 14.5 0.2 0.1 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter XSC 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 20.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 
Sgr 0.0 46.6 0.2 0.0 21.3 82.0 1.5 13.8 67.6 0.0 8.7 
Bvt 1.7 0.0 1.2 0.1 23.2 19.1 0.9 11.9 9.4 0.1 12.3 
Xfp 0.9 0.0 0.6 3.4 14.1 12.1 5.6 2.6 8.3 0.3 4.4 
Mmp 2.6 0.0 1.3 0.0 6.5 10.9 1.0 4.4 1.8 0.0 0.8 
Ffp 2.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 28.8 44.8 0.1 9.0 4.5 0.0 7.2 
Cog 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.3 0.0 8.2 1.1 0.1 21.6 
Twl 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.3 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 
Pch 0.1 0.1 1.4 1.1 4.2 10.3 1.9 1.4 0.2 0.3 5.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.9 
Veq 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.5 
Emq 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.9 
Xmn 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.8 2.5 12.7 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 8.4 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-27 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.1 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 percent of Madagascar rice imports are sourced in Botswana. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-28 
Applied Tariffs on SADC Exports in SADC Importing Markets 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter BWA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 21.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.5 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 25.0 5.5 0.5 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 33.4 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 14.9 33.7 0.0 15.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 16.9 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 4.9 9.7 4.4 7.2 0.0 0.0 24.5 37.3 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 14.2 44.1 4.2 0.0 3.5 10.0 12.6 0.0 2.0 
Mtp 5.0 22.0 0.0 9.3 0.1 15.0 6.4 5.1 0.0 4.9 
Veq 0.0 2.1 0.2 10.8 0.0 7.9 14.3 38.6 0.0 10.0 
Emq 5.0 15.2 0.1 5.9 0.0 8.6 10.3 11.8 0.0 4.9 
Xmn 4.6 17.3 0.0 21.7 0.0 0.0 22.4 31.3 0.0 5.1 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 21.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MDG 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.6 6.0 0.0 0.0 23.3 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 
Mtp 7.5 0.0 0.0 11.6 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 
Veq 0.8 0.0 0.0 25.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.1 14.1 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MWI 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 20.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.2 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 
Sgr 8.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.9 0.0 22.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.1 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.5 0.0 24.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 4.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 8.9 18.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 17.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.9 0.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 15.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 7.7 0.0 0.0 11.2 4.8 10.9 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.0 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 
Xmn 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 19.3 0.0 0.0 1.4 15.6 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 20.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MUS 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 0.0 17.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.2 0.0 0.0 24.9 4.0 11.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 17.8 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.6 0.0 17.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 
Veq 9.9 0.0 0.0 6.8 3.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3
3
6
 
Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter MOZ 
Ric 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 19.8 0.0 23.2 2.6 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 16.9 0.0 4.6 0.0 14.0 24.4 7.8 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.0 2.5 14.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 22.3 0.0 12.6 0.0 15.0 23.0 3.4 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 12.5 25.0 0.0 0.1 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 346.4 0.0 0.0 28.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 1.5 24.1 14.9 16.0 0.3 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.7 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 1.0 15.0 0.9 15.0 2.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 
Twl 30.5 0.0 8.5 0.0 35.8 25.0 15.5 25.5 15.6 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 16.9 0.0 0.6 13.1 4.0 0.0 
Mtp 4.0 0.0 22.8 0.0 1.6 19.1 11.5 11.0 2.5 0.0 
Veq 15.0 0.0 10.9 0.0 13.3 7.8 11.1 28.0 22.8 0.0 
Emq 1.1 0.0 4.9 0.0 4.0 1.4 6.4 9.6 0.4 0.0 
Xmn 9.5 0.0 14.8 0.3 1.8 24.6 0.1 252.5 2.1 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 19.8 0.0 23.2 2.6 0.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter ZAF 
Ric 0.0 0.0 10.0 2.8 6.4 25.0 5.0 15.0 0.0 2.9 
Wgr 0.0 2.6 0.1 0.0 2.1 16.8 5.0 22.1 0.0 2.1 
Vfr 0.0 10.0 19.2 0.9 24.4 24.9 15.9 29.3 0.0 5.3 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.2 5.3 13.5 13.5 20.4 6.5 14.2 74.4 0.7 8.8 
Sgr 0.0 12.5 24.6 80.0 7.5 25.0 24.9 24.9 0.0 5.3 
Bvt 0.0 6.9 20.1 70.6 24.1 18.5 23.0 51.8 0.0 29.8 
Xfp 0.0 6.8 11.4 17.5 18.8 22.2 15.4 24.2 0.0 9.7 
Mmp 0.0 4.6 13.0 5.8 19.7 24.3 13.7 28.5 0.0 7.1 
Ffp 0.0 1.3 8.0 0.6 6.1 12.8 13.9 9.6 0.0 11.5 
Cog 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.1 4.7 4.9 1.8 5.3 0.0 10.3 
Twl 0.0 5.0 16.2 3.5 20.3 21.2 19.3 23.6 0.0 13.1 
Pch 0.0 0.4 6.0 12.3 7.9 6.0 9.0 11.3 0.0 11.8 
Mtp 0.0 2.9 14.0 13.5 8.2 9.6 8.0 11.7 0.1 5.7 
Veq 0.0 5.3 12.2 7.8 7.6 4.7 12.5 29.3 0.0 5.7 
Emq 0.0 4.8 7.4 12.8 8.0 9.6 5.9 12.6 0.0 4.3 
Xmn 0.0 3.5 13.0 10.1 13.1 12.7 12.8 22.7 0.0 11.3 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 10.0 2.8 6.4 25.0 5.0 15.0 0.0 2.9 
Xsr 0.0 2.6 0.1 0.0 2.1 16.8 5.0 22.1 0.0 2.1 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter TZA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 20.4 0.9 0.0 3.3 14.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 8.5 2.5 14.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 11.5 49.4 0.0 14.7 16.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 23.3 0.0 25.0 17.8 24.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 9.1 21.2 25.5 16.5 7.8 15.5 20.3 0.0 9.9 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.0 0.0 3.7 21.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 2.1 3.6 0.0 0.3 16.1 12.8 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 8.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 24.1 0.2 7.0 0.0 17.1 21.7 24.4 35.0 15.2 0.0 
Pch 0.0 5.0 6.5 10.0 12.2 9.1 7.5 20.0 14.8 10.4 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 11.4 20.0 13.8 0.0 3.9 0.0 15.0 6.4 
Veq 26.4 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 9.0 15.8 26.9 16.8 0.0 
Emq 1.5 4.9 3.0 0.0 1.3 1.1 5.7 8.3 1.3 0.0 
Xmn 4.7 0.0 14.5 25.8 16.1 1.7 22.9 16.4 14.2 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter ZMB 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.9 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 
Sgr 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 25.0 0.0 6.1 5.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 0.0 24.9 0.0 0.0 8.4 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.7 0.0 18.6 0.0 0.0 3.7 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 
Twl 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.3 17.6 0.0 2.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 26.8 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 14.9 0.0 0.0 7.5 
Veq 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 3.5 5.4 0.0 8.3 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Xmn 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.3 0.1 21.6 0.0 3.3 14.8 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.9 0.0 0.0 2.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB XSC XSD 
Exporter ZWE 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 9.5 
Sgr 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.2 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 29.3 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 24.8 0.0 0.0 13.9 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.6 0.0 24.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 22.1 0.0 0.0 9.9 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.9 
Twl 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.7 1.1 20.6 0.0 4.3 18.4 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 0.0 15.3 0.0 0.0 13.6 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 10.3 
Veq 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 1.9 7.5 0.0 7.8 7.6 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 11.4 
Xmn 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.4 22.5 0.0 1.1 19.4 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter XSC 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 2.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.8 8.9 0.0 0.0 23.5 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 
Sgr 0.0 12.5 22.7 0.0 7.5 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 5.4 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 10.0 72.7 24.9 0.0 25.0 24.8 64.2 0.0 30.5 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 19.2 11.6 14.9 0.0 17.5 8.5 10.3 0.0 10.8 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 21.9 0.0 24.1 15.8 32.8 0.0 7.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.2 12.8 16.1 0.0 11.1 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 4.8 0.0 25.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 15.4 
Twl 0.0 0.0 20.5 3.8 16.4 0.0 12.9 24.0 29.9 0.0 9.1 
Pch 0.0 5.0 5.1 5.8 9.5 0.0 9.9 0.7 6.2 0.0 12.6 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 9.2 9.9 11.2 0.0 15.5 6.5 17.0 20.0 4.3 
Veq 0.0 5.0 16.1 0.0 17.8 0.0 5.1 12.2 31.3 0.0 7.4 
Emq 0.0 0.0 10.8 33.1 8.3 0.0 14.5 11.9 47.2 0.0 6.4 
Xmn 0.0 5.0 19.5 0.1 4.1 0.0 22.0 21.4 17.1 0.0 10.9 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 2.0 
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Table A4-28 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.6 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 59.1 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Ffp 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.1 0.0 
Pch 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 10.0 10.9 6.6 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 14.9 27.8 20.9 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 12.2 0.0 0.0 1.5 13.3 0.6 4.6 8.2 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 20.3 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.3 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Madagascar grants duty-free access to rice imports from Botswana. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-29 
Exports to SADC to Total Exports Ratios by Commodity 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter BWA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.3 
Wgr 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 56.4 0.0 0.1 5.9 0.0 0.0 62.9 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.1 0.0 7.6 8.9 0.0 24.2 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.4 
Xcr 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 39.1 0.0 0.2 12.8 10.2 0.0 62.6 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 0.0 0.0 61.1 12.0 0.0 82.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.5 0.1 0.9 1.3 0.1 0.0 25.9 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85.4 0.0 0.6 2.9 1.0 0.0 90.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 14.1 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.6 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 47.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 48.5 
Pch 0.0 0.9 0.0 2.0 69.3 0.9 2.1 11.3 1.4 0.2 88.1 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.1 25.5 0.1 0.0 33.1 
Veq 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.0 88.8 0.0 2.4 0.5 1.3 0.0 94.1 
Emq 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3 51.4 0.2 2.3 1.8 2.5 0.2 59.5 
Xmn 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 29.5 0.0 3.1 3.4 2.1 0.0 38.4 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.5 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter MDG 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Pch 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.0 0.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 11.4 
Mtp 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Veq 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 
Emq 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.4 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.8 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter MWI 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 21.2 0.0 0.0 24.1 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 6.9 4.7 1.2 43.3 0.0 5.1 63.9 
Vfr 0.8 0.0 2.1 0.1 6.3 0.1 0.1 1.7 1.5 0.0 12.6 
Pfb 1.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 40.7 6.1 7.2 0.0 17.8 0.0 73.6 
Xcr 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.4 5.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 7.0 
Sgr 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 6.5 4.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 12.7 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.5 4.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 9.2 
Xfp 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 43.9 1.0 7.6 28.6 0.0 0.4 81.9 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 5.4 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.0 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 6.1 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 31.8 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.5 0.0 34.7 
Pch 0.3 0.0 0.1 5.2 22.3 1.6 31.8 14.0 0.2 0.0 75.4 
Mtp 0.2 0.0 0.0 11.9 71.4 0.4 4.1 2.6 0.2 0.0 90.8 
Veq 6.4 0.0 0.0 14.5 42.3 2.0 6.0 12.5 1.0 0.0 84.6 
Emq 0.8 0.0 0.0 11.2 24.1 7.7 9.1 15.4 0.0 0.1 68.3 
Xmn 0.8 0.0 0.1 68.7 14.3 0.5 2.7 1.4 0.3 0.1 88.9 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 68.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter MUS 
Ric 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 20.7 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 23.5 
Xfp 0.0 6.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 9.3 
Mmp 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 6.6 
Ffp 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 
Twl 0.1 2.5 0.0 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.2 
Pch 1.2 10.8 1.1 0.1 2.9 2.0 1.3 0.9 0.1 1.0 21.3 
Mtp 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.1 2.9 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.6 12.8 
Veq 0.8 1.7 0.0 0.2 1.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Emq 0.1 3.1 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 7.5 
Xmn 0.1 2.9 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.7 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 6.2 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.1 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter MOZ 
Ric 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 22.4 27.6 0.0 16.3 0.0 0.0 71.5 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 41.4 0.0 3.0 4.6 0.0 12.1 0.1 0.0 61.2 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 7.3 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.0 12.7 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.5 0.0 9.3 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 47.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 3.3 0.0 0.0 51.1 
Sgr 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 3.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 6.3 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 15.1 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 1.1 1.9 4.4 0.0 26.4 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 6.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 7.8 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 4.1 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 6.8 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 22.5 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 24.2 
Pch 0.0 0.0 56.7 0.0 24.3 0.0 1.2 0.7 3.8 0.0 86.7 
Mtp 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Veq 12.2 0.0 8.4 0.0 36.7 4.3 4.4 1.6 8.3 0.0 76.0 
Emq 1.4 0.0 4.4 0.0 17.2 0.1 2.8 3.8 24.3 0.0 53.9 
Xmn 0.5 0.0 2.0 0.9 21.0 0.6 1.4 5.8 0.3 0.0 32.5 
Utc 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.6 0.1 29.6 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter ZAF 
Ric 43.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 12.8 2.0 36.1 0.7 95.5 
Wgr 20.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 3.0 1.8 5.4 28.2 18.6 4.0 81.1 
Vfr 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 2.3 0.9 7.1 
Pfb 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 11.4 1.4 0.0 13.2 
Xcr 6.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 2.6 0.1 0.9 2.3 9.2 1.0 22.8 
Sgr 7.2 0.4 0.0 3.5 15.7 3.4 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 35.0 
Bvt 5.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.2 11.1 7.0 26.1 
Xfp 10.1 0.1 0.8 1.1 2.8 0.3 2.8 3.2 18.7 1.0 40.9 
Mmp 16.9 0.0 0.5 0.9 4.8 0.4 1.1 1.8 30.9 2.1 59.6 
Ffp 1.5 0.0 0.1 2.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 6.4 0.5 12.0 
Cog 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 
Twl 8.9 0.3 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.3 0.9 1.6 15.1 0.7 30.7 
Pch 9.2 1.0 1.8 0.9 3.3 1.3 3.6 4.9 15.0 2.0 43.0 
Mtp 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.6 0.5 6.5 
Veq 6.4 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.3 0.5 1.3 1.2 9.6 0.4 22.0 
Emq 8.8 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.1 1.3 4.5 3.1 11.1 2.2 34.7 
Xmn 4.7 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.0 7.7 0.7 18.9 
Utc 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 2.6 3.1 0.2 13.4 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter TZA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 
Pfb 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 
Twl 0.0 1.0 6.2 0.0 0.9 3.2 2.3 0.4 2.0 0.0 16.0 
Pch 0.0 2.5 11.8 0.3 2.1 1.1 5.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 25.1 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 41.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 42.0 
Veq 0.3 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 5.5 26.5 1.2 0.5 0.0 37.6 
Emq 0.4 0.0 18.4 0.0 0.4 7.2 6.9 2.3 0.2 0.0 35.8 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.8 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Xsr 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter ZMB 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 
Wgr 1.0 0.0 18.9 0.0 0.0 0.7 7.8 63.3 1.5 0.4 93.7 
Vfr 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 45.2 0.2 0.3 46.4 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.1 0.0 33.4 0.0 0.4 2.1 0.0 39.6 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 11.5 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 21.7 0.0 0.0 36.7 
Sgr 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 3.4 0.1 0.7 0.2 15.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 17.6 0.0 1.0 1.3 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.0 26.5 
Xfp 0.6 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.3 65.0 0.1 7.6 0.7 0.1 78.4 
Mmp 0.4 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 24.4 
Ffp 0.1 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.8 2.4 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 7.5 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 39.1 
Twl 1.1 0.0 1.9 10.8 0.0 10.5 0.3 4.0 0.3 0.0 28.9 
Pch 0.1 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.1 1.3 2.4 3.0 0.4 0.0 13.7 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.7 8.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 13.6 
Veq 2.2 0.0 2.7 0.0 1.8 12.0 9.0 39.2 3.6 0.0 70.5 
Emq 0.3 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.7 53.5 3.0 12.2 0.5 0.0 73.4 
Xmn 0.7 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.3 48.3 1.5 8.6 0.3 0.0 63.0 
Utc 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.3 3.8 0.1 34.2 0.0 88.8 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZMB XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter ZWE  
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 70.4 0.0 0.0 70.6 
Wgr 29.8 0.0 12.5 0.2 0.0 6.2 0.0 16.4 0.4 0.0 65.6 
Vfr 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 13.8 0.6 0.0 19.4 
Pfb 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.9 0.0 0.8 1.5 0.0 23.5 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 6.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 8.2 
Sgr 10.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.0 33.4 
Bvt 2.8 0.0 4.8 0.6 8.5 2.2 0.0 6.0 1.9 6.5 33.3 
Xfp 9.1 0.0 4.6 0.0 1.7 22.2 0.7 17.6 0.5 0.1 56.5 
Mmp 12.7 0.0 11.4 13.7 1.6 27.5 2.2 2.9 4.4 0.0 76.4 
Ffp 8.5 0.0 10.5 0.0 1.1 5.7 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 27.1 
Cog 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.1 68.2 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 72.3 
Twl 4.9 0.0 4.2 0.3 1.2 39.3 0.2 4.3 1.4 0.1 55.9 
Pch 11.3 0.0 16.3 0.3 1.6 17.7 0.1 31.6 0.5 0.1 79.5 
Mtp 1.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 11.0 0.0 2.2 0.1 0.0 16.2 
Veq 7.7 0.1 7.1 0.0 4.0 56.1 4.2 9.1 0.8 0.0 89.1 
Emq 5.7 0.0 13.0 0.0 2.0 21.1 0.9 25.3 2.2 0.0 70.2 
Xmn 4.3 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.9 61.6 0.3 8.1 0.6 0.2 80.3 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
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Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter XSC  
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.5 82.9 
Wgr 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 16.6 0.0 0.0 13.4 0.0 15.6 55.2 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 29.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 36.3 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 19.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 20.3 
Xcr 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.2 48.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 67.6 
Sgr 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 4.2 54.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 62.6 
Bvt 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.9 52.4 0.2 1.5 0.4 0.1 29.3 91.7 
Xfp 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.0 2.9 23.0 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.2 3.5 33.9 
Mmp 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.8 33.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 2.4 39.6 
Ffp 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 66.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.2 69.2 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 9.5 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 23.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 24.1 
Pch 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.6 65.6 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 4.8 75.2 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 11.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.4 16.5 
Veq 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 39.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 35.9 78.4 
Emq 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 39.3 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 12.2 53.9 
Xmn 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.7 71.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 6.7 79.9 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.8 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3
5
3
 
Table A4-29 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF  TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD SADC 
Exporter XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.9 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 8.5 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 7.5 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.0 15.2 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 3.4 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 4.4 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 6.6 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
0.0 percent of Botswana rice exports are destined for Madagascar.  
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-30 
Shares for non-SADC non-EU Exporters in SADC Importing Markets 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter USA 
Ric 0.0 8.2 45.2 0.0 4.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.0 
Wgr 0.0 22.8 16.3 0.0 38.1 26.9 3.8 8.3 5.9 28.8 31.1 
Vfr 0.1 8.7 29.5 2.7 4.8 7.1 40.3 6.1 17.0 2.0 9.3 
Pfb 1.4 0.5 0.5 2.4 6.2 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.4 
Xcr 0.1 49.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 5.7 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.1 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 
Bvt 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.1 8.5 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.0 
Xfp 0.1 8.6 20.8 0.4 5.9 3.3 1.7 2.5 11.3 1.9 2.3 
Mmp 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.2 4.2 3.4 1.2 2.5 0.6 0.3 9.8 
Ffp 0.5 4.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 10.3 1.3 7.8 1.7 0.3 7.4 
Cog 0.1 27.4 0.0 14.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 9.1 19.1 
Twl 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.2 2.0 1.9 2.4 1.1 1.4 0.4 1.9 
Pch 0.5 1.9 1.8 1.2 4.4 10.0 2.2 1.3 2.5 1.2 4.8 
Mtp 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 3.5 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.9 10.1 
Veq 1.5 3.4 1.1 1.2 2.9 7.9 19.2 1.9 6.9 0.9 1.2 
Emq 3.6 2.8 4.4 4.1 1.7 9.9 7.0 3.4 2.8 2.1 24.9 
Xmn 0.6 1.0 2.2 3.8 4.4 8.3 7.3 1.9 2.7 7.5 5.3 
Utc 2.8 7.7 8.6 7.8 4.0 5.1 7.5 7.6 1.3 3.2 7.8 
Tcm 9.4 8.7 11.9 14.3 18.5 10.0 13.2 31.2 23.7 8.0 5.5 
Xsr 20.6 33.9 22.3 20.9 23.0 24.6 26.5 27.1 32.1 19.3 22.1 
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Table A4-30 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter EAS 
Ric 0.7 5.0 1.6 0.4 3.7 0.6 10.0 0.3 0.8 0.4 2.2 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.6 39.6 1.2 3.7 1.5 18.1 13.8 2.4 0.3 0.2 13.0 
Pfb 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Xcr 0.0 3.2 0.0 6.6 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.5 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.2 8.6 0.5 2.1 0.4 1.8 1.0 0.2 1.2 0.8 0.1 
Xfp 0.1 4.7 0.2 4.3 1.3 3.5 0.8 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.8 
Mmp 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.7 
Ffp 2.7 10.3 2.0 4.0 3.2 8.2 15.7 3.6 2.4 0.5 1.3 
Cog 0.4 2.8 0.3 1.3 0.9 0.4 1.5 0.0 0.2 0.6 7.0 
Twl 21.4 56.9 31.3 32.9 27.4 48.1 33.8 27.1 31.9 42.9 28.9 
Pch 1.7 7.8 5.3 7.4 7.4 12.0 7.7 5.9 3.8 2.2 5.3 
Mtp 0.5 10.6 4.6 4.6 6.0 13.5 10.0 2.5 1.1 2.4 5.0 
Veq 2.4 34.0 20.3 36.8 16.9 22.2 32.6 12.5 13.8 2.6 80.3 
Emq 1.9 16.3 13.3 14.2 8.3 20.5 15.1 9.2 12.1 7.0 6.6 
Xmn 0.9 12.3 2.2 10.9 3.3 12.1 5.2 4.0 3.5 3.0 5.4 
Utc 6.3 16.5 9.2 13.7 8.7 7.5 19.2 20.3 0.8 5.6 20.4 
Tcm 12.0 30.7 13.8 16.3 14.7 20.0 12.4 10.4 22.4 20.3 29.7 
Xsr 8.0 6.9 7.9 7.3 8.2 8.4 7.5 8.5 17.3 7.3 9.1 
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Table A4-30 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter SAS 
Ric 0.7 86.6 45.2 97.9 89.0 96.2 83.4 33.1 81.6 13.1 95.2 
Wgr 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 45.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.2 1.5 1.7 21.8 0.2 8.9 1.9 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 
Pfb 1.1 0.2 5.0 56.5 2.3 0.7 7.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 4.1 
Xcr 1.4 0.3 0.1 30.5 0.5 13.3 1.3 3.1 4.6 2.1 1.6 
Sgr 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.1 18.3 2.4 1.3 0.1 0.0 
Bvt 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.4 0.2 1.6 3.0 0.3 3.5 0.1 0.7 
Xfp 0.2 5.7 7.6 11.3 27.3 18.0 55.9 1.9 4.8 1.0 7.5 
Mmp 0.1 1.3 7.3 7.5 6.3 0.6 3.3 8.2 0.6 0.2 11.2 
Ffp 1.5 8.1 2.0 11.7 1.7 3.8 8.0 3.2 1.3 0.4 9.3 
Cog 0.6 11.8 1.3 6.0 0.7 0.2 14.6 0.0 0.2 0.3 2.8 
Twl 1.9 10.6 32.2 35.0 32.9 15.7 20.0 22.1 16.1 7.2 28.8 
Pch 1.0 8.9 5.5 18.3 6.3 7.8 11.4 5.0 3.2 1.0 7.0 
Mtp 0.1 16.4 9.2 10.2 5.0 6.2 3.8 2.9 0.9 0.5 2.6 
Veq 0.6 6.7 13.6 17.0 12.6 3.0 6.1 6.6 7.5 1.5 0.9 
Emq 0.9 9.8 5.2 10.0 3.9 5.4 8.0 2.4 2.8 1.4 3.0 
Xmn 1.0 10.8 3.5 23.2 4.7 9.3 10.5 5.6 3.5 5.6 2.5 
Utc 1.5 3.6 2.1 3.2 2.2 1.1 4.3 4.6 0.2 1.2 4.6 
Tcm 7.3 5.4 6.7 5.9 6.1 6.4 6.8 4.3 4.6 6.3 6.2 
Xsr 4.7 4.3 4.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.7 4.0 3.4 3.9 5.6 
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Table A4-30 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter SSA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Wgr 0.0 6.9 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.6 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Vfr 0.2 9.9 0.4 0.1 0.9 3.5 2.8 2.4 3.8 0.1 3.1 
Pfb 0.1 0.0 0.0 22.5 0.3 3.4 21.7 0.0 0.0 27.3 58.5 
Xcr 0.1 5.1 0.2 4.3 0.0 6.4 46.9 0.7 3.7 5.5 6.9 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 54.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Bvt 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.2 6.6 2.4 0.1 0.0 1.9 
Xfp 0.0 1.2 3.5 3.5 0.3 1.4 12.4 16.0 7.1 0.1 2.5 
Mmp 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 23.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Ffp 0.5 4.7 0.4 6.6 0.5 1.4 19.3 1.5 0.9 0.1 1.2 
Cog 0.0 2.8 0.8 0.1 0.0 11.0 45.3 5.9 21.6 5.7 1.7 
Twl 0.2 0.2 3.1 0.5 0.9 0.2 3.0 2.5 0.9 0.0 2.1 
Pch 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.3 5.6 1.2 0.2 1.9 5.3 
Mtp 0.0 2.6 19.8 0.6 1.6 13.0 5.4 8.2 0.1 0.0 2.0 
Veq 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 2.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.1 
Emq 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.9 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.5 
Xmn 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.3 0.2 1.3 6.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 2.2 
Utc 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Tcm 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 
Xsr 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.8 
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Table A4-30 (cont.) 
(Percent, fob price, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter ROW 
Ric 0.1 0.2 4.1 1.4 3.0 1.8 5.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Wgr 0.2 1.1 19.3 57.1 53.9 66.3 39.6 0.5 23.1 0.3 38.9 
Vfr 0.8 6.8 3.6 25.2 2.2 24.8 26.3 1.5 0.6 0.6 20.4 
Pfb 12.8 64.2 4.6 2.9 56.0 4.2 18.0 2.5 1.0 5.6 15.5 
Xcr 0.8 2.6 0.1 10.5 0.5 39.2 5.6 1.9 2.4 0.4 12.3 
Sgr 0.3 18.4 0.8 0.6 0.1 8.2 28.7 8.1 1.3 0.9 75.0 
Bvt 0.4 2.4 2.7 16.1 1.2 14.5 11.0 0.4 3.7 0.9 3.2 
Xfp 0.4 30.4 17.8 30.9 12.8 38.0 8.3 2.9 6.1 1.5 25.2 
Mmp 0.8 64.8 14.2 66.0 22.2 60.1 38.2 15.3 15.9 1.7 32.4 
Ffp 2.4 11.7 1.8 8.8 2.9 14.3 14.9 3.7 2.7 2.6 31.4 
Cog 36.1 11.8 4.4 11.5 27.9 71.6 21.4 75.4 0.2 25.0 17.6 
Twl 0.7 1.2 2.9 4.6 4.6 7.0 33.1 9.2 6.3 0.6 9.9 
Pch 2.1 19.3 11.0 37.2 7.6 15.6 41.8 7.7 13.2 1.7 12.6 
Mtp 1.9 13.5 1.7 57.8 4.1 26.3 12.9 6.8 1.4 0.3 12.8 
Veq 1.9 5.8 1.4 2.7 2.2 6.9 5.8 6.2 7.5 6.0 4.7 
Emq 9.6 3.0 6.9 9.5 5.8 8.0 16.5 11.8 17.0 2.6 11.5 
Xmn 1.6 3.0 12.4 5.2 9.4 10.0 21.7 5.0 3.5 2.7 15.9 
Utc 5.8 15.4 21.1 17.2 39.9 29.1 12.7 12.2 1.3 28.4 12.0 
Tcm 26.9 18.2 24.1 18.1 20.8 19.7 25.7 22.8 18.3 20.5 11.4 
Xsr 15.2 13.4 15.3 15.0 14.5 16.7 15.8 16.0 15.1 12.4 13.1 
0.0 percent of Botswana rice imports are sourced in the USA. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-31 
Applied Tariffs on non-SADC non-EU Exports in SADC Importing Markets 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter USA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 10.0 5.0 2.5 0.0 25.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 10.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.8 1.9 16.1 5.0 11.4 1.4 2.5 
Vfr 6.3 9.9 17.4 18.3 5.4 4.9 19.3 14.2 13.2 10.7 5.2 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 3.2 19.6 22.1 0.3 0.0 4.4 14.5 12.9 62.8 0.6 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 12.5 23.4 77.6 0.0 10.0 24.8 0.0 0.0 69.9 30.0 
Xfp 13.2 5.9 18.7 6.0 8.9 8.3 24.9 18.0 25.4 7.7 7.0 
Mmp 8.5 2.4 5.0 4.3 14.8 10.6 14.6 11.5 0.0 37.4 9.9 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.0 9.7 0.1 3.9 3.5 4.9 0.0 9.6 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 5.0 4.5 0.1 5.5 
Twl 28.6 5.5 24.5 18.3 24.2 17.7 21.8 24.2 34.5 24.3 13.9 
Pch 5.7 0.6 4.8 15.1 7.4 3.2 7.1 9.9 13.3 2.2 9.5 
Mtp 7.7 4.4 13.2 25.5 4.1 3.9 12.4 7.8 15.5 6.1 6.0 
Veq 5.4 4.9 6.3 33.3 6.3 11.8 0.4 8.5 12.7 8.2 4.6 
Emq 2.3 4.5 5.2 17.6 8.2 1.7 6.1 6.0 11.4 1.9 2.8 
Xmn 8.3 4.4 12.0 29.6 23.0 3.5 23.0 17.7 19.0 16.0 10.5 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-31 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter EAS 
Ric 0.0 0.0 7.2 3.9 7.5 0.0 24.9 3.5 11.1 0.0 9.9 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 24.3 4.1 0.0 3.2 0.0 
Vfr 11.6 9.8 14.0 8.0 10.4 9.5 11.9 5.9 8.2 0.0 5.6 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 8.7 0.5 0.0 11.4 5.1 11.6 1.1 15.5 79.0 8.8 15.1 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.6 0.0 2.3 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 16.5 13.7 0.0 76.0 21.4 67.5 19.8 12.8 13.7 45.8 21.7 
Xfp 13.2 1.6 22.5 9.8 18.4 7.9 21.0 22.5 29.4 2.9 23.1 
Mmp 0.0 3.6 0.8 26.9 23.3 13.5 12.3 3.2 0.0 20.3 8.3 
Ffp 0.0 1.8 0.0 9.5 9.1 1.1 0.5 10.4 3.6 0.3 7.7 
Cog 0.1 0.1 2.7 7.0 6.1 2.0 0.6 4.7 4.0 0.7 1.9 
Twl 31.7 4.7 23.8 9.2 22.3 28.3 20.1 20.2 26.8 20.1 14.9 
Pch 7.6 3.3 9.9 18.8 5.8 6.4 9.3 6.9 10.7 5.4 13.6 
Mtp 10.2 4.0 15.0 18.5 11.3 5.9 7.6 13.5 24.4 10.7 6.9 
Veq 19.2 6.4 20.4 9.6 10.5 17.7 6.9 14.7 30.1 13.0 2.3 
Emq 3.6 5.3 7.5 16.6 10.3 3.0 7.5 8.2 11.6 7.4 5.3 
Xmn 14.6 5.5 18.1 26.5 17.4 8.5 19.3 19.7 28.5 11.4 11.6 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-31 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter SAS 
Ric 0.0 0.0 13.4 5.0 7.3 0.0 25.0 5.0 15.0 0.0 3.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.5 5.5 0.0 5.3 0.2 0.0 
Vfr 1.3 4.1 17.9 8.9 16.4 6.2 11.8 11.4 12.3 8.6 5.7 
Pfb 1.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 14.7 3.8 0.0 4.2 
Xcr 3.3 2.1 20.9 20.9 22.7 6.5 7.8 17.8 74.4 4.0 9.5 
Sgr 3.0 11.2 8.9 43.8 6.2 7.7 24.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 
Bvt 335.2 6.8 15.2 49.5 6.9 137.4 22.0 17.5 69.0 27.6 28.4 
Xfp 12.4 6.8 13.8 21.4 15.0 7.9 15.6 20.9 25.8 8.4 9.4 
Mmp 24.0 3.5 9.6 0.2 12.1 9.9 20.5 7.3 27.2 78.8 9.6 
Ffp 0.0 0.5 2.7 9.0 4.8 0.4 3.8 2.9 1.4 0.0 10.1 
Cog 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.7 2.6 0.1 2.9 5.1 4.5 0.5 3.7 
Twl 27.7 6.8 17.7 7.8 23.0 23.7 18.3 17.5 26.8 23.5 15.3 
Pch 4.6 2.5 9.8 13.6 6.5 4.6 7.0 9.6 9.1 5.7 9.4 
Mtp 8.5 2.8 12.4 14.1 6.9 5.7 17.2 10.6 21.9 4.3 9.7 
Veq 12.1 5.0 8.9 15.1 15.5 11.6 12.3 12.2 25.3 3.5 9.1 
Emq 5.0 4.8 7.0 16.2 10.5 2.2 7.6 7.6 15.7 4.8 7.4 
Xmn 11.8 4.5 16.0 22.6 11.8 7.0 16.2 11.6 24.5 3.1 12.5 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
 
  
 
3
6
2
 
Table A4-31 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter SSA 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 
Wgr 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 
Vfr 6.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 10.5 9.3 18.1 7.6 1.1 7.9 9.2 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 5.0 
Xcr 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.0 9.7 17.0 0.1 14.8 9.5 10.2 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 24.7 0.0 0.0 4.6 18.2 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 5.7 15.9 0.0 25.5 15.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 21.5 
Xfp 1.9 0.3 11.0 0.2 24.7 6.9 20.5 0.1 13.3 9.1 15.6 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.4 22.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 8.1 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.1 1.9 0.5 10.9 4.8 2.1 0.0 9.7 
Cog 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 7.0 5.0 0.3 14.5 
Twl 22.5 5.2 0.3 0.1 22.1 16.8 19.3 1.7 10.2 23.1 12.8 
Pch 5.9 0.0 0.7 0.3 14.6 5.8 9.7 1.1 5.0 5.1 13.8 
Mtp 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.3 7.8 0.1 13.9 1.3 6.2 0.5 11.0 
Veq 6.1 4.9 10.8 2.9 7.3 0.7 4.8 4.9 4.3 0.8 8.1 
Emq 1.7 3.1 1.9 8.7 11.6 1.1 5.9 3.4 18.4 2.4 5.3 
Xmn 7.4 0.3 1.6 1.1 19.2 6.2 16.0 2.1 17.7 19.9 14.9 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3
6
3
 
Table A4-31 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Exporter ROW 
Ric 0.0 0.0 8.6 4.8 7.4 0.0 24.8 1.0 6.0 0.0 3.7 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.5 2.1 5.0 3.2 5.6 0.0 4.0 
Vfr 0.0 3.3 12.3 5.1 18.2 5.3 15.2 15.6 10.9 4.7 5.2 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 0.0 9.9 2.0 13.3 0.1 
Xcr 2.4 0.0 21.3 14.7 20.1 12.7 4.0 8.2 61.5 1.2 10.1 
Sgr 0.8 12.4 0.0 0.0 3.9 16.0 24.8 9.1 0.0 16.9 6.7 
Bvt 8.0 8.0 11.4 45.9 14.4 23.5 23.3 8.4 47.2 48.7 26.2 
Xfp 11.2 5.2 8.6 6.4 11.1 10.0 23.4 14.4 9.5 16.9 10.9 
Mmp 0.2 3.0 9.2 1.1 22.5 17.8 20.3 12.9 30.1 39.1 9.7 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.6 2.4 1.7 6.3 5.3 3.4 2.0 9.9 
Cog 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.3 2.6 0.0 0.3 4.9 3.7 0.0 4.9 
Twl 9.7 7.6 20.6 13.5 18.0 16.0 21.4 20.5 30.7 18.3 16.0 
Pch 2.8 0.3 3.8 24.3 5.9 3.6 3.2 4.5 9.3 3.7 9.2 
Mtp 7.1 0.9 14.6 0.5 10.9 0.9 13.5 7.9 15.8 7.3 6.4 
Veq 4.1 4.5 17.6 28.3 10.2 14.7 8.3 12.8 13.3 8.4 5.4 
Emq 0.9 4.6 7.2 9.7 8.5 2.3 8.6 6.5 12.5 2.5 5.9 
Xmn 3.9 3.9 5.9 25.5 18.7 6.7 17.5 17.2 46.2 17.9 12.6 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Botswana grants duty-free access to rice imports from the USA. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-32 
Exports to non-SADC non-EU Markets as Ratios to Total Exports 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer USA 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.4 13.0 2.9 0.1 3.9 0.0 13.3 1.0 7.7 2.3 22.6 
Wgr 5.1 0.6 4.7 0.0 2.9 0.2 9.1 0.4 8.0 6.2 22.6 
Vfr 11.1 0.3 19.6 6.2 1.7 3.6 2.8 0.2 0.4 0.7 16.5 
Pfb 5.4 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 
Xcr 4.9 46.0 11.9 0.7 1.8 3.8 3.3 2.3 2.0 2.2 4.3 
Sgr 2.5 1.5 5.2 2.4 25.5 4.5 5.1 0.0 6.3 0.1 11.2 
Bvt 10.3 13.2 10.9 4.5 9.9 6.4 12.3 7.5 0.9 0.6 19.9 
Xfp 1.3 0.7 2.3 1.4 1.0 4.1 3.7 0.7 1.7 1.7 6.4 
Mmp 2.6 6.1 12.3 7.0 8.2 2.7 13.5 4.3 0.5 0.4 10.9 
Ffp 5.4 9.2 7.9 38.4 2.6 3.4 10.9 7.7 2.5 0.8 1.3 
Cog 1.7 23.5 25.2 25.3 0.1 2.0 0.5 0.7 0.8 9.6 36.7 
Twl 32.8 58.1 62.4 22.0 30.4 16.3 9.5 1.5 8.4 70.3 15.4 
Pch 1.5 11.7 3.9 5.9 0.9 8.0 5.2 0.3 2.6 2.7 63.8 
Mtp 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 11.9 0.2 2.1 7.7 50.0 0.3 
Veq 4.8 0.0 2.2 10.4 3.7 13.9 4.2 1.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 
Emq 4.0 0.6 14.8 6.8 1.8 6.6 1.0 0.3 4.3 0.8 2.1 
Xmn 4.8 3.9 1.4 8.8 3.7 12.0 19.1 7.8 7.9 2.9 26.9 
Utc 9.1 8.8 3.3 8.2 1.5 6.2 12.8 0.7 28.5 6.8 7.9 
Tcm 20.4 16.2 15.1 15.1 20.5 13.0 12.9 5.2 19.9 11.2 18.7 
Xsr 17.0 34.8 12.6 14.3 22.0 16.4 29.0 17.1 28.5 15.2 26.2 
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Table A4-32 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer EAS 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.4 13.4 3.1 0.1 4.2 0.0 13.8 1.1 5.0 3.0 17.6 
Wgr 5.3 0.6 5.1 0.0 3.1 0.9 9.4 0.4 5.1 6.4 17.6 
Vfr 10.8 0.1 18.0 6.4 0.7 6.2 1.8 0.2 0.1 7.0 12.9 
Pfb 5.6 7.5 1.6 0.0 10.4 2.1 17.3 16.3 16.7 9.4 0.5 
Xcr 4.5 0.7 3.6 19.6 1.3 7.6 7.9 2.1 18.7 2.2 3.0 
Sgr 2.6 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 23.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Bvt 10.7 13.7 11.7 4.9 10.8 2.2 12.7 8.2 0.5 0.6 15.5 
Xfp 1.3 7.4 0.8 9.1 14.1 11.2 11.8 0.7 0.6 2.8 32.3 
Mmp 2.6 10.5 13.2 7.2 8.9 3.4 14.0 4.7 0.6 2.0 8.9 
Ffp 3.5 28.2 15.8 3.0 74.5 13.7 26.1 17.1 7.0 0.9 41.3 
Cog 0.9 23.1 23.6 23.6 54.8 16.6 43.5 2.0 1.8 8.7 46.1 
Twl 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.0 2.2 7.1 9.3 4.0 4.1 0.6 12.0 
Pch 1.5 2.9 3.2 4.5 0.8 6.4 5.9 0.4 0.7 0.8 4.8 
Mtp 0.2 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 26.0 1.6 33.2 26.5 16.4 13.4 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.6 10.2 0.0 19.8 3.3 1.9 0.2 1.3 0.7 
Emq 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.2 2.6 2.0 0.3 0.5 21.2 2.6 
Xmn 5.5 1.8 1.2 1.6 4.2 18.2 6.4 1.6 0.5 6.8 5.8 
Utc 16.3 16.0 7.0 15.9 3.0 10.7 18.4 1.1 18.3 15.3 5.7 
Tcm 10.9 13.4 13.1 13.2 9.8 14.7 9.3 6.1 12.8 11.9 13.9 
Xsr 13.1 6.7 17.6 12.1 10.3 13.3 8.6 15.9 18.3 9.5 17.4 
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Table A4-32 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer SAS 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.1 4.4 1.0 90.8 1.4 0.0 4.6 0.4 1.1 0.8 4.2 
Wgr 1.8 0.2 1.6 0.0 1.0 0.8 3.2 0.1 1.1 2.1 4.2 
Vfr 3.6 2.2 29.4 2.2 77.5 2.2 65.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 7.3 
Pfb 1.9 19.4 12.2 98.5 39.2 79.2 57.9 20.9 42.1 66.8 96.9 
Xcr 1.5 13.2 1.8 8.9 2.3 5.6 9.5 0.2 2.3 0.6 16.5 
Sgr 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 7.9 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 3.6 4.5 3.8 7.9 7.1 2.1 4.2 2.6 0.1 0.2 3.7 
Xfp 0.4 1.3 0.5 3.4 0.7 3.0 1.9 0.2 9.6 0.6 10.9 
Mmp 0.9 2.1 4.9 2.9 2.9 1.5 5.9 1.5 0.1 0.2 2.0 
Ffp 1.2 1.9 3.0 2.3 3.7 5.0 11.2 19.2 16.0 0.2 0.4 
Cog 0.0 11.2 11.9 11.9 3.5 1.4 12.1 21.2 3.0 3.9 2.2 
Twl 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.2 1.7 2.8 8.1 0.5 0.6 0.1 2.9 
Pch 0.6 13.2 2.1 2.9 0.7 6.4 9.6 0.1 3.8 0.6 2.4 
Mtp 0.1 34.1 1.1 25.7 0.4 15.0 7.6 13.4 2.7 3.4 15.1 
Veq 0.0 2.3 0.6 5.1 4.3 1.6 8.0 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.2 
Emq 0.5 3.5 4.2 12.2 10.7 2.4 3.1 0.1 0.3 8.4 0.7 
Xmn 1.7 0.2 1.8 1.6 2.1 5.6 32.7 5.5 0.2 3.9 0.3 
Utc 5.6 5.5 1.3 5.5 1.0 3.3 4.9 0.3 3.9 5.2 2.4 
Tcm 3.7 3.9 4.4 5.2 3.4 5.4 3.1 1.9 2.7 4.2 3.2 
Xsr 5.1 4.0 4.5 5.5 5.2 4.7 4.7 5.0 3.9 5.1 4.4 
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Table A4-32 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer SSA 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.5 17.6 4.3 0.2 3.8 3.7 91.8 2.6 0.1 0.6 
Wgr 0.3 0.0 2.2 85.4 17.9 14.8 25.2 3.6 6.4 0.2 0.6 
Vfr 0.4 0.2 1.2 3.9 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 
Pfb 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 2.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Xcr 0.2 0.1 3.3 0.5 1.1 3.2 9.3 1.4 1.8 0.3 1.4 
Sgr 0.1 0.1 37.1 0.0 3.1 12.7 0.5 52.1 1.6 10.0 48.3 
Bvt 0.4 0.5 11.4 7.7 3.8 5.6 9.7 17.5 15.3 0.3 3.1 
Xfp 0.9 0.3 3.0 3.8 0.0 3.5 14.8 15.1 3.4 4.7 5.5 
Mmp 0.1 51.0 0.5 37.2 0.3 2.9 0.7 43.5 1.0 0.4 1.5 
Ffp 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.9 2.9 2.6 11.7 3.2 0.4 
Cog 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 2.1 12.8 0.4 0.2 0.0 
Twl 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2 1.7 13.7 3.4 2.0 0.0 3.3 
Pch 0.8 0.9 0.5 12.0 0.6 7.9 22.4 82.2 2.7 5.0 16.9 
Mtp 0.0 0.2 0.6 9.1 0.0 2.7 2.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 4.2 
Veq 0.1 0.9 1.9 7.7 1.0 1.8 25.4 15.6 5.2 0.3 9.7 
Emq 1.0 1.1 0.7 5.5 0.3 8.9 21.8 13.7 14.7 0.6 14.3 
Xmn 0.3 0.3 0.2 7.2 0.3 3.8 5.9 8.2 1.5 0.9 1.6 
Utc 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.9 4.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Tcm 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Xsr 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 
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Table A4-32 (cont.) 
(Percent, volume, 2004) 
Importer ROW 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.5 17.2 4.0 0.1 5.3 0.7 17.6 1.4 4.5 3.0 17.9 
Wgr 6.8 0.8 6.4 0.0 3.9 0.9 12.3 0.5 4.8 8.4 17.8 
Vfr 13.8 1.5 1.8 13.9 1.1 14.0 4.2 0.9 8.6 3.6 15.9 
Pfb 7.1 7.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 8.7 22.5 1.5 0.8 0.5 
Xcr 5.8 7.8 21.6 10.6 7.8 23.4 16.4 6.2 14.4 2.8 10.8 
Sgr 3.3 2.2 0.3 1.0 5.8 12.9 6.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 
Bvt 13.6 17.7 14.8 5.5 19.2 9.7 16.6 10.4 41.0 2.3 15.7 
Xfp 1.8 1.1 3.8 4.2 3.6 11.5 12.5 1.8 1.5 12.5 10.7 
Mmp 12.1 8.0 16.7 11.8 14.9 13.3 17.9 6.7 1.6 8.7 8.9 
Ffp 4.9 7.9 12.1 5.2 3.1 8.2 12.7 13.5 1.1 1.3 7.6 
Cog 2.2 10.1 9.6 9.6 2.9 12.5 12.9 5.3 3.1 5.4 4.1 
Twl 1.6 2.0 1.2 3.3 4.4 10.5 13.8 6.3 1.8 2.3 25.6 
Pch 2.1 3.9 4.4 19.7 1.7 9.9 10.0 0.7 3.4 9.0 4.2 
Mtp 65.7 39.0 1.4 9.0 0.2 15.1 43.0 31.8 21.2 3.7 53.0 
Veq 0.4 1.8 0.1 20.5 3.9 12.3 4.3 2.7 2.5 2.6 74.5 
Emq 2.8 1.3 6.3 27.1 15.9 9.6 8.1 7.5 2.8 10.0 38.2 
Xmn 7.0 4.5 1.8 8.0 2.3 9.2 16.9 5.2 1.9 2.2 11.5 
Utc 18.2 18.5 8.3 18.8 44.2 22.4 22.0 2.0 16.5 19.8 47.2 
Tcm 14.0 16.1 16.1 16.5 10.5 15.9 12.1 7.6 11.5 14.8 13.6 
Xsr 18.8 20.4 21.3 17.3 19.1 19.0 19.9 22.2 16.5 15.8 18.3 
0.4 percent of Botswana rice exports are destined for the USA.  
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A4-33 
Applied Tariffs on SADC Exports in the non-SADC non-EU Importing Markets 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer USA 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 2.4 0.0 51.3 0.0 42.9 3.4 11.7 3.7 67.2 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 29.1 34.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 40.7 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.3 0.1 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.1 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.7 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.6 3.2 5.7 0.0 10.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
  
 
3
7
0
 
Table A4-33 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer EAS 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 349.5 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.3 0.0 2.3 10.5 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.5 2.3 0.4 0.0 9.2 0.6 0.1 14.2 2.1 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.0 0.0 60.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0 20.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.6 4.5 11.8 0.1 11.5 2.7 0.0 5.7 8.3 2.3 
Mmp 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 2.3 11.4 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 2.2 0.3 1.6 0.0 1.9 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Cog 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 
Twl 3.8 1.6 6.9 7.6 0.0 7.7 1.9 4.3 5.6 4.3 1.3 
Pch 0.0 8.4 0.0 3.9 0.9 3.4 3.1 0.0 5.1 6.7 3.1 
Mtp 0.0 2.4 0.0 2.4 0.0 1.6 2.1 0.8 3.3 2.1 0.9 
Veq 0.0 7.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.4 3.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 
Emq 0.7 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 3.1 1.0 0.9 0.6 6.4 6.0 
Xmn 0.3 1.8 0.2 2.7 2.8 1.9 0.5 0.7 2.9 0.8 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 349.5 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-33 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer SAS 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.0 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 31.7 28.6 4.6 30.5 11.5 30.6 0.0 22.7 11.3 15.1 
Pfb 0.0 7.2 1.9 10.0 2.7 0.9 6.4 2.4 3.1 3.8 4.7 
Xcr 0.0 1.3 150.4 3.7 19.1 24.7 33.9 7.5 28.3 0.0 33.7 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.5 0.0 52.8 9.9 0.0 0.0 10.4 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.4 38.9 70.5 3.4 0.0 0.0 13.2 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 43.5 10.9 27.7 49.7 17.6 15.0 11.9 59.5 4.4 50.0 
Mmp 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.3 0.0 12.7 6.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 
Ffp 0.1 4.2 3.5 0.4 0.6 5.0 5.4 0.3 0.3 1.3 3.7 
Cog 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 15.9 7.4 11.3 14.3 7.8 0.0 0.2 
Twl 4.6 5.4 6.8 10.9 4.1 9.7 13.4 4.6 9.9 9.2 0.0 
Pch 3.2 7.6 13.7 8.4 6.9 10.8 13.7 10.9 17.0 8.2 13.2 
Mtp 6.4 15.9 14.6 12.8 19.3 11.8 6.0 4.5 15.0 5.4 19.5 
Veq 0.0 10.0 90.6 38.4 24.0 10.4 14.0 0.0 0.0 21.4 0.0 
Emq 13.9 1.0 13.5 7.3 1.5 8.3 10.6 3.9 7.9 6.7 2.8 
Xmn 1.3 7.2 14.5 10.6 5.2 4.7 4.9 3.5 9.0 7.1 6.5 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.0 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A4-33 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer SSA 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.9 0.0 19.5 6.2 19.9 19.2 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 12.3 0.0 3.9 25.0 34.6 32.5 24.8 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.2 0.0 38.6 0.0 25.6 27.0 28.2 7.8 32.0 9.7 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 6.0 8.4 10.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 
Xcr 0.0 2.4 1.9 51.5 14.9 17.5 14.1 14.0 4.4 13.7 14.0 
Sgr 0.0 0.0 0.1 35.5 22.2 56.8 15.4 29.0 0.0 43.6 27.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.7 18.1 34.3 24.8 25.3 25.9 30.8 22.6 
Xfp 23.8 33.6 0.0 26.0 42.8 25.3 15.6 24.0 26.3 16.4 16.2 
Mmp 3.4 10.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 22.8 8.4 20.0 9.6 11.1 11.3 
Ffp 7.5 12.5 0.0 14.8 0.0 14.0 12.5 11.5 18.8 24.8 12.5 
Cog 9.8 0.0 0.0 4.7 9.0 11.6 12.3 10.7 17.8 7.6 0.2 
Twl 11.1 26.1 2.4 20.3 18.9 24.2 27.2 28.1 5.5 18.2 20.1 
Pch 5.4 9.6 3.3 10.6 16.8 13.8 18.3 12.2 5.7 4.2 8.2 
Mtp 10.2 14.5 12.9 19.7 4.2 15.0 9.5 2.6 5.1 13.1 19.3 
Veq 14.3 15.7 2.6 56.2 11.1 12.3 15.2 11.2 10.9 13.9 23.4 
Emq 12.5 15.2 2.9 7.0 14.9 10.3 9.5 11.4 20.9 14.3 19.5 
Xmn 15.5 12.7 2.4 6.6 25.5 16.9 9.0 14.5 6.2 19.7 21.7 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.9 0.0 19.5 6.2 19.9 19.2 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 12.3 0.0 3.9 25.0 34.6 32.5 24.8 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3
7
3
 
Table A4-33 (cont.) 
(Percent, Imports-weighted preferential rates, 2004) 
Importer ROW 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 1.7 1.3 2.8 1.2 7.8 2.3 3.5 3.1 5.1 2.9 
Pfb 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 6.2 10.0 56.7 3.7 6.7 11.1 7.0 20.8 1.6 7.8 
Sgr 0.0 1.9 0.0 4.9 4.8 11.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 26.9 5.5 0.0 67.0 18.6 0.0 
Xfp 0.8 0.4 1.2 3.4 6.9 10.2 11.9 4.7 3.8 12.9 26.4 
Mmp 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 60.5 0.4 3.5 54.7 2.4 0.0 
Ffp 0.3 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.4 3.7 4.4 7.9 42.3 6.3 9.3 
Cog 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.6 1.2 0.0 3.5 1.9 5.3 
Twl 10.1 2.8 2.2 10.3 4.8 9.9 4.1 0.9 8.0 3.7 3.3 
Pch 1.6 5.1 2.5 1.5 14.5 5.5 3.4 9.2 2.4 1.0 4.1 
Mtp 0.0 2.2 1.8 4.6 0.6 3.2 2.6 1.8 1.0 2.5 2.3 
Veq 2.1 4.1 32.3 2.4 13.7 8.2 1.2 1.3 8.1 5.2 4.1 
Emq 2.4 6.3 2.3 2.7 3.3 5.0 3.1 3.7 5.0 5.2 6.3 
Xmn 0.5 3.9 4.3 2.6 4.7 5.2 3.3 2.6 11.9 9.4 10.5 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
The USA grants duty-free access to rice imports from Botswana. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the GTAP7 Database. 
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Table A6-1 
Simulated Changes in Tariffs, Sim11 
(Percentage points) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU 
Exporter EU BWA MOZ ZAF XSC 
Importer BWA MOZ ZAF XSC EU 
Ric 0 -4 0 0 0 0 -58 0 
Wgr 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 -10 0 
Vfr 0 -14 -1 -6 0 0 -1 -1 
Pfb 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 -3 -6 -2 0 0 -2 0 
Sgr -2 -5 -4 -3 0 -48 -61 -242 
Bvt -3 -15 -5 -3 0 0 -10 0 
Xfp -1 -17 -7 -4 -4 0 -11 0 
Mmp 0 -17 -33 -61 -70 0 -35 -98 
Ffp 0 -9 -1 0 0 0 -3 0 
Cog 0 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl -10 -17 -11 -15 0 0 -1 0 
Pch -1 -4 -3 -3 0 0 0 0 
Mtp -2 -8 -3 -1 0 0 0 0 
Veq -18 -7 -12 -5 0 0 -3 0 
Emq -1 -7 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 
Xmn -3 -13 -4 -6 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-2 
Total Trade Impact 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Total Imports 
BWA 0.0 1.8 1.9 1.7 0.1 1.7 1.8 1.5 
MDG 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.4 1.0 0.4 1.4 2.7 
MWI 0.1 -1.0 -1.0 3.4 0.6 6.8 7.5 12.0 
MUS 0.1 -1.3 -1.2 0.2 3.1 7.9 10.8 13.4 
MOZ 0.8 -0.5 0.3 5.8 0.8 -0.3 0.6 6.1 
ZAF 1.3 0.7 2.0 3.0 1.2 0.7 1.8 2.9 
TZA 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 1.5 0.6 0.5 1.1 2.9 
ZMB 0.2 -0.8 -0.5 6.7 0.8 -0.4 0.4 7.5 
ZWE 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 9.5 1.0 10.4 11.4 21.7 
XSC 0.1 29.4 29.9 30.1 0.0 25.5 25.9 25.9 
XSD 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.7 -0.2 0.5 1.0 
 Total Exports 
BWA -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.8 
MDG 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.1 -0.7 0.3 1.1 
MWI -0.1 -1.1 -1.1 5.7 1.2 8.8 10.2 17.1 
MUS 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 1.2 4.2 0.5 4.2 6.8 
MOZ 1.1 -0.2 1.0 5.7 1.2 -0.3 0.9 5.6 
ZAF 1.7 0.0 1.8 2.4 1.7 0.0 1.7 2.3 
TZA -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 2.8 1.6 0.4 2.0 4.8 
ZMB 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 7.5 1.0 -1.0 0.0 7.7 
ZWE 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 10.7 1.6 1.5 2.9 12.9 
XSC 0.1 9.0 9.2 9.6 0.1 8.1 8.4 8.6 
XSD 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.3 
Note: percentage changes are calculated based on figures valued at baseline world prices. 
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Table A6-3 
Trade with the EU 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Imports from the EU 
BWA 9.1 4.0 13.3 14.1 8.9 4.0 13.2 14.0 
MDG -0.1 0.1 0.0 -1.7 6.3 1.5 7.8 6.1 
MWI -0.6 0.3 -0.4 -10.9 12.1 10.4 23.7 10.9 
MUS -0.1 -1.0 -1.2 -3.8 24.8 9.7 35.6 32.4 
MOZ 11.8 1.6 13.6 1.3 11.7 2.1 14.0 1.7 
ZAF 8.6 2.4 11.2 12.1 8.4 2.5 11.1 12.0 
TZA -0.3 0.5 0.2 -4.4 15.0 1.4 16.6 11.2 
ZMB -0.8 1.2 0.4 -9.3 12.9 2.8 16.0 4.2 
ZWE -0.9 1.6 0.7 -21.5 33.0 12.0 48.6 15.1 
XSC 3.1 33.8 38.2 39.3 2.8 29.2 33.1 34.0 
XSD -0.1 0.9 0.8 -1.7 8.9 1.0 9.9 7.4 
 Exports to the EU 
BWA 0.4 2.2 2.7 2.5 0.5 2.2 2.7 2.6 
MDG 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.6 1.1 0.8 2.0 2.6 
MWI 0.5 -4.0 -3.6 2.5 2.1 37.5 40.4 49.0 
MUS 0.1 -3.2 -3.1 -0.9 5.1 12.2 16.8 20.9 
MOZ 1.5 -0.6 0.9 4.0 1.6 -2.1 -0.5 2.4 
ZAF 1.8 -0.1 1.8 0.1 2.1 -0.2 1.9 0.3 
TZA 0.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2 1.4 2.9 4.3 4.6 
ZMB 0.4 -2.2 -1.8 2.9 1.5 12.9 14.6 20.7 
ZWE 0.7 -4.1 -3.4 6.4 2.3 58.9 61.6 75.0 
XSC 0.9 126.9 128.7 126.8 1.1 115.6 117.8 115.1 
XSD 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.5 
Note: percentage changes are calculated based on figures valued at baseline world prices. 
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Table A6-4 
Trade with Third Parties 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Imports from USA 
BWA -1.6 3.8 2.1 2.7 -1.8 3.8 2.0 2.6 
MDG 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.9 1.3 0.3 0.0 
MWI -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -6.5 -2.3 8.9 6.4 0.3 
MUS 0.0 -1.7 -1.8 -3.0 -5.5 11.6 5.4 4.6 
MOZ -1.3 1.5 0.1 -5.4 -1.3 2.0 0.5 -5.0 
ZAF -4.4 2.4 -2.1 -1.3 -4.5 2.4 -2.3 -1.4 
TZA -0.1 0.2 0.0 -2.8 -3.6 1.0 -2.8 -5.1 
ZMB -0.4 0.5 0.1 -3.9 -1.4 1.9 0.5 -3.5 
ZWE -0.5 1.4 0.9 -13.8 -3.7 15.3 11.0 -4.2 
XSC -1.0 34.9 34.0 35.2 -1.2 30.3 29.1 30.1 
XSD -0.1 0.6 0.5 -1.6 -4.9 0.7 -4.3 -6.1 
 Exports to USA 
BWA 0.3 -5.3 -5.1 -5.3 0.4 -5.4 -5.0 -5.2 
MDG 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.5 1.7 -3.0 -1.3 -0.3 
MWI 0.3 0.8 1.1 7.8 1.6 -13.1 -11.8 -6.9 
MUS 0.0 2.7 2.7 4.0 4.9 -15.4 -11.3 -10.5 
MOZ 0.4 2.3 2.7 4.0 0.4 0.7 1.2 2.4 
ZAF 2.3 -3.1 -0.8 -2.8 2.6 -3.2 -0.6 -2.6 
TZA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.2 -1.1 0.1 0.3 
ZMB 0.4 -0.7 -0.2 6.4 1.7 -4.9 -3.2 3.4 
ZWE 0.7 -1.5 -0.8 10.9 2.6 -19.2 -17.1 -8.0 
XSC 1.7 -56.1 -55.7 -56.2 2.2 -51.5 -51.0 -51.2 
XSD 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.8 -0.1 0.7 1.0 
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Table A6-4 (cont.) 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Imports from EAS 
BWA -2.6 3.0 0.4 1.5 -2.7 3.3 0.4 1.7 
MDG 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 -4.1 1.2 -2.9 -3.7 
MWI -0.6 0.3 -0.4 -13.6 -4.0 8.8 4.5 -8.7 
MUS -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -2.5 -9.1 5.4 -4.7 -6.2 
MOZ -3.6 1.8 -2.0 -13.9 -3.7 2.3 -1.6 -13.5 
ZAF -5.8 2.6 -3.4 -2.6 -5.9 2.6 -3.5 -2.6 
TZA -0.2 0.3 0.1 -5.0 -4.9 1.2 -3.8 -8.2 
ZMB -0.7 1.1 0.4 -11.6 -3.0 2.9 -0.3 -11.9 
ZWE -0.8 1.3 0.5 -21.1 -7.3 12.6 4.1 -16.7 
XSC -1.6 24.6 22.8 24.1 -1.9 21.2 19.1 20.2 
XSD 0.0 0.4 0.4 -0.6 -3.2 0.5 -2.8 -3.7 
 Exports to EAS 
BWA 0.4 -4.4 -4.0 -4.2 0.5 -4.4 -4.0 -4.2 
MDG 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 -1.0 -0.6 -0.2 
MWI 0.2 0.4 0.6 3.0 0.9 -7.0 -6.2 -4.1 
MUS 0.0 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.1 -9.2 -7.2 -6.9 
MOZ 0.4 -0.9 -0.5 0.3 0.5 -1.6 -1.1 -0.3 
ZAF 2.3 -3.2 -0.9 -2.8 2.6 -3.2 -0.7 -2.6 
TZA 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.3 -1.1 0.2 0.8 
ZMB 0.4 -0.8 -0.3 8.3 2.1 -5.7 -3.6 4.9 
ZWE 0.8 -2.9 -2.0 12.3 3.1 -37.3 -35.2 -25.5 
XSC 1.1 -42.5 -42.1 -42.7 1.4 -37.7 -37.1 -37.5 
XSD 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.8 -0.1 0.7 1.0 
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Table A6-4 (cont.) 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Imports from SAS 
BWA -1.8 3.9 2.0 2.8 -2.0 4.0 2.0 2.8 
MDG 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.7 -3.3 1.6 -1.8 -3.3 
MWI -0.5 0.2 -0.4 -12.7 -3.2 9.1 5.6 -7.1 
MUS -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -2.7 -9.3 4.7 -5.7 -7.6 
MOZ -2.3 2.3 -0.1 -9.2 -2.4 2.8 0.2 -8.8 
ZAF -3.8 3.1 -0.8 0.0 -3.9 3.2 -0.9 0.0 
TZA -0.1 0.5 0.4 -3.5 -3.9 1.5 -2.5 -5.9 
ZMB -0.6 1.0 0.4 -11.6 -2.8 3.3 0.3 -11.5 
ZWE -0.7 1.6 0.9 -22.4 -6.7 16.0 8.1 -15.7 
XSC -1.5 29.8 28.1 29.4 -1.7 25.7 23.8 24.9 
XSD 0.0 0.6 0.6 -1.4 -5.3 0.7 -4.7 -6.4 
 Exports to SAS 
BWA 0.5 -4.2 -3.8 -4.1 0.5 -4.2 -3.8 -4.0 
MDG 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 -1.6 -1.2 -1.0 
MWI 0.2 0.4 0.6 2.5 0.8 -7.5 -6.7 -5.0 
MUS 0.0 2.0 2.1 2.9 2.1 -11.9 -9.9 -9.4 
MOZ 0.4 -1.2 -0.8 -0.7 0.4 -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 
ZAF 2.6 -3.6 -1.0 -3.2 2.9 -3.6 -0.7 -3.0 
TZA 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.9 1.8 -1.3 0.4 2.0 
ZMB 0.4 -0.7 -0.3 7.5 1.9 -5.4 -3.5 4.3 
ZWE 0.4 -2.1 -1.7 7.6 1.6 -40.8 -39.9 -34.8 
XSC 1.0 -41.3 -40.9 -41.4 1.3 -36.5 -35.8 -36.2 
XSD 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 1.0 -0.2 0.8 1.2 
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Table A6-4 (cont.) 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Imports from SSA 
BWA -1.2 4.6 3.4 4.0 -1.2 4.7 3.5 4.0 
MDG 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.4 -2.2 1.6 -0.7 -2.0 
MWI -0.8 0.3 -0.5 -14.2 -2.8 12.7 9.5 -5.1 
MUS -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -2.6 -5.6 7.1 0.5 -1.2 
MOZ -2.4 2.1 -0.5 -11.6 -2.5 2.6 -0.1 -11.2 
ZAF -1.5 1.8 0.2 1.2 -1.7 2.1 0.4 1.3 
TZA -0.2 0.6 0.4 -5.4 -4.7 1.8 -3.0 -8.0 
ZMB -0.7 2.0 1.2 -8.1 -2.3 3.5 1.1 -8.2 
ZWE -0.5 2.2 1.7 -14.9 -3.0 20.5 16.8 -3.3 
XSC -1.3 22.1 20.7 22.0 -1.5 20.0 18.4 19.5 
XSD -0.1 1.2 1.1 -2.7 -7.2 1.2 -6.3 -9.4 
 Exports to SSA 
BWA 0.5 -6.3 -5.9 -6.2 0.6 -6.3 -5.9 -6.1 
MDG 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 -1.3 -0.8 -0.4 
MWI 0.5 -8.0 -7.6 1.9 2.6 25.2 28.2 37.9 
MUS 0.0 3.8 3.9 5.3 2.9 -20.8 -18.7 -18.0 
MOZ 0.4 3.5 4.0 2.7 0.5 0.1 0.6 -0.7 
ZAF 2.2 -3.5 -1.3 -3.6 2.5 -3.6 -1.1 -3.6 
TZA 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.6 -1.1 0.4 1.0 
ZMB 0.2 -1.2 -1.0 0.5 0.9 2.0 3.0 5.3 
ZWE 0.4 -1.3 -0.9 6.6 1.7 -24.7 -23.5 -18.4 
XSC 1.1 -23.6 -23.1 -23.6 1.3 -20.4 -19.8 -20.1 
XSD 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 2.6 -2.1 0.6 1.4 
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Table A6-4 (cont.) 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Imports from ROW 
BWA -1.8 4.0 2.1 3.0 -1.9 4.0 2.0 2.9 
MDG -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -2.7 -1.8 1.5 -0.4 -2.9 
MWI -0.5 0.1 -0.4 -9.3 -2.9 10.2 7.0 -2.2 
MUS -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -4.6 -7.9 8.2 -0.6 -3.9 
MOZ -1.8 1.6 -0.3 -6.4 -1.8 2.0 0.1 -6.1 
ZAF -2.3 2.2 -0.1 0.9 -2.4 2.4 -0.1 0.9 
TZA -0.2 0.5 0.3 -4.5 -4.1 1.5 -2.7 -6.9 
ZMB -0.5 1.9 1.5 -3.3 -1.5 2.0 0.4 -4.4 
ZWE -0.8 1.8 0.9 -21.1 -5.0 12.9 7.2 -15.4 
XSC -1.2 33.8 32.5 33.5 -1.5 29.2 27.6 28.4 
XSD -0.1 0.7 0.6 -1.7 -5.8 0.6 -5.3 -7.1 
 Exports to ROW 
BWA 0.8 -10.0 -9.5 -9.8 0.8 -10.1 -9.6 -9.9 
MDG 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 -1.6 -1.0 -0.5 
MWI 0.4 0.8 1.2 7.3 2.0 -15.3 -13.7 -9.1 
MUS 0.0 2.4 2.4 3.3 2.5 -14.0 -11.8 -11.3 
MOZ 1.2 -1.1 0.1 3.4 1.3 -2.7 -1.4 1.8 
ZAF 2.1 -3.0 -0.9 -2.8 2.4 -3.1 -0.8 -2.6 
TZA 0.1 0.0 0.1 4.6 2.8 -1.5 1.2 5.5 
ZMB 0.5 -0.8 -0.3 7.9 2.1 -5.7 -3.6 4.6 
ZWE 0.8 -2.7 -1.8 11.8 3.0 -32.8 -30.8 -21.2 
XSC 1.0 -40.6 -40.3 -40.7 1.3 -36.5 -36.0 -36.2 
XSD 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 1.4 -0.2 1.2 1.7 
Note: percentage changes are calculated based on figures valued at baseline world prices. 
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Table A6-5 
Intra-SADC Trade 
(Percentage change) 
 Sim11-SADC Sim11-EU Sim11 Sim12 Sim21-SADC Sim21-EU Sim21 Sim22 
 Imports from SADC 
BWA -1.3 1.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.2 0.8 -0.3 -1.0 
MDG 1.0 0.4 1.4 24.9 0.2 -7.1 -7.0 16.0 
MWI 0.8 -2.4 -1.7 20.3 -1.5 3.1 1.6 25.0 
MUS 1.6 -6.1 -4.5 34.7 -8.3 6.0 -2.7 42.2 
MOZ -2.2 -3.6 -5.8 22.6 -2.0 -3.8 -5.8 22.7 
ZAF -2.4 -23.3 -25.4 -22.3 -1.8 -24.6 -26.1 -23.3 
TZA 1.3 -4.3 -3.0 37.7 -3.7 -4.8 -8.5 31.0 
ZMB 1.1 -2.8 -1.7 20.5 -0.8 -3.4 -4.2 18.2 
ZWE 0.9 -1.9 -1.1 28.0 -2.2 8.2 5.7 36.9 
XSC -0.1 28.4 28.6 28.3 -0.1 24.7 24.9 24.4 
XSD 1.6 -13.3 -11.8 20.5 -6.0 -12.4 -17.7 12.8 
 Exports to SADC 
BWA -7.4 -8.9 -15.8 -13.7 -7.9 -9.7 -17.0 -14.9 
MDG -0.3 0.8 0.4 2.1 -5.1 3.2 -2.5 -0.7 
MWI -2.3 2.5 0.0 12.5 -1.9 -7.8 -9.6 1.1 
MUS -1.0 5.2 4.1 10.0 1.0 -18.5 -17.5 -13.5 
MOZ -0.1 2.4 2.4 20.5 -0.7 12.8 12.1 30.9 
ZAF 0.0 9.1 9.2 22.7 -1.6 9.5 8.0 21.7 
TZA -2.0 2.2 0.1 23.0 2.0 2.1 4.1 27.1 
ZMB -1.0 1.6 0.6 10.9 -2.0 3.2 1.3 10.6 
ZWE -1.2 5.0 3.8 13.8 -0.5 -14.4 -14.5 -5.9 
XSC -1.6 -39.4 -40.5 -37.7 -2.2 -35.3 -37.0 -33.8 
XSD -0.1 1.2 1.1 2.6 0.6 1.2 1.8 3.2 
Note: percentage changes are calculated based on figures valued at baseline world prices. 
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Table A6-6 
Price Changes for Commodity Imports, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage change, price) 
 
CIF Price of Imports from the EU Domestic Price of Imports from the EU Domestic Price of Composite Imports 
BWA MOZ ZAF XSC BWA MOZ ZAF XSC BWA MOZ ZAF XSC 
Ric -0.1 1.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 -1.7 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.4 
Wgr -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 
Vfr -0.2 6.3 0.1 2.7 0.4 -6.4 0.1 -3.0 0.1 -0.2 0.5 -0.1 
Pfb -0.1 -0.5 0.6 0.0 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.5 -0.2 0.6 0.5 
Xcr -0.3 1.2 2.4 0.7 0.3 -1.2 -2.4 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Sgr 1.0 2.0 1.7 1.4 -0.8 -2.4 -1.5 -1.4 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.2 
Bvt 1.3 5.7 1.8 0.9 -1.0 -8.0 -2.5 -1.0 0.2 -3.0 -1.2 0.0 
Xfp 0.5 8.1 2.8 1.8 -0.3 -7.1 -2.7 -2.0 0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 
Mmp -0.2 7.6 12.5 23.6 0.4 -7.8 -14.1 -20.8 0.1 -0.9 -5.6 -2.2 
Ffp -0.2 3.6 0.0 -0.4 0.4 -4.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 
Cog 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 -3.8 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.5 
Twl 4.6 7.4 4.6 6.7 -4.5 -7.7 -4.8 -6.5 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 0.1 
Pch 0.4 1.7 0.8 1.0 -0.3 -2.2 -0.7 -1.1 0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.5 2.9 1.0 0.2 -1.2 -4.0 -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -1.0 0.2 -0.3 
Veq 6.0 2.8 3.1 1.9 -9.6 -3.6 -7.1 -2.2 -3.8 -0.9 -4.9 -0.4 
Emq 0.1 1.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 -4.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -2.7 0.4 -0.1 
Xmn 1.1 5.0 1.3 2.7 -1.1 -6.8 -1.6 -2.8 0.0 -2.1 -0.5 -0.1 
Utc -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.3 
Tcm -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 
Xsr -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.4 
Note: changes in world prices are relative to the CPI for USA and changes in domestic prices are relative to the CPI for each region.   
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Table A6-7 
Price Changes for Commodity Exports, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage change, price) 
 
World Price of Exports to the EU The EU Domestic Price of SADC Exports 
BWA MOZ ZAF XSC BWA MOZ ZAF XSC 
Ric -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
Wgr -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 
Vfr -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 
Pfb -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 
Xcr -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 
Sgr -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 
Bvt -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
Xfp -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 
Mmp -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 
Ffp -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 
Cog 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Twl -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 
Pch -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Mtp -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 
Veq 3.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 3.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 
Emq -0.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 
Xmn -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 
Utc -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 
Tcm -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 
Xsr -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 
Note: changes in world prices are relative to the CPI for USA and changes in domestic prices are relative to the CPI for each region.  
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Table A6-8 
Price Changes for Commodity Exports, Sim11-EU 
(Percentage change, price) 
 
World Price of Exports to the EU The EU Domestic Price of SADC Exports 
BWA MOZ ZAF XSC BWA MOZ ZAF XSC 
Ric 7.7 0.1 -1.8 10.5 7.8 0.2 -37.6 10.6 
Wgr 4.6 0.2 6.0 14.3 4.6 0.2 -4.0 14.3 
Vfr 10.3 0.2 1.3 4.2 10.3 0.3 0.1 2.6 
Pfb 8.0 0.4 0.6 27.4 8.1 0.5 0.7 27.4 
Xcr 20.7 0.2 1.5 18.5 20.3 0.2 -0.7 17.1 
Sgr 28.8 7.6 21.7 57.5 28.9 -27.7 -26.0 -55.2 
Bvt 1.4 0.1 6.4 11.0 1.4 0.2 -4.0 10.2 
Xfp 3.7 0.2 6.6 14.6 -0.7 0.2 -4.4 13.3 
Mmp 40.6 0.6 18.7 58.3 -18.4 0.7 -12.4 -21.4 
Ffp 0.4 0.2 2.7 10.4 0.5 0.2 -0.7 8.4 
Cog 0.4 0.2 0.2 4.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 4.8 
Twl 1.5 0.2 0.7 14.7 1.5 0.3 0.2 14.0 
Pch 2.9 0.4 0.5 11.8 3.0 0.4 0.4 11.7 
Mtp 4.6 0.4 0.8 13.8 4.6 0.4 0.5 13.4 
Veq 4.1 0.4 2.2 6.2 4.0 0.4 -1.1 6.3 
Emq 2.2 -0.1 0.6 10.2 2.2 -0.1 0.6 9.6 
Xmn 1.3 0.5 0.5 10.9 1.3 0.0 0.5 10.4 
Utc 0.6 0.3 0.4 3.9 0.7 0.4 0.5 4.0 
Tcm 0.9 0.1 0.3 2.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 2.9 
Xsr 0.9 0.1 0.3 7.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 7.0 
Note: changes in world prices are relative to the CPI for USA and changes in domestic prices are relative to the CPI for each region. 
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Table A6-9 
Price Changes for Commodity Imports, Sim11-EU 
(Percentage change, price) 
 
CIF Price of Imports from the EU Domestic Price of Imports from the EU Domestic Price of Composite Imports 
BWA MOZ ZAF XSC BWA MOZ ZAF XSC BWA MOZ ZAF XSC 
Ric 0.2 0.0 0.3 3.5 -2.2 -0.6 -0.6 -13.3 -2.8 -0.5 -0.4 -13.7 
Wgr 2.5 0.2 0.4 6.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -11.0 1.2 -0.3 -0.4 -10.5 
Vfr 3.5 0.4 0.5 28.8 1.0 -0.2 -0.3 7.8 1.4 0.4 0.4 7.7 
Pfb 2.9 0.5 0.5 -1.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -17.4 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -17.3 
Xcr 1.8 0.5 0.2 14.4 -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 -4.2 -0.3 1.0 -0.5 -4.2 
Sgr 0.5 -1.1 -2.8 20.7 -1.8 -1.7 -3.6 1.1 -1.8 -3.7 -11.6 0.5 
Bvt 1.4 1.1 0.7 8.2 -1.0 0.4 -0.1 -9.4 0.2 3.1 1.5 -8.3 
Xfp 1.4 1.0 0.7 7.6 -1.0 0.3 -0.2 -9.9 0.2 2.0 1.0 -9.2 
Mmp 1.1 0.9 0.5 5.0 -1.2 0.3 -0.4 -12.1 1.0 1.9 0.5 -10.3 
Ffp 13.3 1.1 1.7 16.0 10.7 0.4 0.8 -2.9 11.4 3.4 4.5 -2.2 
Cog 0.3 0.0 0.2 -0.8 -2.1 -0.7 -0.7 -16.9 -1.9 -0.4 -0.6 -17.3 
Twl 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.6 -2.3 -0.4 -0.3 -14.9 -1.9 0.1 0.4 -14.7 
Pch 0.5 0.4 0.6 2.9 -1.9 -0.3 -0.3 -13.8 -1.5 0.4 0.6 -13.5 
Mtp 0.6 0.3 0.3 2.7 -1.7 -0.3 -0.6 -14.0 -1.2 0.3 -0.4 -13.5 
Veq 0.5 0.2 0.2 3.7 -1.8 -0.4 -0.7 -13.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.7 -12.7 
Emq 0.4 0.2 0.2 4.0 -1.9 -0.5 -0.7 -12.9 -1.5 -0.2 -0.6 -12.5 
Xmn 0.8 0.3 0.6 4.6 -1.5 -0.4 -0.2 -12.4 -1.1 0.0 0.7 -12.1 
Utc 1.0 0.0 0.3 7.3 -1.4 -0.7 -0.6 -10.1 -1.2 -0.6 -0.5 -10.0 
Tcm 0.9 0.1 0.4 11.8 -1.5 -0.5 -0.5 -6.3 -1.4 -0.5 -0.5 -6.3 
Xsr 0.9 0.1 0.3 8.0 -1.5 -0.6 -0.5 -9.6 -1.4 -0.5 -0.5 -9.6 
Note: changes in world prices are relative to the CPI for USA and changes in domestic prices are relative to the CPI for each region. 
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Table A6-10 
Changes in Domestic Production, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 
Wgr 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.0 
Vfr -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Pfb 0.3 0.0 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 1.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.2 0.0 
Xcr -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.0 
Sgr 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Bvt 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.0 
Xfp -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 
Mmp -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6 -1.3 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -3.2 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 0.0 
Cog 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 
Twl -0.6 0.0 -0.8 0.0 -1.9 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.8 0.0 
Pch -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 
Mtp -0.6 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 1.7 2.2 -0.9 0.2 0.7 0.5 -0.2 
Veq -20.7 0.1 -6.3 -0.1 -4.9 -3.0 -0.1 -0.5 -7.5 -1.6 -0.1 
Emq 0.5 0.0 -1.2 -0.1 -1.5 1.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 
Xmn -0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.1 -3.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -1.0 -0.8 0.0 
Utc 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Tcm -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
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Table A6-11 
Changes in Total Imports, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 
Wgr 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -1.2 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Vfr 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 -1.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.3 
Pfb -0.3 0.1 -0.5 0.0 -2.4 -1.3 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.4 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.6 
Sgr 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 -0.3 0.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.7 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Xfp 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Mmp 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.8 24.4 0.1 0.7 1.0 6.3 0.0 
Ffp -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 -1.2 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -1.0 0.1 
Cog 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1 
Twl -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 
Pch 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Mtp -2.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 
Veq 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 5.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0 
Emq 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 -0.5 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Xmn 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 2.9 1.9 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 
Utc 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.0 
Tcm -0.7 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 
Xsr -0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 
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Table A6-12 
Changes in Import to Total Demand Ratios, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veq 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Emq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-13 
Changes in Imports from the EU, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -0.7 0.0 -0.3 0.0 11.0 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 
Wgr -1.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 2.3 -0.2 -1.1 -0.7 0.4 -0.3 
Vfr -0.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 27.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 11.2 -0.2 
Pfb -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 -2.6 3.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.7 -0.2 -0.1 
Xcr -2.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 8.0 17.5 -0.2 -0.7 -0.9 4.3 -0.4 
Sgr 5.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 13.4 9.8 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 8.6 -0.2 
Bvt 3.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 15.7 4.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 2.4 -0.1 
Xfp 2.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 44.7 14.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 8.8 -0.1 
Mmp -1.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 82.0 166.2 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 469.4 -0.2 
Ffp -0.7 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 15.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -0.1 
Cog 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 10.6 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 
Twl 40.8 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 75.3 43.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 67.2 -0.2 
Pch 2.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 11.4 5.5 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 6.4 -0.2 
Mtp 3.4 -0.3 -1.3 -0.5 24.9 7.8 -1.1 -1.7 -2.0 1.4 -0.5 
Veq 45.2 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 19.4 21.5 -0.2 -0.9 -0.9 12.5 -0.1 
Emq 0.5 -0.1 -1.2 -0.2 17.0 1.2 -0.5 -1.5 -1.3 0.0 -0.3 
Xmn 7.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 42.1 9.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 20.4 -0.2 
Utc -0.7 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 
Tcm -0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 
Xsr -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -1.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 
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Table A6-14 
Changes in the EU Shares in SADC Markets, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Sgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp 0 0 0 0 6 27 0 0 0 10 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 1 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 1 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Veq 10 0 0 0 3 10 0 0 0 1 0 
Emq 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Xmn 1 0 0 0 8 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-15 
Changes in South Africa Shares in SADC Markets, Sim11-SADC 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp 0 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0 -10 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 1 0 -2 0 1 1 0 0 
Veq -9 0 1 0 -1 0 1 1 0 0 
Emq 0 0 1 0 -4 0 1 1 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 0 0 -4 0 0 0 0 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-16 
Changes in Domestic Production, Sim11-EU 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -28.3 0.0 0.1 17.5 -0.5 14.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 -23.9 -0.2 
Wgr -8.7 -0.1 0.0 1.8 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.2 1.0 -25.3 0.0 
Vfr -12.6 -0.1 1.0 5.5 0.7 2.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 60.3 0.0 
Pfb -17.6 0.0 1.6 0.7 -1.8 -1.5 0.0 0.6 -1.5 -62.6 0.1 
Xcr -22.9 0.1 1.1 12.6 -0.2 10.6 0.0 0.0 -2.4 -14.6 0.0 
Sgr -19.5 -1.3 -23.0 -30.5 111.8 -1.6 -0.9 -8.3 21.5 1056.9 -5.2 
Bvt -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 1.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -8.2 0.3 
Xfp -0.9 -0.1 1.1 3.4 1.1 2.5 0.0 0.4 1.0 -31.4 0.2 
Mmp 55.4 -0.1 0.4 3.9 1.8 2.0 0.0 0.3 1.4 104.4 -0.1 
Ffp 38.7 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 8.2 0.0 
Cog -4.5 0.1 0.2 0.6 -1.0 -0.8 0.0 0.2 -0.4 -43.1 0.0 
Twl -7.7 0.5 3.2 4.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -58.0 0.1 
Pch -3.4 0.3 1.1 2.7 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 -39.0 0.3 
Mtp -11.4 0.2 1.9 1.0 -2.6 -2.6 0.8 -0.6 -2.8 -49.0 0.4 
Veq -9.7 -0.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.8 -0.1 -14.2 -0.3 
Emq -12.9 -0.1 1.0 4.3 8.2 -0.7 0.3 1.3 0.3 -35.2 0.2 
Xmn -2.3 0.2 0.8 3.6 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.0 -30.4 0.6 
Utc 0.8 0.0 -0.4 -0.9 -0.9 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 11.2 -0.3 
Tcm -0.6 0.0 -0.5 0.7 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 25.1 -0.1 
Xsr -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 -0.2 
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Table A6-17 
Changes in Import to Total Demand Ratios, Sim11-EU 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 
Wgr 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 
Vfr 3 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Pfb 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 
Xcr 4 0 0 -3 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 
Sgr 0 0 1 0 -2 2 0 0 0 -5 1 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 7 0 
Mmp -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 2 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Twl 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 
Mtp 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 
Veq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 
Emq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 
Xmn 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
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Table A6-18 
Changes in ‘Rest of SACU’ Export by Destinations, Sim11-EU 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 6.3 -0.3 -0.8 0.0 0.9 -39.6 -0.1 1.5 1.1 32.2 -41.9 
Wgr -40.8 -59.6 -0.7 -52.2 -57.2 -54.3 -0.2 -2.8 -46.4 38.8 -53.9 
Vfr 2.4 -11.9 -12.1 -14.6 -9.0 -8.4 -11.7 -10.5 -0.1 176.7 -10.2 
Pfb -65.5 -70.4 -70.0 -0.2 -67.9 -68.0 -70.3 -0.5 -0.1 -7.1 -68.5 
Xcr -59.1 -65.8 -0.7 -68.4 -62.4 -63.3 -65.5 -65.3 1.8 148.7 -62.8 
Sgr 81.6 59.1 62.9 51.0 63.8 48.9 69.6 71.4 65.2 443.2 71.4 
Bvt -17.4 -20.9 -20.2 -20.5 -17.9 -18.7 -19.5 -17.9 -18.5 -2.6 -19.1 
Xfp -38.9 0.0 -42.9 -42.7 -42.8 -42.8 -45.9 -44.4 -43.2 -19.1 -42.5 
Mmp -52.6 -57.9 -55.9 -58.7 -54.3 -56.0 -55.1 -51.8 -53.0 -36.4 -57.7 
Ffp 17.7 -25.7 -25.0 -30.0 -22.4 -22.7 -27.5 -24.8 -24.7 27.6 -23.7 
Cog -25.4 -36.8 -29.4 -27.8 -27.2 -40.4 -25.7 -41.1 -28.1 -35.2 -32.5 
Twl -62.4 -63.6 -62.9 -61.8 -61.8 -60.9 -63.2 -62.6 -61.9 -57.5 -62.3 
Pch -45.9 -47.6 -49.2 -47.4 -46.0 -47.7 -48.2 -49.4 -47.5 -37.8 -46.4 
Mtp -56.6 -0.2 -57.0 -56.8 -56.8 -59.4 -59.3 -57.8 -58.4 -49.2 -57.4 
Veq -27.7 -30.9 -30.1 -32.3 -30.0 -30.2 -31.8 -29.0 -29.8 -12.7 -33.9 
Emq -51.9 0.0 -51.2 -54.7 -53.1 -51.9 -53.5 -52.1 -51.9 -35.5 -53.3 
Xmn -44.1 -47.4 -46.5 -48.1 -46.6 -45.1 -47.1 -46.2 -45.8 -28.8 -46.4 
Utc -12.9 -15.7 -17.4 -17.3 -17.0 -16.3 -15.0 -14.8 -16.6 17.6 -14.6 
Tcm -6.9 -10.2 -11.1 -12.3 -9.6 -8.8 -10.2 -10.2 -9.8 37.4 -10.1 
Xsr -19.8 -22.7 -23.3 -24.0 -22.3 -21.6 -22.7 -22.7 -22.3 3.6 -22.6 
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Table A6-18 (cont.) 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 EU USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
Ric -49.3 -46.2 -46.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr -53.6 -49.2 -51.7 -58.5 -0.1 -54.2 
Vfr -9.2 -11.1 -10.4 -11.2 -10.4 -10.5 
Pfb -70.3 -70.2 -68.9 -68.8 0.0 -70.2 
Xcr -64.3 -65.4 -65.4 -65.6 -64.2 -65.4 
Sgr 3738.9 76.8 80.5 78.6 67.8 80.2 
Bvt -20.1 -20.6 -20.7 -20.7 -19.9 -20.4 
Xfp -42.2 -42.1 -43.1 -44.9 -43.4 -43.6 
Mmp 567.2 -58.2 -58.1 -57.6 -57.7 -57.3 
Ffp -25.5 -25.7 -28.8 -29.8 -26.8 -27.2 
Cog -43.8 -43.8 -42.9 -42.2 -41.1 -43.9 
Twl -62.9 -62.7 -63.2 -63.2 -63.1 -62.9 
Pch -50.0 -49.5 -49.3 -48.4 -48.3 -49.8 
Mtp -59.4 -59.9 -59.7 -59.6 -58.0 -59.3 
Veq -31.4 0.0 -32.1 -32.6 -33.1 -31.3 
Emq -53.4 0.0 -54.1 -54.3 -53.9 -54.1 
Xmn -48.1 -49.2 -47.6 -47.8 -47.3 -48.5 
Utc -16.3 -16.6 -15.3 -15.6 -16.1 -16.5 
Tcm -10.2 -10.1 -10.1 -10.2 -10.1 -10.1 
Xsr -22.7 -22.6 -22.6 -22.6 -22.6 -22.6 
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Table A6-19 
Changes in ‘Rest of SACU’ Export Shares by Destinations, Sim11-EU 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MOZ ZAF ZWE XSD EU USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 1 0 2 
Wgr 0 0 -1 -1 2 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sgr 0 -1 -4 -51 0 -2 67 0 0 0 -9 0 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp -1 0 -2 -30 0 -2 47 0 -2 0 0 -8 
Ffp 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veq 0 0 0 1 0 -2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Emq 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-20 
Changes in Shares in the EU Markets by Exporters, Sim11-EU 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MUS ZWE XSC EU SAS SSA ROW 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sgr 0 -5 -1 59 -36 -2 -1 -13 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp 1 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-21 
Simulated Changes in Tariffs, Sim21 
(Percentage points) 
 Sim21-SADC 
Exporter EU 
Importer BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0 0 0 -3 -4 0 -8 -3 -8 0 -2 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -6 -2 0 -1 -4 
Vfr 0 -8 -5 -11 -14 -1 -12 -12 -15 -6 -7 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 -1 
Xcr 0 -4 -5 -12 -3 -6 -1 -6 -4 -2 -13 
Sgr -2 -11 0 -45 -5 -4 -21 0 0 -3 -5 
Bvt -3 -3 -12 -64 -15 -5 -16 -19 -21 -3 -25 
Xfp -1 -2 -15 -9 -17 -7 -18 -19 -22 -4 -10 
Mmp 0 -5 -10 -11 -17 -33 -17 -11 -23 -61 -10 
Ffp 0 -1 -1 -4 -9 -1 -9 -5 -9 0 -10 
Cog 0 0 -7 0 -5 0 -2 -4 -8 0 -9 
Twl -10 -6 -15 -15 -17 -11 -18 -17 -25 -15 -13 
Pch -1 -2 -2 -21 -4 -3 -6 -6 -7 -3 -9 
Mtp -2 -3 -13 -15 -8 -3 -14 -9 -13 -1 -6 
Veq -18 -6 -11 -8 -7 -12 -6 -11 -28 -5 -6 
Emq -1 -4 -7 -11 -7 -1 -6 -4 -9 -1 -4 
Xmn -3 -3 -7 -32 -13 -4 -11 -12 -18 -6 -10 
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Table A6-21 (cont.) 
(Percentage points) 
 Sim21-EU 
Exporter BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Importer EU 
Ric 0 -37 -126 -116 0 -58 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 -28 0 -10 0 0 -1 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 -8 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 -1 0 0 
Sgr 0 -112 -87 -79 -48 -61 -82 -90 -146 -242 -67 
Bvt 0 0 0 -4 0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp -4 0 0 -1 0 -11 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp -70 0 0 -17 0 -35 0 0 -11 -98 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veq 0 0 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0 0 0 
Emq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-22 
Changes in World Prices for Imports from the EU, Sim21-SADC 
(Percentage change, cif price) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.2 1.5 -0.1 3.1 1.1 3.1 -0.1 0.5 
Wgr -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.4 3.3 0.9 -0.3 0.0 1.6 
Vfr -0.2 3.2 2.2 4.3 6.3 0.0 5.0 5.3 6.5 2.6 2.4 
Pfb -0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.4 -0.5 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 
Xcr -0.3 1.5 2.3 4.6 1.1 2.3 0.3 2.7 1.4 0.6 4.9 
Sgr 0.9 4.6 -0.1 18.2 2.0 1.6 8.3 -0.2 -0.2 1.3 1.7 
Bvt 1.3 1.0 4.2 16.4 5.7 1.7 5.0 8.3 8.5 0.9 7.4 
Xfp 0.5 0.9 7.0 2.9 8.1 2.8 8.5 9.1 10.0 1.8 2.7 
Mmp -0.2 1.8 4.0 4.1 7.6 12.5 6.7 4.6 9.5 23.5 3.2 
Ffp -0.2 0.2 0.2 1.2 3.6 -0.1 3.4 2.0 3.5 -0.4 2.9 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.2 1.7 0.9 0.0 1.2 
Twl 4.6 2.4 7.0 6.2 7.4 4.6 7.8 7.2 10.1 6.7 4.9 
Pch 0.4 0.6 0.6 7.2 1.6 0.8 2.4 2.4 3.0 0.9 2.7 
Mtp 0.4 1.0 5.2 5.6 2.9 1.0 5.3 3.5 6.0 0.2 1.5 
Veq 6.0 1.6 4.2 2.8 2.8 3.1 2.2 4.2 9.1 1.8 2.9 
Emq 0.1 0.8 2.2 2.3 1.8 0.2 1.7 1.6 3.2 0.0 1.1 
Xmn 1.0 1.1 2.2 8.6 5.0 1.3 3.6 4.8 6.2 2.7 2.8 
Utc -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 
Tcm -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 
Xsr -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 
Note: changes in world prices are relative to the CPI for USA. 
 
 
  
 
4
0
2
 
Table A6-23 
Changes in Domestic Prices for Imports from the EU, Sim21-SADC 
(Percentage change, price) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 -1.7 1.0 -3.5 -1.3 -3.7 0.5 0.8 
Wgr 0.4 0.3 0.5 2.9 0.3 0.2 -1.9 -1.0 0.8 0.1 -0.3 
Vfr 0.4 -3.9 -1.9 -3.4 -6.4 0.2 -4.9 -5.5 -6.6 -3.0 -2.2 
Pfb 0.5 0.2 0.6 4.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 
Xcr 0.3 -1.7 -2.2 -4.3 -1.2 -2.4 0.0 -2.8 -1.1 -0.7 -5.3 
Sgr -0.8 -5.5 0.5 -15.2 -2.5 -1.4 -9.1 0.3 0.9 -1.4 -1.0 
Bvt -1.0 -1.7 -6.2 -25.0 -7.9 -2.4 -8.6 -8.2 -9.1 -1.0 -11.5 
Xfp -0.3 -1.2 -6.3 -3.3 -7.1 -2.6 -7.3 -7.8 -8.3 -1.9 -4.1 
Mmp 0.5 -2.3 -5.2 -3.9 -7.8 -14.0 -7.6 -5.0 -9.6 -20.8 -4.4 
Ffp 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -4.5 0.2 -4.5 -2.7 -4.3 0.0 -4.2 
Cog 0.7 0.3 -5.3 2.7 -3.8 1.0 -0.9 -2.0 -5.2 0.6 -4.7 
Twl -4.5 -3.1 -6.6 -4.9 -7.8 -4.8 -7.5 -7.3 -10.8 -6.4 -5.1 
Pch -0.2 -0.8 -0.5 -8.7 -2.1 -0.7 -2.9 -2.7 -2.9 -1.0 -4.1 
Mtp -1.2 -1.8 -5.8 -5.5 -4.0 -0.7 -6.4 -4.3 -5.1 -0.4 -2.4 
Veq -9.5 -3.6 -5.2 -2.3 -3.6 -7.0 -2.6 -5.3 -13.0 -2.2 -0.9 
Emq 0.0 -2.9 -3.8 -5.2 -4.4 0.2 -3.1 -2.2 -4.4 0.0 -0.9 
Xmn -1.0 -1.8 -4.0 -14.9 -6.8 -1.5 -5.4 -5.5 -8.5 -2.7 -4.4 
Utc 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.7 
Tcm 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.4 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.7 
Xsr 0.6 0.3 0.5 2.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.7 
Note: changes in domestic prices are relative to the CPI for each region. 
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Table A6-24 
Changes in Domestic Prices for Composite Imports, Sim21-SADC 
(Percentage change, price) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.5 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.4 1.8 
Wgr 0.0 0.3 0.3 2.9 0.2 0.7 0.7 -0.1 0.6 0.1 1.4 
Vfr 0.1 -1.2 0.3 1.9 -0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.9 
Pfb 0.3 0.0 0.3 4.0 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.5 1.3 
Xcr -0.1 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 -1.1 
Sgr 0.1 -1.1 0.4 2.0 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.5 
Bvt 0.1 -1.1 -2.2 -19.1 -3.1 -1.1 -5.8 -0.4 -1.9 -0.1 -7.0 
Xfp 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.0 -2.2 
Mmp 0.1 -0.8 -1.8 0.3 -1.0 -5.6 -2.1 -0.5 -0.2 -2.2 -1.9 
Ffp 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.8 -0.4 0.4 -1.2 -0.5 -1.7 -0.2 -0.7 
Cog 0.6 0.3 0.2 2.7 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.2 
Twl -0.1 -0.9 0.1 0.4 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -1.7 0.1 -0.6 
Pch 0.2 -0.3 0.0 -1.7 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.0 -1.8 
Mtp -0.5 -1.0 -0.4 0.6 -1.0 0.1 -1.4 -0.8 0.1 -0.3 -1.0 
Veq -3.8 -2.1 -1.4 0.2 -1.0 -4.9 -0.6 -1.2 -4.8 -0.3 1.4 
Emq 0.0 -2.2 -1.7 -3.3 -2.7 0.5 -1.4 -0.7 -1.4 -0.1 0.2 
Xmn 0.0 -1.1 -2.1 -8.7 -2.1 -0.4 -2.2 -0.9 -2.8 -0.1 -2.3 
Utc 0.3 0.1 0.5 2.2 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 1.7 
Tcm 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.7 
Xsr 0.5 0.3 0.5 2.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.7 
Note: changes in domestic prices are relative to the CPI for each region. 
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Table A6-25 
Changes in World Price of Exports to the EU, Sim21-EU 
(Percentage change, price) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 7.7 21.7 76.2 54.4 0.5 -1.8 0.1 0.5 4.3 9.4 -0.1 
Wgr 4.6 1.1 2.0 4.0 0.9 6.3 0.2 2.0 22.0 12.9 0.0 
Vfr 10.2 0.8 2.5 28.3 0.5 1.4 0.3 2.0 14.2 3.6 0.3 
Pfb 6.7 0.6 3.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 1.4 16.4 23.9 0.2 
Xcr 21.1 0.6 4.0 25.1 0.7 1.4 0.5 1.8 14.5 16.8 0.1 
Sgr 39.8 49.2 16.4 26.6 6.7 18.5 31.8 20.9 28.9 52.9 19.8 
Bvt 1.4 -0.2 1.9 4.4 0.2 6.3 0.2 0.8 6.0 9.7 0.1 
Xfp 3.7 0.3 6.4 7.1 0.4 6.6 0.1 0.9 4.5 12.9 0.2 
Mmp 40.6 0.5 6.7 15.6 1.2 18.7 0.1 1.8 14.0 56.1 0.1 
Ffp 0.4 0.3 2.2 10.6 0.3 2.8 0.2 0.7 7.6 8.9 0.0 
Cog 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.3 3.6 0.1 
Twl 1.5 0.6 8.7 4.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 5.6 12.9 0.1 
Pch 2.9 0.4 6.4 4.0 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.6 7.7 10.3 0.1 
Mtp 4.7 0.8 6.6 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.9 6.1 12.1 0.1 
Veq 4.3 0.5 3.6 2.7 0.5 2.2 0.8 1.5 9.8 5.5 0.2 
Emq 2.2 0.5 4.5 4.1 0.0 0.6 0.7 1.3 10.1 9.0 0.1 
Xmn 1.3 0.3 6.0 4.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 1.5 5.3 9.7 0.0 
Utc 0.6 0.2 3.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 1.1 1.9 3.5 0.1 
Tcm 0.9 0.3 1.7 3.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6 2.6 2.5 0.1 
Xsr 0.9 0.3 7.4 2.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 2.5 6.1 0.1 
Note: changes in world prices are relative to the CPI for USA. 
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Table A6-26 
Changes in Domestic Production, Sim21-SADC 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.5 1.5 
Wgr 0.2 0.5 -0.5 0.6 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 0.1 -0.3 
Vfr -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 -0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Pfb 0.1 0.5 -0.9 -4.4 -0.1 0.9 2.2 0.5 0.4 1.6 -1.2 
Xcr -0.4 0.1 2.1 -0.9 -0.2 1.4 0.2 -0.1 1.3 -0.4 -0.3 
Sgr -0.1 0.0 2.4 2.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.1 1.9 
Bvt 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -5.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -1.5 -1.9 
Xfp -0.2 0.1 -0.7 0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 0.2 -1.5 
Mmp -0.1 -0.3 -1.0 -2.9 -1.6 -1.3 -0.6 -0.2 -1.8 -3.1 -3.8 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 
Cog 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.4 0.7 0.6 
Twl -0.6 2.4 0.2 9.1 -2.0 -0.4 0.5 -0.3 -1.7 1.3 -1.4 
Pch -0.6 0.5 0.2 -3.5 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.5 -0.7 -2.6 
Mtp -0.9 -0.4 -0.7 3.5 1.8 2.3 3.8 1.4 3.9 0.6 -1.3 
Veq -20.9 3.2 -6.1 -2.6 -5.7 -3.0 -0.4 -2.8 -11.3 -1.8 2.2 
Emq 0.2 2.2 -2.3 -5.9 -2.3 1.2 -2.4 -2.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 
Xmn -0.4 0.2 -2.7 -0.4 -3.4 0.2 -2.3 -0.7 -2.6 -1.1 -2.4 
Utc 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.7 
Tcm -0.2 0.4 0.3 2.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.3 
Xsr 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 
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Table A6-27 
Changes in Total Imports, Sim21-SADC 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.2 -0.4 -0.6 -1.6 -0.8 -1.4 -0.5 -2.0 
Wgr 0.3 0.0 -0.3 1.3 -0.3 -1.4 -1.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.2 -1.9 
Vfr 0.2 2.4 -0.4 0.3 0.5 -1.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 
Pfb -0.1 0.4 0.9 7.9 -2.5 -1.1 -1.8 -0.9 -1.3 0.4 -3.4 
Xcr 0.3 2.3 -0.5 3.5 1.2 -0.5 -1.0 0.6 -1.0 -0.1 4.7 
Sgr 0.2 3.2 -0.1 1.2 0.1 -0.8 -0.7 0.0 0.2 -0.2 -2.1 
Bvt 0.1 1.3 2.3 21.1 2.7 1.2 6.8 0.3 2.2 0.1 7.3 
Xfp 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.2 1.9 1.0 0.0 -0.2 4.5 
Mmp 0.7 3.0 6.8 0.8 2.9 24.1 8.9 2.1 2.5 6.2 5.6 
Ffp -0.1 0.3 -0.3 -1.4 0.6 -1.2 2.4 1.1 5.1 -1.2 1.6 
Cog 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.8 2.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.2 -0.4 2.4 
Twl -0.3 2.1 0.1 8.0 1.5 1.1 0.1 1.4 3.4 0.1 2.8 
Pch 0.1 0.8 0.2 4.6 0.9 0.8 0.5 1.2 0.8 -0.1 4.2 
Mtp -2.1 2.1 0.7 1.2 1.3 0.3 1.7 1.1 2.0 0.2 1.1 
Veq 1.3 0.5 0.9 1.6 0.5 5.4 0.5 1.1 1.9 0.3 -0.2 
Emq 0.4 0.5 0.8 2.7 1.1 -0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.3 
Xmn 0.3 3.3 3.5 10.3 3.0 1.7 4.1 2.5 6.7 0.3 6.5 
Utc 0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -1.8 0.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.4 0.1 -0.6 -2.0 
Tcm -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.4 -1.2 -0.8 -1.8 
Xsr -0.5 0.1 -0.5 -1.3 -0.1 -1.2 -1.0 -0.5 -1.2 -0.7 -1.6 
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Table A6-28 
Changes in Import to Total Demand Ratios, Sim21-SADC 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
Bvt 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mmp 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Pch 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Veq 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Emq 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-29 
Changes in the EU Shares in SADC Markets, Sim21-SADC 
(Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vfr 0 4 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 2 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 3 0 9 0 3 0 1 0 0 10 
Sgr 0 4 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Bvt 0 1 4 16 5 2 6 1 6 0 9 
Xfp 0 2 2 6 2 3 7 2 2 0 6 
Mmp 0 4 9 8 6 27 14 4 5 10 11 
Ffp 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 2 5 0 4 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Twl 1 4 2 10 6 6 5 4 12 1 10 
Pch 0 1 1 13 2 2 4 2 2 0 8 
Mtp 0 3 2 7 3 2 7 3 2 0 6 
Veq 10 5 6 7 3 10 4 5 17 1 3 
Emq 0 4 6 11 7 1 6 3 8 0 5 
Xmn 1 3 6 26 8 4 9 5 13 1 9 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-30 
Changes in Domestic Production, Sim21-EU 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -28.4 0.5 12.4 -57.0 -1.2 13.8 -0.5 -1.3 -3.7 -22.0 -0.4 
Wgr -8.5 0.4 -0.2 -9.4 0.0 2.7 -0.1 0.5 -16.9 -22.7 -0.1 
Vfr -12.5 -0.2 -1.5 -25.7 0.4 2.0 -0.3 1.0 -22.1 54.5 -0.1 
Pfb -6.0 -0.3 -6.8 -2.1 -1.1 5.2 -1.1 0.1 -45.7 -56.7 0.0 
Xcr -22.1 -1.3 -17.2 -51.7 0.6 12.6 -0.1 1.3 -44.6 -13.3 -0.1 
Sgr -5.8 10.5 210.1 144.9 74.1 -1.7 6.1 92.6 694.6 918.1 19.4 
Bvt -0.6 1.0 0.1 1.5 0.9 1.5 0.0 0.1 -1.6 -7.4 0.3 
Xfp -0.8 -0.7 -3.6 -16.1 1.0 2.5 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -28.2 0.1 
Mmp 55.2 0.9 -0.9 -19.3 1.6 2.0 -0.1 0.2 -12.3 122.2 -0.2 
Ffp 38.7 0.5 -0.5 -15.5 0.6 1.6 0.0 0.2 4.7 13.0 -0.1 
Cog -4.4 -0.4 -3.6 -4.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -1.9 -8.0 -34.8 -0.1 
Twl -7.6 -4.0 -20.0 -24.9 0.2 0.4 -0.9 -1.3 -18.2 -53.8 0.0 
Pch -2.8 -0.6 -5.7 -13.0 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.4 -7.0 -35.4 0.4 
Mtp -12.5 -1.4 -8.6 -6.3 -3.5 -2.6 -0.9 -5.4 -32.5 -44.8 0.2 
Veq -10.2 -3.2 -5.9 -7.1 1.7 0.7 -1.0 -0.6 -17.7 -12.7 -0.4 
Emq -12.9 -3.5 -7.2 -23.1 7.5 -0.8 -0.5 -1.9 -23.7 -31.7 -0.1 
Xmn -2.1 -0.6 -4.9 -20.1 1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -13.8 -27.6 0.5 
Utc 0.7 0.3 1.9 6.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 -1.5 8.5 9.5 -0.2 
Tcm -0.7 -0.5 3.4 -5.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.8 0.5 21.8 -0.1 
Xsr -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 1.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 3.7 0.2 -0.2 
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Table A6-31 
Changes in Total Exports, Sim21-EU 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -30.8 59.0 376.3 -58.8 1.5 15.0 -2.2 -3.7 -16.8 -36.5 -1.0 
Wgr -21.4 -0.1 -2.3 -9.7 1.7 9.3 -0.6 4.3 -25.6 -48.0 -0.5 
Vfr -17.0 -1.0 -4.5 -43.6 0.8 3.6 -0.9 3.3 -26.6 -7.4 -0.3 
Pfb -14.8 -2.0 -6.6 -2.1 -1.4 3.8 -1.3 0.1 -48.3 -62.8 -0.1 
Xcr -14.2 -3.6 -19.8 -67.0 2.6 17.1 -0.8 5.6 -52.0 -58.8 -0.7 
Sgr 63.3 211.9 221.0 161.3 85.6 4.9 105.0 145.5 846.2 1085.1 57.2 
Bvt -2.8 0.1 -4.3 -3.0 0.3 5.9 -0.3 0.5 -10.1 -16.7 1.1 
Xfp -2.1 -1.4 -3.3 -22.0 1.5 10.9 -0.6 1.0 -13.4 -38.8 1.4 
Mmp 263.0 -0.5 -0.9 -25.5 2.2 33.3 -2.0 0.4 -32.7 308.4 1.3 
Ffp -0.1 -0.9 -6.2 -28.7 -0.5 6.6 -0.7 -1.6 -16.6 -20.4 -0.4 
Cog -4.5 -0.5 -3.8 -4.7 -0.7 -1.2 -0.6 -1.6 -11.4 -34.9 -0.1 
Twl -7.7 -4.4 -24.1 -24.9 -0.8 -0.4 -1.2 -3.9 -30.6 -57.8 -0.6 
Pch -2.7 -1.0 -9.1 -19.7 4.8 1.7 0.5 -0.1 -13.0 -43.7 -0.1 
Mtp -14.7 -2.0 -16.0 -8.7 -3.5 -3.7 -1.4 -5.5 -33.3 -55.0 -0.5 
Veq -10.3 -3.2 -6.3 -15.6 2.3 2.7 -0.4 0.7 -21.7 -28.4 -0.5 
Emq -13.3 -3.5 -9.3 -27.4 9.8 0.0 0.6 -2.3 -25.0 -48.1 -0.7 
Xmn -4.9 -1.9 -11.9 -25.2 2.0 0.3 -1.5 1.2 -22.9 -41.8 -0.2 
Utc -2.8 -0.8 -5.1 -1.5 2.7 -0.1 -0.9 5.1 -8.2 -14.5 -0.4 
Tcm -3.4 -1.3 -6.1 -10.7 -0.8 -1.2 -0.6 -1.7 -8.1 -8.3 -0.3 
Xsr -3.4 -1.1 -2.3 -7.5 -0.9 -1.2 -0.9 -1.4 -9.2 -20.2 -0.4 
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Table A6-32 
Changes in Exports to the EU, Sim21-EU 
(Percentage change, volume) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric -40.3 122.1 746.5 -0.7 -5.3 -0.7 -2.9 -5.6 -26.1 -46.1 -1.7 
Wgr -23.3 -0.1 -11.2 -0.1 -5.9 23.6 -1.7 -11.3 -0.1 -50.3 -0.9 
Vfr -30.3 -1.4 -8.2 -40.4 -1.9 -0.4 -1.1 -5.1 -28.0 -7.7 -0.2 
Pfb -27.5 -2.2 -14.6 -0.8 -2.6 0.2 -1.7 -5.7 -50.4 -65.6 -0.8 
Xcr -0.7 -3.8 -20.2 -67.6 -3.8 6.0 -0.6 -9.7 -51.2 -60.9 -0.7 
Sgr 81.3 225.9 419.0 167.5 126.3 118.7 138.8 366.8 1272.1 3257.7 144.0 
Bvt -3.5 0.0 -4.6 -1.4 0.1 9.6 -0.4 -2.1 -11.3 -18.0 -0.6 
Xfp 2.6 -1.6 -0.1 -21.8 -2.1 21.8 -0.8 -4.3 -14.7 -38.6 -1.2 
Mmp 392.4 1.0 1.0 9.4 1.0 182.0 -2.6 1.0 -17.4 641.8 -2.8 
Ffp -1.9 -1.4 -6.5 -29.5 -1.3 2.3 -1.0 -2.7 -22.8 -22.4 -0.5 
Cog -4.5 -0.4 -3.8 -4.7 -0.8 -1.1 -0.6 -2.7 -12.2 -35.3 0.0 
Twl -10.3 -4.6 -0.1 -25.1 -2.4 -1.3 -2.5 -4.8 -32.9 -58.4 -0.8 
Pch 0.0 -2.3 0.0 -20.7 0.0 -2.4 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -45.8 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 -9.1 -3.5 -3.5 -2.7 -5.9 -33.9 -54.8 -0.6 
Veq 0.0 -3.4 0.0 -15.7 0.0 7.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -28.5 0.0 
Emq -16.4 -4.3 0.0 -28.2 0.0 -4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -48.9 -1.0 
Xmn -8.1 -2.2 -0.1 -25.6 -0.6 -3.1 -1.8 -0.1 -26.2 -44.3 -0.4 
Utc -2.9 -0.9 -0.1 -1.6 -3.3 -2.3 -1.0 -5.2 -8.3 -14.7 -0.7 
Tcm -3.7 -1.4 -6.5 -11.0 -0.9 -1.3 -0.8 -2.4 -9.4 -9.0 -0.5 
Xsr -3.5 -1.2 -0.1 -7.5 -1.0 -1.3 -1.0 -1.5 -9.2 -20.3 -0.4 
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Table A6-33 
Changes in Shares in the EU Markets by Exporters, Sim21-EU 
 (Percentage points) 
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 
Sgr 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 1 10 42 0 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A6-33 (cont.) 
(Percentage points) 
 EU USA EAS SAS SSA ROW 
Ric 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wgr 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pfb 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xcr 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sgr -42 0 0 -2 -1 -15 
Bvt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xfp 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mmp -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Ffp 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cog 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Twl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pch 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mtp 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veq 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emq 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xmn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utc 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tcm 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xsr 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A7-1  
Trade Impact (Percentage change, valued at baseline world prices) 
 Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha 
 Total Imports Total Exports 
BWA -2.3 -2.7 -1.9 -0.8 -0.9 -0.4 
MDG -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 
MWI -6.7 -0.5 -0.6 -8.9 -1.1 -1.0 
MUS -12.1 -4.7 -2.8 -8.6 -4.9 -2.9 
MOZ -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7 
ZAF -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 
TZA -1.1 -0.6 -0.6 -2.1 -1.5 -1.5 
ZMB -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 
ZWE -10.7 -1.2 -0.7 -4.4 -0.6 -0.4 
XSC -20.9 -4.2 -3.0 -13.5 -2.5 -1.6 
XSD -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 
 Imports from the EU Exports to the EU 
BWA -12.9 -12.1 -7.5 -5.2 -5.3 -2.9 
MDG -7.5 -6.2 -6.1 -3.0 -1.0 -0.9 
MWI -19.6 -11.7 -11.6 -30.6 -1.8 -1.5 
MUS -28.2 -21.7 -13.2 -22.2 -7.5 -4.7 
MOZ -12.6 -11.0 -11.0 1.4 -0.8 -0.9 
ZAF -4.8 -3.2 -2.2 0.0 -1.6 -0.9 
TZA -14.7 -13.5 -13.5 -4.7 -1.1 -1.1 
ZMB -13.8 -12.0 -12.0 -15.2 -0.9 -0.8 
ZWE -33.8 -26.3 -16.4 -45.9 -3.4 -2.2 
XSC -25.4 -7.5 -5.5 -64.7 -12.3 -8.0 
XSD -9.6 -8.6 -8.6 -2.0 -1.1 -1.1 
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Table A7-2 
Trade with Third Parties, (Percentage change) 
 Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha 
 Imports from USA Exports to USA 
BWA -2.9 -2.3 -1.5 6.0 5.8 3.6 
MDG -0.3 0.9 0.9 1.2 -1.6 -1.4 
MWI -6.7 1.2 1.3 14.8 -0.7 -0.9 
MUS -7.3 3.7 2.4 14.3 -3.6 -1.8 
MOZ -1.1 0.6 0.7 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 
ZAF -0.3 1.2 0.9 1.8 -0.2 -0.2 
TZA 2.2 3.2 3.2 0.2 -1.0 -0.9 
ZMB -0.8 0.7 0.7 3.6 -0.8 -0.8 
ZWE -12.6 0.5 0.4 26.7 1.0 0.5 
XSC -22.9 -4.1 -2.7 105.1 9.3 5.9 
XSD 3.9 4.7 4.7 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 
 Imports from EAS Exports to EAS 
BWA -1.7 -0.4 -0.1 5.0 4.7 2.8 
MDG 2.9 4.2 4.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
MWI -5.4 2.6 2.6 6.9 -0.4 -0.5 
MUS 0.6 6.0 3.5 10.2 -0.1 0.2 
MOZ 0.2 2.4 2.5 1.4 -0.1 -0.2 
ZAF 0.6 2.3 1.7 1.9 -0.1 -0.2 
TZA 3.1 4.3 4.3 0.0 -1.1 -1.1 
ZMB -0.6 1.7 1.8 4.0 -1.0 -1.1 
ZWE -7.8 3.5 2.2 62.7 1.4 0.7 
XSC -16.6 -2.2 -1.5 60.1 5.9 3.8 
XSD 2.5 3.1 3.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 
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Table A7-2 (cont.) 
(Percentage change) 
 Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha 
 Imports from SAS Exports to SAS 
BWA -3.0 -2.2 -1.4 4.8 4.4 2.7 
MDG 1.7 3.2 3.3 1.0 -0.3 -0.3 
MWI -6.2 2.0 2.1 7.3 -0.3 -0.6 
MUS 1.5 6.0 3.1 14.3 0.3 0.5 
MOZ -1.3 1.3 1.4 1.8 -0.1 -0.1 
ZAF -1.3 0.8 0.6 2.1 -0.1 -0.2 
TZA 1.9 3.4 3.5 -0.2 -1.5 -1.5 
ZMB -1.0 1.6 1.7 3.8 -0.9 -1.0 
ZWE -10.8 2.7 1.7 80.0 2.8 1.5 
XSC -19.7 -3.3 -2.1 57.0 5.7 3.7 
XSD 4.4 5.2 5.2 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9 
 Imports from SSA Exports to SSA 
BWA -4.4 -3.8 -2.5 7.3 6.9 4.2 
MDG 0.7 2.2 2.1 0.7 -0.4 -0.4 
MWI -9.8 1.3 1.4 -19.2 -2.3 -2.0 
MUS -4.4 2.3 0.4 27.8 0.6 0.6 
MOZ -1.0 1.3 1.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 
ZAF -1.5 0.1 0.1 2.2 -0.1 -0.2 
TZA 2.1 4.0 4.0 -0.2 -1.3 -1.3 
ZMB -1.7 0.9 1.1 -2.9 -0.6 -0.6 
ZWE -14.9 0.1 0.1 38.4 1.2 0.7 
XSC -16.4 -2.9 -1.9 30.4 7.7 5.3 
XSD 5.8 7.1 7.2 -0.4 -2.6 -2.6 
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Table A7-2 (cont.) 
(Percentage change) 
 Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha Alter Alter_Sug Alter_Sug & Doha 
 Imports from ROW Exports to ROW 
BWA -3.1 -2.1 -1.4 12.4 11.7 7.0 
MDG 0.3 1.7 1.7 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 
MWI -7.2 1.7 1.8 16.8 -0.9 -1.0 
MUS -1.9 6.2 3.3 17.1 0.3 0.4 
MOZ -0.8 0.9 1.0 2.0 -0.7 -0.7 
ZAF -1.5 0.2 0.2 1.8 -0.1 -0.1 
TZA 2.1 3.6 3.6 -0.8 -2.4 -2.3 
ZMB -0.9 0.6 0.7 4.0 -1.0 -1.0 
ZWE -9.4 1.7 1.3 51.6 1.0 0.5 
XSC -22.0 -3.5 -2.3 56.8 5.6 3.6 
XSD 5.0 5.6 5.6 -1.0 -1.3 -1.3 
Note: calculated based on figures valued at baseline world prices.  
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Table A7-3 
Changes in Domestic Production, Alter 
(Percentage change)  
  BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 40.8 0.4 5.5 140.3 1.4 -12.3 0.3 1.3 3.4 27.6 -1.0 
Wgr 9.0 -1.0 0.6 10.7 0.2 -3.1 0.2 -0.3 25.5 27.2 0.3 
Vfr 14.6 0.3 1.6 36.1 -0.3 -1.6 0.3 -0.8 23.2 -37.0 0.2 
Pfb 3.8 -0.4 5.7 12.4 0.8 -6.2 -0.8 -1.9 95.0 129.5 1.1 
Xcr 30.8 1.0 20.2 115.6 -0.5 -13.8 0.1 -0.5 83.6 16.5 0.4 
Sgr -9.0 -9.5 -66.6 -58.3 -41.9 0.2 -5.9 -48.7 -85.7 -90.2 -18.3 
Bvt 0.2 -0.9 0.1 3.3 -0.3 -1.2 0.2 0.1 1.0 10.2 1.4 
Xfp 0.8 0.4 4.4 17.4 -0.8 -2.5 0.1 -0.1 0.7 34.4 1.3 
Mmp -35.7 -0.5 1.9 29.2 -1.2 -2.0 0.5 -0.1 17.7 -55.3 4.2 
Ffp -28.3 -0.5 0.7 19.0 -0.6 -1.4 0.1 -0.2 -5.1 -13.2 0.6 
Cog 4.2 0.2 3.1 3.9 -0.3 0.3 -0.4 1.1 7.4 50.2 -0.5 
Twl 6.3 1.5 26.8 7.7 1.1 0.5 0.4 1.4 27.2 114.8 1.3 
Pch 3.6 -0.1 6.0 20.7 -0.9 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 7.1 54.5 2.0 
Mtp 17.3 1.7 10.4 3.6 2.7 1.6 -3.0 4.3 44.8 81.1 1.2 
Veq 30.5 0.1 11.5 12.9 2.4 2.7 1.7 2.7 35.7 16.7 -1.6 
Emq 14.3 1.2 9.9 47.3 -6.7 0.1 2.7 3.1 35.4 48.4 0.4 
Xmn 2.5 0.3 7.9 29.8 -3.2 -0.7 3.0 0.8 22.0 38.8 1.8 
Utc -1.4 -0.4 -2.1 -7.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 1.1 -8.6 -8.8 -0.4 
Tcm 0.8 0.0 -3.6 5.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.6 -1.1 -17.8 -0.1 
Xsr 0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -4.4 -0.3 -0.1 
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Table A7-4 
Changes in Domestic Production, Alter_Sug 
(Percentage change)  
  BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 38.1 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.2 -4.9 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 4.1 -1.4 
Wgr 9.7 -0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 -1.5 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.6 0.3 
Vfr 15.7 0.0 0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.2 -7.4 -4.3 0.0 
Pfb 19.4 -0.4 -0.5 9.7 0.3 -0.2 -1.8 -1.1 1.4 14.3 1.2 
Xcr 32.8 0.0 -1.1 0.3 0.1 -1.6 -0.1 0.1 -8.6 4.4 0.3 
Sgr 31.3 -0.3 -3.4 0.2 -1.5 -1.0 -0.1 -1.8 3.3 10.9 -2.8 
Bvt -0.1 0.1 0.2 4.5 0.6 -0.9 0.3 0.1 -0.4 2.0 1.7 
Xfp 2.1 0.0 0.4 -3.3 0.0 -1.5 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -1.3 1.4 
Mmp -35.4 0.3 0.8 1.6 -0.3 -1.4 0.5 0.0 -3.4 -69.6 4.0 
Ffp -28.0 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.9 0.1 0.1 -1.3 -30.6 0.6 
Cog 4.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 4.1 -0.6 
Twl 8.5 -2.2 0.6 -19.0 1.9 0.9 -0.3 0.2 1.4 10.7 1.4 
Pch 5.2 -0.6 -0.2 4.5 0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.3 5.2 2.4 
Mtp 15.4 0.4 0.1 -3.5 -0.9 -0.1 -4.4 -0.5 0.7 6.8 1.2 
Veq 29.6 -2.7 4.0 4.6 4.3 2.5 0.7 1.9 10.3 1.8 -2.0 
Emq 15.5 -2.0 1.7 12.2 -0.4 -0.1 2.1 1.2 3.0 5.1 0.4 
Xmn 3.2 -0.2 2.5 1.9 3.2 -0.3 2.3 0.4 1.7 5.4 2.3 
Utc -1.7 -0.2 -0.4 -1.5 -0.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -1.7 -0.6 
Tcm 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 
Xsr 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.3 
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Table A7-5 
Changes in Domestic Production, Alter_Sug & Doha 
(Percentage change) 
  BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 22.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.1 -3.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 3.1 -1.4 
Wgr 6.0 -0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.8 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.3 
Vfr 9.8 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -3.4 -2.4 0.0 
Pfb 12.0 -0.4 -0.1 5.9 0.1 -0.1 -1.8 -0.8 0.9 8.9 1.2 
Xcr 19.6 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.1 -1.0 -0.1 0.1 -3.7 3.2 0.3 
Sgr 18.1 -0.2 -2.7 0.3 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 -1.4 1.5 7.2 -2.6 
Bvt -0.1 0.0 0.1 3.2 0.6 -0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.1 1.9 1.7 
Xfp 1.4 -0.1 0.5 -1.1 0.1 -0.9 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 1.4 
Mmp -21.2 0.3 0.8 1.6 0.4 -0.8 0.5 0.1 -1.8 -48.3 3.9 
Ffp -16.2 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.1 -0.6 -20.1 0.6 
Cog 2.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 2.3 -0.6 
Twl 4.7 -2.1 0.0 -12.3 1.6 0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.5 6.8 1.4 
Pch 3.4 -0.6 -0.2 2.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 3.6 2.5 
Mtp 9.6 0.3 0.1 -2.3 -1.0 -0.1 -4.3 -0.5 -0.1 4.6 1.2 
Veq 19.0 -2.7 1.8 3.2 2.5 1.6 0.7 1.8 6.1 1.3 -2.0 
Emq 9.4 -2.6 1.6 7.4 -0.1 0.0 2.1 1.1 2.5 3.6 0.4 
Xmn 2.2 -0.3 2.6 -0.6 2.6 -0.2 2.4 0.4 1.1 3.8 2.4 
Utc -1.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -0.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -1.2 -0.6 
Tcm 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 
Xsr 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 
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Table A7-6 
Changes in Export Volume to the EU, Alter 
(Percentage change)  
  BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 58.1 3.7 16.8 0.7 5.6 0.7 1.4 5.0 27.0 72.2 -2.2 
Wgr -3.1 0.1 11.2 0.1 6.3 -19.9 1.1 10.7 0.1 43.9 -1.0 
Vfr 27.7 1.6 8.2 71.7 2.1 1.8 0.5 4.6 24.0 -6.1 -1.1 
Pfb 14.7 1.4 15.2 0.7 2.5 -1.8 -0.6 4.3 80.8 140.2 0.7 
Xcr 0.6 3.2 23.9 156.1 4.0 -1.1 0.5 8.4 79.9 103.8 -2.2 
Sgr -45.1 -69.3 -80.6 -61.4 -55.5 -53.6 -58.6 -79.0 -91.8 -97.0 -60.6 
Bvt -5.5 -0.2 4.5 -1.2 -0.1 -9.3 0.1 1.7 1.3 10.9 1.1 
Xfp -2.7 1.0 0.1 18.4 2.2 -18.7 0.1 3.5 7.6 45.8 0.1 
Mmp -79.5 -1.0 -1.0 -51.3 -1.0 -65.6 1.1 -1.0 -49.4 -86.7 0.8 
Ffp -15.4 1.1 6.5 17.7 1.4 2.4 0.3 2.1 7.5 0.5 -1.3 
Cog 4.2 0.2 3.2 3.6 0.4 0.6 -0.2 1.5 10.0 50.7 -0.7 
Twl -7.6 1.5 0.0 0.1 2.7 2.3 0.5 3.6 29.2 101.0 -2.0 
Pch 0.0 0.5 0.0 24.4 0.0 1.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 72.3 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.8 2.6 -3.2 4.1 43.5 113.7 -2.1 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.7 0.0 
Emq 14.7 0.7 0.0 48.3 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.5 -2.9 
Xmn 7.1 0.5 0.0 26.6 3.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 35.6 73.8 -1.4 
Utc 2.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 2.4 1.6 -0.3 4.3 8.2 16.5 -1.9 
Tcm 4.1 0.6 6.2 12.2 0.7 0.6 -0.3 1.7 9.4 9.5 -1.5 
Xsr 3.8 0.9 0.0 9.6 0.9 0.6 0.1 1.0 9.6 24.8 -1.4 
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Table A7-7 
Changes in Export Volume to the EU, Alter_Sug 
(Percentage change)  
  BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 52.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -0.4 -5.5 5.8 -3.8 
Wgr -4.5 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 -25.5 -0.6 0.3 0.0 -20.5 -1.8 
Vfr 21.3 -0.1 0.2 -10.5 0.1 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -14.6 -9.8 -1.7 
Pfb 21.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -2.2 -0.7 -13.9 -1.2 -0.1 
Xcr -0.1 -0.1 -1.1 -19.7 0.0 0.1 -1.1 -0.2 -21.5 -5.8 -3.0 
Sgr 1.2 -1.4 -3.7 0.2 -2.0 -1.8 -2.3 -2.6 3.7 11.4 -5.3 
Bvt -6.3 -0.1 -0.2 -6.3 -0.1 -10.1 -0.3 -0.1 -10.0 -7.3 0.3 
Xfp -3.7 -0.3 -0.1 -10.3 0.2 -20.7 -0.7 -0.2 -8.9 -4.2 -0.9 
Mmp -79.7 -1.2 -1.2 -69.7 -1.2 -67.8 -0.7 -1.2 -72.9 -93.0 -1.4 
Ffp -16.1 0.0 0.0 -18.0 0.2 1.4 -0.6 -0.3 -17.6 -23.9 -1.8 
Cog 4.1 -0.2 -0.3 -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 -1.3 3.7 -0.8 
Twl -7.9 -2.8 0.0 -25.0 0.4 0.2 -2.2 -0.7 -14.4 -6.0 -2.8 
Pch 0.0 -1.6 0.0 -1.6 0.0 -0.2 -1.6 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.8 -1.0 -0.2 -5.9 -1.1 -1.3 6.6 -2.8 
Veq 0.0 -3.0 0.0 -1.2 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.8 0.0 
Emq 14.0 -3.1 0.0 6.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 -3.7 
Xmn 5.8 -1.4 0.0 -6.9 0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.7 7.1 -1.8 
Utc 2.0 -0.9 0.0 -2.0 -0.8 0.0 -1.2 -0.2 0.4 1.6 -2.6 
Tcm 3.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 2.6 -2.0 
Xsr 3.5 -0.2 0.0 1.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -0.3 0.1 2.3 -1.8 
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Table A7-8 
Changes in Export Volume to the EU, Alter_Sug & Doha 
(Percentage change)  
  BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 31.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.4 -0.5 -2.6 5.5 -3.8 
Wgr 1.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 -12.9 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -8.6 -1.8 
Vfr 15.1 -0.1 0.2 -4.8 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 -7.0 -3.9 -1.7 
Pfb 16.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -2.3 -0.7 -6.5 2.5 -0.1 
Xcr -0.1 -0.2 -1.3 -9.7 -0.1 0.0 -1.2 -0.3 -10.4 0.6 -3.0 
Sgr 0.7 -1.1 -3.0 0.2 -1.5 -1.3 -2.0 -2.1 1.7 7.5 -4.9 
Bvt -2.6 -0.1 -0.3 -2.4 -0.1 -5.0 -0.3 -0.2 -4.9 -3.0 0.2 
Xfp -0.7 -0.4 0.0 -4.7 0.1 -10.4 -0.8 -0.2 -4.2 -0.3 -1.1 
Mmp -47.3 -0.7 -0.7 -41.8 -0.7 -41.0 -1.1 -0.7 -45.6 -64.4 -1.6 
Ffp -4.6 -0.1 0.0 -7.3 0.1 1.0 -0.6 -0.3 -7.0 -9.2 -1.8 
Cog 2.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 -1.3 1.9 -0.7 
Twl -5.2 -2.7 0.0 -16.2 0.4 0.0 -2.2 -0.7 -9.6 -3.7 -2.8 
Pch 0.0 -1.5 0.0 -2.3 0.0 -0.3 -1.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -1.0 -0.3 -5.9 -1.1 -1.9 3.7 -2.8 
Veq 0.0 -3.0 0.0 -1.3 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.8 0.0 
Emq 7.5 -3.5 0.0 2.7 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 -3.8 
Xmn 3.4 -1.3 0.0 -4.8 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -1.2 4.2 -1.7 
Utc 1.3 -0.9 0.0 -1.1 -0.9 0.0 -1.2 -0.4 0.2 1.0 -2.6 
Tcm 2.4 -0.6 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3 1.7 -2.0 
Xsr 2.2 -0.2 0.0 1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 1.5 -1.8 
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Table A7-9 
Changes in Regions Shares in the EU Markets, Alter 
(Percentage points)  
 BWA MDG MWI MUS MOZ ZAF TZA ZMB ZWE XSC XSD 
Ric 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vfr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pfb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Xcr 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Sgr 0.0 -0.4 -1.7 -6.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -10.1 -41.3 -0.1 
Bvt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xfp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mmp -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 
Ffp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cog 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Twl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mtp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Veq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xmn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tcm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Xsr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
 
